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SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis investigates the design, implementation and impacts of the market-smart input 
subsidy (NAIVS) in Tanzania’s Ruvuma Region. 
The research uses a mixed-methods approach, where quantitative data analysis is 
complemented by qualitative research. Using four waves of household panel data, I found that 
voucher receipt had no statistically significant impact on maize yields, income poverty or the 
household assets owned by recipient households. The qualitative research finds that this was due 
to flaws in NAIVS’s design and in its implementation. Weak institutional capacity was found in 
voucher management, especially at the lower level of government: a substantial number of 
vouchers went missing; inputs and vouchers were delivered late most years; and vouchers were 
resold by farmers. 
Due to an increase in real input prices, the ‘top-up’ payment required for voucher use 
was increased, which made it difficult for poor farmers to access the subsidy. In practice, the 
input vouchers were obtained by elites: households with elected positions in the villages; 
wealthier households; and those households who were already using improved inputs prior to 
NAIVS. It contributed to national food security; however, because of the spill-over effects which 
brought a higher increase ratio in input use among non-recipient than recipient households, the 
observed impact on maize yields cannot be attributed to NAIVS. Because of the leakage to 
wealthier farmers and fraud, it did not ensure household food security for poor farmers.  
 The thesis reveals that studies of input subsidy programmes require not only economic 
analysis but also social and political analysis. Such studies would require the use of a new theory 
of change, which uses economic analysis but places social and political analysis at the forefront, 
and in which a mixed-methods approach must be used.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1-1.     Introduction 
Input subsidies have played a crucial role in development policies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
During the period of nationalistic policies in the 1960s and 70s, many SSA countries provided 
universal input subsidies to all farming households with the aim of earning foreign exchange for 
industrialisation through agricultural intensification. Opponents suggest that they tended to 
benefit wealthier farmers most, rather than poor farmers; to bring about market failure; to suffer 
from ineffectiveness and inefficiency due to weak management capacities and frauds, and to incur 
huge costs. Proponents suggest that they educate farmers on input use and, if used properly, will 
develop the private sector which will give farmers better access to inputs. However, due to 
frequent droughts, adverse economic circumstances and dubious policy decisions, the growth rate 
of agricultural GDP per capita for the region was negative or close to zero from the 1970s to the 
early 1990s (World Bank, 2007). 
Because of the economic crisis and financial sustainability concerns, Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s and 90s liberalised markets and removed input subsidies. With 
a positive growth rate of agricultural GDP per capita since then, the earlier trend has been reversed 
by improvements in agricultural performance, better macroeconomic policies and higher 
commodity prices. However, food production, especially cereal yields, has been stagnant in the 
region because of the large budget cut in the agricultural sector after the SAP. The stagnant crop 
yields have long been regarded as a challenge in SSA. 
The main reasons for this low productivity are low levels of input (access to irrigation, 
fertiliser and improved seeds) use, soil degradation, low population density, an underdeveloped 
road network, a diverse agro-ecological system and policy distortion against agriculture. Input 
use in SSA, in particular, has been very low compared to that in other regions of the world, partly 
due to the removal of input subsidies in the 1980s (Morris et al., 2007). The low use of inputs is 
mainly caused by high prices and an under-developed market, due to the low volume of demand 
and high transport costs caused by lack of access to good roads. 
After the SAP, these input subsidy programmes were continued in Zambia, justified on the 
basis of the threat of food insecurity, drought and a stagnant economy. Since the early 2000s, 
other SSA countries have also gradually reintroduced input subsidy programmes using resources 
generated through debt cancellation under the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative 
and General Budget Support. 
The reintroduction of input subsidies often caused considerable tension between 
government and donors. The main opponents cited a history of inefficiencies due to 
mismanagement and fraud. However, the donors’ positions varied over time and were not 
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consistent even within the same institutions (Potter, 2005; Chirwa and Dorward, 2013) due either 
to differing ideologies or to the lack of evidence available as to the effects and efficiency of the 
subsidies.  
In 2003, when I was working with the poverty monitoring sector in Tanzania, the 
government reintroduced an input transport subsidy programme with the objective of improving 
poor farmers’ ability to access inputs. However, this raised major concerns in civil society and 
among donors, partly because of the subsidy’s history of high leakage and inefficiency. Since it 
was difficult to judge at the time whether the government policy was right or not, and considering 
the history of input subsidies under the country’s socialist regime, ‘there was concern among 
African politicians, NGOs, and some policy analysts about the apparent failures of liberalized 
policies in supporting … sustainable intensification of staple food crop production’ (Chirwa and 
Dorward, 2013: 21-22). These factors brought about my own concern in the country’s input 
subsidies and motivated me to undertake this doctoral research. 
The reported success of the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) in the mid- 
2000s has brought about a recent surge of interest in the new type of ‘market-smart’ subsidy, 
which uses coupons or vouchers to deliver subsidy directly to small-scale farmers, to avoid fraud 
and illicit behaviour. It also promotes the development of the private sector by involving it in 
input procurement and delivery. Market-smart subsidies aim to overcome the problems of market 
failure and ineffectiveness and inefficiencies experienced by the previous universal input 
subsidies by targeting small-scale poor farmers and aiming for poverty reduction and economic 
growth through an increased use of inputs. 
At least eight African countries (Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Zambia, Mozambique, Nigeria and Ghana) have introduced ‘market-smart’ input subsidies since 
the late 1990s (Banful, 2011). African Union member states gathered for the African Fertilizer 
Summit in 2006 and declared their unanimous commitment to increase fertiliser use from the then 
current low level of 8 kg per hectare to an average of 50 kg per hectare. They also declared that 
they would provide funding for financing mechanisms for fertiliser operation and smart subsidies, 
and eliminate all taxes and tariffs on fertilisers and their raw materials (African Union, 2006). 
One of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals agreed in 2015 was ‘to end hunger, achieve 
food security, improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture’ (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2015), while increasing the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale 
farmers was listed as one of the measures towards this objective. Recognising the crucial role that 
‘market-smart’ input subsidies could play in attaining this goal, this thesis aims to analyse the 
effects and impacts of these subsidies in SSA on poverty reduction and farmers’ livelihoods, 
focusing on the effects of the programme design and implementation which, so far, have been 
subject to little detailed study. It aims to analyse the challenges of these programmes and thus 
provide lessons for future ‘market-smart’ subsidies in SSA. 
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1-2.      Food security in sub-Saharan Africa 
The food security situation in SSA has worsened since the world food crisis of 1972/74. Not only 
has crop yield stagnated, but the lack of institutional capacity to ensure wide access to delivered 
foods has meant that malnutrition is prevalent in SSA. However, because of positive agricultural 
growth and better institutional management between 2000 and 2013, the prevalence of 
undernourishment in SSA has improved by 30 per cent (World Bank, 2015b). 
The World Summit on Food Security (WFS) (2009) adhered to the definition of food 
security declared by the same Summit in 1996 as being ‘when all people, at all times, have 
physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary 
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’. However, it added to this the statement 
that ‘(t)he four pillars of food security are availability, access, utilization and stability. Nutritional 
dimension is integral to the concept of food security.’ 
Since 2008, food and input prices have been on the increase and are projected to remain 
high in the coming years, which has made food security an emerging concern. In 2014, African 
states adopted the Malabo declaration on accelerated agricultural growth and transformation for 
shared prosperity and improved livelihoods (African Union, 2014), an implementation strategy 
and a roadmap to turn the goals into concrete results. 
In SSA, the progress toward improving food insecurity in general has been slow but has 
varied among countries. Food availability in SSA has increased by nearly 12 per cent over the 
past 20 years. Of the 40 countries in SSA, seven have achieved both the Millennium Development 
Goals (to halve the absolute number of people suffering from hunger) and the WFS (to halve the 
absolute number of undernourished) targets; 11 have met the MDGs targets and made progress 
on WFS, and 12 have made progress towards meeting MDGs and/or WFS targets. Meanwhile, 
the number of stunted children has stagnated while the number of underweight children has 
declined (FAO, 2015a). 
In order to achieve food security, a multi-sectoral approach is required, as well as 
agricultural growth. The State of Food and Agriculture 2015 (FAO, 2015b) suggests that ‘social 
protection programmes are effective in reducing poverty and hunger’ (p. xiii), and need 
coordination with agricultural interventions to improve livelihoods sustainably. One agricultural 
intervention is input subsidy programmes, which can reach more of the poorest by adapting the 
input package to their particular needs, and by linking with social cash transfer programmes which 
enable the poorest to pay the ‘unsubsidised’ part of the inputs. 
 
1-3. Food security policies and input subsidies in Tanzania 
From the late 1960s until the early 1990s, the Tanzanian government used to monopolise input 
importation and marketing with the provision of significant subsidies using various mechanisms 
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(Benson et al., 2012). The inefficiencies of the agriculture-related parastatal agencies, and the 
failure of the pricing policies, led to a foreign exchange deficit and had an adverse impact on 
farmers’ living standards (Ellis, 1982). Under market liberalisation policies, input subsidies were 
phased out between 1990 and 1994 (Putterman L, 1995). 
Successive devaluations and the removal of input subsides increased the real price of 
imported fertiliser in the 1990s (Delgado and Minot, 2000). This reduced the profitability of input 
use for food crops, especially in the Southern Highlands, the country’s ‘breadbasket’, where 
relatively many farmers had previously been using improved inputs. Benson et al. (2012) report 
much volatility in the amount of fertiliser imports over the past twenty years, as they depended 
on the take-up and removal of the various input subsidy programmes. However, some reports 
have stated that since the previous input use was not high nationwide, the impact of the removal 
of input subsidies on national maize production has been modest (less than 5%) (Cooksey, 2012), 
allowing maize production to keep pace with demand (Cooksey, 2005). 
For food security purposes, a Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) was established under the 
National Milling Corporation (NMC) in the late 1970s (Bryceson, 1993; Stryker and Amin, 2013).
The SGR became an independent 
agency as part of a public sector 
reform and the National Food 
Reserve Agency (NFRA) was 
formed from it in 2008, ‘to maintain 
national optimum level of storage, 
to address local food shortages and 
to respond to immediate food 
emergency requirements’ (MAFC, 
2015). Currently, while there are 
boards for cash crops such as coffee 
or cashew nuts, there is no board for 
food crops such as maize or rice. 
Excess-produced maize is brought 
to Dar es Salaam for export. 
Informants in NFRA Songea 
suggested that ‘the minimum  
circulation stock of maize is 
150,000 tons countrywide. Surplus 
Maize is circulated from Ruvuma to 
Dodoma and/or Arusha depots for 
delivering to the maize deficit 
Note: Arrows show the direction of maize  
Source: Map of the world (2014) 
Figure 1: Political map (regions) and the surplus maize   
circulation route from Ruvuma region 
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areas’0F1 (Figure 1). For the food security purposes this NFRA route might be different from the 
commercial route to Dar es Salaam (Wilson and Lewis, 2015), which, however, might be much 
smaller than the one from Iringa and Mbeya in the amount. The amount distributed to specific 
regions is decided by the Prime Minister’s office, which takes into consideration food shortages 
caused by drought, poor rainfall, hunger and natural disasters in these regions1F
2
.  
The above-mentioned input subsidy re-introduced in 2003/04 was that provided to input 
supplier companies for transport costs, in order for them to deliver an agreed quantity of fertilisers 
to farmers at fixed prices (World Bank, 2009a). However, with no proper monitoring mechanism 
the expected amounts of inputs were not delivered to the smallholders or sold to other farmers at 
the market prices. 
In 2008, when food and input prices started to rise, the government of Tanzania asked donors for 
emergency support for food security programmes. The World Bank responded to this with the 
launch of the Tanzania Accelerated Food Security Project, which aimed to achieve national and 
household food security by providing input subsidy (the National Agricultural Input Voucher 
Scheme (NAIVS)) to small-scale farmers (World Bank, 2009a). Learning from Malawi’s 
experience, the project introduced a ‘market-smart’ subsidy by promoting private sector 
development in the input market. The NAIVS project document states that ‘vouchers have proven 
more effective and less apt to distort the market than methods used commonly in the past, such as 
direct subsidies and centralized control of fertilizer procurement and distribution’ (World Bank, 
2009a: 71). The subsidy targeted maize and rice production in areas with a potentially high 
response to input use, i.e., the Southern Highlands, and northern and central-western areas. The 
project aimed to achieve poverty reduction and economic growth through increased crop 
production, targeting 2.5 million small-scale farm households in the country. The ‘benefits’ of a 
‘smart’ subsidy include ‘increased farmer output, stronger private input markets, and increased 
adoption of new technologies by poor farmers’ (ibid: 71). Varioius studies acknowledge that ‘these 
benefits depend greatly on how the subsidy programme is designed and implemented’, which is 
the focus of this thesis (World Bank, 2009; Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurle, 2012; Jayne and Rashid, 
2013). 
 
 
1-4.     Key features of the input subsidy programmes 
In order for input subsidy programmes to be effective and efficient, many complex elements must 
be considered. In this section the key features of the subsidy programmes are summarised. 
 
 
                                                     
1 Interview in December 2012.  
2 Interview with the MAFC Director of National Food Security (October, 2012) 
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1-4-1. Programme aims, design and implementation 
Input subsidy programmes tend to have dual objectives: 1) to increase national food security and 
accelerate economic growth through increased maize/rice production; and 2) to reduce poverty 
amongst small-scale farmers by improving household food security through increased production 
from the increased use of inputs (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2013a). 
However, these cannot be attained by targeting one group. In order to achieve national economic 
growth, it would be better to target large farmer households who have complementary inputs to 
enhance productivity. For the purpose of poverty reduction, small-scale farmers who could also 
achieve high marginal productivity3 should be targeted. As regards the implementation of NAIVS, 
it was difficult to achieve the two objectives at the same time because of the late delivery or resale 
of vouchers; difficulties in paying the ‘unsubsidised part’ of inputs; the embezzlement of vouchers 
and subsidised inputs by politicians, government officers and elites; and the diverting of vouchers 
to elites or wealthier farmers, as will be discussed at length in Chapter 4. This thesis analyses 
whether the programme aim, design and implementation flawed well, as design and 
implementation are key for any effective ‘market-smart’ subsidy programme. 
 
1-4-2. Targeting 
Knowing that previous input subsidy programmes incurred heavy costs, targeting small-scale 
farmers accurately was important for the efficiency (without leakage to wealthier farmers) and 
effectiveness (higher marginal productivity4) of the programme. Normally, input subsidy 
programmes combine various types of targeting: geographical targeting (high-potential areas); 
categorical targeting (landholders); proxy-means tests (local definition of poor and vulnerable); 
and /or community selection. The efficiency and cost-effectiveness of these methods of targeting 
vary from case to case. Studies suggest that ‘market-smart’ subsidies are not exempt from 
targeting errors and the politicisation of targeting (Banful, 2011; Mason and Jayne, 2013). Pan 
and Christiaensen (2012) mention elite capture in input voucher distribution during the pilot year 
in Kilimanjaro Region in Tanzania, where 60 per cent of vouchers were obtained by village elites. 
 
1-4-3. Input / Voucher delivery  
Due to the vouchers being printed in the UK and late ordering by the Tanzanian government 
causing late delivery of the vouchers to the project site and the lack of administrative and 
technical capacities, subsidised inputs and vouchers tend to be delivered late  
 
3, 4 There are no scale economies in fertiliser use; nevertheless, an alternative argument is that larger 
farmers might be better-educated or more experienced in fertiliser use and achieve higher marginal 
productivity. The evidence either way is not wholly conclusive but the evidence on lower per hectare use 
by smaller farmers and the normal assumption of declining returns suggest the marginal productivity 
argument supports the small farm case. 
- 7 - 
 
(Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Jayne and Rashid, 2013). This lateness affects the effectiveness of 
the subsidy, as either farmers delay planting and grow fewer crops, or they choose not to delay 
and plant traditional seeds without using planting fertiliser and resell their vouchers (Chirwa et al., 
2011a). 
Since most of the inputs are imports in SSA, they are susceptible to price changes in the 
international market. Therefore, although there is a suggested subsidy ratio in the programme, the 
farmers’ payment for ‘unsubsidised’ parts of inputs fluctuates and the face values of vouchers did 
not change, with poor farmers sometimes unable to obtain the subsidised inputs if the prices 
become higher. 
Studies suggest that patron-client relationships or rent-seeking behaviours exist in the 
government hierarchies of SSA countries, for the former where more junior officials give resources 
(in this case inputs or vouchers) to senior officials in return for favours from them (Fjeldstad et 
al., 2003; Cooksey, 2012). The incentive structure for government officials to implement 
government-run social transfer programmes is very weak, for example, especially at the lower 
levels where remunerations are low. When opportunities exist, therefore, ‘siphoning off’ is a 
frequent practice (Ellis et al., 2009: 65). Maliro (2011) suggests that ‘there are openly reported 
instances of fraudulent behavior that nonetheless fail to provoke official outrage or censure or 
punishment, in effect allowing such behavior to become institutionalized over time’ (p. 146). As 
regards the input voucher programme in Tanzania, Cooksey notes that there were many missing 
vouchers, probably taken by government officials and politicians before they reached the villages 
(Cooksey, 2012). Frauds and illicit behaviour commonly occur in input subsidy programmes 
(Cooksey, 2012; Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Jayne and Rashid, 2013). Ellis et al. (2009) suggest 
that the new technologies such as mobile phones merit future consideration for effective delivery.  
 
1-4-4. Impact of input subsidies on maize yields and poverty 
Several studies suggest the ‘market-smart’ subsidy programmes increased maize production 
among beneficiaries in Malawi and Zambia (SOAS et al., 2008; Chirwa et al., 2011a; Ricker- 
Gilbert and Jayne, 2011; Lunduka et al., 2013; Mason et al., 2013); raised national maize 
production in Malawi (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011; Lunduka et al., 2013) although the official 
data for maize production in Malawi seem to be overstated (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013), and 
could raise maize or rice production, in their estimation, in Nigeria (Liverpool-Tasie and 
Takeshima, 2013). 
However, these increases in production are found to be concentrated in wealthier 
households, with the programme making almost no impact on poverty reduction in Malawi and 
Zambia (Marenya and Barrett, 2009; Lunduka et al., 2013; Mason and Jayne, 2013; Ricker- 
Gilbert et al., 2013b), while a seed voucher programme which provided rice seeds to randomly- 
selected farm households was reported to have a significant impact on income poverty in Nigeria 
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(Awotide et al., 2013). 
 
1-4-5. Gender impacts 
Since the programmes target vulnerable households, including female-headed households, they 
should have gender impacts on farmers’ households and in the communities. However, in 
patriarchal societies such as those in SSA, it was not easy to target women in many cases because 
of their powerless positions. The study by SOAS et al. (2008) found that in Malawi, male- headed 
households were more likely to receive coupons than female-headed households. Chirwa et al. 
(2011a) found that in 2008/09 women-controlled plots were less likely to apply fertilisers than 
men-controlled plots; however, within male-headed households the application of ‘subsidised 
fertilisers’ did not have much difference between men-controlled and women- controlled plots, 
and the access to commercial fertilisers were favourable to women-controlled plots. This 
suggests that the programme could reduce gender difference in intra-household decision-making 
power. 
 
1-4-6. Market effects 
Input subsidies affect the market in inputs, by increasing supply and demand and thus lowering 
their prices. ‘Market-smart’ subsidies aim to promote the development of the private sector by 
using it in input procurement and delivery. In some cases, such as that of the FISP, the role of 
the private sector was nonetheless limited. 
Leakage to wealthier farmers means that commercial purchases can be displaced by 
subsidised inputs, making the net increase in input purchase less than the subsidised input volume. 
Studies on FISP find that an increase in maize production lowers maize prices, and that increased 
labour demand due to an increase in production brings about higher labour wages (Chirwa and 
Dorward, 2013; Dorward and Chirwa, 2013). Meanwhile, some farmers sell vouchers at less than 
their value as they prefer to raise money rather than buy inputs. Other wealthier farmers buy these 
vouchers as they are at below market price (Ellis et al., 2009). 
 
1-4-7. Cost effectiveness 
Input subsidy programmes are very costly, and it is therefore important to analyse their cost- 
effectiveness. The analysis should compare all the procurement and delivery costs per unit of each 
type of input with the value of the inputs at local market prices. However, due to information 
constraints it is difficult to implement any adequate analysis of cost-effectiveness. The most- 
studied input subsidy programme is FISP in Malawi. Ellis et al. (2009) suggest that universal 
coverage, i.e., less targeting, might be more cost-effective because of the tendency towards elite 
capture. 
The right benefit-cost ratio (BCR) was keenly debated in the case of Malawi (Jayne et al., 
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2013; Dorward and Chirwa, 2015; Jayne et al., 2015); Dorward and Chirwa debated how to treat 
the diversion cost and indirect effects of the input subsidy programme in particular. Jayne et al. 
(2015) suggest that the BCRs of input subsidy programmes are negative and that investment in 
traditional public goods such as agricultural R&D and extension, or on road, rural electrification 
or other productivity-enhancing investments, should therefore be priorities instead of continuous 
investment in unproductive subsidy programmes (Fan et al., 2007). 
 
1-5.      Research questions 
In order to analyse the key issues of the input subsidy programmes, this thesis aims to address the 
following research question: 
 
Research question: How did NAIVS impact on poverty reduction and the livelihoods of farmers 
in Ruvuma Region in Tanzania? 
To date, several studies have been conducted concerning the implementation and impact of 
NAIVS. The baseline survey for the impact study of NAIVS, conducted by the Tanzanian 
government, found that beneficiaries were better-off and better-‘connected’ to village leaders than 
non-beneficiaries (Patel, 2011). The impact study found that beneficiaries made greater 
maize/rice yield gains than non-recipients; however, the profitability of input use for the average 
farmer not in receipt of subsidy was low, as it depended on input use efficiency and output prices 
(URT, 2014e). NAIVS had a positive effect on farmers’ learning about the inputs, and a 
significant number of programme graduates continued to buy the commercial inputs. As input 
subsidies have been a crucial but contentious tool for development policies in SSA but so far very 
few studies have been conducted on the impact, design and implementation of the programmes, 
this thesis aims to address the current concern as to whether ‘market-smart’ subsidies could be 
effective and efficient in improving the household food security, and reducing the poverty, of 
small-scale farmers, overcoming the deficiencies of past input subsidies such as market failures, 
leakage to wealthier farmers, mismanagement and fraud. As Jayne et al. (2013) suggest, ‘(g)reater 
attention to program design and implementation details to reduce problems of crowding out and 
diversion can substantially raise the returns to such programs’ (p.687). By revealing in detail the 
design and implementation of the current programmes in SSA, the thesis is a unique study which 
highlights the challenges for these programmes and could offer lessons for future subsidy 
programmes in SSA. 
I focus on Ruvuma Region, for the panel data which I obtained from World Bank focused 
on Kilimanjaro and Ruvuma Regions, and NAIVS voucher distribution was focused on the 
Southern Highlands (URT, 2014e), ‘the grain supplier’ in the country, which Ruvuma was a part, 
and Ruvuma was one of the poorest regions in the country (URT, 2005), thus the study on Ruvuma 
is better in order to measure the impact on poverty. 
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To address the research question, this thesis addresses the following six research sub- 
questions: 
 
Research sub-question 1: Who received NAIVS vouchers? 
NAIVS aimed to target initially small-scale poor, vulnerable households, with the land criteria of 
no more than 1 ha. of maize or rice cultivation, with priority given to vulnerable households such 
as female-headed households (World Bank, 2009a). Other studies of market-smart input 
subsidies (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Jayne et al., 2013; Jayne and Rashid, 2013) similarly 
suggest elite capture and diversion and fraud in Malawi, Zambia, Kenya and Tanzania. These 
studies also suggest that targeting was an issue; there were inclusion errors and exclusion errors. 
In that context the question of who obtained vouchers is pertinent in the case of NAIVS in 
Tanzania. This thesis looks in detail at how the targeting and voucher management were 
designed and implemented, and who ultimately received vouchers. 
 
Research sub-question 2: Did NAIVS increase the maize yields of recipient households? 
This thesis analyses whether NAIVS increased the maize yields of recipient farmers through the 
increased use of inputs. NAIVS was designed to target poor, small-scale farmers in the highly 
promising area of input use. It aimed to achieve poverty reduction as well as economic growth 
through increased maize or rice production, by using improved inputs. Using subsidised inputs, 
small-scale farmers who had not used improved inputs in the previous five years could obtain a 
higher marginal productivity (World Bank, 2009a). NAIVS provided subsidised inputs for three 
consecutive years so that poor, small-scale recipient farmers could accumulate enough income to 
purchase commercial inputs after the subsidy; i.e., they could ‘exit’ the programme. NAIVS was 
designed so that the receipt of one voucher package for three consecutive years would more than 
double a farmer’s maize productivity, from 1,120 kg per acre to 2,450–3,200 kg per acre. Rice 
yield was expected to rise by 60 ~ 90%, from 1,735 kg per acre to 2,800–3,300 kg per acre (World 
Bank, 2009a: 22). This thesis analyses whether NAIVS achieved the expected outcome of 
increased maize yields, and if not, why. 
 
Research sub-question 3: Did NAIVS reduce poverty and increase the food security and the 
assets of recipient households? 
Through increased maize production, the small-scale recipient farmers are expected to increase 
their income, in such a way that the net maize-buyers reduced their purchases and/or net maize- 
sellers could increase their sales, thus they could increase available income. If they increase their 
income, they can accumulate assets. Dorward and Chirwa (2013) suggest that in Malawi, FISP 
reduced income poverty from 2005/06 to 2007/08 by a limited amount, although there might be 
a data limitation in their study. Other studies suggest that in Malawi and Nigeria, the subsidy 
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programme reduced income poverty (Xu et al., 2009b; Awotide et al., 2013). This thesis uses 
panel data to control other conditions in order to look at whether NAIVS reduced poverty and 
increased the food security and the assets of recipient households with the analysis of change in 
livelihoods. If these outcomes were not achieved, the thesis analyses the reasons. This thesis also 
looks at the livelihood strategies of poor small-scale farmers in relation to the voucher programme, 
e.g., reselling vouchers or sharing them with other farmers. 
 
Research sub-question 4: Did receipt of NAIVS input vouchers have any gender impacts? 
‘Market-smart’ subsidies target vulnerable households, prioritizing female-headed households. 
If targeting was successful, therefore, and with all other conditions equal, female-headed 
recipient households could increase their maize production and their poverty in comparison 
with male- headed non-recipient households. However, studies find that despite these aims, 
female-headed households were less likely to receive subsidies in Malawi (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 
2011; Chibwana et al., 2014), and FISP did not reduce the gap between male-headed and 
female-headed households in the adoption of modern seeds and fertilisers (Fisher and 
Kandiwa, 2014). There was, however, a smaller gender gap between male-controlled and 
female-controlled plots in the use of fertilisers (Chirwa et al., 2011a). This thesis looks at 
whether NAIVS did prioritise female- headed households in the distribution of vouchers, and 
how these households’ livelihoods changed accordingly. 
 
Research sub-question 5: Did NAIVS lower maize producer prices and increase agricultural 
wages? 
With subsidised inputs occupying a relatively large proportion of total input demand in the 
region, total maize production and labour demand should both have increased, reducing the real 
price of maize and increasing agricultural wages. This should have benefited maize-deficit, 
labour-surplus poor farmers and maize-surplus labour-deficit farmers should have suffered. 
Chirwa and Dorward (2013) suggest that these were such indirect impacts of FISP. This thesis 
looks at these aspects of NAIVS in Ruvuma Region as these are the key elements for poverty 
reduction of poor farmers. 
 
Research sub-question 6: Did NAIVS promote the private sector? 
Subsidised inputs are intended to increase input availability, which will in turn reduce input prices 
and promote demand. ‘Market-smart’ subsidies aim to overcome the deficiencies of the 
conventional government-supplied input subsidy programme - which brought about market 
distortion - by using the input private sector for input procurement and delivery. Depending on 
countries, the involvement of the private sector varied. This thesis looks at how NAIVS promoted 
the private sector and how private agents acted in the programme; what the challenges were; and 
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whether the agents were willing to stay in the input business in future years. Given that most of 
the subsidised inputs in Tanzania are imported, this thesis also looks at the trend of input prices 
and how this affected voucher receipt by farmers. 
 
1-6. Thesis structure 
This thesis aims to contribute to the discussion of the effectiveness and efficiency of the ‘market- 
smart’ input subsidy programme in SSA, by a detailed analysis of its design and implementation. 
The strengths of this thesis are that it employs a wide range of data taken from the five countries’ 
programmes and a detailed case study in Tanzania, using secondary literature and data review, 
and primary mixed-methods research in Tanzania; and that it considers the impact of input 
subsidies through an analysis of design and implementation issues. It concludes with an overview 
of the challenges posed by these programmes which may or will be faced by other SSA countries. 
So far, few detailed studies have been conducted on the design and implementation of 
programmes. The thesis looks at the case study of NAIVS in Tanzania with mixed-methods, using 
empirical qualitative and quantitative data in Ruvuma Region, one of the ‘grain suppliers’ in the 
country. A mixed-methods approach is appropriate to measure the impact on farmers’ livelihoods 
as well as to look closely at how the programme was implemented. The quantitative data is 
primarily based on the panel data, which captured the agricultural situation just before the pilot 
year and again in the programme’s third year. The qualitative information was collected through 
key informant interviews, farmer group discussions in the region and, to a lesser extent, at national 
level in the third year of the programme. This thesis analyses the impact of NAIVS on poverty 
reduction and change to farmers’ livelihoods by looking at how the programme was designed and 
implemented; how design and implementation impacted on maize production and productivities, 
poverty, food security and livelihoods of the recipient farmer households, as well as their indirect 
effects on non-recipients, villages and the wider economy; and how social and power relations 
affected the programme, conversely, how the programme affected these relationships.  
The structure of this thesis is as follows. The next chapter looks at the input subsidy 
programmes in SSA countries, and their successes and challenges. The third chapter presents the 
analytical framework and the research methodology of the thesis. The fourth chapter provides a 
detailed analysis of the programme’s aim, design and implementation. The fifth chapter analyses 
the characteristics of voucher recipients. The sixth chapter looks into the impact of NAIVS on 
maize yields. The seventh chapter analyses the impact of NAIVS on poverty, farmers’ livelihoods 
and gender aspects in Ruvuma. The eighth chapter presents an analysis of the indirect impact of 
NAIVS on the wider economy, by looking at changes in input prices, maize prices and agricultural 
wages. The ninth chapter discusses the findings based on the research questions. The tenth chapter 
concludes with an analysis of future challenges to ‘market-smart’ subsidies in SSA. 
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Chapter 2. Review of input subsidies in sub-Saharan Africa5 
 
 
2-1. Introduction 
Since their independence in the years before the mid-1970s, a number of sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries have developed food security programmes by providing subsidies, credits, 
other inputs, extension services and marketing facilities to small-scale farmers as well as by 
controlling markets and food crop prices (Ellis, 1982; Maxwell, 2001). At first many of these 
countries provided universal input subsidies that were accessible to all farming households. Due 
to fiscal unsustainability and the inefficiency of these state-controlled policies due to market 
distortion, structural adjustment programmes introduced in the 1980s and 1990s created 
liberalised input and output markets with the abolition of pan-territorial prices, the privatisation 
of state-owned enterprises and the removal of input subsidies in many countries. Among them 
the removal of input subsidies was a critical development due to the fiscal and budgetary 
orthodoxy. Although a positive growth rate of agricultural GDP per capita has been reported in 
the region since then, the food crop yields have been stagnant in the region. One of the reasons 
for this low productivity has been the low level of input use (World Bank, 2007).  
       However, due to the threat of food insecurity, especially from drought and a stagnant 
economy, subsidy programmes have continued in Zambia. Other SSA countries have also 
gradually reintroduced input subsidy programmes, as their governments have received debt 
cancellation under the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and General Budget 
Support since around the early 2000s, enabling them to put money into agricultural input subsidies. 
Such subsidy programmes have been popular among politicians since they can show direct 
support for citizens, and ‘compensate for the lack of long-term investment for infrastructure and 
short-cut the need for more complex effort for market development’ (Poulton et al., 2009: 1416).  
After attempting with initiatives such as the Starter Pack and Targeted Input Programmes, 
Malawi launched the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) across much of the country in 
2005/06. This subsidy aimed to overcome the problems of previous input subsidies of market 
distortion and leakage to non-intended beneficiaries: by targeting small-scale farmers and 
achieved wide coverage through the use of vouchers (sometimes known as ‘coupons’); and by 
using the private sector for the procurement and delivery of inputs in order not to distort the input 
market. This is called a ‘market-smart’ subsidy (Minot and Benson, 2009). The innovative  
 
5 A part of this chapter was used for the forthcoming article, ‘Input subsidies in sub-Saharan Africa’ 
co-authored with Martin Greeley (Kato, T. and Greeley, M. (2016) 'Agricultural input subsidies in sub- 
Saharan Africa', IDS Bulletin, Vol. 47 (2) pp. 33-48.) 
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approach and the report of success in increasing maize production and yields from 2005/06 to 
2007/08 brought subsidy lobby and impetus to the unanimous commitment of the African Union 
states to increasing input use through ‘market-smart’ subsidies to promote food crop yields, 
mainly of maize (African Union, 2006). Since the food and input price spikes in 2008, even donors 
that advocated for agricultural liberalisation, such as the World Bank, have been supporting these 
programmes (Benin et al., 2013). 
Since the late 1990s, 11 countries have introduced input subsidies in SSA (Crawford et 
al., 2006; Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurle, 2012). These input subsidies have evolved from 
demonstration packs to large subsidy programmes, but have mainly shifted to targeting small- 
scale farmers, as in Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, 
Mozambique, Nigeria and Ghana, while those in Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Mali were 
universally distributed (Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurle, 2012; Liverpool-Tasie, 2012b). We focus 
here on the ‘market-smart’ subsidies, targeting small-scale farmers and promoting private sector 
development. Evidence shows that these subsidies have increased fertiliser use, average food crop 
yields and food crop production, but that their success depends on the context, and their design 
and implementation (Dorward and Kydd, 2005; Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurle, 2012; Chirwa and 
Dorward, 2013). 
In this chapter I aim to analyse the design and implementation features of input subsidy 
programmes and how these affected the outcomes. I will first review five most prominent ‘market- 
smart’ input subsidy programmes in SSA (Malawi, Zambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania) on 
their historical developments, on their features of design and implementation and their outcomes. 
In the case of Tanzania, I will review the input subsidies prior to the current programme which 
will be the focus of my thesis and is explained in detail from the next chapter. Lastly, I will 
conclude with an overview of the challenges these programmes pose. 
 
2-2.    Overview of five ‘market-smart’ subsidy programmes in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
2-2-1. Design and implementation of ‘market-smart’ input subsidies 
In aiming to overcome the past deficiencies of input subsidies, ‘market-smart’ input subsidies 
generally have the following characteristics: 1) targeting small-scale, vulnerable farmers, who did 
not use inputs before but in theory would find it profitable to do so; 2) promoting private sector 
development, where the private sector procures and distributes inputs by using vouchers, 
providing matching grants and loan guarantees, etc.; 3) having an ‘exit’ strategy, because of their 
huge financial burden on governments and possible market distortion (Morris et al., 2007; Chirwa 
and Dorward, 2013; Jayne and Rashid, 2013). The use of vouchers emerged as a mechanism for 
simultaneously targeting subsidies and promoting the private sector, as well as tightening the 
relationship between input agro-dealers and the financial sector (Gregory, 2006). An overview of 
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several features of these programmes in five SSA countries under study is given in Table 1. As 
regards exit strategy, however, among the subsidy programmes studied, only that in Tanzania 
explicitly mentioned one, while other programmes did not and that in Ghana was implemented as 
a single-year programme. 
As mentioned in the section 1-4-1, current subsidy programmes target eligible farmers, in 
most cases small-scale, but also those who achieve high marginal productivity. Such households 
do not necessarily constitute a homogenous group. Targeting small-scale, vulnerable farmers 
would increase the effectiveness of the programme by increasing input use, given that these 
farmers did not use inputs before the programme. However, as complementary inputs are not 
readily available, small-scale farmers would not have increased their productivity as much as if 
they had access to complementary inputs whereas wealthier ones would do better when they 
received inputs. Because of these different effects, the programme’s targeted group becomes 
unclear. 
Most of these programmes used decentralised targeting, through traditional authorities, 
local key stakeholders, voucher committees, or farmer cooperatives, etc. Use of local stakeholders’ 
knowledge reduces administrative cost, and is common in various anti-poverty programmes 
(Grosh et al., 2008). In the case of Tanzania, voucher committees were established from national 
to village levels (World Bank, 2009a). This multi-sectoral arrangement encompassed the 
government, private sector and farmers’ groups. Beneficiaries were selected at village level. The 
process was designed in such a way that the beneficiary candidates were selected at hamlet level, 
and the names were suggested to the village voucher committees, which were then compiled into 
lists and reported to the village assembly for discussion and approval. 
Though targeting methods varied, all the programmes under study targeted small-scale 
farmers by either descentralised targeting or community targeting. However, studies suggest that 
leakage to wealthier farmers, elite capture and illicit behaviour were found in most of the countries 
(Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Jayne and Rashid, 2013). In our case study in Tanzania, explained 
in detail in Chapter 4, and in other programmes, decentralised targeting using vouchers based on 
eligibility criteria – albeit ostensibly more cost-effective and a better way of targeting those in 
need – has often been subject to elite capture and fraud, and therefore does not work efficiently 
(Pan and Christiaensen, 2012).  Liverpool-Tasie (2012a)  suggests  that  social  capital  and  
intragroup  dynamics  were important in voucher allocation in analysing how the programme in 
Nigeria targeted farmer groups which would later distribute inputs among smallholder farmers. 
Female-headed households were prioritised in several countries, such as Malawi, Zambia and 
Tanzania. However, because of power relations in communities, the evidence in Malawi and the 
qualitative information in our study in Tanzania show that female-headed households had difficulty 
obtaining subsidised inputs (Chirwa et al., 2011a). An e-voucher system was piloted in Zambia 
and has been implemented in Nigeria in order to curb these problems.  
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The degree of the ‘market-smartness’ varied by contexts, that is, the nature of the 
relationship between public and private sectors, the geographical coverage of the private sector, 
and the policy orientation toward private sector development of the countries. The programme in 
Malawi used parastatal agencies for input distribution and retailing, with limited participation by 
private agents in order for mutual trust to be developed (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013). In Tanzania 
these activities were undertaken by the private sector, which promoted the development of a 
private input sector through the increased input demand created by subsidies (URT, 2014e). In 
Nigeria, after the inefficient history of the previous input subsidy programmes where the 
government controlled input procurement and delivery, the new programme left fertiliser 
procurement and delivery to the private sector (Liverpool-Tasie and Takeshima, 2013). 
 
2-2-2. Effects and challenges of the ‘market-smart’ input subsidies 
Studies suggest that most of the programmes brought about increased maize production and maize 
yields, when climatic and economic conditions were favourable. The studies reported that the 
programmes in Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia found increased maize productivity and 
output, and the first two also increased household income and reduced poverty (Xu et al., 2009b; 
Yawson et al., 2010; Awotide et al., 2013; URT, 2014e). Examining the field results of rice-
producing farms in Ghana, Wiredu et al. (2015) suggest that the programme did increase land 
productivity, while reducing labour productivity, as increased labour, mostly from family, was 
demanded due to increased production. 
Meanwhile, most of the programmes were found to be ineffective and inefficient, due to 
leakage to wealthier farmers and elite capture, late delivery of vouchers and inputs, and 
displacement of commercial input purchase. A study on political economy of the subsidy 
programme in Malawi suggests that ‘the threat of the political capture of the programme for short- 
term goals….is always imminent. … The debates about FISP among technocrats are stymied by 
the preponderance of the political considerations about the programme’ (Chinsinga, 2012b: 2). 
The subsidy in Ghana suffered political influence in voucher distribution, whereby areas where 
the government leadership had political interest benefited preferentially (Banful, 2011). On 
displacement, using nationally representative panel data in Zambia, Xu et al. (2009a) suggest that 
the less developed the private sector, the more subsidies tend not to be displacing, as they create 
fertiliser demand. One solution for displacement could be e-vouchers, by which Nigeria is 
reported to have tripled fertiliser use per hectare from 2011 to 2013 (from 6.6 to 17.8 kg) (World 
Bank, 2015b), a performance that merits detailed study. 
Studies suggest that input subsidies have had a wider impact on the economy through 
increased food crop production: a reduction in consumer food prices, which would benefit poor 
food consumers; an increase in rural agricultural wages; the expansion of input access; and the 
promotion of private sector development in rural areas (Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurle, 2012; Chirwa 
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and Dorward, 2013; Dorward and Chirwa, 2013). However, the benefit has varied with the nature 
of the subsidies and their context in the markets, as well as with the weather. Chirwa and Dorward 
(2013) suggest that the large scale of the programme in Malawi brought about a reduction in real 
maize prices, and that it promoted private sector development and agricultural growth. An 
informational spill-over effect was also observed in Tanzania (URT, 2014e). 
The benefit-cost ratio in the overall economy was debated in the case of Malawi (Jayne et 
al., 2013; Dorward and Chirwa, 2015; Jayne et al., 2015) and the Zambian study reported a ratio 
of below one (Mason et al., 2013). A synthesis of recent studies on market-smart input subsidies 
suggests that programme costs outweigh the benefits. The production gains have been found to 
be limited due to low fertiliser use efficiency, diversion from intended beneficiaries, and 
displacement of previously commercial input use (Jayne and Rashid, 2013). 
All the programmes found similar challenges of the previous subsidy programmes; such as 
improvements in targeting, an increase in the transparency of voucher distribution, better 
monitoring and evaluation, and timely delivery of vouchers. The programme in Tanzania found 
that the late redemption of vouchers by the National Micro-finance Bank caused reluctance among 
the agro-dealers to continue in the subsidy business. In the next section I will describe each 
country’s experience in greater detail. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of five recent input subsidy programmes in sub-Saharan Africa 
 Malawi Zambia Ghana Nigeria Tanzania 
Programme Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme 
Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme 
Fertiliser Subsidy 
Programme 
Growth Enhancement 
Support Scheme 
National Agricultural 
Input Voucher Scheme 
Year 
implemented 
2005/6 ~   2009 ~ 2008 ~ 2013, 2015  2012 ~  2008/09 ~  
Programme 
objectives 
Improve resource-poor 
smallholder farmers’ 
access to improved 
inputs in order to 
achieve household and 
national food self-
sufficiency and raise 
incomes 
Improve household and 
national food security, 
incomes, and 
accessibility to 
agricultural inputs by 
small-scale farmers  
Enhance national food 
production and 
security  
Promote fertiliser 
demand and private 
input sector 
Reduce poverty and 
household food 
insecurity as well as 
achieve economic 
growth and national 
food security 
Targeted 
crop  
Maize, legume, and 
other cash crops 
(reverting to maize and 
legume only since 
2009/10) 
Maize Maize or rice, and 
legume (soya bean) 
Maize or rice Maize or rice 
Targeted 
beneficiaries 
 
Smallholder farmers, 
with female-headed 
households a priority 
Small-scale farmers 
(less than 5 ha)  
Smallholder food crop 
farmers (maize, rice, 
sorghum and millet) 
Smallholder farmers  Small-scale farmers 
(less than 1 ha. 
although this criterion 
was eliminated in 
2010), able to pay for 
and use inputs with 
female-headed 
households as a 
priority 
Beneficiary 
selection 
mechanism 
Varied with time – 
through traditional 
authorities, varied 
stakeholders, village 
development 
committees, open 
meetings for allocation 
led by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food 
Security 
Cooperative boards, 
extension officers, and 
local leaders are 
involved in selection  
Extension officers Farmer registration Village voucher 
committee 
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Subsidy 
delivery 
Coupons  Farmer cooperatives 
(piloted e-voucher) 
Coupons E-voucher through 
mobile phone 
Voucher 
Subsidised 
input 
package 
50 kg of fertiliser + 2~4 
kg of seeds 
200 kg of fertiliser + 10 
kg of maize  
No standard package 
(Compound fertiliser + 
Urea) 
100 kg of fertiliser + 
seeds  
100 kg of fertiliser + 
10 kg of seeds 
Subsidy 
amount 
About 64~93 per cent of 
input cost 
About 50~75 per cent of 
input cost 
About 50 per cent of 
input cost 
About 40 per cent of 
input cost 
About 50 per cent of 
input cost 
Exit strategy Not explicit Scaling-down as the 
years go by 
No – one-year 
programme 
No Three-year exit plan 
Monitoring 
and 
evaluation 
system 
Yes – numerous 
evaluation studies 
implemented (SOAS et 
al., 2008; Dorward et 
al., 2010) 
Yes (Mason and Jayne, 
2013) 
Not reported Not reported Yes – there was 
monitoring system and 
impact evaluation 
conducted (Patel, 
2011; URT, 2014) 
Private 
sector 
development 
Yes, but limited; the 
private sector has been 
involved in parallel with 
parastatal distribution 
and retailing (Chirwa 
and Dorward, 2013) 
Yes, but limited to a few 
contracted retailers. 
Concerns were raised 
that the programme 
discouraged private 
participation (Mason et 
al., 2013) 
Yes, but limited to big 
input supplier 
companies, which 
reduced competition 
and sales by smaller 
retailers (Benin et al., 
2013) 
Yes (Lenis Saweda O. et 
al., 2013)  
Yes. In some cases 
small agro-dealers 
could not deliver the 
inputs, and big 
retailers tended to be 
assigned for delivery 
by district government.  
 
Source: Author 
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2-3.      Case study countries 
2-3-1. Malawi 
The majority of Malawian farmers are smallholders. According to the Integrated Household 
Survey carried out in 2011/12, farmers in Malawi had an average of 1.4 ha. of land for cultivation, 
and about 70 per cent of the land was dedicated to maize. About a third of the population had very 
low food security (Republic of Malawi, 2012). As in other African countries, since independence 
credit programmes have delivered fertiliser and hybrid maize seeds to small-scale farmers. Since 
the 1980s, production of maize, which is the main food crop in Malawi, has rested upon subsidies 
for hybrid maize. As the Structural Adjustment Programme came in, the smallholder agricultural 
credit programme collapsed in 1994. With lack of access to inputs, farm productivity dropped 
as landholdings grew smaller due to population pressure, and maize became the dominant crop 
(Blackie and Mann, 2005). In the early 1990s, Malawian smallholder farmers faced high food 
insecurity and threats of drought. Furthermore, there was an influx of refugees from civil war in 
Mozambique. This combination of challenges was exacerbated by the lack of access to inputs due 
to the removal of subsidies, the collapse of credit for inputs and an increase in input prices. 
Liberalisation policies seemed to bring little benefit but more costs. Fearing shortages, the 
government’s Food Security and Nutrition Unit developed a projection of maize production which 
indicated that there would indeed be a serious food deficit. Donors were persuaded by this 
projection to introduce the free distribution of hybrid seeds and fertilisers in 1994/95. Agricultural 
research was conducted into 1,700 farm field trials over five years to obtain the most adequate 
seed and fertilisers, as well as identify optimum legume rotations. Backed by political support 
across the government and technical assistance, the ‘Starter Pack’ programme came into being.  
The ‘Starter Pack’, targeting smallholder farmers but covering the whole country, was 
followed by the ‘Targeted Input Programme’ which was smaller in scale, targeted vulnerable 
households and was designed as a social protection programme. After an extreme drought that 
seriously reduced agricultural productivity, the government of President Mutharika, in line with 
its election promise, launched FISP in 2004/05 by increasing the amount of subsidised inputs, and 
introducing voucher delivery with the participation of the private sector, the so-called ‘market- 
smart’ subsidy. The programme objective was to increase smallholder agricultural productivity 
and food sufficiency, and reduce vulnerability to hunger and food insecurity (Minde et al., 2008). 
In its initial couple of years, specifically from 2005/06 to 2007/08, FISP had a positive 
impact on maize production and productivity. The School of Oriental and African Studies et al. 
(2008) reviewed the existing studies and concluded that increases of 12, 15, and 18 kg of maize 
harvest per kg used of nitrogenous fertiliser were reasonable estimates of the responses of local 
(traditional), open-pollinated varieties (OPV) and hybrid varieties respectively, under reasonable 
farmer management. Further gains of 100 kg and 200 kg per ha. for OPV and hybrid varieties 
were made over local varieties without applying fertiliser. Other studies suggest that the receipt 
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of subsidized fertiliser had a statistically significant positive impact on food consumption (Holden 
and Lunduka, 2010; Chirwa et al., 2011a). Holden and Lunduka (ibid.) suggest that 66 per cent 
of households reported improved household food security from receiving subsidies and 30 per 
cent of households reported that the receipt of subsidies increased maize consumption. 
As regards the impact on income poverty, Dorward and Chirwa (2013) suggest on the basis 
of informal rural economy modelling6 that the receipt of subsidies increased the household income 
of all households in the Shire Highlands by 7 per cent, with lower gains (around 4 per cent) in the 
less poor Kasungu-Lilongwe Plains area. This corroborates the improvement of subjective well-
being due to receipt of subsidies found by Chirwa (2011a), which suggests that by using indicators 
for subjective well-being, the mean value increased from 1.66 in 2004/05 to 2.347  in 2011/12. 
As to the wider impact on the economy, several studies using computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) and partial equilibrium models suggest that increased maize production due 
to the increased input use from FISP lowered maize prices. Dorward and Chirwa (2013) suggest 
that an aggregate production increase led to lower maize prices, by which median prices fell by 
from 8 per cent to 40 per cent in different scenarios. Increased labour demand due to the increased 
input use raised rural agricultural wages. The School of Oriental and African Studies (2008) report 
that median daily wage rates rose by 33 per cent from 2005/06 to 2006/07, which corroborates 
results from focus group discussions and key informant interviews. Chirwa et al. (2011a) find that 
nominal wages have increased since 2009. Coupled with falling maize prices, this implies that the 
real wage rate has increased. Ricker-Gilbert (2011) finds a large contraction in the labour supply 
from 2006/07 to 2008/09, from which the increase in wage rate would be expected. The reduction 
in maize prices and the rise in wage rates increased maize purchasing power by 47 per cent 
between January 2009 and January 2010 (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013: 156). 
Using data from the 2011/12 Integrated Household Survey, Chirwa and Dorward (2013) 
suggest that there was some displacement of commercial fertiliser by subsidy recipient 
households from 2009/10 to 2010/11; this was also due to the substantial increase in input prices 
during that period. Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2011) find that the displacement rate was 22 per cent on 
average, with a higher rate for non-poor households (30 per cent) than for poor households (18 
per cent), by allowing for changes in the price of fertiliser and maize or tobacco. Displacement of 
seeds was reported to be higher by Mason and Ricker-Gilbert (2011: 19), who found a 56 per cent 
displacement of seeds from 2006/07 to 2008/09 from nationally representative Agricultural Input 
Support Surveys. With this displacement, Chirwa and Dorward (2013) suggest that in the   short 
term the subsidy had a negative effect on the input market, but due to the increased demand for 
 
6 The model of household and rural economy modelling, which is developed by simulating standard 
household/livelihood model structures and aggregating them in the rural maize and labour markets. 
7 Household’s own valuation of the level of overall satisfaction with life ranging from 1 as the poorest, 6 
as the richest. 
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inputs brought about by subsidies in the medium to long term they appear to have been catalytic 
in raising demand for inputs. 
 
2-3-2. Zambia 
Since the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme, various fertiliser subsidy 
programmes have been implemented: the Fertiliser Credit Programme starting in 1997 which 
targeted small-scale farmers; the Food Security Pack Programme, a 100 per cent grant to 
‘empower … households to be self-sustaining’; the Fertiliser Support Programme which has had 
large-scale coverage of the country since 2002/03 and was enabled by donors’ support for the 
General Budget Support, as well as the price boom in copper and other commodities; and the 
Farmer Input Support Programme since 2009/10, in which the content of the input pack was 
halved to 200 kg of fertiliser and 10 kg of hybrid maize seed (Mason et al., 2013). Existing studies 
suggest that 90 per cent of the subsidy budget was going to the Farmer Input Support Programme, 
with the rest going to the Food Security Pack Programme. 
Although it operates on a smaller scale, the Food Security Pack has similar characteristics to 
a ‘market-smart’ subsidy. It provides inputs for 0.25 ha. of production of maize, cassava or sweet 
potato, and of legume. It is designed to optimise the natural soil balance and fulfil the food 
requirements of resource-poor households (Jorgensen and Loudjeva, 2005). To improve 
sustainability, the packs are provided free in the first year of receipt, but after the first couple of 
years farmers are expected to pay 50 per cent of the value in kind after harvest, with the proceeds 
partly stored to ensure food security and partly sold to finance public works (ibid.). Pack 
distribution is managed by a NGO, which selects the geographical area in which the local 
committee established for the programme selects the beneficiary farmers. However, targeting has 
been often affected by elite capture and by the widespread splitting and sharing of packs (ibid.). 
The Fertiliser Support Programme started in 2002 and operated on an increasingly large 
scale, its beneficiaries rising from 120,000 to 500,000 farmers in 2009/10. Fertiliser support 
programme renamed Farmer Input Support Programme since 2009, with the contents of the 
programme remained the same. The subsidy value rose from 50 per cent to 75 per cent of input 
costs. The fertiliser was procured by contracted private suppliers and distributed through 
cooperatives. The objective of the programme changed over time. At first, it aimed to assist 
smallholders to access inputs in remote areas where the private sector does not operate. Later, 
private sector market and service expansion were stressed as objectives. The beneficiary criteria 
are having at least 1 ~ 5 ha. of land and the capacity to cultivate maize and other crops on that area. 
It has been claimed that these criteria exclude the poorest farmers who own less than 1 ha. (40 per 
cent of total farmers (Weber, 2008) cited by (Minde et al., 2008)). Minde et al. (ibid.) find that 
from 2003/04 to 2007/08 the programme targeted wealthier farmers. However, they find that 
small farmers, with 1.7–5 ha. of the land, had the biggest marginal productivity. The 
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displacement of previously purchased inputs was found more among large-scale farmers than 
smallholder farmers. 
Studies find that the receipt of the subsidy had a positive significant impact on the fertiliser 
application rate, the maize area planted, yields and output (Xu et al., 2009b; Mason et al., 2013). 
However, Xu et al. (2009b) suggest that farmers in Zambia may lack incentives to purchase 
commercial fertilisers even when they have capacity to do so. There was a positive spill over effect 
on the yields and output of other crops, although the size of the impact was less than half that on 
maize (Mason et al., 2013: 623). The cultivation of maize was expanded into areas previously left 
fallow, which goes against conventional wisdom in Zambia. One kg increase in subsidized 
fertiliser raises maize production by 1.88 kg on average (Mason et al., 2013: 624). The relatively 
low response rate to input use was explained by the crowding out of previously purchased inputs, 
high level of soil acidity, and late delivery of vouchers. 
Existing studies suggest that the benefit from receiving fertiliser does not outweigh the cost 
of the programme (Mason et al., 2013; Mason and Smale, 2013). The benefit-cost ratio from 
receiving the seed component of the programme cannot be discerned from the existing studies8. 
These studies thus raise concerns about the effectiveness of the programme. 
 
2-3-3. Ghana 
Prior to the Structural Adjustment Programme which was launched in 1983¸the Ghanaian 
government operated several subsidy programmes, including agricultural inputs such as fertilisers 
and seeds. However, there were problems of late delivery, delivery of insufficient amount and 
inappropriate fertilisers, leakage to unintended beneficiaries, rent-seeking behaviours and 
political manipulation, as seen in other SSA countries. 
In order to curb the negative effects from the food and input price crisis in 2008, the Ghanaian 
government launched a fertiliser subsidy programme. The programme adopted the ‘best practice’ 
of the market-smart subsidy (Banful, 2010): farmers received region-specific or fertiliser-
specific vouchers with which they could buy fertilisers if agents accepted the vouchers. 
Vouchers were then redeemed by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture via a fertiliser importer. 
However, it was revealed that only 11 per cent of retailers had links with fertiliser importers, 
which limited the number of retailers participating in the programme. Only 30 per cent of the 
retailers participated, some of whom did not have links to the importers and therefore asked for 
redemption through the other retailers. Furthermore, the concentration of retailers who had links 
to retailers coincided with the concentration of the input supply network, which undermined 
 
8 Although Mason et al. (2013) suggest that Mason and Smale (2013) find that the benefit of receiving 
subsidised maize seed outweighs the cost, the author cannot find the evidence to prove this assertion. 
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competition among input suppliers and allowed for price collusion, etc. 
Banful (2010) also suggests that in 2008, an election year, voucher distribution was 
politically manipulated: more vouchers were distributed to the regions which had supported 
opposition parties in the previous election. It was implemented as a one-year programme, but has 
continued every year, except for 2014, being revived again in 2015. Yawson et al. (2010) find 
that there were challenges in the improvement of the distribution of coupons and fertilisers to 
ensure the higher effectiveness of fertilisers, and that price and non-price factors constrained 
farmers in participating in the programme, leading to few farmers actually benefitting from it. 
 
2-3-4. Nigeria 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa (177.5 million in 2014) and since the 1960s 
petroleum has accounted for a major part (75 per cent) of government revenues (World Bank, 
2015b). Nigeria is one of the few countries in SSA which produces nitrogenous and phosphorous 
fertilisers (Mogues et al., 2008). Due to its size, Nigeria alone accounted for 23 per cent of 
fertiliser consumption in sub-Saharan Africa in 2008/09 (Groot, 2009). Most of the population is 
engaged in agriculture, whose productivity is still low. One of the reasons for this low productivity 
is that fertiliser use has remained limited (17.8 kg per ha.) (World Bank, 2015b). Banful et al. 
(2010) suggest that this low use of fertiliser was not because farmers could not afford it or lacked 
knowledge about its use, but because the government’s village extension agents, the main input 
providers to the farmers, have few staff, and lack knowledge about fertilisers and improved seeds. 
Nigeria started its large-scale fertiliser subsidy programme in the 1970s in order to 
increase agricultural productivity and improve food security. The level of subsidy was high, 
reaching 86 per cent of the market price for Urea in 1992 (Mogues et al., 2008); however, there 
were reports of a high percentage of diversion from the intended beneficiaries, late delivery and 
low quality (Nagy and Edun, 2002; Banful and Olayide, 2010). 
The government continued to procure and distribute subsidised fertilizers up to 2011. From 
the 1980s to 1996, fertiliser procurement and distribution were exclusively conducted by the 
federal government. Pan-territorial prices were set; that is, each type of fertiliser was sold at the 
same price throughout the country. Following many years of poor performance and an 
unsustainably high fiscal cost, fertiliser markets were partially liberalised in 1996 when a few 
private companies entered the market and the subsidies were shared between federal and state 
governments (Mogues et al., 2008). However, federal government is still responsible for most of 
the country’s fertiliser procurement and distribution and different states apply different amounts 
to the subsidy so that the subsidy component in their retail price varies throughout the country. 
During the period between 2001 and 2005, fertiliser subsidies accounted for 42 per cent of total 
federal capital spending on agriculture (ibid.).  
A pilot programme using a paper voucher system was conducted from 2009 to 2011. A 
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study of two regions found that beneficiaries tended to be poorer and that there was a crowd-in 
effect whereby the recipient farmers bought more private inputs than before (Liverpool-Tasie 
(2012b). The new government launched the Agricultural Transformation Agenda in 2012. This 
includes the Growth-Enhancement Support Scheme, which aims to provide subsidy to a targeted 
5 million farmers each year over four years by using e-vouchers through mobile phones across 
the whole country. Procurement and distribution were shifted to the private sector (Federal 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 2015). The programme seemed to bring about a 
steep increase in fertiliser use per ha., and it was reported that the targeting of poor farmers had 
succeeded in reducing leakages during distribution (Liverpool-Tasie and Takeshima, 2013). 
 
2-3-5. Tanzania 
Tanzanian food policy has evolved around the principle that staple food was situated among 
‘strategic commodities’ and that people recognised that the access to their own food was one of 
their ‘natural rights’ (Bryceson, 1993: 3). In 1967, Tanzania announced that it was adopting 
African socialism in the Arusha Declaration. Since the early 1970s, villagisation started to 
facilitate the distribution of productive and social service infrastructure, including providing 
inputs such as tractors and fertilisers to the ujamaa villages to which people were forced to 
migrate. Fertiliser importation and marketing has been monopolised by the government. 
Farmers in the Southern Highlands, traditionally the ‘bread-basket’ region of the country, 
including the Ruvuma region, benefitted from fertiliser subsidies from 1973 to 1983 and the pan- 
territorial maize pricing of the National Maize Corporation (NMC). In 1973/74, the National 
Maize Production Programme started to provide free improved inputs to 13 regions using 
cooperatives as distribution agents. This was followed by the National Maize Project, providing 
the input packages, targeting suitable maize-growing areas in 10 regions in 1975 and financed by 
the World Bank. This programme initially offered a 50 per cent subsidy to be reduced over time. 
With the low repayment rate made, the programme coverage was reduced to the six most suitable 
regions for maize production, and loan interest was introduced. At the completion of the 
programme in 1982, about 50 per cent of the loans and interest provided during the period were 
found to be unpaid. However, a visible positive impact was seen in Ruvuma, Mbeya and Rukwa, 
where marketed maize more than doubled. The ‘Big Four’ regions (Iringa, Mbeya, Ruvuma, and 
Rukuwa) benefitted from the programme, having received 59 per cent of countrywide distribution, 
and became the NMC’s main supply areas. 
However, because of corruption, frequent delays in delivery and fertiliser shortages the 
subsidy was not effective (Minot, 2009). Due to the adverse effects of drought in 1971/72, an oil 
price shock in 1973 and more droughts in 1974, the country faced food insecurity. Within the 
agriculture sector, the volume of exports decreased substantially, accompanied by deteriorating 
terms of trade resulting in a decline in export revenue (Wangwe, 1987). Due to the economic 
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crisis since 1983, liberalisation of the agricultural market began, including the liberalisation of 
the input market and the phase-out of fertiliser subsidies by 1994. Cooksey (2012) suggests that 
there was only modest effect on maize yields for there was previous low input use and inefficient 
use of fertilisers even during the period of subsidies. 
In 2000/01, Tanzania developed its Poverty Reduction Strategy as a condition of receiving 
aid cancellation under the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. It also started to 
receive General Budget Support, which enabled the government to have financial liquidity. In 
2003/04, the Tanzanian government reintroduced input transport subsidies which provide 
subsides to transport companies for delivering certain amount of inputs to the villages to promote 
the adoption of technology. The reintroduction of subsidies was met with deep concerns by donors, 
civil society and researchers because of the history of inefficiency and ineffectiveness. It was later 
found that the intended amount of subsidised inputs was not delivered to the villages, due to the 
misbehaviour of the contractors. The programme was therefore gradually scaled down by the year 
2007. 
Ex-parastatal agencies such as the Tanzania Fertilizer Company (TFC) may sometimes be 
given a special mandate by the government in times of crisis such as drought. For example, in 
early 2008 when input prices rose sharply, the government asked the TFC to buy Urea at a high 
price in order to meet demand. Later that year input prices declined sharply, so the TFC could not 
compete with other input supplier companies who purchased inputs more cheaply after the crisis 
ended. The TFC therefore took out a substantial loan from the banks for that year, which they 
were still repaying at the time of my research at the end of 2012. 
In the face of the food and input price crisis, the Tanzanian government approached donors 
for a project to curb the risk of food insecurity, especially that of vulnerable people, to which the 
World Bank responded in 2009 with the introduction of a ‘market-smart’ subsidy, the National 
Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS). The NAIVS aims for national and household food 
security by targeting small-scale farmers, learning from the successful experiences in Malawi. 
The details of the programme design and implementation are explained and discussed from 
Chapter 4 to Chapter 8. 
 
2-4.     Conclusion 
In this chapter, I first reviewed the history of input subsidies of SSA: how some SSA countries 
have reintroduced input subsidies after the Structural Adjustment Programmes and later adopted 
‘market-smart’ subsidies. Input subsidies were first removed during the Structural Adjustment 
Programme because they were very inefficient: as they were expensive, suffered high leakage 
to wealthier farmers, caused market distortion, and were relatively ineffective, providing low 
increase in yields and low or even negative benefit-cost ratios. However, in the liberalised markets, 
farmers, especially small-scale poorer farmers, were struggling to access inputs at full market 
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prices. This difficulty was exacerbated by market failures, as markets tended to be thin and 
fragmented in rural areas. Meanwhile, in Zambia, due to the frequent severe droughts and threats 
to food insecurity, input subsidies continued even during the periods of structural adjustment. 
Also due to the food security concern and for intention to buy political support from farmers, SSA 
governments reintroduced the input subsidy programmes. From the reported success of Malawi’s 
FISP many SSA countries adopted ‘market-smart’ subsidies, which was facilitated by the debt 
cancellation under HIPC initiatives and the discretionary funds made available from General 
Budget Support. At least eight SSA governments have adopted ‘market-smart’ subsidies since 
then, and since the food and input price crisis in 2008, donors have started to support them. 
Secondly, I reviewed the features of design and implementation of these programmes, how 
these affected the outcomes and the challenges to improvement. These programmes were reported 
to be generally successful in achieving increased input use, maize production, maize yields and 
food security under favourable economic and weather conditions, and in promoting private rural 
input business. A fall in maize prices and an increase in local agricultural wages were also reported 
in Malawi and our study in the Ruvuma region, which would benefit labour-surplus smallholder 
farmer households (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013). However, studies reported that unclear 
programme objectives and the various implementation problems prevented the programme from 
being effective and efficient. 
A challenge exists to make clear the programme objectives, whether these are higher 
national food crop production for national food security, or the increased use of inputs by poor, 
small-scale farmers for household-level food security. In the programmes recently implemented, 
these two objectives run alongside each other, but are often contradictory. Which objective would 
increase marginal productivity more significantly would differ from case to case. However, in 
order to raise its effectiveness, each programme should clearly state its primary objective and 
have an adequate design and implementation plan to achieve it. 
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Chapter 3. Analytical Framework and Research Methodology 
 
3-1. Introduction 
‘Development interventions deliver inputs or resources through a process or modality that 
generates outcomes leading to short- and long-term impacts, some intended, others unforeseen’ 
(Devereux and Roelen, 2015: 150). The National Agricultural Input Voucher (NAIVS) 
programme is based on a theory of change as it wants to bring expected changes to outcomes and 
people’s attitudes. Theory of change is ‘a comprehensive description and illustration on how and 
why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context’ (Center for Theory of Change, 
2015). However, the input subsidy programmes often do not work as intended, due to unforeseen 
causes and the socio-economic and political power relations between actors. Conversely, the 
programme effects changes in socio-political relations among actors. An actor-oriented approach 
(Long, 1990) which was adopted to analyse the social and political relations of the actors related 
to the development project could be applied to the analysis of the input subsidy programmes. 
In this chapter, I will first present the analytical framework of NAIVS’ theory of change 
by using economic theories. After that, I will present the analytical framework of how NAIVS 
affected social relations using an actor-oriented approach, as the provision of inputs influenced 
the different agencies to interact with each other, and changed social relations. This change of 
relations also affected the impact of NAIVS on various aspects. In order to answer the research 
question stated in Chapter 1, I will then explain the research methodology and the reasons for 
using mixed methods, followed by a description of the challenges experienced in the fieldwork. 
 
3-2. Analytical framework 
3-2-1. Theory of change of NAIVS 
The theory of change of NAIVS was developed by referring to the existing studies on input 
subsidy programmes, including those by Chirwa and Dorward (2013), Ellis et al. (2009), several 
studies on the impact of Malawi’s programme (Chibwana et al., 2011; Holden and Lunduka, 2011; 
Lunduka et al., 2013), and Devereux and Roelen (2015) (Figure 2). It is developed based on 
economic theories and programme processes. The hypothesis of the framework is as follows: if 
farmers receive and use subsidised inputs, they will increase maize / rice yields9 and production, 
which will then enable them to increase crop income and reduce income poverty. The subsidy for 
improved inputs (fertilisers and improved seeds) is provided as ‘inputs’ of the programme. 
 
 
9 As the programme targets mainly maize, hereafter it refers to maize. 
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Figure 2: Theory of Change of NAIVS 
Source: Author 
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The preconditions for the programme are based on the six capitals (human, social, financial, 
political, physical and natural), which are the important measurements of how the households 
have access to the programme and how it achieves the intended outcomes. The impact of the 
programme is determined by the process, that is, how it is designed and implemented. The 
outcome is the increase in maize yields and production. If maize yields and production are 
increased through the increased use of improved inputs, national and household food security 
are achieved as short- term impacts as long as weather and other economic conditions do not 
much change. As indirect impacts, the real maize producer price will become lower due to the 
increased maize production in the region; and agricultural wages will be higher because of the 
increased labour demand created by increased maize production. This makes a lower or higher 
real farm income for the net food-seller households, depending on the ratio of increased 
production and reduction of price, while it gives a higher real farm income for the net food-
buyer, labour-surplus households. And net food-seller labour-surplus households will benefit 
from increased maize production, lower real input prices and the higher agricultural real wage. If 
the programme continues in the long run, assets will accumulate. All these would be affected by 
the weather conditions, the input/output crop markets, food security policies and programmes 
and maize imports/exports. 
After three years of voucher receipt, recipient households may accumulate enough income 
to purchase commercial inputs and can then ‘exit’ the programme so that they continuously 
purchase inputs (fertilisers and improved seeds) by themselves. However, in order to achieve 
increased production, good agronomic practices and good weather (i.e., regular rainfall), stable 
input / output market prices, and sound food security policies such as trade policies and various 
taxes on crop marketing are required. Meanwhile, the programme might cause recipient 
households to focus on maize cropping, and cropping the same crop might in turn make them more 
vulnerable to weather shocks or soil degradation. 
As regards input use, in the less developed countries where the input use is low, the 
provision of subsidised inputs increased the input supply in the area. Although the programme 
increased input demand, its demand response was slower than the increased input supply brought 
about by the programme. This lowered the real input prices. The lower input price will bring 
benefits to the non-recipients as well and promotes spill-over effect. The programme also 
promotes private input business in rural areas due to increased demand: given the lower real input 
prices and greater knowledge of the positive effect of inputs on increase in yields, the recipient 
households will take up subsidised / commercial inputs in the next season. 
There are, however, conditions to achieve the realisation of each step of this hypothesis. 
As process factors, unless the subsidy recipients are initially poor and did not previously use the 
improved inputs, the programme may bring about a displacement of commercial input purchase 
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and thus increased maize yields may not be achieved. Furthermore, if some subsidies are 
sold/given to better-off farmers or to the agro-dealers without being used for input sales, then 
maize yields may not increase. Studies on input subsidies (Morris et al., 2007; Chirwa and 
Dorward, 2013; Jayne and Rashid, 2013) suggest that the programmes were ineffective because 
of displacement, fraud and elite capture in voucher distribution. 
From outcomes to short-term impacts, household food security through increased maize 
yields and production also depends on the production of other crops, crop market prices and non- 
farm income. Under the liberalised open market, the price at which maize producers sell their 
crop may depend on international maize prices. Agricultural wages depend on weather and other 
economic conditions. The hypothesised long-term asset accumulation would therefore also 
depend on various factors, including economic and weather conditions, other crops’ markets, non- 
farm opportunities, etc. 
Measuring income poverty reflects the volatility of income/consumption; meanwhile, 
illiteracy, stunting, and other indicators of access to assets provide more insight into the past 
(Howe and McKay, 2007). I will therefore assess the change not only in household consumption, 
but also in household assets, which is mostly correlated to household consumption in Household 
Budget Survey in Tanzania, according to the Poverty Score Card for Tanzania (Shreiner, 2013). 
This takes into account such items as ownership of tables, radio, a bicycle/motor bike/vehicle and 
a modern roof. As regards household assets, as sending children to school is an important 
measurement for inter-generational poverty, and since I heard in the villages that there are many 
financial obstacles preventing poor farmers from doing so, I measure the change in their capability 
for sending school-age children (aged 6 – 17 years) to school. 
The capitals listed above also imply the power to act and reproduce, and challenge or 
change the rules that govern the control, use and transformation of resources (Bebbington, 1999). 
The framework in the next section incorporates the analysis of the social, economic and political 
relationships that create poverty and wealth. With a lack of effective public and private institutions 
in rural areas, informal networks using their social capital are an important mechanism through 
which households and individuals can access resources. 
 
3-2-2. Analytical framework for NAIVS’s social relations 
Figure 3 shows how NAIVS affected and was affected by social relations. The framework is based 
on the actor-oriented approach, where ‘agencies’ interact with each other. The notion of agency 
‘attributes to the individual actors the capacity to process social experience and to devise ways of 
coping with life, even under the most extreme forms of coercion’ (Long, 1990: 8), and has what 
Giddens (1979) calls a ‘transformative capability’ from bottom-up. I use this approach for the 
analytical framework firstly because actors interact with each other and reshape social relations 
due to the programme implementation; and secondly because I am looking at the impact of the 
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programme on small-scale, normally powerless, farmers and this approach provides a social and 
political context to look at development programmes (Biggs and Matsaert, 2014). Devereux and 
Roelen (2015) suggest that the impact of development programmes in general is affected by social 
relations, and that, conversely, it affects social relations. This dynamic impinges on the impacts, 
and thus in examining the impact of the programme, an accompanying analysis of social relations 
is necessary. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Analytical framework: NAIVS’s impact on social relations 
Note: Straight arrow: Input flow 
Dotted line: Relationship 
Width of arrows: Bolder the stronger the relationship 
IFIs: International Financial Institutions 
ASDP: Agricultural Sector Development Programme 
Source: Author 
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political economy (Bernstein, 2010). By modelling agricultural policies Brooks et al. (2008) also 
found that input supplier companies have most of the benefit which does not go down to the 
farmers. NAIVS has impacted on the social relations of related actors as described below. 
The World Bank supported the Tanzanian Government in formulating, designing and 
implementing NAIVS and Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), other poverty-eradicating 
intervention, which supports vulnerable communities in such ways as constructing irrigation 
facilities and providing credit to poor and vulnerable households. Other aid agencies supported 
the government with the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP), which 
complements the NAIVS programme by strengthening the capacities of district governments, 
strengthening extension services and encouraging productivity through constructing irrigation 
facilities, and commercialisation. Under NAIVS, foreign, sometimes multinational input supplier 
companies sell inputs to national input traders, where transport companies transport them to the 
regions. 
The NAIVS programme document suggests that fertiliser prices would rise as the 
economic situation revives and fuel prices rise, and due to the lagging expansion capacities for 
fertiliser production (World Bank, 2009a: 8, 41). In the international fertiliser market, a few 
countries, and a few companies within those countries, occupy a major market share and can thus 
raise input prices. For Urea, to give one example, the top five producing countries have 60 per 
cent of the market share, and the top four firms occupy more than 50 per cent in most of these 
countries (Hernandez and Torero, 2013). This price-setting process and rising input prices in the 
international market runs through the elites: government bureaucrats; politicians at national and 
local levels, and village elites and the agro-dealers assigned for input deliveries. Among the 
former there is a patron-client relationship (Fjeldstad et al., 2003; Cooksey, 2012), whereby the 
ex-tribal chief or higher level politicians command power over their subordinates, who promise 
support in return for vouchers.  
Among farmers, wealthier farmers obtain most of the subsidised inputs because of 
affordability and their social and political power while small-scale farmers can’t afford. Female 
farmers and those belonging to less powerful tribal groups tend to be left out of the programme’s 
benefits. The strong power of foreign input supplier companies and the subsequent actors in the 
input supply chain to NAIVS was assured by the increase in the demand for inputs which the 
programme itself brought about, and the concentration of global input suppliers. Meanwhile, elite 
capture and the targeting of middle-scale farmers excluded small-scale farmers, increasing the 
gap between the two groups. It thus increased the inequality of socio-economic power between 
every rung of the ladder from foreign input suppliers to small-scale farmers (Figure 3). 
The existing studies suggest an inequality of power among actors in the programme. In 
his study of NAIVS, Cooksey suggests that ‘a concerted attempt by higher levels of the 
administration to curb abuses of the inputs distribution system at lower levels (…) might serve to 
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reduce the number of beneficiaries and increase the frustration of those left out’ (Cooksey, 2012: 
19). This indicates that a high ratio of vouchers is retained by the higher cadre of government, 
reducing the number of vouchers reaching the farmers. Having collected opinions from various 
parts of the country, the MKUKUTA (Swahili acronym for National Strategy for Growth and 
Reduction of Poverty) Monitoring System (2007) similarly reported that farmers mentioned that 
the least poor benefitted from the government’s supply of fertilisers and seeds. 
In the villages, the implementation of NAIVS also affected social relations between 
recipients and non-recipients, village leaders and farmers, male-heads and female-heads of 
households, and older-heads and younger-heads of households. NAIVS was designed to target 
small-scale farmers for three consecutive years. These intended recipients might then be in a 
position to change power relationships. However, it would provoke jealousy among poor recipient 
farmers, and tension between recipients and non-recipients. Furthermore, if village leaders limited 
the distribution of vouchers to only a few of their friends for all three years, farmers would know 
of this and the fraud would incite their jealousy or anger. NAIVS targeted female-headed 
households as a priority because they are normally poor and vulnerable. However, given that it 
operated in a patriarchal society where discrimination against female-headed households is so 
obvious that women do not even have access to land, giving subsidies to female-headed 
households might provoke jealousy or even anger among poor male-, or even all male-, household 
heads, which might prevent the female-headed households benefitting from the programme. 
NAIVS targeted vulnerable households, including elderly-household heads. As seen in 
the salutation towards the elderly in Tanzania, which is ‘shikamoo (‘Hello’ to elderly in Swahili), 
the elderly are respected in Tanzanian culture. However, they cannot work as hard as younger 
people as they tend not to be healthy or mobile, and they farm in a more conservative style and 
tend not to be willing to take modern technology and thus tend to be poor. They tend to have 
more household members who support them, but when they receive subsidies as they have less 
physical capacity and knowledge on inputs, they might therefore give the inputs to their children, 
or the children might receive vouchers and return to the elderly members with a harvest. If 
elderly recipients give subsidised inputs to siblings they maintain power in the households but 
the children who actually cultivate the harvest might do all the decision-making. I will use panel 
survey and key-informant interviews to investigate these issues. 
 
3-3. Reason for using mixed methods 
In the last decade, the mixed-methods approach has received flourishing attention in practising 
social research, especially as regards poverty analysis (Kanbur, 2001; Shaffer, 2013; Roelen and 
Camfield, 2015). Various journals on the topic have emerged, including the Journal of Mixed 
Method Research and the International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches; and the 
Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioural Research (Tashakkori and Teddle, 2003) 
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have been published. ‘Triangulation’ is the widely-cited rationale for a multi-method approach 
(Denzin, 1989). Although combining approaches does not ensure validity, it examines different 
aspects of the same problem (Brannen, 2009), it can produce a fuller, more multidimensional 
account of social phenomena (Fielding and Fielding, 1986), and give both depth and breadth to 
research findings by drawing upon the different strengths of various applications (Fahmy et al., 
2015). 
Several studies (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Jayne et al., 2013; Jayne and Rashid, 2013) 
suggest that the subsidy programmes in SSA in general were flawed by elite capture and a lack 
of implementation capacity. A mixed- method investigation is required in order to see how the 
vouchers were distributed, which might have affected the impact of the programme. Mixed 
methods could provide detailed contextual information as to why and how the expected 
hypothesis on the theory of change was not borne out, such as why and how small-scale farmers 
did not get vouchers; why and how maize yields and / or input use by farmers did or did not 
increase; how household food security was or was not achieved, etc. 
Mixed methods could also provide information on the social and political relations of actors 
related to the programme, which will shed light on social dynamics. These social and political 
relations might have been affected by the programme but they are also key in explaining the 
programme’s impacts (Devereux and Roelen, 2015). 
 
3-4. Research methodology 
My research uses mixed methods and is both qualitative and quantitative. Firstly, I conducted 
qualitative interviews, namely key-informant interviews, farmer group discussions and village 
meetings to explore the context of the voucher programme and its management. Secondly, I 
conducted a panel survey of four rounds, based on the panel data of three rounds (in 2004, 2005, 
and 2009), which had been developed by the World Bank10, to which I added one round (in 2013) 
of panel data. I revised and added to the original panel survey questionnaires developed by World 
Bank, especially in the input voucher section. Other quantitative data was then collected from the 
government and other sources. I combined the findings of all these methods, giving equal 
importance to each, to investigate the causal relations of the impacts of the programme, as well 
as to analyse changes in social and political relations. 
 
3-4-1. Qualitative research 
My qualitative data consisted of 113 semi-structured key-informant interviews, four farmer group  
 
 
10 World Bank ‘Household vulnerability panel’ (Christiaensen, L. and Sarris, A. (2007a) Household 
Vulnerability and Insurance Against Commodity Risk: Evidence from Rural Tanzania, Vol. FAO 
Commodities and Trade Technical Paper No. 10.) 
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discussions, five Village Voucher Committee (VVC) member group interviews, and ten extensive 
village meetings, which was undertaken mainly in Songea district, Mbinga, and, to a lesser extent, 
in Tunduru and Namtumbo, the latter two were in charge of another supervisor in the survey who 
provided information on field notes and observations (Appendix 1). Key informants are MAFC 
officers (9 interviews), village chairman (22 interviews), farmers (15 interviews), village/ward 
executive officers (14 interviews), VVC members (13 interviews), village/ward agricultural 
extension officers (12 interviews), agro-dealers (7 interviews), private companies/agencies (6 
interviews), local government agriculture officers (4 interviews), international organisation 
officers (3 interviews), NGOs (3 interviews), University professors (2 interviews), local 
government officer (1 interview), and a farmer association official (1 interview). The research 
topics were the participants’ knowledge, experiences, evaluation and opinions of the programme, 
and voucher distribution and management (Appendix 2). I organised groups in three villages in 
three districts of recipient / non-recipient households in the pilot year with different household 
incomes (wealthier, middle-income, and poorer) in Round 3 data. However, I then found out that 
the voucher experience had changed: non-recipient households in the pilot year had mostly 
become later recipient households and their reported income status in Round 3 did not seem to 
reflect their real income at the time of the Round 4 survey. Thus the ‘intended’ focus group 
recipients / non-recipients discussion became simply group interviews with a mixed farmer group. 
Extensive village meetings were conducted with village key informants, along with the 
panel village survey, where I asked the same questions on their experiences, opinions and 
evaluation of the programme, and obtained many opinions and comments. I also interviewed key 
stakeholders, i.e., local government agricultural officials, the Village Executive Officer (VEO), 
the village chairman, the chairman and other members of the VVC, and agro-dealers. During the 
second part of my research – the panel survey – while enumerators were conducting panel 
household surveys, I conducted key-informant interviews with purposive sampling, mainly with 
the village elites –the village chairman, the VEO, the chairman of the VVC, and Ward/Village 
agricultural officials, in order to obtain general contextual information in the villages. Sometimes 
farmers also asked me to interview them, as they wanted to talk about corruption in the village. 
For the protection of privacy, the village names are anonymised. 
 
3-4-1-1. Reflexivity and limitation 
When I conducted the fieldwork, especially in the qualitative research, I had to recognise my 
positionality and limitation in interpreting the meaning of people’s behaviour and practices. I am 
an outsider to Tanzanian nationals, being a Japanese female researcher. Being an outsider in the 
society gives advantages and disadvantages in doing research: the advantage comes from being 
able to be objective about the norms and practices which people inside the society take for granted. 
Insiders tend to dismiss the nature of these norms and practices whereas an outsider can catch and 
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objectify them. The disadvantage comes from not being able to capture the subtleties of people’s 
behaviour and what they truly meant in the interview and other occasions in the fieldwork, as 
these meanings are culturally embedded. I sometimes felt that there were some invisible barriers 
between the participants and myself, which limited my capacity to capture the meaning of their 
words and behaviours for my research. Furthermore, in a patriarchal African society like Tanzania, 
where men have power over women, and being an outsider researcher, a challenge is posed by 
male interviewees’ disrespect for female researchers, or more by male researcher assistants, which 
sometimes hindered the smooth interviews and fieldwork. As a female, it was sometimes difficult 
for me to exercise control over male research assistants. Based on my positionality as outlined 
above, I will reflect on what I have observed. I will recognise the data limitations from being an 
outsider. 
Swahili – a foreign language for me - also made it difficult to conduct fieldwork. In the 
first part of my research, I asked for a translator in the interviews. I then felt some barriers had 
been erected and was frustrated when I felt that the translators did not translate word by word the 
interviewees used, although I asked the translator to translate each word literally. These feelings 
on my part lessened in the second part of my research, when I was doing interviews myself with 
the support of a driver, who knows English to some extent and supported me by translating only 
when needed, as by that time I had become more conversant with Swahili and felt more familiar 
with the local people’s culture and lives. Even then, however, I felt some barriers were still 
preventing me from fully understanding the meaning of people’s behaviours and words. That is 
also the limitation of my qualitative research. 
 
3-4-2. Quantitative research 
 
3-4-2-1. Panel data 
My quantitative data is based on four rounds of the panel data in a nine-year period (2004 – 2013), 
among which up to the third round of the panel (2004, 2005, and 2009) I obtained the data from 
the World Bank, and the fourth round I collected myself (2013). The original panel survey was 
intended to assess the potential for market-based insurance instruments to mitigate the household 
vulnerability of cash crop growers (Christiaensen and Sarris, 2007b). The original panel sample 
in Ruvuma covered 892 households in 36 villages, which are farmer-representative in Ruvuma 
with stratified random sampling (Sarris, 2004). In Round 3, the input voucher section was added 
as a part of the questionnaire in order to look at who was targeted in the pilot year (Christiaensen 
and Pan, 2009a). I obtained the panel data set of Rounds 1 to 3 with list of households and 
locations from World Bank researchers with the condition that I use only for academic purposes.  
I used the 144 households who reported having received vouchers in the pilot year in 
Round 3 as treatment households and 205 other households that reported that they had ‘not received 
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Voucher distribution 
vouchers’ or were ‘inapplicable to answer’, in the way that I picked up 1.5 times the number of 
other households as the recipient households from the respective villages as control households. 
This made a total of 34911  panel households in 33 villages.  
Since the objective of the original panel survey was to assess the viability of insurance 
mechanisms for cash crop growers, the selection of original panel sample villages was biased 
toward having more cash crop growing districts and villages than those where no cash crop was 
grown, whose bias I have to consider for analysing the data. 
The timings of NAIVS’ voucher distribution, panel survey period and qualitative research 
are shown in Figure 4. The harvest season for maize is from June to August. Each panel survey 
was conducted in the lean season, from February to April. Thus, Round 3 crop production data 
provide information for the previous agricultural season, that is, the year previous to the 
introduction of the pilot programme. Round 4 collects the data for the third year (without counting 
the pilot year) of the programme. I will refer to my Round 4 panel data as ‘Author’s data’ in this 
thesis. 
Panel survey 
 
 
Year 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3                                                       
 
Pilot 
 
Figure 4: Timing of NAIVS voucher distribution, panel survey and qualitative research 
Note: Line with both arrows suggests the agricultural season surveyed (November to June in the next year) 
Source: Author 
 
The household survey questionnaire covered household socio-demographic characteristics, 
activities of household members, off-farm income, household assets, land ownership and use, 
crop production, farm inputs, livestock production and sales, marketing of crops, extension, 
access to credit, shocks, household consumption expenditure by item, and extended information 
on experiences of input vouchers than the one in the questionnaire in 2009 (Appendix 3). The 
village survey questionnaire covered basic data: geographical and agro-ecological information, 
socio-economic information, information on shocks, labour and input-market information, and 
marketing information, as shown in Appendix 4. The questionnaire was translated into Swahili to 
conduct the survey. I employed the following survey team: 1 survey supervisor (I performed as 
another supervisor); 11 survey enumerators (including 1 district agricultural extension officer per  
 
11 Out of 349 households 309 households have the household consumption expenditure data, which 
would be used for the panel regression analysis. 
 
Round 4 
Agricultural season for survey  
Qualitative research 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
8 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
- 39 - 
 
district, totalling 4, and 7 others); 4 data enterers to the programme; 1 data programmer; and 6 
data entry checkers. 
Before conducting the survey, I carried out a three-day training for enumerators on the survey 
questionnaire, and piloted the survey in two villages, after which I modified the questionnaires in 
order to fit it in local context. After each day of survey, I checked the data for any gaps or problems 
of consistency and if necessary I asked enumerators to revisit households to revise them until the 
errors were corrected. After each day of survey, I also asked enumerators what they had perceived 
or understood from the survey or from the villagers, in order to get a better understanding of the 
contextual information. I cleaned data by the methodology seen in the Appendix 5. 
Table 2 shows the voucher receipt experience of the panel sample in each round and 
mobility from non-recipient to recipient households. Because of the problem of recalling, I use 
voucher receipt data from 2008/09, the pilot year of the programme from the data of Round 312. 
Since it was found out that the different households were selected each year, about half of non- 
recipients13 in Round 3 became recipients in Round 4; thus the ratio of households who ever 
received vouchers doubled, from a third to two-thirds. I will look into the characteristics of 
recipients and non-recipients in Round 3, and of the group changing from non-recipients to 
recipients in Round 4, in Chapter 6. 
 
Table 2: Recipient / non-recipient households of the panel sample households 
Voucher receipt Round 3 Change of voucher receipt during 
Round 3 and 4 
Round 4 
Recipient 103 - - 204 
 - Non-recipients
 
who became recipients 
101 - 
Non-recipient 206 - - 105 
Total 309 - - 309 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a) and Author’s data 
 
3-4-2-2. Data analysis 
For analysis of the impact of voucher receipt on maize yields, income poverty (household 
consumption), household assets and sending children to school, I will adopt the Difference-in- 
Difference methodology with Propensity Score Matching (Heckman et al., 1997; Khandker et al., 
2010). I will look at each of the difference-in-difference estimates of the voucher receipt of those 
recipient households who received vouchers in the pilot year, in 2010/11 or in any year of the 
programme, and of the ‘graduates’ who received vouchers for more than three years. I will also 
analyse the characteristics of each of these recipient households and those who were selected but 
did not receive vouchers in the pilot year, by using difference-in-difference estimates. In the  
12 There are some discrepancies between the data of Round 3 and Round 4 surveys. 
13 Includes households who answered “inapplicable”. 
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regression analysis, I will consider the endogeneity among independent variables and the error 
term (Heckman and Vytlacil, 1998; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011). 
 
3-5. Challenges in the fieldwork  
Other than being an outsider and a female researcher, other challenges existed in the fieldwork 
such as in the selection of enumerators with adequate capacities and qualities: even though these 
were introduced by the local government statistical agency as being ‘experienced’ in surveys, 
their quality was not guaranteed. Even with the training given to them and my own daily checks 
after they collected data, some of them did not learn from errors and made the same mistakes 
every day. Another issue was their lack of motivation to work properly. One, being sent to 
interview the household which runs the local pub, ended up drinking the local brew until evening. 
Another spent the whole day on the plot of an interviewee who grows drugs on the slope toward 
Lake Malawi14. After those incidents I had to ask them to leave the work, and then replaced them. 
Their poor performance might have been due to lack of incentives to do the work better because 
I was offering low pay. The reason I asked the local statistical agency to introduce their local 
enumerators was that I thought that they were experts in enumeration in household surveys and 
comprehension of local culture and tribal languages might be needed in the interviews. Actually, 
however, I found that almost all the interviewees could converse in Swahili so the enumerators 
did not need to be local personnel. I might have been able to hire more qualified, motivated and 
younger ones to work on my research. Another issue was the abstention of a local agricultural 
official from participating in enumeration. I asked district agricultural officers in charge of 
vouchers to take part in the survey team as enumerators, for they knew the people in the villages 
and the local farmers’ agronomic and voucher practices and conditions. I also expected that they 
would know what was happening with vouchers in these villages. However, after being trained, 
a district agriculture officer in charge of vouchers of District A did not show up in the survey 
activities. After a couple of days, he brought another officer who was not in charge of vouchers 
to take part in the survey. In the process we had had some disagreement, which he claimed was 
the reason that he wanted to leave the survey activities. However, I suspected that he did not want 
to be in the survey as he knew that farmers would be alleging fraud in voucher management. 
The rains and the remoteness of the area also made difficult our fieldwork. We went to the area 
near the border with Mozambique, or to the villages near Lake Malawi, where we had to find 
guest houses far from the villages being surveyed. Once, a female enumerator had to sleep in the 
car as there was no adequate room in the guest house in the village under survey. Muddy roads 
often hindered our fieldwork, and people and villagers had sometimes to help us rescue our  car  
 
14 Information from villagers. 
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from muddy holes. In one village we surveyed, we found a pick-up truck from the District Office 
and villagers seemed to get together in the meeting. I heard that magic-makers had created lions 
who were killing the livestock so District Officers came with guns to catch the lions, but failed, 
so they were discussing what to do with the magic- makers that created and controlled the lions. 
I was so surprised that all the villagers, even the District Officers, believed that magic-makers 
controlled lions. I felt that the remoteness influenced this belief.  
However, I do not think that it affected the content of the information which the 
interviewees provided for my research as this is not the sort of the issues concerning witches or 
magic makers. 
I took their consent to participate in the research by informing them of the research 
purposes and that their responses would be anonymous in my thesis. In almost all cases, they were 
willing to participate in my research, even happy for me to record the interviews. In one village, 
however, a survey team with another supervisor found that some of ‘the panel’ households to 
which they had asked village leaders to guide them were not real panel households, as the 
information on household members did not correspond to the previous panel data. They then 
asked the village leaders to find the right panel households, but not all of them could be found in 
the end. I suspect this might be due to the fact that village leaders did not want to disclose their 
illicit behaviours in voucher management and so guided the data collectors to the households of 
their ‘friends’ instead of the panel households. However, without their cooperation my fieldwork 
could not be conducted. 
 
3-6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I present the analytical framework of this thesis. My analytical framework is two- 
fold. One part is the theory of change, based on economic theories and programme processes 
which is explained in detail in the next Chapter. With prior assets and a food crisis as the 
preconditions, the improved inputs are provided as the programme inputs, with the NAIVS 
programme as the process, and increased maize yields and production as the outcome. This 
outcome may be affected by leakage to wealthier farmers, displacement of previous commercial 
input use, weather and input use efficiency. The programme aims to bring about increased 
national food security as well as increased household food security as a short-term impact, while 
indirect impacts should be lower real maize producer prices and increased agricultural labour 
wages. These would reduce real farm income for the majority of Ruvuma farmers, who are net 
food-seller households, but who also benefitted from increased maize production on the other 
hand, while increasing the income of poor net food-buyer, labour-surplus households. If the 
programme continues long-term, it will bring about the long-term impact of asset accumulation. 
All these impacts are affected by the national and international maize markets, maize import and 
export, and national food security policies, and also affect local maize and labour markets.  
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However, the real implementation of NAIVS was affected by the social and political 
relations of the actors, and the power relations among these actors. Another part of the framework 
therefore uses an actor-oriented approach, which analyses these social relations which might have 
also been affected by NAIVS. Most SSA countries import the majority of their inputs. Foreign 
input supplier companies supply inputs to these countries, to be imported by input traders and 
distributed to the regions by transport companies. With support from the World Bank and other 
aid agencies, the Tanzanian government provides input subsidies. These, however, sometimes are 
captured by elites (politicians or government officers) before reaching the intended beneficiaries. 
A rise in input prices, additional contributions requirement made to village leaders and late 
delivery of inputs/vouchers all made it difficult for small-scale farmers to benefit from subsidies, 
which were mostly obtained by middle-scale farmers or captured by village or upper-level 
government elites, in collusion with agro-dealers. Voucher distribution was also affected by 
gender and tribal issues, with women and minority tribal groups tending not to benefit. This 
caused an increasing gap between middle-scale farmers on the one hand, and small-scale and 
vulnerable (female-headed, minority group, elderly-headed, sick or disabled-headed, poorer) 
farmers on the other, and made it difficult for the latter group to step up out of poverty. In the 
globalised market economy, foreign input supplier companies have the most power, while small- 
scale and vulnerable farmers are the most powerless. The implementation of NAIVS was affected 
by this power relationship, and at the same time promoted it. 
I am using a mixed-methods approach in order to analyse in detail whether and how NAIVS 
worked to increase national and household food security in Tanzania, focusing on the Ruvuma 
region. For the quantitative research I will mainly use the panel data of four rounds, concentrating 
on rounds 3 and 4 which capture the agricultural data of the year previous to the pilot of NAIVS 
and its third year, respectively, in order to analyse the impact of NAIVS. The panel consists of 
349 households in 33 villages, two-thirds of which received the vouchers at least once, while others 
received none. I use Difference-in-Difference with Propensity Score Matching considering 
endogeneity for regression analysis. I will, however, recognise the data limitations of my research 
as this was a little skewed in order to have data from more cash crop growers in the panel sample. 
For the qualitative research, I will use information from 113 key-informant interviews, 
including 23 extensive interviews, four farmer group interviews and five group interviews with 
VVC members, ten extensive village meetings. The research topics were the participants’ 
knowledge, experiences, evaluation and opinions of the programme, and voucher distribution and 
management. I may also have limited information as an outsider and female researcher, and I will 
recognise this limitation in my qualitative research. 
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Chapter 4. The Tanzania NAIVS Programme: Intention, design and 
implementation 
 
Considering the subsidy as ‘money’, VVC members are changed every year (VVC 
chairman in Village L in Mbinga). 
 
If vouchers are used properly, they can improve [the farmer’s] life (Village chairman, 
Namtumbo). 
 
4-1. Introduction 
Executing a development project is a complex process. A development project is composed of 
activities, output, purpose, and goal (BOND, 2003; FAO Forestry department, 2015)15. Its cycle 
is flown from problem identification, formulation, implementation to evaluation, this being called 
project cycle management (FAO, 2001; EC, 2004). The proper development of a project requires 
a good project intension, design and framework (Figure 5), and good programme design is the 
key to successful programme implementation. 
Programming 
(Intention) 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation Formulation (Design) 
 
 
Implementation 
Figure 5: Project cycle management 
Source: Author modified from EC (2004) 
 
 
However, projects are sometimes not designed well if the targeted group is not clearly identified, 
as is the case with NAIVS. Good project implementation requires that institutions have sufficient 
capacity and that there is an enabling culture. Projects are also sometimes not properly 
implemented due to the failure to set up the institutions required; to those institutions’ lack of 
capacity to implement; or to lack of incentives for  
 
15 It is also expressed as activities, outputs, objectives and impact (COOP Africa and ILO Cooperative 
Programme (2010) Project design manual - A step-by-step tool to support the development of cooperatives 
and other forms of self-help organisation, Geneva: ILO.) 
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those individuals working for the projects or stakeholders who are affected by social norms, such 
as corruption. We now are talking about the programme on input subsidy. Here I define the 
programme composing of several projects. The programme also has the programme objective, 
design, implementation and evaluation. Thus here I now talk about the market-smart input subsidy 
programme, as it consists of the project of subsidy delivery, the one of training of agro-dealers, 
and/or of the monitoring and evaluation of these projects. 
Druille and Barreiro-Hurle (2012) mention that the subsidy programme design should be 
aligned with the programme objective and truly ‘market-smart’, which prevents market failure. A 
synthesis study on subsidies reports that the programme needs careful design and implementation, 
given that its cost sometimes exceeds benefits because of leakage to wealthier farmers, 
displacement of commercial purchase, and lack of accompanying output price support and good 
trade policies (Jayne and Rashid, 2013). 
In this chapter I will explore in detail how NAIVS evolved from intention through design 
to implementation. I argue that there were several flaws in its design and implementation which 
hindered its effectiveness and efficiency. I will then analyse the political economy of the 
programme, as this underlies the flaws in implementation. I will conclude by analysing the 
challenges to the programme’s design and implementation. 
 
4-2. Intentions behind NAIVS 
Now I will look at the intention of the NAIVS. In line 
with the national development plan, that is, the 
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of 
Poverty I & II (Swahili abbreviation: MKUKUTA I 
& II), the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy 
(ASDS) was first implemented through the 
Agricultural Sector Development Programme 
(ASDP) in 2006 with a sector-wide approach. The 
objective of ASDS was to achieve a sustained 
agricultural growth rate of 5 per cent per annum  
through a transformation from subsistence to commercial agriculture. To implement the strategy, 
the ASDP aimed to improve agricultural growth, reduce poverty and improve food security 
through 1) enabling farmers to have better access to, and use of, agricultural knowledge, 
technologies, marketing systems, and infrastructure; and 2) promoting private investment in 
agriculture within an improved regulatory and policy environment (URT, 2011a). The input 
subsidy – the focus of my research – is situated within the first point of this framework. And in 
2011 after the regional initiative of The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) – 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) compact, the Tanzania 
Programming 
(Intention) 
Evaluation Formulation 
(Design) 
Implementation 
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Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (URT, 2011b), which accords with the state-led 
ASDP, was developed.  
In 2008, Tanzania faced a world food and input price crisis and it was projected that ‘the 
global food and farm input prices (were) also likely to remain significantly higher than the 
historical levels’ (World Bank, 2009a: 1). In order to mitigate the risk of food insecurity, the 
Tanzanian government launched a ‘market-smart’ subsidy called the National Agricultural Input 
Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) in 2009, learning from the success of the Malawian experience (SOAS 
et al., 2008; Dorward and Chirwa, 2011). The programme document states as its objective ‘to 
contribute to higher food production and productivity in targeted areas by improving farmers’ 
access to critical agricultural inputs’ (World Bank, 2009a: 35), in order to mitigate the potential 
effects of imminent or future emergencies. The programme has three components: 1) improving 
access to agricultural inputs (fertiliser and seed); 2) strengthening input supply chains; and 3) 
project management, and monitoring and evaluation. 
NAIVS aimed to ensure emergency food security at national as well as household levels, 
especially for poor and vulnerable households who are more prone to crisis, by providing inputs 
to increase maize and rice production. However, it also aimed for the programme itself to be more 
sustainable, increasing the incentives for farmers to use subsidised inputs by subsidising their 
market price by 50 per cent, while farmers had to pay the rest half. In order to get high marginal 
productivity, it targeted areas with a high potential to use inputs, and small- to middle-scale 
farmers. The first group was targeted because of its vulnerability to price shocks, and the second 
because they are able to pay top-up and have the capacity to invest in complementary inputs to 
allow the subsidised inputs to be effective, and both groups are less prone to displacement of 
previously purchased inputs than the wealthier households. And the programme document states 
that ‘since NAIVS does not target the ‘poorest of the poor’, it was planned that the Tanzania 
Social Action Fund (TASAF) would provide complementary social protection for poor and 
vulnerable households through the provision of public works, as well as support to villages in 
food-deficit districts. There were also other initiatives, including the rehabilitation of small-scale 
irrigation facilities, integrated soil fertility management, the development of the seed sector, and 
other productivity-enhancing interventions by the Agricultural Sector Development Programme 
(ASDP). 
As an emergency response, the programme was ‘short-term’ to complement other 
programmes supporting medium- to long-term agricultural development. It therefore had an ‘exit 
strategy’, aiming to provide subsidy for three years so that the recipients could accumulate 
sufficient income to continue purchasing commercial inputs afterwards. The approach had 
originally been tested as a pilot in ten districts in 2008/09 and scaled up to full operation in 53 
out of 169 districts of high-potential zones for maize and rice production in 2009/10. The 
programme planned to operate for five years, with the World Bank initially planning to support 
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finance for the first three16. During the five-year period, late-coming entrants in the second and 
third years were able to receive three years’ worth of vouchers as the programme was expanding. 
The second year (2010) corresponded with an election year, when the most vouchers were 
distributed in the end (URT, 2014e).  
To avoid market distortion, the programme used the private sector for input procurement 
and delivery, while the vouchers were delivered through public administrative channels. In order 
to increase the number of agro-dealers, several training activities were conducted and credit 
guarantees were provided to allow them to buy inputs from the Tanzania Fertiliser Company. 
Vouchers were redeemed by the ex-parastatal bank, the National Microfinance Bank (NMB), 
which has branches in each district. 
 
4-3. Design of NAIVS 
This section looks at the following key 
characteristics of the programme design: 1) 
beneficiary criteria; 2) input voucher package and 
exit strategy; 3) institutional set-up for voucher 
management and decentralised targeting; and 4) 
private sector development. 
 
4-3-1. Beneficiary criteria 
According to World Bank (2009a: 36), out of about 
5.5 million farm households and 4 million small-scale poor farm households who were eligible 
for input support17, NAIVS targets 2.5 million small-scale poor farmers with the objective of 
helping them to increase food security and reduce poverty through the provision of vouchers. 
Selection criteria, according to NAIVS’s Project Implementation Manual, were that the 
beneficiary must be 1) a full-time resident of a target village; 2) head of a household cultivating 
maize and/or rice on not more than one ha., that is, small-scale farmers; 3) willing to use the inputs 
provided; 4) willing to act as a role model for other farmers in the use of good agricultural practice; 
and 5) financially able to co-finance the inputs purchased with vouchers. Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, priority would be given to female-headed households and farming households 
who had not used improved inputs for the previous five years, and rice farmers with access to 
irrigation facilities. Only one voucher would be provided to each selected household head, even 
when more than one household member was an independently practising farmer (URT, 2009b). 
 
 
16 It later partly financed the whole five years. 
17 Information obtained from an interview with an officer at the Input Section of MAFC (November, 
2012). 
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However, MAFC later distributed new Strategic guideline for implementation and 
procedure for NAIVS for 2011/12 which was informed to Regional Secretariat (RS) with slightly 
different beneficiary selection criteria (MAFC, 2011) (Appendix 6). The principal revised points 
are that the beneficiary had to have land suitable for the cultivation of one acre of maize or rice, 
which was also mentioned as a criterion by several village leaders, by eliminating the land 
criterion for small-scale cultivation, i.e., less than one ha. of maize/rice. This change was made 
for securing the beneficiary criteria – who has the land at least one acre of maize/rice cultivation. 
The original criteria – less than one hectare – was set for targeting small scale farmers, given that 
the average land size per household was 2 ha. in 2007/08 (URT, 2012c), but in practice the ability 
to pay has become more important criteria, for such small-scale farmers could not pay the top-up 
even they were selected. Thus having made aware that the subsidies were for small-scale farmers, 
this change made not only to target to small-scale farmers by cases.  
Other reasons have been attributed for the change in beneficiary criteria. One agro-dealer 
in Songea, for example, claimed that vouchers had been distributed to regions where maize and 
rice were cultivated very little, so misused there. However, the study suggests that these food- 
shortage areas have relatively higher marginal productivity of input use because of the original 
lower fertiliser use compared to water availability, and have higher cost involved for bringing in 
food. The Public Expenditure Review on NAIVS suggests that the additional bag of maize/rice 
produced because of subsidised inputs in these food shortage areas was therefore more 
economical than the additional two bags of maize/rice in food surplus areas (URT, 2014e: 18, 59).  
This change bore out the words of an MAFC official: ‘‘the programme targets small- to 
middle- income farmers. The ‘top-up’ criterion is the most important one, for the poor farmers 
can’t pay the top-up. If they can’t pay, they can’t get the inputs.”18 The World Bank programme 
official also suggested in the interview in November 2012 that “the programme targets 
production-surplus households. This means that it is targeted at middle-scale farmer households.” 
Also I heard the same from several key informants in the field. The design of 50 per cent subsidy 
made it difficult to target small-scale farmers, thus, targeting to middle-scale farmers just 
reflected the real recipients under this design. By introducing this change, the programme made 
clear that it did not aim at ensuring the household food security of the poorer group, but rather at 
national food security through increased national maize/rice production. 
 
4-3-2. The input voucher package and amount of subsidy 
The subsidy amounts to 50 per cent of the projected market price of the input package, whose 
ratio to actual input price at the time of purchase by farmers is susceptible to change due to  
 
18  Interview with an MAFC official, November 2012. 
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changes in the input market price. The input package consists of nitrogen, phosphate and 
improved maize or rice seeds sufficient to apply to 0.5 hectare of maize or rice cultivation, that 
is, 100 kgs of nitrogenous fertiliser (Urea), 50 kg (1 bag of Di-ammonium Phosphate (DAP)) or 
100 kg (2 bags of Minjingu Rock Phosphate (MRP)) of phosphorous pentoxide, and 10 kg of 
improved maize / rice seeds (hybrid or open-pollinated varieties (OPV)). The improved-yield 
seeds and phosphate fertiliser are to be used in planting, and the nitrogen fertiliser is for use six 
to eight weeks after planting19. It was intended that farmers should purchase the complete package, 
which consists of three separate vouchers designed for each type of input. The programme 
document suggests that given the low level of input use prior to the programme (8 kgs per hectare) 
the programme was expected to increase yield significantly. After receiving vouchers for three 
years, maize farmers were projected to more than double their yields, from 1,120 kg/per ha. in the 
base year to 2,450 to 3,200 kg/per ha. In the same way, rice yields were projected to rise from 
1.735 kg/per ha. to 2,800 – 3,300 kg/per ha. (World Bank, 2009a: 22). 
 
4-3-3. Institutional set-up for voucher management and decentralised targeting 
For the purpose of voucher management, Voucher Committees (VCs) were established at each 
government level, namely national (National Voucher Committee (NVC)), regional (Regional 
Voucher Committee (RVC)), district (District Voucher Committee (DVC)), ward (Ward 
Voucher Committee (WVC)) and village (Village Voucher Committee (VVC)) (Figure 6). The 
voucher committee chair is assigned to the highest political figure at national level to ward level, 
namely the Minister of Agriculture, Food security and Cooperatives (in the case of the NVC), 
the Regional Commissioner (for the RVC), the District Commissioner (for the DVC) and the 
Ward Councillor (for the WVC). Meanwhile, the VVC chairperson is selected from VVC 
members. VC members are composed of government officials, representatives of input supplier 
companies, agro-dealers, farmer associations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the 
NMB. For proper targeting and transparency, actual targeting of beneficiaries was decentralized 
to the village level, according to the number of allocated vouchers to the village and the 
beneficiary criteria mentioned in the Section 4-3-1. The VVC is composed of six members, who 
come from different hamlets, a lower level than villages (in Swahili kitongozi), three women 
and three men who have been approved by the village assembly. Finally, the position of VVC 
Secretary is normally assigned to the Village Executive Officer (VEO), the top government 
official, who is assigned by the District Executive Director in the village (MAFC, 2011). 
 
19  Interview with District B agricultural official November 2012. 
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Figure 6: Structure for voucher management 
Source: The author, developed from (MAFC, 2011) and fieldwork findings. 
Notes: 1) Arrows show direction of orders and actions (monitoring and intervention respectively). 
2) Dotted line shows collaboration on voucher management between agro-dealers and VVC. 
3) Cells with broken line borders show the functions of voucher committees and agro-dealers. 
 
Allocated voucher numbers to regions are based on the criteria to be mentioned later in 4-4-1 
and on prior requests from each region, and announced by the NVC to the RVC in the middle of 
September, so that the district can prepare to communicate the voucher allocation to village level 
before the time of planting, that is, the end of November – early December, in unimodal rainfall 
regions such as in Ruvuma20. According to Regional Secretariat (RS) Ruvuma, the RVC is 
convened from August to September in order to determine voucher distribution to each district 
and inform it accordingly. After allocation from national to regional level, vouchers are normally 
delivered from national level to the regions around November to December, depending on the 
planting season of the region, i.e., earlier for bimodal area (rainy seasons are: from October to 
January for short rain, March to May for long rain); and a little later for unimodal area (where 
it rains from November to April), where the unimodal area accounts for about 90 per cent of 
national maize production (World Bank, 2009a: 103). The RVC assigns a number of vouchers to 
the districts and the DVC, in coordination with the WVC, assigns them to villages. The VVC had 
already submitted its request for a certain number of vouchers to the WVC and DVC earlier in  
 
20 From interview with MAFC official, November 2012. 
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the year, it is then that the villages were informed of the actual number of vouchers to be received 
in the year. Then VVC allocates them to each kitongozi. VVC members selected from each 
kitongozi select beneficiary candidates from their vitongozi  (plural form of kitongozi) in 
collaboration with vitongozi chairpersons. The VVC compiles lists of beneficiary candidates 
from these selected names to develop a provisional village beneficiaries list, which is then 
discussed and confirmed at the village assembly. Once finalised, the list of beneficiaries is 
displayed on the village government office notice board for transparency and accountability, 
and forwarded to the upper Voucher Committee level (ward, district, etc.). 
Vouchers are normally delivered by District agricultural extension officials to villages. 
When vouchers and inputs are delivered to the village, farmers selected for vouchers are told to 
come to the village office with ‘top-up’ money ready. They sign the vouchers and are taken to the 
agro-dealers by VVC members, in some villages farmers were taken to the agro-dealers of their 
own choice, while others were taken to the ones pre-determined by VVC members, which is not 
in line with the programme design of free market where farmers can choose the agro-dealers. 
 
4-3-4. Private sector development 
The programme promoted private sector development by letting it procure and distribute inputs 
and provided training on the input business to encourage new agro-dealers to enter the sector. The 
NVC assigns input suppliers to procure inputs, mostly imported. The DVC assigns agro-dealers 
to distribute inputs in each village. More than two agro-dealers should be assigned to deal with 
the vouchers in each village to encourage competition. By the time the vouchers arrived in the 
regions, the agro-dealers were supposed to buy and bring inputs to the villages and put them in 
the temporary storages they had set up there. The stored inputs were looked after by a guard/agent 
who was hired to deal with subsidised inputs, also sometimes with commercial inputs. When the 
vouchers arrived, the dealers were waiting for the voucher-recipient farmers to come to the store 
with payment of ‘top-up’ money, whereupon they sold the inputs, and signed and retained the 
vouchers. They kept a ledger book to record the subsidised inputs sold and redeemed the vouchers 
at the National Microfinance Bank (NMB). 
 
4-4. Implementation of NAIVS 
4-4-1. Voucher distribution at national and regional levels  
An analysis of the implementation of NAIVS at regional level begins with an explanation of 
how vouchers were distributed in Ruvuma.  
- 51 - 
 
NAIVS provides subsidised inputs to 2.5 
million households in the country by providing more 
than 500,000 tons of fertilisers and 50,000 tons of 
improved seeds. Although it was subject to change 
following decisions taken by the National  
Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme-Forum (NAIVS-
National Forum) each year, the basic criteria for 
allocating vouchers to regions and districts are as 
follows: 
- Districts with soil and rainfall patterns suited for maize cultivation 
- Total number of households who cultivate not more than one hectare of maize or rice2 
- Total area under maize and rice cultivation 
- Total maize and rice production 
- Area under irrigation (World Bank, 2009a) 
NAIVS was originally designed to target only zones with a high potential for increasing 
maize/rice production by using inputs. However, political imperatives led to the extension of  
NAIVS to all regions and farming districts in the country. In 2008/09, when a pilot programme 
was operated in 11 regions, 737,400 households were beneficiaries. After the programme started, 
this number increased year on year, reaching up to 2,011,000 households in 2010/11, which 
corresponded to the election year before decreasing to about 1,800,000 in 2011/12 (URT, 2014e) 
(Table 3). 
As Potter suggested before FISP began in Malawi and Maliro suggested about the 
distribution of vouchers during the programme, the programmes may have had a political 
influence as much driving force as any technical (agricultural or safety net) issue (Potter, 2005: 
35; Maliro, 2011: 146)). The political influence can also be seen in the case of NAIVS from the 
fact that the number of vouchers distributed in the election year (2010) was the highest during the 
programme period. 
 
Table 3: Number of vouchers distributed in the country and allocation to Ruvuma 
Year 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12  
Total vouchers 
distributed in the 
country 
730,667 1,511,900 2,011,000 1,779,867 
 
Vouchers allocated 
to Ruvuma 
85,000 172,740 203,412 192,469 
 
Proportion of 
national total 
received in 
Ruvuma 
11.5% 11.2% 8.0% 10.7% 
 
Source: Author, developed from RS Ruvuma (2012a), RS Ruvuma (2012d), RS Ruvuma (2012b), RS 
Ruvuma (2012c), URT (2014e) 
 
21 As mentioned earlier, it was up to 2010/11. 
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The RS data shows that the number of vouchers allocated to the Ruvuma region in different 
years was also in parallel with the change in number for the whole country. The proportion of 
vouchers allocated to Ruvuma of the national total was around 8.0% to 11.5%, which was 
higher than originally planned in the programme document, and was relatively large 
considering that its share of the maize production in the country was 9 % in 2007/08 (URT, 
2013d). Table 3 shows that in 2010/11 more proportion of vouchers were allocated to other 
regions than Ruvuma than in other years. Approximately an average of 33,000 tons of Urea 
and 7,200 tons of hybrid seeds were distributed each year from 2008/9 to 2011/12 in Ruvuma. 
For the first application (phosphorous fertiliser), there was no disaggregated data between 
MRP (100 kg in the package) and DAP (50 kg in the package), thus the available data only 
shows that about 670,000 vouchers were distributed for the first application during the period 
in the region. 
 
Graph 1: Number of Urea vouchers allocated to Ruvuma by district 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Author, developed from RS Ruvuma (2012a), RS Ruvuma (2012d), RS Ruvuma 
(2012b), RS Ruvuma (2012c) 
 
As we saw in Graph 1, the Songea district received the largest allocation of vouchers in Ruvuma, 
and about 2.8 times that of Tunduru, the smallest recipient in the region. Additionally, maize seed 
vouchers represents 98 per cent of the total number of seed vouchers allocated from 2008/9 to 
2011/12. 
Employing data on the number of Urea vouchers allocated, we now turn to the volume of 
subsidised inputs compared to the number of agricultural households. Urea voucher allocation 
represents a more accurate measure of the total number of beneficiaries than phosphate fertiliser 
and seeds as it has no alternative in the subsidy package, and reflects the closer to the true picture 
of receiving vouchers than other inputs, whose situation will be explained later in section 4-4-3. 
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Table 4: No. of Urea vouchers allocated and ratio to total number of agricultural households 
Note: Number of agricultural households interpolated into and extrapolated from the National 
Agricultural Sample Census 2007/0822 and the Population and Housing and Census 2012 respectively. 
Agricultural HHs: Agricultural households. 
Sources: The author’s calculation, adapted from RS Ruvuma (2012a); RS Ruvuma (2012d); RS Ruvuma 
(2012b); RS Ruvuma (2012c); URT (2012c); URT (2014a). 
 
We could see that in Songea and Namtumbo the number of vouchers relative to number of 
agricultural households exceeded 100 per cent in several years. If all vouchers reached to farmers 
in these two districts all the households received vouchers. From the total number of vouchers 
allocated and agricultural households (238,055 in 2011/12) we know that an average of nearly 2.9 
Urea vouchers were distributed per agricultural household in the region during the four years (one 
pilot year plus three years of the programme) (Table 4). This means that the number of vouchers 
distributed in the region, was big enough for nearly all the region’s agricultural households to 
have received three years’ worth of vouchers, i.e., to be able to ‘exit’. 
Other than in the pilot year, from 2009/10 to 2011/12, the number of vouchers were 
enough to be allocated to about 83 per cent of the region’s households, although there were 
differences between districts. National Agricultural Sample Census 2007/08 report that the 
average maize plot area per panel household is 1.4 ha. in Round 423. The voucher package was 
designed for 0.5 ha. of maize cultivation, and the input use ratio among the agricultural 
households before programme implementation in the region was only 30.6 per cent (URT, 2012c). 
For these I estimate the ratio of subsidised Urea in relation to the total regional requirement to be 
medium scale of the subsidy programme - (0.5 ha. x 0.83) / (1.4 ha. x 0.7)) = 41.8 per cent without 
displacement if these rates of input amount per ha. is adequate.  
Secondly, the high number of vouchers per household in Songea district was probably 
due to the fact that vouchers were distributed to each farmer rather than to each household. In 
Songea district, there were 37,854 agricultural households and 116,215 individual farmers, 
meaning that there was an average of three farmers per household, 108,080 of whom were  
 
22 The National Agricultural Sample Census 2007/08 defines an ‘agricultural household’ as one that 
meets at least one of the following criteria: 1, owns or farms at least 25 square meters of arable land; 
2, owns or has kept at least one head of cattle, or five goats, sheep, or pigs, or 50 chickens, ducks or 
turkeys, as of at least the agricultural year 2007/08 in its entirety. 
23 Adjusted by sampling weights. The National Agricultural Sample Census 2007/08 Ruvuma region 
report suggests that in Ruvuma household planted an average of 0.8 ha. of maize. 
2008/09
Ratio to
total
agricultural
HHs (%)
2009/10
Ratio to total
agricultural
HHs (%)
2010/11
Ratio to
total
agricultural
HHs (%)
2011/12
Ratio to
total
agricultural
HHs (%)
Total
Proportion
in total (%)
Songea DC 24,000 72.8 55,640 163.8 65,658 187.8 64,417 179.2 209,715 32.1
Songea municipality 10,000 27.0 20,500 53.9 24,110 62.0 21,096 53.0 75,706 11.6
Namtumbo 21,000 62.4 34,400 99.7 40,471 114.5 37,393 103.3 133,264 20.4
Mbinga 20,000 23.3 42,900 48.7 50,475 56.0 46,517 50.4 159,892 24.5
Tunduru 10,000 18.8 19,300 35.9 22,698 42.0 23,046 42.4 75,044 11.5
Total 85,000 39.4 172,740 78.0 203,412 89.7 192,469 82.9 653,621
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engaged in maize cultivation (URT, 2012c; NBS, 2013c). The panel data suggests that two panel 
villages in the district received more vouchers than the number of total households; one particular 
village received nearly twice as many vouchers as there were households in 2010/11 and 2011/12, 
and reported in the village meeting that they had distributed vouchers per individual farmer. 
However, the panel household data results do not seem to corroborate this. From 2009/10 
to 2011/12 the average subsidised Urea per recipient household was about 100 kg, twice the 
packaged amount per year in the villages. And only very few households on the panel reported 
that more than one household member had received vouchers. This means that due to the late 
delivery of vouchers most of the recipient households received two bags, rather than packaged 
one bag of Urea, but without receiving improved seeds nor phosphate (planting) fertilisers, as 
several farmers in District A informed. Considering the number of vouchers to be allocated in 
the region being sufficient for most of the households having received a voucher every year, the 
panel data results suggest that less vouchers were distributed in the villages than being reported 
in the District governments’ data. This may indicate that a number of vouchers reported by the 
RS’s data went missing and did not reach the households, although a part of this discrepancy 
might also be due to under-reporting.  
On actual implementation, several reports mentioned deviation from the above- 
mentioned design and rule. As concerns targeting, I observed how the programme diverged from 
its design in the following ways. 
 
4-4-2. Targeting 
To ensure effectiveness and efficiency, targeting has become a key issue in the design and 
implementation of programmes concerned with poverty, food insecurity and vulnerability (Basley 
and Kanbur, 1989; Chinsinga, 2005). However, the beneficiary criteria for targeting varied among 
villages and occasionally diverged from the rule, as also found in Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme (Maliro, 2011: 126) as follows: 
 
4-4-2-1. Targeting wealthier households 
The actual beneficiaries were not small-scale farmers, but middle-income farmers, as confirmed 
by several agricultural officials, including the official in RS who told us that “small- and medium- 
scale farmers are many, among whom medium-scale farmers have been receiving subsidised 
inputs. They normally cultivate 10 to 20 acres (4 to 8 ha.)”, though the case of panel sample 
households have less than this: recipient farmers owned 7.4 ha. and cultivated 2.9 ha. on average, 
while non-recipient farmers owned 4.6 ha. and cultivated 2.0 ha. 
I heard in several villages that the village leaders were applying new criteria which they 
had been informed during the programme period of by the MAFC (MAFC, 2011), that is, that 
recipient farmers must ‘cultivat(e) more than one acre of maize or rice.’ However, as the size for 
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cultivation in Ruvuma is relatively big in the country, this criterion does not classify households 
in the region, as among the panel sample households, only one panel household cultivates less 
than one acre of maize or rice. 
Another criterion I heard about in several villages was that recipient farmers should have 
contributed physically and financially to village activities, such as building school buildings, 
constructing roads, etc., in which case most of elderly or female heads of household could not be 
eligible as they were not physically nor financially capable of making such a contribution. The 
heads of households who satisfied this criterion tend to be young and healthy males, and belong to 
better- off households. 
Another criterion was ‘being willing to act as a role model for other farmers in the use of 
good agricultural practice’. A farmer in Songea district mentioned that “they chose me because I 
am hard-working, and they thought that I would be a [good] example to others.” This criterion 
tended to target better-off and educated farmers, for the poor farmers do not have the physical and 
financial capacities to apply good agronomic practices, even when they are trained to be aware of 
their effects. 
Meanwhile, in other villages village leaders and farmers mentioned that the poor and 
vulnerable households were targeted as the one of the programme objectives. One farmer in a 
focus group discussion in a village in Songea district stated that he “was chosen because (he was) 
a poor person in the community, that is also a criterion” (Farmer A); while another told us that 
“they consider those who have health problems, are poor or elderly, or have livestock (… ) for 
example, those vouchers could help to grow fodder grass for the livestock belonging to elderly or 
sick people who cannot take their livestock out to graze” (Farmer B). But in some cases elderly 
recipient households have some help from children living in other households or others for help 
or in exchange of something to help their plots. 
However, I also heard in other villages that female-headed and disabled-headed 
households had difficulty to get subsidised inputs, because they were not able to pay the top-up 
or extra payment asked by the VVC members, or were not able to contribute to village activities. 
Even when they were selected, it was difficult to get subsidised inputs because of the reluctance 
of village leaders to provide them. Some told us that when they went to the office day after day 
to get inputs, they were told by agro-dealers and village leaders to come back the next day, and 
when they did so they were told that the inputs were finished on the day, this continued many 
days, until they finally gave up. 
 
4-4-2-2. Failure to apply a three-year ‘exit’ strategy; thinly distributed vouchers 
While RS’s data reports that a high number of vouchers was allocated to the region, as we saw in 
Section 4-4-1, I heard from villagers in most of the villages that the “number of vouchers 
distributed was small compared to the number of households”, except in one village very close to 
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Songea town where almost twice as many vouchers were distributed in 2010/11 and 2011/12 as 
there were agricultural households. Distribution was thin because fewer vouchers were distributed 
to most of the villages so village leaders had to select the recipient households. The allocation 
of few vouchers to the villages caused problems for village leaders, as shown in claims such as 
“we don’t want farmers to think we are exercising ‘favouritism’, by only giving vouchers to a 
few of them for three consecutive years.” Resistance to targeting, social tension and 
‘egalitarianism’ were also observed in Malawi (Chinsinga, 2005: 146-147). As the Malawian 
programme tended to distribute vouchers to the villagers in rotation, so that, as VEOs or VVC 
chairmen in several villages in Tanzania also mentioned, they were able to “select beneficiaries 
that did not benefit previously”, and prevent complaints from villagers who would not have been 
selected. This practice, thin distribution of vouchers was one of the reasons for reducing the 
number of households that received vouchers for three years in Ruvuma. Given that only little 
less than a third of all the recipient households received for three years or more, we cannot see 
the application of the ‘three-year exit strategy’ rule (Table 5). From the prevalence of the practice 
of allocating vouchers over one or two years only, the impact of receipt on either maize yield or 
income poverty might have been smaller than had been expected. 
 
Table 5: Ratio of sample recipient households by number of years of voucher receipt to total 
sample households among all recipient households 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
Even so, in those villages where few vouchers were distributed, farmers still claimed that the 
village leaders had distributed the vouchers either among themselves, or to friends, relatives, and 
government institutions, which was more prevalent as fewer vouchers were distributed. I was 
often informed of the claim by village leaders that the officials and politicians at higher level than 
villages, that are, ward executive officer or ward councillors, or sometimes katibu talafa (the 
politician selected at the level between district and ward) put pressure to village leaders to ask for 
their ‘portion’ of vouchers from their villages. 
The above findings in the field corroborate panel data, which show that more than half 
(67 per cent) of the recipient households received vouchers for only one or two years (Table 6). 
Here we notice the large gap between the above RS data concerning the average number of 
vouchers distributed per household and the panel data which reveals the number which actually 
reached the households. As mentioned above, RS data shows that an average of 2.9 vouchers of 
Urea were distributed for all the agricultural households in Ruvuma, meaning that almost all the 
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years All recipients
Ratio to total 
sample HHs
0.28 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.66
Ratio to sample 
recipient HHs
0.42 0.27 0.18 0.15 1.02
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households would have ‘exited’ – received three years of vouchers - the programme. The panel 
sample reveals that households reported an average of only 1.3 years of voucher receipt during 
the period. If the panel households represent all the households, the data suggests that more than 
half (55 per cent) the vouchers disappeared, although there might have been due to a tendency 
to report lower voucher receipt or mis-reporting on the part of panel households, who might have 
expected that continuation of the programme by doing so. With this acknowledgement of the data 
limitation, we can say, however, that the scale of ‘missing vouchers’ in the region was 
considerable. These vouchers might have disappeared between regional and village distribution. 
This ‘leaking’ was also found in other studies such as the one of FISP by Maliro (2011) and the 
study of the Targeted Input Programme in Malawi, although the ratio was much smaller, being as 
low as 10 per cent of the vouchers distributed in the surveyed villages24 (Cullen and Lawson, 
2005: 57). I now analyse the reason for this gap between ideal and actual practice. The reasons 
for it could be listed as 1) capture by politicians and leaders from region to village level, as 
mentioned by officials in RS; and 2) the sale of vouchers by farmers. 
This high number of missing vouchers corroborates the information received from 
Agricultural Officers in the RS office who mentioned that some individuals had cheated the 
system, obtaining vouchers to which they were not entitled, or for political purposes such as 
allocating vouchers to their political allies; in the case of politicians, this was probably to obtain 
money. One of them at first stated that ‘it was 60 per cent’, but ended up claiming that ‘about 
20 per cent of all the vouchers’ were obtained by politicians (Regional Commissioner, etc.). 
This large gap suggests weak institutional capacity to implement voucher distribution at 
regional and lower levels. 
 
Table 6: Households by duration of voucher receipt and ratio to total number of panel 
households 
 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
24 228 villages selected using a multi-staged sampling frame. 
One year-recipient HHs
2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 Total Ratio to total
Ratio to all
recipients
Recipient
households
33 11 21 21 86 0.28 0.43
Two year-recipient HHs
2008/9 &
2009/10
2008/9 &
2010/11
2008/9 &
2011/12
2009/10 &
2010/11
2009/10 &
2011/12
2010/11 &
2011/12
Total Ratio to total
Ratio to all
recipients
Recipient
households
15 4 4 11 2 15 51 0.17 0.26
Three year-recipient HHs
2008/9 &
2009/10 &
2010/11
2008/9 &
2009/10 &
2011/12
2008/ 9&
2010/11 &
2011/12
2009/10 &
2010/11 &
2011/12
Total Ratio to total
Ratio to all
recipients
Recipient
households
10 2 4 18 34 0.11 0.17
Four year-recipient HHs
All uptaker Ratio to total
Ratio to all
recipients
Recipient
households
28 0.09 0.14
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Table 6 shows that among those households which received vouchers for any given two or three 
years, the groups receiving vouchers in two or three consecutive years comprise a high share of 
the recipients in those years. Therefore, it seems that a rule obtains whereby once a household 
is selected as a ‘recipient household’, it continues to be issued with vouchers in consecutive 
years. Given that the number of two year-recipient households is about 1.5 times that of three 
year- recipients, it looks as though that there might also be a rule that two- rather than three-year 
receipt is more popular because of the limited number of vouchers allocated to the villages for 
distribution. There might be a tendency towards actually selecting the same households in 
consecutive years, or years of receipt may have been wrongly reported, either because 
recipients had forgotten in which year exactly they received vouchers, or due to fatigue on the 
part of the interviewees which led them to report simply that they received them in consecutive 
years. As regards ‘interviewee fatigue’, I observed during the household interviews that some 
interviewees had difficulty recalling whether or not they had received vouchers or in which year 
they have received in years earlier than the previous agricultural season. The difficulty in 
recalling might have been further exacerbated by the complexity of either getting all the inputs or 
just a part, or having shared them, or having given some part of the package to other farmers, 
even when they stated officially that they had ‘received’ them. In any case, the data concerning 
the number of years over which vouchers were received (Table 5) appear more reliable than 
those concerning which particular year they were received in. 
It could be expected that after two or three consecutive years of receiving vouchers, 
selected households would increase their income, although some two year-only recipients do 
not conform to the three-year receipt under the ‘exit’ programme design. Furthermore, 
according to information from several informants the ‘exit’ strategy was impossible in practice 
because of the small amount of subsidised inputs and the low profit gained by using the input 
package due to increasing input costs: I heard from several informants that the input package 
for one acre of maize or rice cultivation was only sufficient for their own home consumption, 
and not to give a profit. Furthermore, the profit progressively became less than expected during 
the period because of the increase in real input prices while the face-value of vouchers remained 
almost constant. 
Meanwhile, 14 per cent of the panel received vouchers every year. These households 
might have obtained them from other households who could not pay the top-up, or been selected 
by villages who were giving vouchers to individual household members farmers or been favoured 
by village leaders. On this issue, the NAIVS impact study reports a much higher rate, using 
national level data, such as ’60 per cent of the ‘graduates’ still receive vouchers in the fourth year’, 
suggesting that ‘another farmer in the same household received vouchers’ (URT, 2014e: 34). The 
impact study report uses the term ‘graduation’, not ‘exit’. 
Officials in RS Ruvuma and some agro-dealers mentioned that some District 
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Commissioners in Ruvuma and other regions in the Southern Highlands who have the authority 
to distribute vouchers seemed to confiscate them, and were forced to leave the office. And these 
cases were reported by press from which people knew when I told them that I was researching 
on NAIVS, some of the informants said: “Ah, there are lots of problems of corruption”. Cooksey 
cites that there were reports by the Controller and Auditor General and the Parliamentary 
Accounts Committee of massive corruption and irregular voucher management (Cooksey, 
2012). 
MAFC officials reported that they also monitored agro-dealers by making some visits to 
the villages, and where they had found cases of cheating the system, in some cases they prosecuted, 
with the offenders being jailed25. In Mbinga district, three agro-dealers were sent to either the 
Corruption Prevention Bureau or to the court. Tanzania Fertiliser Company Ltd. (TFC) Manager 
in the Songea office informed me that he had also been monitoring the agro-dealers in terms of 
voucher management and loan repayment and farmers groups such as tobacco farmer associations, 
and had reported some cheating agro-dealers and farmer groups to the court. In some cases, agro- 
dealers had received inputs with loans from the TFC or the banks, and had left the region even 
without distributing inputs nor paying back the loan. 
Some agro-dealers mentioned that the previous input subsidy programme was better than the 
current voucher system which has been subject to far more cheating. However, the MAFC 
official told me that the previous input transport subsidy programme had also faced problems 
of cheating by the agro-dealers, as it could not trace whether they actually delivered inputs to 
the farmers, because the subsidy amount was provided to the agro-dealer before them 
develivering vouchers while the vouchers could be traced to the farmers who received them by 
their signatures to vouchers, thus NAIVS would be better. However, a signature itself is not 
sufficient evidence since I often heard in some villages that village leaders signed dead persons’ 
names or children’s names, or asked villagers to sign even when they had not received the 
subsidised inputs. Thus vouchers cannot work as a guarantee that the person of signature 
actually received subsidised inputs. Without close monitoring and checking of voucher 
management at the micro-level, it seems that the system does not function effectively and 
efficiently. 
In the Round 3 and 4 surveys, we asked about whether they were selected for or had 
received vouchers from 2008/09 to 2011/12, although there were two sections in Round 4 
(Household Roster and Voucher sections) asking whether households had been selected for or 
in receipt of vouchers in each subsequent year of the programme. As the answers in the Voucher  
 
25 Interview with officials in the input section of the MAFC in November 2012 and January 2013. 
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section do not seem reliable26 I present the data by Household Roster. Although there is data for 
2008/09, i.e., in Round 4, the Round 3 data are more reliable as there is a shorter recall period. 
Over the years under study, the ratio of selected and voucher-recipient households to the total 
number of panel households did not change to any great extent, being around 35~41 per cent and 
31~37 per cent respectively (Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Ratio of households reporting selection for and receipt of vouchers to total number of 
selected sample households (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Out of 309 panel households. For 2008/09 the data is of Round 3. For other years the data is of the 
Household Roster section of Round 4. 
Sources: Christiaensen and Sarris (2004); author’s data 
 
The big difference between the ratio of selected and received households to the total sample in 
2008/09 - the pilot year - might have been due to that since farmers were unaware of the 
importance of using the full input package in the pilot year, even if they had been selected for 
vouchers, when they found out that they had to pay the top-up many of them chose not to receive 
their inputs. It may even have been the case that they were not aware of how the programme itself 
worked, so that in several villages they felt they were being cheated as they had been asked to pay 
top-up for nothing. Many selected farmers rejected to receive vouchers thus there were many 
‘returned’ vouchers in the record of local government in the pilot year. However, as they came to 
understand the programme better, and the efficacy of all the inputs became apparent to previously 
sceptical farmers, they became more willing to use the package as prescribed. The above data 
suggest that the ratio of the households who did not receive vouchers after having been selected 
among the selected households decreased from 20 per cent to 11 per cent over the course of the 
programme. 
 
4-4-2-3. Targeting farmers within one household – multiple voucher receipt by one household 
In some villages where a larger number of vouchers was distributed (in 2010/11 and 2011/12), 
vouchers were given to individual farmers rather than households. This occurred especially in the  
 
26 The households of positive answer for voucher receipt supersede the ones selected for vouchers. The 
reporting errors might occur due to the respondent fatigue and / or owing to some complications of 
having received either only one part of the package (Urea), or of not having received the input package 
at all even though they were officially recipients and had signed the voucher to show they had received 
the full package.  
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Round / Section Round 3 Roster Roster Roster
Selected (A) 41 35 39 35
Received (B) 33 33 37 31
Difference (A)-(B) 8 2 2 4
Ratio of (B)/(A) 80.5 94.3 94.9 88.6
Recipient ratio to total 10.7 10.7 12.0 10.0
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main voucher recipient district, Songea district. In the two surveyed villages in Songea district, 
the number of vouchers exceeded the number of households in two years. One village is very 
close to Songea town and is on the main road to Namtumbo town. Another has very fertile land, 
famous for beans cultivation and is on the main road from Songea town to Dar es Salaam, where 
I observed there were many tractors in the town. Thus the concentration of vouchers to these 
villages were due to their political-economic power as villages and their high fertility of the land. 
On the former village the agricultural input official and village leaders declared that they were 
distributing vouchers ‘per farmer’, if there were independent farmers within one household. In 
a village in Songea district, a VVC member mentioned that he had received four vouchers in his 
household as it contained ‘four independent farmers’. It seems that even with more vouchers 
distributed, there was still elite capture in that way. 
 
4-4-3. Resale of vouchers 
In the survey question as to whether other villagers had sold their vouchers, unlike the information 
from the qualitative interviews above, responses did not change markedly from year to year, with 
high response levels maintained throughout and as many as 28 per cent of participants answering 
that ‘many’ villagers sold vouchers across the four years under study. The proportion of 
respondents who reported that ‘some’ villagers had sold their vouchers increased during the 
period, while those reporting that ‘few’ villagers had sold their vouchers decreased. 
 
Graph 2: Ratio of households who reported resale of vouchers 
 
Source: Author’s data 
 
The maintaining or worsening situation of resale of vouchers shown in Graph 2 over the years 
under study does not correspond to the information from several informants who suggested that 
the number of such individuals had dropped over time to ten per cent as they became aware of the 
importance of the input package.27 However, there was also information which was almost in line 
with the Graph 2: an informant told that the proportion of farmers who had sold their vouchers in 
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the first year of the programme was as high as 40 per cent on average in the region;28 and a farmer 
in a Mbinga village suggested that the resale or sharing of vouchers was still practised among 
almost half of the programme beneficiaries up to the second and third years of the programme. 
Other study participants informed me that in the fourth year of the programme, some 
farmers still engaged in the sale of vouchers because they did not have sufficient money to pay 
the top-up. This corroborates  with the above quantitative findings that there was some difference 
between selected and recipient households (Table 7).  
The general lack of interest in using programme inputs and preference for selling vouchers 
or inputs (seeds) to other wealthier farmers or to agro-dealers was corroborated by a VVC 
member in Songea district thus: 
 
The committee gives the vouchers to the farmers; now, these farmers collect the full 
set of vouchers from the committee then they go to the agro-dealers. Now, with these 
agro- dealers we don’t know what happens there. The agro-dealers issue a full set of 
hybrid seed and fertiliser I think, but we don’t know what the farmers do – whether 
they sell it or whatever – when they come back from agro-dealers. 
 
Additionally, in a farmer group discussion which also took place in Songea district, a farmer 
articulated the situation thus: 
I think most farmers who are not trained take the hybrid seed and first application, 
but when they get home, they don’t use them (and sell them to others) (...) It is very 
common – even the government knows about this: it says that both these agro-dealers 
and the farmers are dishonest (…) but these farmers don’t understand the importance 
of improved farming methods, which are many. There are only a few farmers who 
understand the importance of good farming methods, who normally take the whole 
set, and want the government to increase the vouchers. 
 
It was also suggested that the lack of interest in using the subsidy package was because “many 
farmers don’t like improved seeds, as they can’t use them the following year and have to buy 
them each year, while the traditional seeds could be used the following year” (Agricultural 
extension official, Districts A and B). 
Additionally, a farmer in Songea district mentioned the following: 
 
Regarding the seed, most farmers don’t like to follow the improved farming methods: 
they prefer to follow traditional methods; they don’t like to use this hybrid maize  
 
27 Official of input supplier company B, Songea District. 
28 Manager of input supplier company A, Songea District. 
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seed (...) they prefer traditional seed because it grows quicker. 
 
4-4-4. Increase in top-up prices 
One reason why some selected households did not receive the promised vouchers might have 
been an increase in top-up prices, while voucher face values remained constant, those of fertilisers 
in particular. Many informants in the field confirmed that the prices of such inputs went up in 
2010/11 and again in 2011/12, which made it difficult for them to pay top-up. Indeed, in one 
farmer group discussion, farmers suggested that there had been a considerable increase in the 
price of fertiliser in 2010/11: 
 
The input price went up a great deal in 2010/11: it was TZS [Tanzania Shilling] 
21,000 (equivalent to 8 BP29) per bag of Urea in 2008 but from 2010/11, it was TZS 
52,000 (equivalent to 23 BP30). It was TZS 30,000 (equivalent to 15.7 BP31) per bag 
of DAP [diammonium phosphate: a fertiliser] in 2008 and has been TZS 54,000 
(equivalent to 23.8 BP32) per bag since 2010/11. But the price of seeds has remained 
the same: TZS 7,500 (equivalent to 3 BP33) per bag of maize. For the whole package 
it was about TZS 132,000 (equivalent to 51 BP34) last year. 
Moreover, if farmers were unable to pay the top-up for the full package, they sought to share the 
inputs with others. In a remote village in Mbinga, I found that 50 per cent of the panel recipient 
households shared vouchers owing to the aforementioned price rises in 2011/12, although 
informants indicated that only 25 per cent had done so in 2010/11. I will make a detailed 
comparative analysis of changes in the market and subsidised, top-up prices of fertiliser, as well 
as the voucher package as a whole in the period under study in the Chapter 8. 
 
4-4-5. Late delivery of vouchers 
Another reason for the resale of vouchers was their late delivery, as reported by many informants, 
especially in 2010/11 and 2011/12 when there was widespread late distribution relative to the 
planting season. The original project document stipulates that: 
Vouchers must be printed in April to May in order to reach beneficiaries by July to 
August, when farmers have just harvested and have enough cash to pay the top-up 
 
 
29 Exchange rate (100 BP=257,229 TZS) as of 1st December, 2011.  
30 Exchange rate (100 BP=226,938 TZS) as of 1st December, 2010. 
31 Exchange rate (100 BP=191,056 TZS) as of 1st December, 2008.  
32 Same as footnote 7.  
33 Exchange rate (100 BP=250,700 TZS) as of 3rd December, 2012. 
34 Same as footnote 6. 
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 (...) [Since] Parliament only approves the budget in August to September (...) the 
resolution of this matter should be treated with some urgency by the MFEA [Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Affairs] and MAFC[Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
Security and Co- operatives] (World Bank, 2009a: 40). 
 
However, the implementation of the project did not follow these guidelines. In an interview, an 
official of the Agricultural Input Voucher Section, MAFC, informed me that the budget was 
approved in July to August, and budget allocation within the Ministry was approved from August 
to September, when the voucher procurement process was initiated, and it took about four and 
half months for the vouchers to reach the farmers, which means the delivery would be late for 
planting.35  
This was corroborated by farmers who reported that after 2009/10, vouchers and inputs 
tended to be delivered too late for the planting season, normally not arriving until mid-December 
to mid-January, and sometimes not until mid-February. Even when such late delivery was 
anticipated at central level in 2011/12 and RS took measures to ensure that alternative documents 
were made available, according to informants (including some from the MAFC), these were 
merely subject to the same delay. This inefficiency prompted farmers either to take Urea only  
or not to bother with the first fertiliser application and improved seeds at all; or, when they 
eventually received the vouchers, to sell those which were by that time superfluous to their own 
requirements. 
 
4-4-6. Subsidised input receipt by type of inputs 
In respect of fertiliser usage, for the first application I found a tendency to increase the amount 
of Minjingu rock phosphate (MRP), which the programme introduced widely as a better 
alternative to DAP and because it is the only fertiliser produced in the country (see further 
discussion in Chapter 6). Although many informants argued that they did not like MRP, because 
of its complicated way of application and that DAP was more effective in terms of increasing 
yield, farmers tended not to use DAP as much due to its high price. 
This corroborates the panel data. In the pilot year, 34 per cent of panel households 
received subsidised Urea; although more than 50 per cent were issued with maize seeds; a little 
under 50 per cent received MRP; while only 4 to 6 per cent received DAP. There was some 
displacement of commercial Urea usage as farmers in Ruvuma had been used to spreading Urea 
before the programme was implemented. And due to late delivery of vouchers and as some of 
the farmers did not know the effects of the other inputs, they were reluctant to spend their money  
 
35 MAFC official, December 2012. 
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on them. 
As shown in Table 8, the ratio of those in receipt of each input to the total number of 
sample households remained virtually constant throughout the study period. The largest ratio is 
found in respect of Urea, which almost all recipients received; followed by that for maize seeds, 
at approximately 20 per cent of total sample households; and for MPR reducing from 17 to 14 per 
cent, inputs being principally restricted to these three items. If we consider the range of 
programme-prescribed inputs, those farmers in receipt of the full package represented almost 
50 per cent, although the figure was a little lower in 2010/11 (Table 9). Conversely, those who 
received Urea only amounted to about 33 per cent of the total, a ratio that remained virtually 
constant, although, again, it dropped a little in 2010/11.  
 
Table 8: Number of programme beneficiary households by input type and year reported (%) 
Source: Author’s data 
 
 
Table 9: Number of programme beneficiary households in receipt of different types of input (%) 
Source: Author’s data 
 
4-4-7. Return of vouchers 
A few recipient households reported that they had returned vouchers or given them away 
(Table 10). In terms of Urea, the proportion of such households rose to more than ten per cent 
in 2010/11. This increase was probably due to the higher number of vouchers distributed that 
season, which resulted in their being distributed even to households that either could not pay 
the top-up or did not want the vouchers in the first place. 
No. of
households
Ratio to total
recipients
(%)
No. of
households
Ratio to
total
recipients
No. of
households
Ratio to total
recipients
(%)Urea only 34 33.3 34 29.6 32 32.7
Maize seeds only 0 0.0 2 1.7 0 0.0
Urea+maize seeds 7 6.9 10 8.7 9 9.2
Urea+MRP+maize 43 42.2 37 32.2 34 34.7
Urea+DAP+Maize 10 9.8 12 10.4 11 11.2
2011/122009/10 2010/11
No. of
households
Ratio to total
sample (%)
No. of
households
Ratio to total
sample (%)
No. of
households
Ratio to total
sample (%)
Urea 102 33.2 113 36.8 96 31.3
DAP 11 3.6 17 5.5 14 4.6
MRP 51 16.6 53 17.3 43 14.0
Maize seeds 61 19.9 64 20.8 55 17.9
Rice seeds 1 0.3 2 0.7 1 0.3
Other 1 0.3 1 0.3 2 0.7
Any input 102 33.2 115 37.5 98 31.9
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
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Table 10: Reasons for not using vouchers to obtain prescribed inputs 
Source: Author’s data 
 
In the Round 3 survey, 80 per cent of the households which had opted to receive vouchers reported 
that they had actually been issued with them (Author’s calculation). The main three reasons cited 
by the rest of the selected households for their failure to obtain the vouchers were that: they did 
not have the cash and, either could not get credit, or did not want to get credit; or there was no 
instruction on how to use the package best. 
 
Table 11: Reasons for non-receipt of vouchers by selected households (Round 3) 
 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a) 
 
In the Round 4 survey, reasons for the non-receipt of vouchers differed slightly from those offered 
in Round 3 (Table 12). Although the main reason cited was still lack of cash, the second most 
common explanation was reluctance or inability to obtain credit, which was followed by the fact 
that there was no adequate system to administer the vouchers at village level. 
 
Table 12: Reasons for failure to purchase subsidised inputs even when selected for voucher issue 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s data. 
 
4-5. Political economy of voucher management  
Policy makers should consider the social component of a behaviour change induced by projects, 
since our behaviours are affected by relationships and the social contexts of where we live (World 
Bank, 2015c: 42). Corruption is one of the social norms which affects the effective operation of 
Returned
them
Gave them
away
Total
Ratio to
total
recipients
Returned
them
Gave them
away
Total
Ratio to
total
recipients
Returned
them
Others Total
Ratio to
total
recipients
UREA 7 1 8 8.2 12 0 12 10.8 2 1 3 3.2
DAP 7 1 8 8.2 10 0 10 0.1 2 0 2 2.1
MRP 7 1 8 8.2 10 0 10 0.1 2 1 3 3.2
Maize seeds 7 1 8 8.2 10 1 11 0.1 2 1 3 3.2
Rice seeds 6 1 7 7.1 10 0 10 0.1 2 0 2 2.1
Other 2 0 2 2.0 2 0 2 0.0 0 0 0 0.0
2010/112009/10 2011/12
Did not have cash and
did not have anybody
to lend money
Did not have cash and
could not find credit
Poor voucher
administration in the
village
Total
11 3 5 19
Did not have cash
and did not want to
get credit
Did not have cash
and could not find
credit
Cost/effort of
collecting fertilizer
is too large
There was no
instruction on how
to use package best
Total
5 7 1 6 19
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projects (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). In Uganda, traditional 
systems rule over formal ‘modern’ ones, and thus fiscal 
corruption may be understood in a context of political 
economy where access to resources depends on patron-
client networks (Fjeldstad, 2005). In Tanzania several 
studies suggest that neo-patrimonialism is the norm 
(Bratton and Walle, 1994; Booth, 2005; Pan and 
Christiaensen, 2012). Several authors suggest that ‘neo-
patrimonialism’ is prevalent in many African countries (van de Walle, 1999; deGrassi, 2008; 
Chirwa and Dorward, 2013). Patron-client relationships exist where there are very few 
opportunities for upward mobility in the shape of, for example, higher education, foreign 
intervention, extensive travel, wider communications networks, etc., and communities remain 
highly reliant on patrons (Cammack, 2007: 600). This situation may be even more prevalent under 
democratically-elected governments (Poulton, 2012: 2). 
The majority of the informants whom I encountered in the field suggested that frauds and 
illegal behaviour within the management of NAIVS vouchers was a problem. Based on the 
empirical data, mainly, qualitative, this section looks at why, how and in which contexts these 
behaviours or actions occurred, and how they affected the effects of NAIVS and the lives of 
farmers. 
Several reports of frauds in voucher distribution were made in key informant interviews 
in villages and towns. The majority of these concerned cases in villages where vouchers were 
taken up by village leaders or upper level bureaucrats or politicians, in collusion with agro-dealers. 
Farmers explained the frauds in the villages as discrimination or financial extortion on the part 
of village leaders and VVC members. But sometimes they did not report as they were afraid of 
being penalised by village leaders afterwards. The cause of these frauds are listed as follows: 
firstly I found that the structure of the VVCs did not work properly; indeed, I often heard that 
these were operated by VEOs, the secretary of VVC, the powerful village bureaucrats whom 
people call ‘President(s) in the village’. Secondly, most VVC members were not properly trained, 
eventually VVCs were actually controlled by the VEOs. Farmers mentioned that VEOs often 
collaborated with government extension officials at ward or village level and then colluded with 
agro-dealers. This made it non-transparent for villagers as to who lllllllllhad received vouchers. 
In several villages voucher distribution was actually controlled by the politically powerful people, 
namely, VEO, Ward/Village Agricultural Extension Officers, Ward Councillors, Ward 
Executive Officers, and agro-dealers, where the VVC or village assembly did not have any 
control. 
In many villages, farmers mentioned favouritism in voucher distribution, claiming that 
VEOs and VVC members selected their friends and relatives as beneficiaries. They also 
Implementation
Formulation 
(Design)
Evaluation
Programming 
(Intention)
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claimed that leaders sometimes wrote ‘ghost’ names so that they could keep the vouchers 
themselves, a practice which was also observed in the Targeted Input Programme in Malawi 
(Cullen and Lawson, 2005). In some villages, farmers claimed that VEOs and VVC members 
reserved vouchers for themselves first, and gave the rest to their friends and relatives, and that 
they also rewarded those farmers who made financial contributions to village activities, which 
was also seen in the Malawian case (ibid.). In many villages, farmers mentioned extortion, 
whereby they were asked by VEO and VVC members to pay extra money in addition to the top-
up. One reason for this was that the work of VVC members is voluntary work – thus unpaid, 
although they had to dedicate several days to VVC work, especially at the time of voucher 
distribution. They had power on voucher distribution. I therefore heard in several villages that 
they used their power to consistently make an extra charge on farmers to be selected in order 
to compensate their work. 
A district agricultural official in charge of vouchers was trained as a district office 
enumerator for my panel survey, however, later, the official decided that he did not want to 
participate in the survey.  I suspect that he was afraid that the situation I was told of by villagers 
that “these corrupt activities were known to all, including village and district officers and leaders” 
would come to light. 
In other villages, even when the farmers knew which agro-dealer would provide good 
quality inputs at cheap prices, some VVCs assigned a pre-determined agro-dealers to each of them. 
Under this system, the agro-dealers would not lose any of the vouchers brought to the villages but 
farmers sometimes had to buy inputs at higher prices. This is an instance of collusion between 
VVC and agro-dealers. Numerous poorer farmers stated that they were unable to afford even 
subsidised inputs because of the high price of seeds and fertiliser, together with the extra charge.  
Bayart traces the roots of the corruption to the colonial state (Bayart, 1993). Since 
independence, there has been a ‘hasty construction of a new bureaucracy in the place of colonizers’ 
(de Sardan, 1999: 32), and the state of post-colonial Africa is now criticised by the western world 
as a legacy of the colonial system (Tripp, 1997: 60). De Sardan (1999) argues that the corruption 
in Africa is culturally rooted, pointing out five common sets of social practices: gift-giving, 
negotiation, solidarity networks, predatory authority and redistributive accumulation, last of 
which might be seen through NAIVS implementation. Corruption is socially accepted as 
legitimate because it is historically and culturally embedded (ibid:34). Fjeldstad et al. (2003: 67) 
cite the study of Ghana (LeVin, 1975) and the case of Uganda (Tumwesigye, 1998) to argue that 
as there is no social stigma attached to corruption, even the bureaucrats sacked from their positions 
because they had acted corruptly, often did not express any guilt or shame.  
Secondly, there was poor implementation capacity at lower level of government. There 
was a poor record of voucher management at district and village levels, as I found substantial 
discrepancies between the beneficiary data I obtained from villages and those of their respective 
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district governments (Table 13). The list of 200 beneficiaries in Village B, District C for 2011/12 
provided by the district government repeats 40 names (20 per cent) and 31 beneficiaries (16 per 
cent) are missing from the beneficiary list obtained from Village B government office. Data 
provided by the district government are missing from the beneficiary lists of 2009/10 and 2010/11, 
but the data indicate that the 151 beneficiaries in 2009/10 are included among the 200 
beneficiaries in 2011/12. Recalling that the programme targets the same households up to three 
times, we assume that the beneficiaries for 2009/10 and 2010/11 appear on this list. However, if 
the beneficiary list from the district government is compared with that from the village 
government, 39 per cent, 47 per cent, and 16 per cent each year respectively of the beneficiaries 
from 2009/10 to 2011/12 are missing from the beneficiary lists obtained from the village office. 
They are ‘missing vouchers’. 
 
Table 13: Number of beneficiaries in Village B according to the beneficiary lists obtained 
from District C and Village B (2009/10 –2011/12) 
Year No. of 
beneficiaries 
No. of beneficiaries common 
to lists obtained from  
District C and Village B 
No. of beneficiaries 
missing from the list from 
Village B 
2009/10 151 92 59 
2010/11 177 94 83 
2011/12 200 128 31 
Source: The author’s calculation from CD source beneficiary lists provided by District C government, and 
beneficiary lists provided by Village B. 
 
At a regional level, the Ruvuma agricultural officer also suggested that “as a political figure, the 
Regional Commissioner sometimes intervenes in the allocation of vouchers; sometimes he 
allocates vouchers to CCM [Chama Cha Mapunduzi (Tanzanian Conservative Party)] 
members.”36 He went on to suggest that as much as 20 per cent or even more (60 per cent, he 
mentioned once) of the total number of vouchers might be illegally distributed in this way. This 
corroborates the information from some villagers that fewer vouchers had actually been 
distributed than had originally been promised. This might have been due to the fact that the leaders 
and VC members from region to village levels retained vouchers for themselves, as mentioned in 
Section 4-4-2-2. 
Cooksey (2012) notes that political motives distort voucher distribution in NAIVS. He 
suggests that CCM made use of NAIVS in seeking votes, and that making ‘misallocations from 
national level down undermined the objective of targeting the subsidies at a broad group of 
smallholders’ (p.17). The largest number of vouchers was distributed in the election year, i.e., 
2010/11, which contributed to the CCM victory. This politicised voucher allocation has benefitted 
the local elites, who have been allowed by ruling elites to plunder local development budgets 
and extract rents from farmers and businesses in order for the latter to secure the loyalties of the 
former. In the case of Ghana, input subsidies were used for political ends by the government so 
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that assistance was distributed to those villages where the ruling party had lost control in the 
previous presidential election (Banful, 2011). Chinsinga suggests that the subsidy in Malawi was 
deeply politicised and that technical debates on improving programme effectiveness were always 
preceded by political motives (Chinsinga, 2012a: 2). He suggests that ‘there are formal and 
informal coupon distribution’ (ibid., p.15), with informal distribution going to the areas where the 
Conservative Party had strong support. Such a politico-economic interpretation of input subsidy 
implementation could be explained in terms of ‘neo-patrimonialism’.Several authors suggest that 
the input subsidy programmes are inherently so politicized that they would be difficult to reduce 
or discontinue due to the pervasive vested interests with which they have become associated 
(Maliro, 2011; Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Jayne and Rashid, 2013).  
The private and politicised appropriation of vouchers has rendered beneficiary targeting and the 
very programme itself ineffective and inefficient. Subsidised inputs seized by politicians and 
village leaders might have been sold on the open market or provided at a discount to agro-dealers 
who redeemed their ‘expenses’ from the NMB without selling them to legitimate project 
beneficiaries. Alternatively, these inputs might have been sold to better-off farmers or exported 
through agro-dealers. Several informants in the field mentioned that farmers sold fewer vouchers 
in the later years of the programme, because of an increased awareness of the effect of inputs on 
maize yields. However, I heard of several cases of fraud and collusion between farmers and agro- 
dealers continuing at the time of my fieldwork, i.e., during the third year of the programme. 
 The above qualitative information as well as district government data suggests that from 
regional to the ward level, leaders obtained vouchers because subordinate leaders and VVC 
members favoured them in the hope of benefitting later on. The practice is maintained because 
village leaders and VVC members receive little or no pay and are often de-moralised. Some of 
these cases were reported to the court and subsequently penalised, as in the resignation of two 
District Commissioners in the region. According to the informants and a MAFC official, some of 
these cases were reported to the police and the accused were taken to court. MAFC officials 
mentioned the existence of a monitoring system through regular reporting from the districts and 
the despatch of ad-hoc monitoring missions. But informants mentioned that these attempts were 
still very few to capture all the frauds. In other cases such corruption was not reported, went 
unpunished and seemed to continue. These frauds and cases of collusion rendered the programme 
inefficient by causing many inclusion and exclusion errors in the targeting. Chirwa and Dorward 
suggest that in the Malawian FISP ‘the extent of elite capture does not appear to be as great as 
that reported by Pan and Christiaensen (2012) in Tanzania (in Kilimanjaro)’ (Chirwa and Dorward, 
2013: 247) (In parenthesis by author). Possible reasons for the higher rate of elite capture in 
Tanzania than in Malawi are 1) more resources are available as the input voucher package in  
 
36 Interview in November 2012.
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Tanzania is larger than that in Malawi, and therefore attracts more fraud; 2) the subsidy 
programme has a shorter history and the institutions designed to create greater accountability were 
less developed than in Malawi; and 3) Kilimanjaro and Ruvuma – the study area – are more 
remote areas than the average rural areas in Malawi, which is a smaller country, and thus less 
likely to be monitored and more easily abused. 
Many scholars have argued that there are limits to state action in SSA. Ekeh (1975: 91) 
suggests that there are two ‘public realms’ in SSA. The first is based on the primordial groupings, 
ties and sentiments which influence and determine the public behaviour of individuals, is moral, 
and operates on the same moral code as the private realm. The second is civic public realm, such 
as the military, the civil service, the judiciary or the police, which is amoral and constitutes a 
place from which one seeks to gain, if possible in order to benefit the moral primordial public 
realm. Hyden (1980) suggests that ‘the fragmentary economic base that characterises a society 
where the peasant mode is strongly articulated gives rise to social formations in which primordial 
orientations are highly rational’ (27-28). This leads to limits to ‘state’ action in the civic public 
realm. 
In the case of NAIVS, farmers knew that they were entitled to receive vouchers if they 
were smallholders and able to pay top-up. Their report on corruption was given to me not only 
out of anger, but also because they were struggling to get their own share of the resources on 
offer: they might have expected that after informing me that they had not got the vouchers to 
which they were entitled, those vouchers would be forthcoming. 
Tensions were higher when there were few vouchers relative to the village population. 
Many village leaders (VVC chairpersons, village executive officials, village chairpersons) 
mentioned that if the village was allocated with very few vouchers, they would not want them 
because they feared that a majority of villagers would accuse them as if they were doing 
favouritism and fraud because only few villagers would receive vouchers. Input subsidy was thus 
a source of conflict in the villages from which the wealthier and more powerful ultimately 
benefitted. The subsidies brought differentiation (Guyer, 1981) among villagers, with the 
wealthier and more powerful increasing their wealth and power, while the poorer and less 
powerful did not get the expected benefits. Without subsidy, however, they would have suffered 
to a greater degree given the higher input prices and stagnant low maize prices, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 8. Furthermore, if farmers received subsidy, they could either use the inputs 
or get some money by reselling subsidised inputs or vouchers to wealthier leaders or agro-dealers. 
Knowing this, most villagers, both leaders and farmers, insisted that they needed more vouchers. 
A big agro-dealer in Songea, who has recently expanded both input and output (maize) business 
because he had means of transport, seems to be a big businessman with significant political 
and economic power in the area. He was very vocal about NAIVS, wrote articles about it in the 
newspapers and spoke of fraud carried out by leaders at regional, district and village levels. 
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“I don’t know anybody,” he said; “there might be conflict of interests”, and described frauds as 
follows: 
 
The problem is with our leaders, especially in the way they implement the programme. 
They blunder because they know that the farmers have nowhere to complain. They may 
provide 2,000 vouchers, but out of those they take away, say, 300 vouchers and send 
them back (...). They send them to the agro-dealers they collude with. For instance, if 
I am the District Commissioner (DC)’s choice, I can get these vouchers because I am 
‘his’ man. That’s where I differed from the district leaders. So the leaders hated me, 
but the farmers liked me. 
At times he confronted the DC, believing that the latter was behaving illegally, while he said that 
he himself was on the side of the farmers. One example of this was when he was chosen by the 
villagers as the agro-dealer for dealing with subsidised inputs in the village, but the leaders of the 
ward did not want him to serve. The villagers did not like this decision and demonstrated against 
it, at which point the DC sent police officers to arrest them. The following day the agro-dealer 
went to the Office of Security Service and the Officer Commander of the District to ask them to 
release the villagers, telling the leaders to ‘stay clear of politics’. As to the politics of the input 
business, he explained 
 
You know, our regions in the south are the breadbaskets of this country, especially in 
maize production. Nearly all the DCs in this part of the country took part in such terrible 
games, and hence some of them have been sacked and one has been transferred from 
one district to another. They usually asked the agro-dealers to give them a bribe of TZS 
2,000,000 (equivalent to 798 BP37). Normally the agro-dealers paid them, but after that 
the inputs did not reach the villages. I didn’t behave like that, so I quarrelled with them 
more often than not. 
 
If leaders receive 600 vouchers, they distribute 500 and give the remaining hundred to 
the agro-dealers. These 100 vouchers are distributed among agro-dealers and leaders 
from district to village levels. 
 
He went on: 
 
It became a big scandal in 2010 (when the most vouchers were distributed), when the 
Regional Commissioner (RC) and DC formed a committee to look into the issue. Some 
extension officials were arrested and remanded in custody. It was published in the media. 
He said that in 2010/11 and 2011/12 about 15 per cent and 25 per cent of vouchers, respectively, 
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were lost due to these frauds. He also mentioned small agro-dealers who lacked capacity or did 
not intend to engage in the business but merely obtained loans and then ran away: 
 
The problem with the Tanzanian government is that it recruits agents who lack 
experience, who have no agricultural education, because in 2009 there were 150 agents. 
But nothing was done, the farmers did not get the services, instead the agents quarrelled 
with each other in the stations where there were ten agents, quarrelling over the vouchers, 
that is, who should get more vouchers, you know. 
 
In the case of Ruvuma, up to the year 2011/12 we found that difficulties had been experienced 
in assigning agro-dealers without incurring abuse. The system was therefore changed in 2012/13  
so that the MAFC assigned several input supplier companies which were responsible for 
contracting out to the agro-dealers which distributed vouchers in the regions38. 
His quotes must be political, as he has taken up a position in opposition to the DC who is 
in conflict with the RC and is a large-scale agro-dealer. But the fact of the illicit behaviour by 
politicians and agro-dealers could be true, although things might have been expressed rather 
exaggeratedly because of his political position against DC. 
 
4-6. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen how the NAIVS programme evolved through intention, design and 
implementation. The intention of the programme was to respond to the food and input crisis 
emergency by ensuring food security especially that of poor and vulnerable households facing 
food and input price hikes. This accords with poverty reduction and economic growth under the 
overall framework of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, and to 
prioritising the provision of inputs and services in the ASDP. This was therefore originally meant 
to be short-term and had an ‘exit’ strategy. After the crisis ended in 2009, the programme changed 
its direction toward more sustainable footing, by encompassing future loan provision after the 
programme period.  
The targeted group therefore changed during the programme, officially in 2011, from 
small-scale farmers with less than one hectare under maize or rice cultivation to middle-
scalefarmers, who cultivate more than one acre of maize or rice and are able to pay top-up. 
However, this reflected the reality revealed since the pilot year. As poor farmers were not 
informed of the effects of the inputs in the first years and could not pay the top-up, which itself  
 
 
37 Exchange rate (100 BP=250,700 TZS) as of 3 December, 2012. 
38 Information from various informants (MAFC, The World Bank, local government officials, etc.). 
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became more difficult as the years went by due to the increase in input prices, the beneficiaries 
became better- off farmers. However, the change in the targeting group made it also difficult to 
achieve the stated ‘exit’ strategy, which in turn made it difficult to achieve the programme 
objective of either poverty reduction or economic growth. Furthermore, this ‘exit’ strategy did 
not fit well with the culture of village leaders who did not like to be seen as exercising 
favouritism, and who thus distributed vouchers ‘thinly’, with 68 per cent of recipient households 
receiving vouchers for only one or two years. 
The implementation of the programme was also flawed, due to the frequent late delivery 
of vouchers, corruption, neo-patrimonialism, politicised voucher allocation, illegal collusion 
between leaders and agro-dealers, missing vouchers and resale of vouchers by farmers. We found 
a large gap between the government data on the number of vouchers distributed in the region and 
the number of vouchers received as reported by panel households. According to government data, 
during four years of the programme (including the pilot year) all the farmer households could 
have ‘exited’; meanwhile, a little more than half of panel recipient households were actually 
issued with vouchers only in one or two years. These ‘missing vouchers’ might have been 
captured by leaders from regional to village level, or by agro-dealers. 
Village leaders explained that this practice was due to the allocation of a smaller number 
of vouchers to the villages and to their attempts to avoid accusations of favouritism, which led to 
turmoil in the community. However, this did not prevent some farmers from claiming that leaders 
had favoured families and friends. We also found that some selected farmers sold their vouchers 
due to late delivery in most years, lack of awareness of effects of inputs, and lack of capacity to 
pay the top-up in the face of increasing prices and no access to credit. All these flaws in 
implementation made the programme relatively ineffective and inefficient. 
Vouchers are changeable to money, thus became as a source of conflict. When fewer 
vouchers were distributed, tension became higher among villagers, village leaders, agro-dealers, 
government officers and lower level politicians. But in the end politicians, government officials, 
village leaders and agro-dealers got most of the benefit, while small-scale, poor farmers were least 
benefitted from the programme. 
The challenges of effectiveness and efficiency would be met by making clear the 
programme’s intention, by providing an adequate programme design and implementation plan to 
fulfil that intention, and by developing the institutional capacity to run the programme without 
fraud and mismanagement. A plan must then be put in place to prevent the illegal behaviours, 
including proper monitoring and evaluation for implementation to be accountable and a 
mechanism for voucher delivery which is independent of the government administration system 
must be established. 
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Chapter 5. Characteristics of voucher recipients 
 
Only a few local farmers will be able to pay the balance because some of them won’t 
have the (money for) top-up for the voucher; and, for that reason, most of these 
vouchers will go to the wealthy farmers…and to government officials…or government 
institutions (Farmer group discussion, Songea district). 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Market-smart subsidy programmes generally have a dual objective: 1) to enhance national food 
security and accelerate economic growth through increased crop (mainly maize or rice) 
production; and 2) to reduce poverty by targeting poor, small-scale farmers and to enhance their 
household food security through better access to inputs (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Ricker- 
Gilbert et al., 2013a). Thus, one of the main features of the smart subsidy is the targeting of 
eligible households, that are, in most cases, poor small-scale farmers. 
However, seeking to reconcile the two aspects of such a target sometimes leads to 
conflicting implementation techniques and challenge in attempting to ascertain exactly who 
should be targeted: in order to effectively achieve the increase in maize production, selected 
households might well comprise those with high marginal productivity, but may or may not 
necessarily be poor. Moreover, the decentralised targeting that is employed for most of subsidy 
programmes is based on the eligibility criteria, which, although it is supposed to be more cost 
effective has often suffered from elite capture and fraud, and thus invariably does not work well 
in practice as seen in the previous chapter. 
A synthesis of recent studies on subsidy programmes informs us that intervention costs 
outweigh the benefits, given that the effect in terms of increased production has been found to be 
limited due to low fertiliser use efficiency, diversion from intended beneficiaries, and 
displacement of previously commercial input use (Jayne and Rashid, 2013). Indeed, research 
suggests that subsidy programmes tend to benefit wealthier households that previously purchased 
commercial inputs, thus crowding out commercial input use (Xu et al., 2009a; Ricker- Gilbert et 
al., 2011; Pan and Christiaensen, 2012). The study of Targeted Input Programme in Malawi 
suggests that between 14 per cent and 18 per cent of households that had received subsidy in 
2011/12 did not satisfy any criteria for eligibility (Chinsinga, 2005: 148). Additionally, voucher 
distribution has often been observed to be manipulated by political interest, a phenomenon that 
arises from the targeting of areas in which the government wants to win popularity (Banful, 2011; 
Jayne et al., 2013). 
The characteristics of voucher recipients have been observed to influence the 
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effectiveness of a subsidy programme such that, in terms of input use, the aforementioned 
limitations to efforts aimed at increasing production affect impact on yields and poverty reduction. 
Two studies, on Zambia and Malawi respectively, found that wealthier subsidy beneficiaries who 
had previously purchased commercial inputs and displaced them caused voucher programme 
inefficiency (Xu et al., 2009a; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011). Finally, employing quantile 
regression analysis, Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2012) argue that fertiliser subsidies do not in fact 
increase crop production for poorer households at all, and, therefore, do not reduce poverty. 
In Chapter 4, we saw how the targeting of village households could deviate from 
programme guidelines; focus turned from poor, small-scale farmers to middle-income agricultural 
households; the programme was susceptible to elite capture through collusion or fraud; and 
vouchers frequently went missing from regional level before they could reach the villages. In this 
chapter, using district data and empirical panel and qualitative data collected from the study area, 
I explore the question of exactly who received vouchers in the region. 
 
5.2 Characteristics of sample households 
In this section, I firstly consider the characteristics of my panel sample of 309 households and 
their possible relationship with analysis of programme impact on maize yields and poverty 
reduction. 
 
5.2.1 Sample distribution and voucher receipt experience 
Panel sample distribution by district and voucher receipt experience is shown in Table 14 and 
Appendix 7. I mix the population of Songea district and Songea municipality for the panel sample 
analysis, since one panel sample village in Songea district became to belong to Songea 
municipality by the time of Round 4 survey. According to the data of Population and Housing 
Census 2012, Mbinga district has the biggest number of agricultural households located in the 
region sharing 40 per cent, followed by Tunduru district with 24 per cent, the rest was 
approximately equally shared between Songea (district plus municipality) and Namtumbo. From 
the Census data of the ratio of agricultural households in rural households my panel household 
distribution by district tells that Mbinga district was oversampled by 28 per cent, while Namtumbo 
district was under-sampled by 47 per cent, followed by Songea district by 17 per cent. Thus I 
would weigh the panel sample by inverted number of these over- and under-sampling of each 
district. 
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Table 14: Ratio of district population to total population of Ruvuma and sample panel 
distribution 
Source: The author’s calculation based on data from NBS (2013a); NBS (2013b); NBS (2013c); NBS 
(2013d); NBS (2013e). 
 
The main cash crop in Mbinga district is coffee and the one in Tunduru is cashew nuts. Since 
input subsidies were for maize or rice cultivation, the big ratio of these two districts on number 
of households in the region would make the impact of input subsidy smaller, given a possibly 
higher ratio of input usage with these cash crops through, for example, exchanging vouchers in 
order to buy other inputs such as Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN) for coffee (as asserted by 
a farmer in a farmer group discussion in Mbinga). Accordingly, my panel study results might 
have been skewed such that the programme impact on maize yields it reveals is lower than was 
actually the case. 
 
Table 15: Sample panel distribution and voucher receipt experience during the programme 
 
Source: The author’s calculation based on data from Christiaensen and Sarris (2004); Christiaensen and 
Sarris (2005); Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
As shown in Table 15, of my 309 panel households, there were about twice as many voucher- 
receipt households as non-recipient households. 50 per cent of all recipients were found in Mbinga, 
about 20 per cent in Songea district and Tunduru, and 10 per cent in Namtumbo. The highest 
recipient rate was found in Songea district, with a rate of 88 per cent of the district sample, 
followed by Namtumbo with 81 per cent. Even in the district of Tunduru, which returned the 
lowest rate, slightly more than 50 per cent of the sample had received vouchers at some time 
during the programme. In total, about 67 per cent of sample panel households had received 
vouchers up to the fourth year of the programme. 
Census:
Agricultural
households in
2011/12
Census:
Agricultural
households in
rural villages
Ratio of
Agricultural
households to
region total (%)
Ratio of panel
sample to
region total
(%)
Over-
sampled
Weight to
be made
Songea district 32,983 30,410 15.41 16.18 0.83 1.21
Songea municipality 37,025 8,072 4.09
Mbinga 85,811 79,375 40.23 51.46 1.28 0.78
Namtumbo 33,633 31,414 15.92 8.41 0.53 1.89
Tunduru 53,299 48,022 24.34 23.95 0.98 1.02
Total 242,751 197,292 100.00 100
Number of
recipients
Ratio to
total
recipients
Number of
non-
recipients
Ratio to
total
recipients
Songea district 50 16.2 44 0.22 6 0.06 0.88
Tunduru 74 24.0 40 0.20 34 0.32 0.54
Mbinga 159 51.5 99 0.49 60 0.57 0.62
Namtumbo 26 8.4 21 0.10 5 0.05 0.81
Total 309 100 204 1 105 1 0.66
District
Voucher receipt
Number of
households
Ratio to
total (%)
Recipient
rate
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5.2.2 Changes of landholdings and their usage 
When looking at the change in landholdings between Round 3 and 4, ranging from 6.8 ha. in 2009 
to 5.9 ha. in 2013, the average area of sample panel landholdings was bigger than the regional 
average of 4.0 ha. reported by the National Agricultural Sample Census (the author’s calculation) 
(URT, 2012d) (Table 16). Also the area of land under cultivation of 2.6 ha. (in both rounds) was 
bigger than the regional average of 2.0 ha. found by the Census (URT, 2012c: 21). Accordingly, 
I infer that panel sample households were probably selected from relatively better-off households, 
that is, after villages were selected with stratified random sampling (Sarris, 2004), sample 
households might have been selected from accessible and better-off households in each village. 
Therefore, I consider the bias of households being relatively ‘better-off’ in interpreting regression 
results, as discussed in detail in this chapter and Chapters 6, 7, and 8. 
 
Table 16: Average land characteristics by ownership and area under cultivation (ha.) 
Source: The author’s calculation based on data from Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
 
5.2.3 Household members’ / relatives’ election to position of village leader 
By reanalysing myself panel data from rounds 1–3 that were surveyed by Pan and Christiaensen 
(2010; 2012), it emerges that 60 per cent of the panel sample household heads were village leaders 
in Kilimanjaro. This is an incredibly high ratio of village leaders; however, according to the 
sampling frame document, the original panel households were selected randomly in the villages 
(Sarris, 2004). In my data in Ruvuma Region the ratio of local elites receiving vouchers in the 
pilot year was higher than this, as much as 71 per cent, while of the VVC members 25 per cent, 
compared to 14.5 per cent in Kilimanjaro. From this I could say that the level of elite capture in 
Ruvuma was even higher than the level of Kilimanjaro as shown in Table 17. Table 17 shows 
of the comparison between Kilimanjaro and Ruvuma on the mean values of the panel households 
out of the number of households being ‘not eligible’, ‘eligible and not redeemed’ and ‘eligible 
and redeemed’ across ‘member of household has elected position in village’ and ‘member of 
households is village voucher committee’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
year
Owned
(A)
Cultivated
(B)
Owned
( C)
Cultivated
(D)
Owned
Rate of
change
(R4/R3)
Cultivated
Rate of
change
(R4/R3)
Owned
(A)/(C )
Cultivated
(B) /(D)
Round 3 7.7 2.9 5.0 2.2 6.8 2.6 1.53 1.31
Round 4 6.3 2.8 5.1 2.3 5.9 0.9 2.6 1.0 1.23 1.21
Total 7.0 2.8 5.1 2.2 6.3 2.6 1.38 1.26
All Ratio Recipients/NRRecipients Non-recipients
-79-  
Table 17: Comparison on the ratio of being selected and in receipt of vouchers in the pilot 
year in Kilimanjaro and Ruvuma 
Note: *Hypothesis means 
Source: For Ruvuma author calculation from Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Pan and Christiaensen (2012) 
 
The average ratios of the percentage of households with elites to total households and voucher 
recipient and selected for vouchers of the round 1 to 339 and my panel are shown in Table 18. My 
panel data40 show that about 20 per cent ((1 – 33.8 per cent) / 42 per cent) of the selected 
households for vouchers in the pilot year did not receive vouchers. My panel data also show that 
about 65 per cent of voucher recipients in the pilot year and 67 per cent of voucher recipients in 
any given year of the programme were village leaders, that is, holders of any official position in 
the community. At the same time, about 17 per cent of voucher recipients were VVC members, 
a lower percentage that derives from the fact that there were fewer VVC members (13 per cent) 
in the sample. And either village leaders or VVC members occupy as much as 68.5 per cent of 
the voucher recipients in any year. My panel sample households were also about 13 per cent 
points more likely to be selected for the programme, and about 13 per cent points more likely to 
receive vouchers in the pilot year than those in the original panel sample. And as many as 67 per 
cent of them were in receipt of vouchers in any given year, which is more than twice the 
proportion of the panel in the round 3. Such results could be correlated with the larger proportion 
of village leaders in my panel sample. Although in my analysis I control for these memberships 
I consider that the panel sample is composed of high ratio of village leaders and VVC members, 
which might affect the results on general trend of all the panel in this chapter, Chapters 6, 7, and 
8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 The panel rounds from 1 to 3 are the whole panel households, although there were attritions in Round 2 
and 3. 
40 305 households, i.e. representing all data variables, including those on individuals such as election to 
official village positions. 
Ruvuma Kilimanjaro Ruvuma Kilimanjaro Ruvuma Kilimanjaro
Number of observations 488 602 50 18 144 152
% of member of household has elected position in village 61.0 37.5 72.0 44.0 71.0 57.5*
% of member of household is in village voucher committee 9.0 3.7 16.0 4.9 25.0 14.5*
Not eligible Eligible and not redeemed Eligible and redeemed
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Table 18: Comparison of sample household characteristics 
 
*Household head elected to position. 
Source: Christiaensen and Sarris (2004); Christiaensen and Sarris (2005); Christiaensen and Pan 
(2009a); author’s data. 
 
5-3. Characteristics of voucher recipient households 
 
 
5.3.1. Regression strategy 
In order to examine the characteristics of voucher recipients, I use quantitative and 
qualitative information. On quantitative analysis I use logit estimates, which employ a 
normal cumulative distribution function and utility theory, or rational choice perspective on 
behaviour, giving similar results to a logit model that is based on a logistical function 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
In my analysis, the decision of the ith household to apply for programme participation 
or not depends on its access to vouchers, Ii, which is determined by one or more explanatory 
variables, Xi, such that the larger the value of Ii, the greater the probability of a household 
being selected for and receiving vouchers, as represented by the following formula: 
 
Ii=B1  + B2Xi 
 
Here I place the hypothesis for research question I mentioned in Chapter 1 that: the more 
assets huseholds have, the more likely they received vouchers. In order to analyse which 
assets were more related to the likelihoof of receiving vouchers, I use the following 
composite asset framework, into which I factor five types of household as well political 
capital, as utilised in a typical sustainable livelihoods framework (Scoones, 1998; Carswell 
Rounds 1 - 3 Round 4
(677 households) (305 households)
Percentage of total sample hosueholds (%) (%)
Household or relative with one or more village leaders 56.2 61.3
Household or relative with VVC members 10.8 13.2
Household or relative with leaders or VVC members 81.9 84.6
Household or relative with village leaders and VVC members 57.5 63
Households selected for voucher in pilot year 29 42
Voucher recipient in pilot year 20.9 33.8
Voucher recipient in any year 30 66.6
Percentage of voucher recipients in piot year
Household head village leader 65.5 65.4
Household head VVC member 21.1 20.6
Households head either village leader or VVC member 68.5 68.9
Percentage of voucher recipients in any year
Household head village leader 66.7 67
Household head VVC members 16 16.9
Household head either village leader or VVC member 67.6 68.5
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et al., 1999; Carney, 2003), and introduced in the present thesis in the Theory of Change in 
Chapter 3. The analysis comprises an integrated quantitative as well as qualitative inquiry. 
Use of panel survey variables to measure each capital type is shown in Table 19. 
 
Table 19: Variables adopted for the measurement of assets reported in household panel survey 
Asset Variable 
Human capital Age, gender, education level, health of household head, household size, 
number of farmers in household, and information and training on input 
use. 
Financial capital Amount of cash income, contribution to social functions in previous 
year, amount of outstanding borrowing and access to credit. 
Natural capital Soil quality41, total land area, and land area under cultivation. 
Social capital Amount of remittances/gifts from neighbours or family members 
outside the village, household members belong to social and religious 
groups. Physical capital Distance to road and irrigation facilities, number of head of livestock 
(bullocks, cows, goats, pigs, chickens) owned42 , having modern house 
roof, amount of Urea / improved seeds used, and total annual household 
consumption per capita. 
Political capital Household members/relatives are elected for positions in village, or in 
Village Voucher Committee. 
 
5-3-2. Descriptive statistics of recipient and non-recipient households, and non-recipient 
households dropped from sample 
Before looking into detail each category of the households who were selected for and received or 
did not receive vouchers in the pilot year or during the programme, I look at the difference in 
mean values in the Round 3 survey of the variables for the assets framework among these groups, 
but also look at households who reported as not received in the pilot year and are dropped from 
the sample households because of the propensity score matching43 (Table 20). In the human 
capital variables the households selected for but did not receive vouchers with the eldest 
household head, with the biggest percentage of male heads, the highest proportion of heads having 
completed standard four, the heads being healthiest, and household size and number of farmers 
being the biggest. In almost all the variables the selected households in the pilot year followed 
them as the second place. It suggests that the selected households in the pilot year had bigger 
human capital. Meanwhile, non-recipient households in any year are headed by youngest, most 
proportion of female-headed, heads with lowest proportion of having completed standard four, 
the size of households and number of farmers in the households being the smallest, and the least 
proportion having received training on input use (1 per cent of the number of households). 
 
 
41 Farmer’s own judgement. 
42 Value of each breed of livestock taken from median price in survey data. 
43 Propensity score matching uses only households who match between the treatment and control 
groups. 
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Table 20: Descriptive statistics of mean values of asset variables in Round 3 for recipient and non-recipient households 
Note: Values are mean values adjusted by sample weighting by district level.  
Source: Author’s data 
Types of
capital
Variable
Not selected
in pilot year
 Selected in
pilot year
Selected but
not received
in pilot year
Received in
pilot year
Non-
recipients in
any year
Received in
any year
Dropped
households
Number of households 177 128 25 103 102 203 25
Househod head age 46.8 49.6 54.9 48.3 46.3 48.8 50.4
Gender of household head (Male=1, Female=0) 0.88 0.98 1.04 0.96 0.88 0.94 0.96
Education of household head (Completed standard 4=1, if not=0) 0.70 0.80 0.85 0.79 0.68 0.78 0.50
Household head is sick/disabled (Sick/disabled=1, if not=0) 0.15 0.19 0.07 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.13
Number of farmers in the household 2.90 3.15 3.28 3.12 2.71 3.15 3.39
Household received training in input use (Yes=1, No=0) 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.05
Household size 6.2 6.7 7.4 6.6 5.8 6.7 6.9
Annual cash income (Thousand TZS) 252.7 343.3 226.0 371.7 286.6 292.8 159.8
Amount of contribution to social functions (Thousand TZS) 18.9 21.4 15.4 22.9 19.3 20.3 15.1
Amount of borrowing (Thousand TZS) 289.0 197.6 158.8 207.0 365.0 193.1 26.3
Whether household member belongs to primary society, SACCO, or other
economic group (Yes=1, No=0)
0.17 0.33 0.26 0.35 0.12 0.31 0.00
Quality of land (Good=1, Average=2, Poor=3) 1.90 2.00 2.20 2.00 1.90 2.00 1.64
Size of owned land (acre) 14.6 18.0 17.1 18.2 11.3 18.3 10.7
Size of cultivated land (acre) 5.90 7.26 7.08 7.30 5.04 7.20 5.17
Amount of remittance/gift received from relatives/friends (Thousand TZS) 66.0 104.5 46.1 118.6 66.9 89.8 40.3
Household member belongs to religious/ social group (Yes=1, No=0) 0.40 0.48 0.43 0.49 0.32 0.49 0.30
Average distance of parcels to all weather road (km) 1.99 2.34 3.30 2.10 2.00 2.20 1.86
Average of parcels with access to irrigation facilities (average of parcels with
access=1, not=0)
0.13 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.17 0.01
Number of bullocks 0.08 0.21 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.18 1.67
Number of cows 0.38 0.82 1.19 0.74 0.49 0.61 2.67
Number of goats 2.19 3.31 3.76 3.21 2.12 2.94 4.90
Number of pigs 0.94 1.22 0.82 1.32 0.91 1.13 2.14
Number of chickens 5.48 8.71 6.64 9.21 4.26 8.13 8.46
Houseroof is metal/stone/concrete (Yes=1, No=1) 0.58 0.80 0.78 0.80 0.49 0.76 0.48
Annual total household consumption per adult equivalent (Thousand TZS) 134.4 193.6 163.2 200.9 113.3 182.3 128.4
Amount of urea used (kg) 35.9 80.5 47.9 88.4 9.3 77.3 32.6
Amount of improved seeds used (kg) 0.2 2.4 1.1 2.8 0.1 1.6 0.1
Household members/relatives are elected for position in village (Yes=1, No=0) 0.58 0.66 0.59 0.67 0.45 0.69 0.78
Whether household member/relative is VVC member (Yes=1, No=0) 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.20 0.05 0.17 0.17
Physical
capital
Political
capital
Human
capital
Financial
capital
Natural
capical
Social
capital
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On the financial capital recipient households in the pilot year had the biggest financial 
capital in all variables except for amount of borrowing, the latter was headed by the poorer groups, 
namely, non-recipient households in any year and households who were not selected in the pilot 
year. 
Again non-recipient households in any year had the smallest financial capital. On natural 
capital though the quality of land was headed by the selected households that did not receive in 
the pilot year, recipient households in any year or in the pilot year, or selected households in the 
pilot year had the biggest land sizes owned and cultivation. On social capital recipient households 
in the pilot year had the biggest amount or remittances / gifts from relatives / friends and were 
more likely to belong to religious / social groups. Meanwhile on the remittance / gifts the recipient 
households in the pilot year had the biggest amount. The biggest proportion of belonging to 
religious or social group was found in the recipient households in any year. On physical capital, 
interestingly, not-selected households in the pilot year and non-recipient households in any year 
had the closest parcels to all weather roads, while the selected households in the pilot year had 
the biggest distance or parcels to all weather roads, which is counter-intuitive. On all the other 
variables except for numbers of cows and goats, recipient households in the pilot year had the 
biggest values. Number of cows and goats were headed by the selected households who did not 
receive vouchers. This suggests that they had other expenses for taking care of these livestock, 
and had other source of income from them, thus for them the subsidized inputs were not such a 
priority. As for political capital, it was found that about 60 ~ 70 per cent of the sample household 
heads are elected to positions in the villages, which is implausibly high. This might partly be 
reporting error or due to the way in which the questions were framed. The recipient households 
in any year had the biggest proportion of being elected for positions in the village, while the 
biggest proportion of household member /relatives being in VVC was found in recipient 
households in the pilot year. In the pilot year when the programme was not well known to the 
people, vouchers tended to be obtained by VVC members themselves, but as the programme came 
to be known widely with years, vouchers became to be captured by village elites. 
Throughout the variables, non-recipient households in any year, headed by younger, most 
proportion of female, least educated, with smallest household size had the smallest values, owning 
and less access to resources, except for the remittance / gift from relatives / friends, which they 
could get relatively more than other groups, since probably they needed them much. Meanwhile, 
the recipient households in the pilot year, though with lower education attainment, had the biggest 
values of almost all the variables. The selected households that did not receive vouchers in the 
pilot year were headed by the most elderly, male, with biggest household size and number of 
farmers in the households, had least cash income and less total household consumption, with 
receiving less remittance / gift and less contribution to social functions, and used less amount of 
improved seeds, which might be related to elderly household heads. Because of smaller income 
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and lack of interest in using improved inputs they did not receive vouchers in the pilot year. 
Recipient households in any year, being a big mixed group, because they were rotating the 
recipient households, had the middle level of values for almost all the variables, except that they 
had the biggest land size for cultivation and the biggest proportion of belonging to religious / 
social groups, and more household members / relatives were elected for positions in the village. 
It suggests that they had more social and political power to be selected for vouchers.  
25 households which reported not receiving vouchers in the pilot year but which were 
dropped from the sample households have older, less educated heads, are more numerous and 
include more individual farmers. It seems that they maintain more livestock than the average of 
the whole sample; however, in most of the other capitals they have lower values compared to the 
other households. This group depends more on livestock rather than crop production, with lower 
income and other assets. However, their political capital, such as the mean value of being elites 
and village voucher committee members, is of the highest value. Dropping these livestock- 
oriented households from the sample would not much distort the analysis of my research. 
In the following sections I will analyse in more detail the characteristics of recipient and 
non-recipient households in the pilot year and recipient households during the programme. 
 
5-3-3. Characteristics of selected households, recipient and non-recipient households in the pilot 
year 
First I will see who were selected for and received vouchers in the pilot year. Firstly, I examine 
the characteristics of those households selected for programme participation in the pilot year, 
making logit estimates of coefficients of household variables and village dummy variables in 
order to see the marginal probability of the households with these variables to be selected for 
voucher. In this regard, there is one village for which there are no relevant characteristics data, 
which is therefore excluded from the analysis. The difference-in-difference estimates show that 
the use of improved inputs for maize cultivation in 2007/08, before the programme started, 
increased the likelihood of selection for programme participation in the pilot year such that the 
deployment of improved seeds and Urea increased such likelihood by 14–16 per cent and 32 per 
cent respectively, both figures being statistically significant (see Appendix 8). The farmers who 
used inputs before the programme were the ones who benefitted from the previous input transport 
subsidy, which tended to benefit only wealthier farmers44. Also there is vast literature about ‘early 
adopters’ – who are generally wealthier in various types of human capital and have more access 
to soft (information and financial services) and hard (roads, vehicles and marketplaces) 
infrastructure (Boz, 2002; Boz and Akbay, 2005; Etoundi and Dia, 2008). 
However, these results contradict one of the programme selection criteria, which states 
 
44 Information from interview with MAFC officer (October, 2012). 
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that, “(p)riority is given to farming households [that] have used little or no fertiliser and improved 
seed with maize or rice over the last five years.” Therefore, selection was not made based on this 
criterion, a finding that is corroborated by Pan and Christeiaensen (2010), who reach a similar 
conclusion based on their analysis of the use of inorganic fertiliser in 2007/08. Such an apparent 
inconsistency may be due to the fact that although first village leaders tried to follow the selection 
criteria, the corresponding households did neither know the effects of the inputs nor were willing 
or able to pay top-up to receive vouchers, thus the leaders ended up selecting the households who 
had used inputs before. 
Indeed, in village A in Mbinga, I was told by VVC chairman that, “Since farmers did not 
know the programme, they thought that inputs were free, so that village leaders were cheating 
money from them instead of giving vouchers free.” Moreover, in the pilot year in this village 
VVCs had yet to be set up;45 rather, village leaders selected households according to programme 
criteria and decisions were approved at a village assembly. Given that many farmers did not know 
enough about the programme in order to make an informed decision, leaders tended to simply 
select households that were willing to use the prescribed inputs and pay the top-up. 
Such a lack of information in the pilot year in particular was also reported by many study 
informants, as exemplified by the following extract: 
 
Since farmers did not know the effects of the inputs, many farmers sold them at a 
cheap price or even gave vouchers either to the agro-dealers or to other able 
farmers who could pay the top-up; that was mostly in the pilot year. 
 
A government agricultural official also asserted that the volume of issued vouchers that were 
subsequently sold on rather than used directly by the beneficiary to obtain inputs rose to 40 per 
cent in the pilot year, while by the third year, it had fallen again to about 10 per cent. 
In my logit analysis I found that the likelihood of selection to the programme in the pilot 
year was also enhanced in villages in which residents enjoyed the convenience of an accessible 
mobile telephone network and were, perhaps consequently, visited frequently by maize buyers, 
that is, farming households in such villages were subject to sufficient voucher allocation for the 
effective use of inputs (Appendix 8). In this regard, statistically, it emerges that an increase in 
number of visits by 1 per cent raises the likelihood of household selection by 10 per cent, a ratio 
that is statistically highly significant; and mobile phone access increases such likelihood by 22 
per cent, which is significant. 
However, the logit results do not show a significant effect on selection likelihood in terms 
of household members and / or their relatives being VVC members, or the percentage of illiterate 
 
45 Interview, village informant. 
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household members, as do Pan and Christiaensen’s regression results (2010: 66). Nevertheless, 
a village executive officer (VEO) in Mbinga asserted that, “Beneficiary farmers are big farmers 
with education.” I therefore infer that the selection of my particular panel sample and / or the use 
of different variables have affected the results differently. 
I now turn to the characteristics of voucher recipients. The results show that households 
deploying improved inputs for maize cultivation in 2007/08 in those villages that exhibited higher 
positive ratios in terms of input sales and visits by maize buyers are more likely to receive 
vouchers in the pilot year of the programme (see Appendix 9). This might be because of the 
different selected variables in the analysis. Indeed, if the amount of Urea use in the previous year 
increases by 1 per cent, the likelihood of receiving vouchers in the pilot year increases by about 
3 per cent, which is statistically significant; while with regard to improved maize seeds, a 1 per 
cent increase in usage raises such likelihood by 11 ~ 13 per cent, which is also statistically 
significant. 
Yet, enhanced likelihood of receiving vouchers might also increase the displacement of 
previously purchased commercial inputs by subsidised inputs. Such speculation is corroborated 
by the finding that increased Urea usage compared to the previous year was more evident amongst 
non-recipient than programme-participation households, a point that is explored further in the 
next chapter. 
Analysing the whole original Ruvuma panel sample regression results, Pan and 
Christiaensen (2010) suggest that households in higher local economic quintiles; amongst the 
village elite; having members on the VVC or in prominent religious and / or social positions; and/ 
or literate heads all have a significant positive effect on the likelihood of receiving vouchers in 
the pilot year, which, they argue, demonstrates that there was elite capture of vouchers in the pilot 
year in Ruvuma. However, my sample panel analysis does not show any such elite capture in the 
pilot year, indicating negative results in this regard in terms of both the effect of household 
members being members of Saving and credit organisations (SACCOs), and/or of religious or 
social groups (see Appendix 9). This might be because of the different selected variables in the 
analysis. The households whose members / relatives were VVC members were more likely to 
be elites: having these members in the elected positions in the villages or belonging to religious / 
social groups, which are statistically significant (Appendix 10). 
As pointed out in Section 5-2-3, 20 per cent of the households selected for programme 
participation in the pilot year did not receive vouchers, the reason probably being that they were 
not convinced that the prescribed inputs would increase crop yields sufficiently to offset the 
financial cost of having to pay 50 per cent of the market prices of supplies. In this section, I 
consider the characteristics of those households that did not receive vouchers after being selected 
for the programme in the pilot year. Out of a total of 128 selected households, 25 reported that 
they had not been issued with vouchers, the reasons given being that they did not have sufficient 
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cash or could not obtain credit to pay the top-up (29 per cent), they did not want to seek to obtain 
credit (20 per cent), or other factors for which there are no data available. 
The logit regression results show that households headed by elderly members, owning an 
above average number of cows, and/or farming comparatively poorly irrigated land tended not to 
receive subsidised inputs after being selected for programme participation in the pilot year (see 
Appendix 11). In respect of the first result, although, in some villages, I found that households 
with elderly heads were positively targeted by the programme on grounds of vulnerability, I was 
informed by several such households that they tended to be poor, since their children got married 
to have different households or became independent farmers even within a household and due 
to an inability to engage themselves in much farming on account of their advanced age. This 
made it difficult for them to pay the top-up. This is probably the reason for the special 
arrangement that was made for the elderly in the pilot year, as exemplified by one Mbinga villager, 
who noted that, “In the early years, a village chairman selected elderly household heads for 
voucher receipt and gave them free inputs”, whose practices, though, in later years, was criticised 
as doing favouritism by villagers, so that the chairman was sacked. However, farmers in several 
villages also informed of ‘tendency to being conservative in terms of adopting modern 
agricultural technology’ such that elderly-headed household heads prefer using traditional seeds 
and not using fertiliser. Finally, the second and third results are reasonable since the more cows a 
household owns, the more financial resources it must invest in animal husbandry, and the less 
cash it has to devote to crop production – and without proper irrigation, no crop can be 
successfully grown. 
 
5-3-4. Comparison between the findings of Pan and Christiaensen (2010) and my analysis 
I will compare the panel results found by Pan and Christiaensen (2010) with my analysis, using 
the same panel data (Table 21). The difference is due to the different regression model: Pan and 
Christiaensen used the two-stage Heckman selection model, using marginal productivities of 
maize and rice, or total production, while my analysis is based on the logit model, as mentioned 
above. 
 
Table 21: Comparison between the findings of Pan and Christiaensen (2010) by Heckman 
selection model and my own by logit model 
 Pan & Christiaensen (2010) My findings 
Selected 
households in the 
pilot year 
•With high marginal 
productivity of inorganic 
fertilisers 
•Bigger land size 
•Having VVC members or 
being members of religious, 
youth, women’s or social 
groups 
•Used improved inputs in 2007/8 
•Reside in villages with cell 
phone access and more visits by 
maize buyers. 
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Selected but not 
received in the 
pilot year 
•Generally poor •Elderly-headed, have more 
cows, have less irrigated land, 
reside where there is less access 
to health facilities but more 
access to water facilities 
Recipients in the 
pilot year 
•Households with previous 
use of inorganic fertilisers. 
•Bigger land size 
•Ndelendele and Yao group 
•Used improved inputs in 2007/8 
•Reside in the villages visited by 
more maize buyers 
Recipients in any 
year of the 
programme 
- There was elite capture. They 
are leaders, used inputs before, 
have little non-farm income, 
own more livestock and have 
higher household consumption 
Note: For the selected but not received in the pilot year by Pan and Christiaensen is of the descriptive 
statistics. 
Source: Author developed from Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
For selected households in the pilot year, there were different findings. Pan and Christiaensen 
found that they were households with high marginal productivity of inorganic fertilisers, more 
land, and including VVC members or being members of religious, youth, women’s or social 
groups. My findings were that they were households which had previously used improved inputs 
and which resided in villages with more cell phone access and more visits by maize buyers. As to 
selected households which did not receive vouchers in the pilot year, there was no regression 
study made by Pan and Christiaensen: my logit estimates are that households headed by elderly 
individuals, owning more cows, with less irrigated land and residing where there is less access to 
health facilities but more access to water facilities, were more likely not to receive vouchers. As 
regards recipient households in the pilot year, the two sets of findings agree that households which 
previously used improved inputs were well-represented. While Pan and Christiaensen found 
households with more land and the Ndelendele and Yao groups were more likely to receive 
vouchers, my finding was that households which reside in the villages visited by more maize 
buyers were more likely to receive vouchers. My finding on recipients in any year of the 
programme was that there was elite capture – the households with members / relatives are in 
elected positions in the villages, also used previously the improved inputs, have little non-farm 
income, own more livestock and have higher household consumption. 
 
5-3-5. Characteristics of voucher recipients during the programme 
As the programme proceeded, farmers became aware of the effects of the prescribed inputs on 
maize yields. Because of comparatively few vouchers per number of households in most of the 
villages under study 46 the beneficiaries had to be selected. However, the selection criteria 
determined by the programme and actual implementation differed from the rule. 
MAFC official in the input support section explained the criteria for selecting programme 
participants, suggesting that, “Beneficiaries are low- to middle-income farmers,” but rather that 
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“small-scale farmers often can’t afford to pay the top-up.” Also, a World Bank official suggested 
that beneficiaries were “middle-income, production-surplus farming households”. An elderly 
widow also suggested that beneficiary farmers had to be able to make a “financial or physical 
contribution to village life,” which she did not have the capacity for, meaning that she was not 
eligible for the programme. Additionally, a farmer in Songea district asserted that:  
 
The programme is good but the problem is when the intended beneficiaries don’t get 
vouchers. Powerful people benefit: they are the agro-dealers, district officials, village 
leaders, and VVC members. 
 
In a farmer group discussion in Tunduru, it was stated that village leaders “don’t know who did 
not receive any vouchers in their sub-villages,” it having been already asserted that, “beneficiary 
candidates were selected in sub-village meetings where every household participated,” and, after 
that, “(recipient candidate) lists were approved in the village assembly.” Accordingly, they should 
have known who had benefitted or not each year, but when I asked them why this was not the 
case, they responded that they didn’t want to be seen as spying on neighbours. This suggests that 
they were envious of recipient households, considering the subsidy as merely supplementary 
income because they knew how the programme operated by then. Moreover, as mentioned above, 
there were many cases of collusion between farmers and agro-dealers, meaning that if neighbours 
heard about them, they might not want to talk about who received vouchers and who did not. It 
may therefore be concluded that fraud, illegal actions, and deviation from the rules in terms of 
voucher management were all prevalent. 
We find that voucher recipients in any year of the programme were the households with 
one or more members and / or their relatives in the VVC, those who deployed improved inputs 
before the programme, those with comparative little non-farming income, those with more 
livestock, and those who exhibited higher household consumption (see Appendix 12). As seen 
above, there is a positive correlation between household members or their relatives who are in the 
VVC, those or their relatives who are village leaders (in elected positions), and those who belong 
to religious and/or social groups (Appendix 10). Therefore, the results suggest that as the 
programme advanced, it was village leaders and better-off households used to deploying 
improved inputs before the initiation of the programme who were issued with vouchers. In the 
traditional context of the study area, the elderly are invariably respected by villagers and thus 
have local power in this sense; however, here, I refer to the robustness of the young, that is, being 
active and mobile, and physically able to farm, with the propensity to access new agricultural 
technology and methodology, and obtain trials, about which I will mention as case stories in 
 
46 With the exception of two surveyed villages in Songea District. 
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Chapter 7. Although even given that there was a high percentage of leaders in the sample, the 
logit estimate allows a comparative analysis of the likelihood of voucher receipt in terms of elite 
versus non-elite community members, and shows that leader that the programme was biased 
towards households whose members comprised one or more village leaders. 
I was frequently informed that leaders distributed vouchers to their friends and relatives, 
‘doing “favouritism”’; and also learnt in the field of several cases of certain selected households 
returning vouchers to leaders because they were unable to pay the top-up, meaning that the elite 
secured them in the end by default. Given that, according to my above logit results, such elite 
capture was not significant either in the cases of households selected for vouchers or of recipient 
households in the pilot year, it may be inferred that any significant elite capture was evidenced in 
subsequent years when a greater number of vouchers was issued. 
The logit estimate findings also suggest that better-off households were likely to receive 
vouchers. This result accords with much of the information collected through interviews with key 
informants, as exemplified by the individual who remarked that, “the programme benefits the 
middle income or better-off households, not the poor households.” The reasons for this given in 
the field were that, “Input prices rose up after the programme started,” and “village leaders and 
VVC members were asking additional money to the farmers”, both of which made it increasingly 
difficult for poor farmers to pay the top-up. 
The effect of previous Urea application on voucher receipt could be due to the increased 
difficulty of paying the top-up in the face of escalating input prices over the course of the 
programme, about which I heard numerous complaints. Many farmers asserted that this made it 
difficult to get vouchers, which, in turn, meant that only those farmers used to deploying the 
prescribed inputs and aware of the benefits in terms of crop yield were willing to continue using 
them under the programme and considered it cost effective to pay ever increasing prices from 
year to year. 
However, this means that the programme failed to promote new users of its tried and 
tested inputs as had been the aim; neither did it achieve poverty reduction amongst poor, small- 
scale, or vulnerable farmers due to increased crop production through continuous use of improved 
inputs; rather, it simply helped elite, well-informed, and better-off farmers to expand the gap 
between them and their less fortunate counterparts. 
The positive effect of having less off-farm income suggests that the programme targeted 
households whose income derived mainly from farming, which is in keeping with its mission in 
the sense that such households should be more willing to invest in agricultural resources and 
technology. Keeping comparatively more chickens increases the likelihood of receiving vouchers 
by six per cent. This suggests that such households spend comparatively less on food than do 
neighbours who keep fewer chickens, and gain more income from selling eggs and chickens – 
meaning that they are better-off and can afford the top-up. 
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5-4. Conclusion 
In this chapter firstly I considered the characteristics of panel sample households. I found a high 
ratio of members of elites among panel sample households. This was probably for practical 
reasons, and because village leaders preferred to select those households who were more 
accessible, or with which they had a closer relationship, for the panel. Sample households were 
found to own or farm larger areas of land than was the average for the region, and were also 
mainly traders in maize. Also I made a comparative analysis of those selected for the programme, 
and those that actually received vouchers in its pilot year as well as across the whole four years 
of its duration among my panel sample households and the original whole panel sample. It 
emerged that my panel sample households were about 13 per cent more likely to receive vouchers 
in the pilot year than was the case with the original whole panel sample for all rounds; and 36.6 
per cent of my panel samples were found more likely to be voucher recipients in any given year 
of the programme, which is more than twice the ratio found in respect of the whole panel sample 
for rounds 1–3. These findings affect further analysis of the impact of voucher receipt on maize 
production and poverty, which I consider in chapters 6 and 7. 
My regression findings suggest that in the pilot year, those households that had previously 
deployed improved inputs tended to be selected for vouchers. The regression results by Pan and 
Christiaensen (2010) and my findings on likelihood of being selected for and receiving vouchers 
in the pilot year are different, whose discrepancy is due to the different regression models. The 
only coincidental finding between the two is that the households with previous use of improved 
inputs were likely to receive vouchers in the pilot year. 
The programme aimed to prioritise households with no or very little history of improved 
input usage during the five years before the programme; however, the reality tended to be the 
opposite practice: I surmise that leaders initially sought to adhere to selection criteria in the first 
year, but many targeted farmers were unaware of the programme itself thus of the benefits of the 
prescribed inputs in terms of increased yields, and therefore were not keen to pay the top-up. 
Recipient households in the pilot year exhibited similar characteristics: those with a previous 
prescribed-input history tended to be issued with vouchers. In this regard, such experienced 
households were probably more willing to use programme inputs in the first place, and, having 
obtained them, they would displace previously purchased inputs, which would decrease the 
effectiveness of the input use (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011). This will be analysed in the next 
Chapter. 
Households that were selected for the programme but did not receive vouchers in the pilot 
year tended to be headed by elderly members, own more cows, and farm comparatively poorly 
irrigated land. Although initially targeted due to their perceived vulnerability, elderly-headed 
households tended not to receive vouchers, probably either because they were unwilling or unable 
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to change traditional farming practices or were too poor to pay the top-up. 
Over its four-year lifespan, the programme expanded its target beneficiary pool, tending 
to include more village leaders, more households that had previously used Urea, those that were 
better-off, and those that generated comparatively less off-farm income. Elite capture and the 
targeting of better-off households – i.e. characteristics of those that wield power – did not 
conclusively emerge from my findings with regard to the pilot year, but was found to have a 
strong effect on voucher receipt in later years as the programme expanded and more farmers learnt 
about it. It seems that the tendency was initially to target according to preset programme criteria 
and, specifically, only accept those with a history of no or little improved input usage; but the 
intervention was later revised such that the programme focus was turned from targeting poor and 
small-scale farmers, to middle-scale cultivators and those that generated a food surplus. Now on 
the implementation due to late delivery of vouchers receiving subsidized inputs, especially first 
application fertiliser and improved seeds, was actually meaningless for farmers so that they did 
not want to receive them. At the same time, real input top-up prices increased, which made it 
difficult for poor farmers to get subsidised inputs. Under this situation, voucher management was 
increasingly manipulated by village leaders and experienced more cases of late delivery in 
subsequent years – all of which meant that only the better-off households could afford to pay the 
top-up and receive vouchers. 
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Chapter 6. Impact of NAIVS on maize yields 
 
We are asking to increase amount of fertiliser vouchers: there is need of use of fertilisers, 
soil is tired. For maize, without fertilisers you will not have good production; without 
fertilisers farmers are living terrible life (Farmer, Tunduru Disrict). 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we saw that the programme benefitted wealthier households with prior 
use of inputs who tended to be village elites – a situation that differed from the programme design, 
which stipulates targeting to small-scale or vulnerable households without prior use of improved 
inputs in the last five years (World Bank, 2009a). Households with sick or disabled heads tended 
to receive vouchers, but not their female-headed counterparts, as the programme designated. 
Moreover, as seen in Chapter 4, section 4-4-2-2, vouchers were thinly distributed to farmers for 
one or two years only, which made less of an impact on recipient household accumulated resources 
compared to that which had been set. 
Several studies claim that Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) has increased 
maize yield (Holden and Lunduka, 2010; Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Chibwana et al., 2014). 
Chirwa and Dorward (2013) cite a study by the School of Oriental and African Studies et al. 
(2008) that, in terms of yield responses to subsidised nitrogen and per kilogram of subsidised 
nitrogen use, found that maize yields increased by 18 kilograms with the deployment of hybrid 
seeds. 
Other studies consider the displacement, mistargeting, and elite capture that all impact 
negatively on subsidy programmes (Xu et al., 2009a; Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Jayne et al., 
2013; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2013a). For example, Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2011: 40) found that for 
every kilogram of subsidised fertiliser, 0.22 kilograms of commercial purchases were displaced. 
Moreover, using farm plot data in Malawi, Holden and Lunduka (2011) found that access to 
subsidies significantly enhanced the amount of fertiliser used at plot level, but that non-recipient 
households increased maize yields more than recipients, which is found in my analysis, given in 
6.2.2, below. They concluded that such a contradictory result was due to the targeting of less 
efficient households. 
In order to avoid the problem of displacement, the National Agricultural Input Voucher 
Scheme (NAIVS) applied eligibility criteria and targeting to households who did not use inputs 
before the programme. However, if the use of a given input was popular in a particular locality – 
as with Urea in the present study’s research area of Ruvuma – such targeting was sometimes 
difficult because households without previous input use tended to be very poor and therefore 
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could not afford the top-up even at subsidised rates. Displacement also occurred when elite 
members of the community – generally the better-off farmers – ‘captured’ vouchers (Jayne and 
Rashid, 2013; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2013a). Such individuals tended to reduce the impact of the 
programme in terms of either increased production and/or poverty reduction.  
Accordingly, in this chapter, employing both qualitative and quantitative data, I consider 
whether the programme increased maize yields in the region under study. 
 
6.2 Maize production and input use 
 
6-2-1. Maize production 
Ruvuma is one of the ‘Big four’ regions in the Southern highlands – the principal maize 
production area in Tanzania. Below I present the analysis of maize production using datat obtained 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, which is, however, different 
from National Agricultrual Sample Census 2007/08 data, e.g. ratio of maize production in 
Ruvuma to country total as follows. From 2007/08 to 2011/12, Ruvuma itself accounted for about 
nine per cent of national output on average (URT, 2013d). Along with the growth in production 
of whole country, Regional Secretariat (RS) data (2012a) suggest that maize production in 
Ruvuma also increased by about 80 per cent during the period, although the increase ratio seems 
too large to be credible (Graph 3). Within Ruvuma, Songea district is the biggest maize producer, 
at 41.0 per cent of regional output in 2007/08; a production figure that rose sharply from 2009/10, 
the year the NAIVS programme became fully operational. The increase ratio of maize production 
during the four years does not accord with the voucher allocation in the region. Production 
increase was bigger in Mbinga than in Songea, by 214 per cent and 111 per cent, respectively, 
while Songea district received almost a third of regional total of voucher distribution and Mbinga 
received almost a quarter. This was probably either due to the less maize production in Mbinga 
than in Songea prior to NAIVS, thus more prevalent previous input use for maize in Songea 
district than in Mbinga, or reporting error, or that there might have been other support for 
increasing maize production. 
The escalation of regional total maize production was also suggested by an agricultural 
officer at the RS: “Production rose up because of subsidies. Ruvuma has normally good rain; 
sometimes there were droughts. Around 75 per cent of farms succeed cultivation normally.” This 
increase in maize yield in Songea district coincided with an upturn in fertiliser consumption, as 
seen in the data from Songea district government which shows that after introduction of the 
programme, consumption of Urea was increased up to three times in 2010/11 compared to 2008/9, 
and the consumption of DAP increased by more than six times (Graph 4). Considering the biggest 
voucher distribution in the district during the period, we may therefore assume that at least part 
of such an increase in maize production was a direct result of this intervention. 
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Graph 3: Maize production in Ruvuma region and its districts (kilo tonnes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ruvuma RS (2012a). 
 
Graph 4: Fertiliser consumption in Songea district (kilo tonnes) 
Source: Author developed from Songea DC (2013) 
 
 
6-2-2. Quantitative evidence on input use 
Before proceeding with the analysis of maize yields, I consider closely the change in input use in 
the region in more detail, since this variable was believed to play a major role in increasing maize 
yields, which was the aim of the programme. National Agricultural Sample Census data for 
2002/03 suggest that input use in Ruvuma was at 13 per cent, which was relatively high in 
nationwide terms (URT, 2006a). However, panel data indicate that almost 50 per cent of recipient 
households used Urea before engaging in the programme (Christiaensen and Pan, 2009a). Such a 
high ratio was corroborated by the analysis in the previous chapter. 
Table 22 suggests that both recipient and non-recipient (in any year) panel households 
increased their input use, with the exception of improved seeds in respect of non-recipients. It is 
noted that the highest increase ratio was observed in the case of non-recipient household for 
inorganic fertiliser use, twice the ratio of recipient households, though the former used still lower 
amount than the latter.  This could partly be an educational effect from NAIVS, or other 
intervention. A farmer in village I in Mbinga exemplified the positive effect of the intervention 
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in a farmer group discussion thus: “Before we received the (subsidised) fertiliser, we were 
suffering hunger: we had to use the money we had saved up to buy food for buying fertiliser.” 
 
Table 22: Input use and increase ratio (%) among panel sample 
 
Note: Data represent crops other than maize. 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
I now turn to the examination of increased input use in more detail. Tables 23 and 24 show 
changing average consumption levels in terms of both commercial and subsidised inputs for maize 
plots, classified by voucher receipt in 2011/12 respectively. These two tables show that the 
recipient households in 2011/12 purchased commercial inputs in the voucher package for maize 
plots by about three times as much as the amount purchased by non-recipient households in 
2011/12, which shows the recipient households in 2011/12 might have been wealthier than non- 
recipient households in general, which was enabled to buy more commercial inputs. Table 23 
shows that recipient households increased all the improved inputs for maize plots, among which 
the increase of MRP was mainly due to the voucher. The average maize plot area of the panel 
households was decreased slightly from Round 3 to Round 4 (1.44 ha. to 1.35 ha.). Thus in average 
terms, the increase of commercial purchase for maize plots even when their owners received 
vouchers in the year, suggests that there was no displacement of purchased inputs for maize. On 
the contrary, non-recipient households in the year reduced their purchase of commercial Urea and 
DAP for maize compared to the one in 2007/8, which was probably due to their lack of capacity 
to purchase these inputs for maize in 2011/12 under the increasing the real prices of these inputs, 
which will be looked at in more detail in Chapter 8. Meanwhile, they increased purchase of MRP 
and hybrid maize seeds, which was probably more accessible in terms of their prices. 
Improved
seeds
Rate of
increase
Inorganic
fertiliser
Rate of
increase
Improved
seeds
Rate of
increase
Inorganic
fertiliser
Rate of
increase
Improved
seeds
Rate of
increase
Inorganic
fertiliser
Rate of
increase
Round 3 15.1 163.9 7 95 13.4 149.7
Round 4 24.7 63.6 289.9 76.9 2.8 -60 219.6 131.2 23.2 73.1 277.2 85.2
All 21.9 228.5 5.3 153.6 20.1 214
Recipient households Non-recipient households All households
Rounds
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Table 23: Changes in recipient households in 2011/12, patterns of averaged commercial and 
subsidised input usage for maize plots (rounds 3 to 4: kg) 
Sources: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
 
Table 24: Changes in non-recipient households in 2011/12, patterns of averaged commercial and 
subsidised input usage for maize (rounds 3 to 4: kg) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Sources: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
Since the survey period corresponding to Round 3 (2007/08) was a year before the pilot year of 
NAIVS, the input amount reported in Round 3 did not reflect the report of voucher receipt in the 
pilot year. As seen in the Chapter 5, the recipient households in the pilot year were wealthier 
households and had used the improved inputs for maize before the NAIVS, the report of voucher 
receipt in the pilot year (2008/09) could be considered to reflect the households’ position on 
affordability of using inputs in the surveyed year. I will disaggregate the households’ voucher 
receipt experience into more detail and look at change in amount of input usage for maize among 
them (Table 25 to 27). 
 
Table 25: Changes in recipient households in 2008/09 but did not receive in 2011/12, patterns of 
averaged commercial and subsidised input usage for maize plots (rounds 3 to 4: kg) 
 
  
Round 3 
(A) 
Round 4 
commercial 
purchase 
(B) 
Differen
ce 
(B) - (A) 
 
Ratio 
(B) : (A) 
Urea 62.0 34.1 -27.9 0.6 
DAP 4.0 0.0 -4.0 0.0 
Minjingu 1.6 4.8 3.2 3.0 
Hybrid 
seeds 
0.9 1.7 0.8 1.9 
OPV 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 
Note: Data are of 62 HHs   
Sources: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
Round 3
(A)
Round 4
commercial
purchase
(B)
Difference
(B) - (A)
Ratio
(B) : (A)
Urea 33.2 27.9 -5.3 0.84
DAP 1.2 0.0 -1.2 -
MRP 0.5 1.7 1.2 3.43
Hybrid seeds 0.4 0.6 0.2 1.45
OPV 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Note: Data are of 207 HHs
Round 3
(A)
Round 4
commercial
purchase
(B)
Difference
(B) - (A)
Ratio
(B) : (A)
Round 4
voucher
Round 4 all
use
(subsidized/
commercial)
 (C )
Ratio
(C) : (A)
Urea 99.8 114.6 14.9 1.15 66.1 180.7 1.81
DAP 5.7 3.1 -2.6 0.54 4.6 7.7 1.34
MRP 1.5 5.1 3.6 3.33 35.2 40.3 26.33
Hybrid seeds 1.6 4.5 3.0 2.91 5.2 9.7 6.26
OPV 0.9 0.0 -0.9 0.00 0.0 0.0 -
Note: Data are of 98 households
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Table 26: Changes in households which did not receive vouchers in 2008/09 but received in 
2011/12, patterns of averaged commercial and subsidised input usage for maize plots (rounds 3 
to 4: kg) 
Sources:Sources: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
 
Table 27: Changes in non-recipient households, patterns of averaged commercial and subsidised 
input usage for maize plots (rounds 3 to 4: kg) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
 
Table 25 shows that the recipient households in 2008/09 which did not receive vouchers in 
2011/12 reduced their purchase amount of Urea for maize by 45 per cent, which might reflect 
their decline in affordability to purchase Urea, and did not tell the story that ever-recipient 
households continued to purchase inputs, as the programme had designed. Meanwhile, the non- 
recipient households in 2008/09 which received in 2011/12 had purchased Urea for maize higher 
amount in 2007/08 than the households grouped in Table 25, and remained almost the same 
purchase amount of Urea for maize as in 2007/08 even receipt of subsidy in 2011/12 (Table 26). 
This suggests precisely that there was no displacement of purchased Urea for maize by this 
household group. And the total usage amount of commercial and subsidized inputs for maize of 
this group is lower than the one of all the recipient households in 2011/12, which includes the 
group which received vouchers in both years. On the other hand, households which did not receive 
vouchers in any one year increased purchase amount of Urea for maize from rounds 3 to 4, which 
is in line the findings in Table 22 (Table 27). 
From the analysis above, we did not find that there was displacement of input use for 
maize by recipient households in 2011/12, meanwhile, the households who received vouchers in 
Round 3
(A)
Round 4
commercial
purchase
(B)
Difference
(B) - (A)
Ratio
(B) : (A)
Round 4
voucher
Round 4 all
use
(subsidized/
commercial)
 (C )
Ratio
(C) : (A)
Urea 79.2 73.4 -5.8 0.93 59.2 132.6 1.67
DAP 0.0 0.9 0.9 - 4.4 5.3 -
MRP 0.0 6.1 6.1 - 24.6 30.7 -
Hybrid seeds 0.5 2.4 1.9 4.63 3.4 5.8 11.10
OPV 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 -
Note: Data are of 59 HHs
Round 3
(A)
Round 4
(B)
Difference
(B) - (A)
Ratio
(B) : (A)
Urea 10.8 24.1 13.3 2.23
DAP 0 0 0 -
MRP 0 0.5 0.5 0.00
Hybrid seeds 0.15 0.08 -0.1 0.53
OPV 0 0 0 -
Note: Data are of 102 households
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the pilot year but did not receive in 2011/12 reduced substantially the commercial purchase for 
maize from prior to NAIVS. As we have seen in Chapters 4 and 5, in increasing input prices, 
farmers’ capacity for receiving vouchers and purchasing commercial inputs fluctuated as years 
went by. If they have capacity to receive vouchers, they were the ones who could maintain or 
increase commercial purchase, but if not, they ended up reducing their input use in all. This 
suggests the fluctuation of the capacity by farmers to purchase inputs during the years. 
Graph 5 shows the panel households’ total inorganic fertiliser usage patterns for all crops 
by voucher receipt experience. In 2011/12, households who could afford to pay the top-up seemed 
to invest much more in inorganic fertiliser than those who were unable to utilise vouchers that 
season. It also shows the slightly reduced usage of fertiliser by the recipient households in the 
pilot year who had previously been in a position to utilise vouchers but were unable to do so in 
2011/12. 
 
Graph 5: Inorganic fertiliser usage patterns by voucher receipt experience (kg) 
Note: Reported total amount of inorganic fertiliser used. 
Sources: The author’s calculation from Christiaensen and Sarris (2004); Christiaensen and Sarris (2005); 
Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
Graph 6 shows the same data as Graph 5 but disaggregated by district. Songea district ranks as 
the highest user of inorganic fertilisers throughout the period (2003–12), followed by Namtumbo 
district, which, although, it had previously experienced some increase, evidenced a lower rate 
than the former from 2008 to 2012. On the other hand, Mbinga district maintained a constant 
upward trend in voucher usage. This suggests that neither the input transport subsidy47 nor that 
provided through NAIVS made a substantial impact on input usage in Mbinga, the latter, however, 
contradicts the relatively high voucher allocation to this district in the region. There might have 
been inefficient use of vouchers by frauds or illegitimate use, or missing vouchers, which might 
have been due to late delivery. Due to the district’s focus on coffee production, inputs were also 
 
 
47 This was cited in the Chapter 5. 
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provided for coffee not only by NAIVS but also by other initiatives, such as coffee farmer 
associations, which were well established and numerous, having been observed in many villages. 
As the contracted farming with provision of inputs was prevalent in these associations, this input 
amount might not have been reported in the survey. In an earlier period, the impact of the 2004 
input transport subsidy for maize and rice was only apparent in Songea and Namtumbo districts, 
while the other two districts did not show substantial changes in their respective input usage 
patterns that year. Input usage in Tunduru district was deemed to be too low, which might be due 
to under-reporting of the actual usage. 
 
Graph 6: Inorganic fertiliser usage patterns by district (kg) 
Note: Reported total amount of inorganic fertiliser used. 
Sources: The author’s calculation from Christiaensen and Sarris (2004); Christiaensen and Sarris (2005); 
Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
6-2-3. Qualitative evidence on input use 
Next, drawing on qualitative data from interviews and farmer group discussions, the outcome that 
a generally upward trend in voucher usage notwithstanding, this did not lead to a concomitant 
increase in the deployment of inorganic fertiliser is explored. One reason for such an outcome 
might be that recipient farmers displaced previously purchased inputs for cultivation of other 
crops. In this regard, a ward agricultural extension officer (WAEO) in village C in Mbinga district 
claimed, “We don’t need input subsidies for maize: we need them for coffee because main crop 
is coffee.” Moreover, a farmer in Mbinga district stated that a voucher had procured a bag of 
calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) rather than Urea: “CAN is good for coffee. The agro-dealer 
mixed it up with Urea for the voucher exchange; when the Urea’s finished, we’ll just ask for CAN 
because it gives a high yield for coffee.” It seems that the voucher management in some villages 
in Mbinga tended to be manipulated for vouchers to be used for coffee production. 
CAN is a fertiliser which contains nitrogen and calcium. Actually, however, CAN seems 
to be one of the adequate fertiliser used as growing fertiliser for maize farming as well, at least in 
Southern highlands. Agricultural research conducted by Uyole Agricultural Research Institute of 
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MAFC, the Research Institute which covers Southern highlands including Ruvuma, 
recommended that CAN should be used as growing fertiliser for maize farming (Malley, 2009; 
URT, 2012b). Thus, CAN could be used for maize as well, though from the above quotes, it does 
not seem the case. Finally, by way of summary, a VEO in another village explained that poor 
farmers could not usually afford to pay the top-up but sought to purchase with voucher at least 
one bag of MPR instead of prescribed two bags or a bag of Urea, with payment of top-up only for 
them. 
These findings accord with the panel data results which show that eight per cent (26 
households) of programme participants used subsidised CAN in coffee cultivation. This may be 
compared with the nine per cent who were found to deploy Urea with the same crop. Of all those 
who cultivated coffee (130 households), 12 per cent reported that they had obtained inputs with 
NAIVS programme vouchers; considering the relatively high voucher allocation in the district, 
this number looks small. This might happen because farmers were aware that the programme and 
its vouchers were not intended to facilitate coffee production, and so their use of inputs might 
have been under-reported. 
No increase in input use by vouchers might also have been due to the low quality of inputs 
distributed by agro-dealers, as suggested in several villages. For example, a female farmer in 
Village A in Songea district noted that, “This fertiliser has no strength: some farmers suspect the 
agro-dealers are mixing the fertiliser with something else to increase their income.” Similarly, in 
Village F in Mbinga district, a VEO asserted that the inputs had expired and did not function 
properly; which he had reported to the district government but had merely been informed that in 
March, as the vouchers were delivered late, it was too late to return the inputs for analysis of the 
case. With regard to the programme’s utilisation of improved maize seeds, informants in some 
villages claimed that the variety distributed through the subsidy was unsuited to the of the area’s 
agro-climatic conditions – although programme guidelines stipulate that they should be (World 
Bank, 2009a). 
Another issue was the late delivery of vouchers to the villages, which, as we saw in 
Chapter 5, was a common occurrence in terms of timing for the sowing season, as exemplified by 
the experiences of a farmer in Songea district: 
 
The system [bureaucracy] is slow and difficult. First, you can go there: after writing 
your name and waiting for your vouchers, you are told that they have run out, and to 
come back later; you go back later, and they tell you that they are still waiting for some 
more; you go again for the vouchers, and they tell you that everything is finished, and 
to come back tomorrow. That also applies to the fertiliser – everything arrives late, very 
late [too late for planting]. It is already December – the rainy season – and time to plant. 
- 102 -  
This might be because of the limited capacity of agro-dealers, or of village leaders’ illicit 
behaviour. In order to mitigate the problem of the late arrival of vouchers, a farmer in village H 
in Mbinga district explained that they farmed with traditional seeds and only applied urea. 
However, informants at a village meeting in village G, also in Mbinga district, asserted that since 
they had obtained their vouchers in January and did not get the inputs until the following month, 
such a late start was unconducive to increasing the yield. Moreover, a farmer in village L in 
Mbinga district mentioned: 
 
We have used up all the money on necessities that we had set aside to buy the inputs; 
that’s why we say it is better that the inputs arrive in October, when we still have some 
money to buy them. When they came late, we had no money left, so we had to sell other 
products to get the money, so we were moving backwards. If we had any goats, we would 
have to sell them. 
 
Nevertheless, many farmers in Songea and Mbinga districts stated that they had procured two 
bags of Urea even though the package stipulated only one (World Bank, 2009a). They explained 
that because the vouchers were received late in terms of the sowing season, they had been assigned 
the additional Urea instead of seeds and the first application of fertiliser. In this regard, it seems 
that vouchers were used completely in lieu of cash to pay agro-dealers. Also they were used to 
use Urea before NAIVS began. On the other hand, several individuals also asserted that they 
needed two bags of Urea per acre of maize. If this were so, it would be reasonable for them to 
buy two bags if the inputs arrived late. This assumption is corroborated by the panel data: 
according to Round 4 results, in 2011/12, 89 households received subsidised Urea at a rate of 92 
kg per household, that is, almost two bags each. NAIVS had reduced the amount of subsidised 
Urea from two bags in the pilot year to one bag when the programme properly began in 2009/10 
(World Bank, 2009a). However, due to the late delivery of vouchers, farmers used their vouchers 
to procure two bags instead of purchasing other inputs (planting fertiliser and seeds). 
The manner in which such a state of affairs as that outlined above affects crop yields is no 
doubt dependent on the agro-climatic condition of any given location. Such extrapolation is 
beyond the scope of this study; however, the late delivery of vouchers, use of subsidised inputs 
for other crops, low quality of inputs, elite capture, and missing vouchers – some of which were 
touched upon in Chapter 4 – clearly had a negative impact on maize yield, and contributed to 
making the NAIVS programme in Ruvuma relatively ineffective and inefficient. 
 
6.3 Analysis of crop-yield trends 
In order to gauge the impact of the programme on maize yields, firstly, I examine general  
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maize and rice yield trends from survey rounds 1 to 4. 
 
6.3.1 Issues around maize production and the area under cultivation 
Different data-collection criteria for mixed-crop-production were employed across the four 
rounds: in Round 1 and Round 2, data were collected with regard to a maximum of 6 crops per 
parcel; while in Round 3, it was up to 11 crops per parcel; and in Round 4, it dropped down to 2 
crops per parcel. Yet, the average number of cultivated crops per parcel reported by households 
in Round 3 was less than two. Therefore, we expect the little amount of data was lost in respect 
of Round 4. 
In order to conduct an inter-round comparative analysis, I selected just two main crops 
per parcel for each round and made a detailed evaluation of crop production accordingly. Table 
28 shows average parcel size and crop cultivation in respect of No.1 - No.4 parcels in rounds 3 
and 4. Households reported the order of parcels along with the order of the parcel size and of the 
importance of the crops cultivated. In Round 3, about 90 per cent of households reported that they 
cultivated up to only four parcels. In rounds 3 and 4, maize cultivation clearly ranked first as the 
main crop; in Round 3, cassava or beans ranked first as the second main crop. In Round 4 coffee, 
rice or beans were the alternative main crops, which were the main cash crops, and cassava, beans 
and banana were the second main crops, which were mostly supplementary food crops. 
Not only for maize, but the average total area under cultivation showed a reduction 
between rounds 3 and 4 (Table 29). The reduction might have been partly caused by Round 4 data 
having only captured two major crops per parcel, but might have also been due to the 
intensification of maize cultivation at the expense of other crops, though maize itself also reduced 
the cultivated area by six per cent. This might be due to the different data collection methodologies 
adopted between rounds 3 and 4 on asking crop cultivation per parcels as mentioned above, and/or 
reporting errors in Round 4. 
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Table 28: Average parcel size, proportion of households cultivating parcels, and proportion of households cultivating each crop in rounds 3 and 4 (%) 
Note: Round 3 data is the sum of two main crops per parcel. Up to third crop in each parcel is coloured in red. 
Source: The author’s calculation from Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
Parcel 1 Parcel 2 Parcel 3 Parcel 4 Parcel 1 Parcel 2 Parcel 3 Parcel 4 Parcel 1 Parcel 2 Parcel 3 Parcel 4
Average parcel size (ha.) 1.5 0.7 0.7 0.2 1.3 0.7 0.4 0.2 1.3 0.7 0.4 0.2
Proportion of households with
land under cultivation
98.4 65.3 53.57 26.95 100 78.2 65.1 38.4 40.9 34.3 27.8 13.8
Maize 28.3 18.5 5.8 3.3 68.7 36.8 13.7 6.2 2.7 0.3 1.7 0.0
Beans 6.2 14.3 7.8 1.3 0.7 20.2 6.5 5.9 13.6 6.9 3.0 1.0
Coffee 7.1 2.6 1.6 1.6 16.9 6.2 10.1 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bananas 9.4 3.6 2.6 2.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.7 8.6 5.3 7.0 4.3
Millet 1.0 2.9 2.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 2.0 1.3 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.0
Wheat 0.7 1.6 2.9 0.3 0.3 0.7 3.3 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.3
Rice 4.9 8.8 4.9 2.3 2.0 10.1 8.5 3.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cassava 9.4 11.0 9.4 3.6 1.6 8.1 9.5 4.2 12.6 7.3 2.3 2.0
Yams 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sweet potatoes 0.3 1.6 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0
Irish potatoes 0.3 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Groundnuts 2.6 3.3 3.9 2.9 0.0 1.0 2.0 1.3 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.3
Onions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.3
Tomatoes 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3
Pumpkins 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.3
Cabbages 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other vegetables 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.7 2.3 2.0 8.3 5.0 2.0 2.6
Sesame 1.6 2.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.3 1.0 0.0 0.3
Peas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 3.3 1.7 1.0 0.3
Sugar cane 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3
Papaya 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Other fruit 2.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tobacco 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cashew nuts 11.4 2.3 3.3 0.3 7.8 2.3 1.6 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sunflower seeds 4.2 3.9 2.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.7 5.0 2.6 1.7 0.7
Avocados 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0
Other 5.2 2.3 2.6 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0
Not applicable 2.0 18.2 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Round 3
Round 4
Crop 1 Crop 2
Ratio of households to crops cultivated
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Table 29: Average area under cultivation by crop and Round 4 to Round 3 ratio (acre) 
 Round 3 Round 4 Ratio 
R4/R3 Maize 3.6 3.4 0.94
Rice 2.1 1.6 0.76 
Beans 2.6 2.1 0.81 
Coffee 2.4 2 0.83 
Cashew 
nuts 
10 7.2 0.72 
Sources: The author’s calculation from Christiaensen and Sarris (2004); Author’s data. 
 
 
6.3.2 Changes in crop yields 
Graphs 7 and 8 show maize and rice yield trends respectively by district across all rounds. Maize 
and rice yield trends seem to be related to that of input use, as shown in Graphs 6, 7 and 8, except 
for the rice yield’s decline in 2004 in Songea. Maize yields across districts increased in Round 2 
(2003/04), fell back in Round 3 (2007/08), and then rose again in Round 4 (2011/12) – the first 
probably being due to the effect of the input transport subsidy and the latter to the NAIVS 
programme. Songea district ranked top with the highest rate of increase from 2007/08 to 2011/12. 
The fact that it experienced similar yields as Songea district in 2007/08 notwithstanding, Mbinga 
district yields increased to a lesser extent, which corresponds to the lower increase of inorganic 
fertiliser use in Mbinga as seen in Graph 6. The substantial yield increase in Namtumbo district 
with regard to Round 2 was probably due to the fact that it benefitted from the input transport 
subsidy which started in 2003/4 to a greater extent than other districts. Although it was ranked 
second in 2003/04, Namtumbo district was ranked third in 2011/12, with a low rate of increase 
since NAIVS started, which is slightly different from Graph 6. 
Average rice yields in all districts constantly increased over the period, an outcome that 
might have been due to few voucher allocation for rice with NAIVS and the other initiatives that 
promoted rice cultivation, the existence of which was noted by several informants in the field. 
The big increase since 2008 in Namtumbo district seems due to the fact that the district promoted 
rice cultivation through NAIVS, which corroborates the information from several informants that 
farmers used the inputs for programme-prescribed cultivation, which was mainly rice in that area 
(interview, Village B). Indeed, according to a village voucher committee (VVC) chairman, 
“Subsidised inputs are intended to be used for maize and rice, so they are rarely used for other 
crops; additionally, Urea is not good for tobacco.” If such claims were true, the lower increase in 
maize or rice yields in Namtumbo district were most likely due to the fact that its farmers tended 
not to obtain the full set of inputs due to the late delivery of vouchers. Rice main producer Tunduru 
increased rice yields up to 2007/08, however, after that there was little increase, which was 
probably due to the few voucher allocation to the district. 
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Graph 7: Panel sample household average maize yields by district (kg/acre) 
Sources: The author’s calculation from Christiaensen and Sarris (2004); Christiaensen and Sarris (2005); 
Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
Graph 8: Panel sample household average rice yields by district (kg/acre) 
 
Sources: The author’s calculation from Christiaensen and Sarris (2004); Christiaensen and Sarris (2005); 
Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
Although a detailed examination of the scale and impact of the input transport subsidy introduced 
from 2003/04 is beyond the scope of the present study, the number of panel households who used 
inorganic fertiliser increased dramatically from Round 1 to Round 2 – up to four times that found 
in Round 1 (see Table 30). However, an MAFC officer informed me that this subsidy tended to 
benefit only wealthier households48. 
 
Table 30: Number of panel sample households using inorganic fertiliser 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
40 157 177 182 
Sources: The author’s calculation from Christiaensen and Sarris (2004); Christiaensen and Sarris (2005); 
Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
 
 
48 Interview in October 2012. 
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Another reason for the high yields in 2003/04 could be good rainfall. The village questionnaire 
asked whether sample households experienced low rainfall compared to a normal year, which was 
indeed the case from January to May in the surveyed agricultural season;49 being most noticeable 
in respect of Round 4, followed by Round 1 (see Table 31). Conversely, in the survey year for 
Round 2 (2003/04) and Round 3 (2007/08), it seems that there was a better level of rainfall in the 
region. Data from Tanzania Meteorological Agency (TMA) does not have adequate information 
for 2003/04, but indicates that there was more than average rainfall in 2007/08 (Table 32). 
 
Table 31: Proportion of villages reporting low rainfall in the surveyed agricultural season (%) 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
27.8 8.3 9.4 37.5 
Sources: The author’s calculation from Christiaensen and Sarris (2004); Christiaensen and Sarris (2005); 
Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
Table 32: Rainfall data in Songea (mm), 2002 - 2014 
 
Note: Season total is from November to May of the next year. Average represents the one from 2002/3 to 
2012/13 when data is available. 
Source: Author developed from URT (2014c) 
 
In respect of rainfall in 2007/08, although it varied in different regions nationwide, the MAFC 
Annual report of 2007/08 states that there was increased revenue collection compared to 2006/07 
due to prolonged rainfall (URT, 2008: 4). Another MAFC report asserts that the food sufficiency 
ratio in 2007/08 was 104 per cent, one of whose reason could be a better level of rainfall compared 
to normal years (MAFC, 2008). Nevertheless, good rainfall in 2007/08 notwithstanding, maize 
yield was lower than that experienced in 2003/04, the reason possibly being due to the phase-out 
of the input transport subsidy ahead of the initiation of the NAIVS programme. 
Additionally, access to village agricultural extension officers (VAEOs) in surveyed 
communities improved between rounds 3 and 4, which might also have contributed to the increase 
in maize yield. Survey results reveal that the proportion of villages with access to extension 
services improved from about 55–60 per cent to more than 80 per cent during the period. However, 
many villages  I visited  were  not  served  by VAEOs,  but  ward agricultural  extension officers 
 
49 No village-level qualitative data is available that indicate low rainfall from November to December in 
the corresponding agricultural season: I acknowledge this as a data limitation. 
Year January February March April May June July August September October November December
Season
total*
Ratio to
average
Survey
round
2002 870 1,910 9,990 1.02 Round 1
2003 1,600 2,260 2,550 670 130 10 230 - - - Round 2
2004 2,190 - 1,550 2,130 0 0 0
2005
2006 - - - 1,960 40 0 30 20 10 0 890 3,760 12,960
2007 3,190 2,320 2,110 690 - 0 20 10 10 430 140 2,850 10,850 1.11 Round 3
2008 2,290 2,920 1,920 590 140 0 0 50 0 10 - 1,630 8,689
2009 1,980 1,740 3,210 99 30 0 10 0 30 0 910 1,320 10,140
2010 3,260 2,310 1,460 730 150 30 20 10 0 30 0 1,590 11,230
2011 2,210 3,070 2,780 1,470 110 0 50 - - - 520 1,440 8,370 0.85 Round 4
2012 2,870 1,110 1,720 590 120 0 0 0 - 0 800 1,720 6,210
2013 2,860 760 - - 70 0 0 0 220 400 1,060 1,480
2014 3,850 1,730 -
Season
average
2,813.8 1,995.0 2,200.0 875.6 94.3 3.8 16.3 12.9 45.0 124.3 617.1 1,973.8 9,804.9
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(WAEOs), who were usually unable to get round all communities due to the large coverage area 
and a limited transport budget. Therefore, the finding that 80 per cent of villages enjoyed such 
access sounds somewhat high. However, this caveat notwithstanding, the data at least show some 
improvement in access to extension services. 
General increases in maize and rice yields were achieved even in poor weather conditions 
in the 2011/12 season, the survey period for Round 4. In this regard, TMA data show that rainfall 
in this season was 15 per cent lower than average 2002/03–2012/13 levels (Table 32). It also 
emerges that in the 2011/12 season,50 more than a third of surveyed villages experienced abnormal 
rain levels, for example, heavy rainfall, untimely rain, drought, and flooding. Conversely, less 
than 10 per cent of villages were subject to such conditions in 2007/08. Increased maize and rice 
yields under such adversity were supported by the introduction of the NAIVS programme, and, 
for example, better access to extension services and other initiatives. Such an upsurge in maize 
yields in respect of panel households is analysed in the next section. 
Table 33 shows that the average yields of main crops cultivated by both recipient and 
non-recipient households increased during the period. Maize yield’s increase of 40 per cent seems 
to be in line with Graph 7, which is different from the increase of about 80 per cent of the data 
from RS (Graph 3). Panel data do not represent the data from the RS, but we cannot judge which 
data is correct.  
Maize, beans and cashew all showed significant increase on average, with a growth rate 
of more than 30 per cent; rice and coffee showed a slower average growth rate of 15 and 21 per 
cent respectively; and, as with other crops, overall average maize yields increased, with non-
recipient households showing even a higher growth rate than their recipient counterparts. This 
high increase of non-recipient households would be a key for the Difference-in-Differences 
regression analysis later in the chapter. Despite the non-recipient’s higher rate of growth, the 
difference between the yields of these two groups widened, which could have been due to the fact 
that recipient households tended to be wealthier; were thus in a position to deploy other beneficial 
inputs; and were able to achieve higher levels of input-use efficiency as they had access to 
technical advice from the VVC. 
Rice yields increased by 30 per cent among recipient households, while those of non- 
recipients decreased a little, which suggests that NAIVS might have increased rice yields. On the 
other hand, rates of increase in terms of other crops cultivated by non-recipient households 
exceeded those of recipient households.  
 
50 Owing to the survey design, data corresponding to this season cover the period January to May 2012, 
a criterion that also applies to the 2007/08 season. 
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Table 33: Average crop yields of sample households in rounds 3 and 4 (kg/acre) 
Sources: The author’s calculation from Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
Although the yield growth of cashew nuts was the highest among the crops, considering the high 
maize yields, it looks likely that the recipient households tended to focus on achieving high maize 
yields, which was consistent with relative intensification to maize cultivation found in terms of 
plot areas, as seen in Table 28. 
Graph 9 shows disaggregated average maize yields by voucher receipt experience in 
2011/12 of 216 matched households. The groups increased more in 2004 than the ones in Graph 
7, which might be because of characteristics of composision of these matched households. Maize 
yields increased substantially in Round 2 in terms of both recipient household groups. It seems 
that those benefitted from the input transport subsidy and the vouchers were of the same wealthier 
group, thus both the voucher recipient groups increased their maize yields in Round 2. As the 
scale of input transport subsidy was shrunk, the gap between the recipient and non-recipient 
households narrowed. Although susceptible to limited data availability, this suggests that 
recipient farmers enjoyed the benefits of this subsidy before the initiation of the NAIVS 
programme, but afterwards, the maize yields of all the groups have increased, though, reasonably, 
especially yields were bigger if they received voucher in 2011/12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crop Voucher receipt Round 3 Round 4
Difference
R4-R3
Ratio R4/R3
Recipients 506.8 677.7 170.9 1.34
Non-recipients 258.8 422.1 163.3 1.63
Average 429.0 591.3 162.3 1.4
Recipients 448.5 564.9 116.3 1.3
Non-recipients 459.5 433.0 -26.5 0.9
Average 452.6 522.1 69.5 1.2
Recipients 145.1 181.9 36.8 1.25
Non-recipients 109.0 181.6 72.6 1.67
Average 133.2 181.8 48.6 1.36
Recipients 376.2 433.7 57.6 1.15
Non-recipients 258.1 384.2 126.1 1.49
Average 343.8 416.0 72.2 1.21
Recipients 57.2 47.5 -9.7 0.83
Non-recipients 71.2 108.1 36.9 1.52
Average 53.8 83.1 29.4 1.55
Maize
Rice
Beans
Coffee
Cashew
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Graph 9: Average maize yields by voucher receipt experience (kg/acre) 
 
Note: Combined recipient and non-recipient household data for 2011/12 represent 216 matched 
households (see Section 6.5.3). One case was eliminated due to the fact that it was an outlier in Round 
2. 
Sources: The author’s calculation from Christiaensen and Sarris (2004); Christiaensen and Sarris 
(2005); Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
Table 34: Average maize yields of recipient households and non-recipient households (kg/acre) 
 
 
Sources: The author’s calculation from Christiaensen and Sarris (2004); Christiaensen and Sarris (2005); 
Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
There does not seem to be a straight common trend among recipient and non-recipient households 
(Table 34), which is probably due to the introduction of the transport subsidy at the time of Round 
2. However, if the results of this round are discarded, I consider that there are similar trends 
between the two in terms of the results of rounds 1 and 3 – on the basis of which I proceeded to 
the regression analysis discussed in the next section (Lechner, 2011). 
 
6.4. Impact of the NAIVS programme on maize yields 
The programme aimed to achieve an immediate positive impact in respect of additional subsidised 
inputs on maize yield, provided that farmers had not used such inputs in recent years. Other than 
in a few villages in Mbinga district, where there were many fraud cases reported, key informants 
suggested that farmers had been able to increase their maize yields by applying subsidised inputs. 
However, as previously discussed, there were many ways in which programme implementation 
was conducted differently from its design, any or all of which may have hindered its impact. How 
Year Average Recipient
households in
any year
Non-recipient
households in
any year
2011/12
Recipients
2011/12 Non-
recipients
2003 110.06 118.29 92.60 145.67 94.30
2004 641.67 736.43 439.38 949.23 485.16
2008 435.57 508.13 267.91 572.09 362.64
2012 612.18 688.73 447.50 770.50 515.95
Ratio:
2008:2012
1.41 1.36 1.67 1.35 1.42
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these factors affected the intended programme aim, and whether the quantitative data tell the same 
story as the qualitative interviews suggest forms the focus of this section. 
 
6.4.1 Regression strategy 
The ‘sustainable livelihoods framework’ noted that rural households draw on different forms of 
capital in planning the allocation of resources and designing a livelihood strategy (Scoones, 1998; 
Carswell et al., 1999; Carney, 2003), which I refer to for developing Theory of Change for this 
thesis, which was presented in Chapter 3. Variables used to indicate households’ assets were also 
presented in Chapter 5; in this chapter, I present those used in each specification. 
Randomly choosing from a sample of observations on a programme or intervention is one 
method of avoiding selection bias. Given that I did not have access to randomised controlled 
samples (Duflo et al., 2008; Duflo et al., 2011) in my study, I subsequently used difference-in- 
differences (DID) methodology to control for unobserved fixed heterogeneity correlated with 
observed variables. With panel data gathered before and after programme initiation, this fixed 
component could be differenced out. Additionally, propensity score matching constructed a 
statistical comparison group that was based on a model of the probability of participating in a 
treatment, using observed characteristics; accordingly, participants may be matched on the basis 
of this probability – or propensity score – to non-participants (Khandker et al., 2010). In order 
to control time-invariant unobservable variables I use a fixed-effect, two-stage, least-square 
procedure, represented thus: 
 
Yit=δ*ti+αdi*di+βi (ti * di)+Xit+εit………………………………………………………….……(1) 
 
 
where Y is maize yields of the household i in time t, i.e. round 3 or 4, 0 if round 3, 1 if round 4; i 
is the individual household; di is the treatment, 1 is when the household received vouchers or 0 if 
not; δ and αdi are coefficients of the time and treatment variables; (ti*di) is the intersection term, 
which is equal to 1 when the household i received treatment in Round 4, or 0 otherwise; the 
coefficient of the estimated value of βi represents the impact of the NAIVS programme of 
individual household i; Xit is the vector of household i’s characteristics in rounds 3 or 4; and εit 
represents residuals. 
Thus the difference in maize yields between matched recipient households and non- 
recipient households and in round 4 or round 3 is explained by each household’s time dummy, 
treatment dummy, intersection term and covariates in rounds 4 or 3, respectively. 
Firstly, matching should control for household characteristics to determine voucher 
receipt based on similarity in terms of probability of selection to the programme. Following 
existing studies, I included in my variables: size of landholding; and the gender, age, health status, 
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and affiliation to one or more official and/or social groups of the household head (Holden and 
Lunduka, 2011; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011; Pan and Christiaensen, 2012). These variables were 
used for either programme selection criteria in terms of the first two, or during programme 
implementation, as observed in the field with regard to the latter three. In respect of the present 
study, I also took into consideration the number of farmers in each household, as informants 
suggested in the villages where the number of vouchers allocated invariably exceeded the number 
of households, they were distributed to individual farmers rather than the household. 
In terms of variables related to maize yields, a higher education level tends to mean that 
farmers had a greater awareness of the importance of improved inputs; ownership of more land 
due to being wealthier; and greater total household consumption expenditure per adult 
equivalent together imply the capacity to earn a higher income with which to pay the top-up. 
As in other studies (Pan and Christiaensen, 2010; Holden and Lunduka, 2011), I included soil 
quality since it was correlated with maize yield; whether any household member was a member 
of religious/social groups, in an elected position in the village, and/or of the VVC as a 
measurement of social capital, based on the finding of elite capture by Pan and Christiaensen 
(2011). Finally, since access to a market, distance to town, availability of input sellers, and 
access to a mobile telephone network all affected access to market which affects probability to 
voucher receipt at village level, these variables were also included in the analysis. On the other 
hand, input and maize prices, and rainfall were not included, as data on these variables were 
not available in all villages under study. Survey interviews also reveal that the engagement of 
children in farming activities during school holidays in particular was widespread, which 
facilitated yield expansion. 
Endogeneity means that when there is a correlation between an independent variable and 
the error term, estimates will be biased (Heckman, 1979; Heckman and Vytlacil, 1998). In this 
regard, one study suggests that a ‘self-selection’ bias arose because voucher recipients tended 
to be originally better off and therefore used improved inputs before the implementation of the 
programme (Mathenge et al., 2014). There is such an endogeneity in the relationship between 
explanatory variables (amount of Urea and improved seeds utilised) and unobserved variables 
(training on input use, belong to SACCO, etc.), which are included in the error term.  
Proxy variables for the independent variable are known as Instrumental Variables (IVs) 
(Heckman and Vytlacil, 1998; Khandker et al., 2010). Accordingly, I aimed to determine those 
IVs which affected maize yield through use of improved inputs only. In terms of the observed 
variase of Urea, amount of use of improved seeds, I used IVs to control for endogeneity. I found 
a ‘proxy’ for Xi (amount of use of Urea and improved seeds, respectively) which was 
uncorrelated with the error term (see Table 35). Since ‘amount of Urea usage’ and ‘amount of 
improved seeds usage’ are endogenous in respect of maize yield, when these variables were 
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regressed by means of explanatory variables; ‘training on input use’ and ‘belonging to a savings 
and credit co-operative (SACCO)’ were found to be IVs, respectively, in the case of voucher 
receipt in 2011/12. In the case of recipient households in any year of the programme, ‘training’ 
was found to be the corresponding IV in both variables. 
 
Table 35: Instrumental variables 
Endogenous variable In case of voucher 
receipt in 2011/12 
In case of voucher receipt 
in any year 
Amount of use of Urea Training on input use Training on input use 
Amount of use of improved 
seeds 
Belong to SACCO Training on input use 
Source: Author’s findings from Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
 
Training on input use was found to only contribute to maize yield when improved inputs were 
deployed. The Round 3 survey included variable on training in arable farming in general, and so 
might have been beneficial in terms of other agronomic management techniques, which would 
directly correlate with maize yield as opposed to via the use of inputs only. However, few of the 
farmers under study had had training of any kind in the field. Accordingly, given such scant 
knowledge on improved inputs found on the parts of many farmers, I consider this to be an 
adequate IV. Conversely, as the majority of accessed credit (92 per cent of households were found 
to use credit to obtain the first input, and about 50 per cent were found to use it to purchase the 
second input) was reported to be utilised to obtain improved seeds and fertiliser, membership of 
a SACCO is also an adequate IV; although not perfect, since credit obtained thus could also be 
used for agricultural tools and inputs not prescribed by the programme. 
In the first stage log, the amount of Urea and improved seeds was only regressed by 
exogenous regressors, as per the following equation: 
 
Y2=X1γ1+X2γ2+e………………………………………………………………………….…(2) 
 
 
where Y2 is the amount of Urea or improved seeds; X1 is the exogenous variable; X2 is IV – either 
‘training on input use’ or ‘belong to SACCO’; and e is the residual. Accordingly, I calculated the 
predicted value Y2  and substitute it with the original DID model. Thus, 
 
Yit=δt*ti+αi*di+βk(ti * di )+y
′ 
2B1+x1it+ e +εit……………………………………………………(3) 
 
 where Yit  is maize yield in the period t; y′ 2 is the predicted value of the amount of Urea or  
improved seeds; x1it are the exogenous variables; and e is the residual from the first stage 
equation. Accordingly, I was able to test whether a given IV was endogenous or not.  
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6.4.2 Descriptive variable statistics 
Table 36 shows the means and distributions of the variables of the recipient and non-recipient 
households in rounds 3 and 4 used in the regression analyses. From rounds 3 to 4 maize yields 
have increased for all the groups, including non-recipient in any one year. The latter is 
corroborated by the increase of input use by this group for Urea. Also increased usage of improved 
seeds was seen in the case of non-recipient in 2011/12. This suggests some educational effects to 
the non-recipient households. The real total daily household consumption has increased for all the 
groups, and was topped by the recipient households in 2011/12.  
It also shows that the position of non-recipient households in 2011/12 who might have 
received in other years was better-off in the survey period (February - April, 2013) than the 
recipients in any one year. Human assets have improved for most of the groups: households 
whose heads having completed standard 5 increased for both recipient groups; health condition 
of household heads have improved a little for all the groups; and number of farmers in the 
households increased for all groups as well, indicating increading land pressure. Meanwhile, 
landholding decreased for all groups except for recipient in 2011/12. 
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Table 36: Descriptive statistics for regression analysis variables 
 
Note: 216 matched households and 219 matched households for regression analysis of voucher receipt in 2011/12, and in any year, respectively. Annual contribution to 
social organisations and total daily household consumption deflated by annual average CPI (2008–12 (=1.55: (NBS, 2010; NBS, 2014). 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data. 
Recipient in
2011/12
Non-recipient
in 2011/12
Recipient in
any one year
Non-recipient
in any one
year
Recipient in
2011/12
Non-recipient
in 2011/12
Recipient in
any one year
Non-recipient
in any one
year
Dependent variable : Maize yield (kg/acre) 590.9 330.4 520.4 284.8 742.0 464.1 663.8 417.5
Treatment variables
Received voucher in 2011/12 (yes=1, no=0) 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
Received voucher in any one year (yes=1, no=0) 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.0
Explanatory variables
Age of housheold head 55.9 48.5 52.1 47.5 58.7 52.3 55.7 51.0
Gender of household head (1=male, 0=female) 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
Household head completed standard 5 (yes=1, no=0 ) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.7
Sick/disabled household head (yes=1, no=0) 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
Number of farmers in household 3.3 3.0 3.3 2.9 4.3 3.5 3.9 3.5
Land ownership (acre) 17.9 15.0 20.3 13.6 19.0 13.4 17.3 13.3
Real annual contribution to social functions
(Thousand TZS)
24.9 21.9 24.4 19.7 42.4 57.6 27.4 50.4
Real total daily household consumption per adult
equivalent (TZS)
578.0 485.7 535.6 393.5 1,446 956.1 754.4 620.3
Belong to religious/social group (yes=1, no=0) 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
Household members/relatives are in elected positions
(yes=1, no=0)
0.8 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.5
Houshold member/relative is in VVC (yes=1, no=0) 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0
Amount of urea used (kg) 123.1 40.9 93.8 10.9 220.2 35.2 130.6 29.5
Amount of improved seeds (kg) 3.3 0.4 2.0 0.1 12.4 1.4 7.5 0.1
Village variables
Have market (yes=1, no=0) 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0
Distance to town (km) 45.6 41.7 42.1 40.8 45.6 41.9 42.3 40.8
Have input sales points (yes=1, no=0) 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Mobile phone network available (yes=1, no=0) 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.7
Round 4
Variable     
Round 3
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6.4.3 Impact of voucher receipt on maize yield 
Propensity score matching results including variables, for voucher receipt in 2011/12 and in any 
year of the programme are found in appendices 13 and 15, respectively. Regression results on 
maize yields are shown in appendices 14 and 16. The residual e from equation (3) in each 
regression is statistically significant: therefore selected IVs are adequate. Average maize yield of 
the matched households increased during the period, but neither voucher receipt in 2011/12 nor 
in any year of the programme has a statistically significant impact on maize yield. Having had 
positive coefficients of time variables in all cases, this suggests that households who did not 
receive in 2011/12 and ‘never-recipient’ households also increased maize yield. 
In terms of impact of voucher receipt in 2011/12 on maize yield, by controlling for the 
use of Urea using the IV, those households whose members did not belong to a religious or social 
group were found to have increased maize yield in Round 4 (see Appendix 14). However, this 
is somewhat counter-intuitive to the supposition that belonging to a social group constitutes 
significant social capital in terms of information exchange, including that on input usage, as such 
an assumption was found not to hold with regard to maize yield. In controlling for the use of 
improved seeds, male-headed households were found to increase maize yield by about 50 per cent, 
which is statistically significant. This was probably due to the fact that male heads of household 
had a greater likelihood of access to training and information on agronomic practices than their 
female counterparts: this supposition is explored further in Chapter 7. The regression on voucher 
receipt in any year of the programme also suggests that a male-headed household had the 
propensity to increase maize yield (see Appendix 16); a finding that is correlated with finding by 
Mathenge et al. (2014) in Kenya. 
In terms of the qualitative findings on the correlation between programme participation 
and increased maize yield, farmers collectively cited all aspects of the substantial impact of the 
use of subsidised inputs, as evidenced in the following quotations: 
 
[There is a] big difference. The harvest improved a lot with fertiliser: with the voucher 
input, from one acre, I get 18 to 20 bags per acre; from the other two acres [not treated 
with improved inputs], the difference is very big: I can get [only] 8 to 10 bags (Recipient 
farmer, Songea district). 
 
The best part of the programme was this; after you had cultivated the soil following that 
method,  you  could  harvest  from 25  to  30  bags  per acre. Traditional local farming 
normally produces this number of bags from four acres! (Recipient farmer, Songea 
district).  
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If the weather is good, I can get 15 bags per acre; with the voucher inputs, I can harvest 
even up to 18 bags per acre. Without the voucher programme, it goes back to how it was 
before – eight to ten bags per acre (Farmer group discussion, Songea district).  
 
Before we started to use this fertiliser, we had a food shortage. This programme has made 
a big improvement: we have enough food now and some of us have even been able to buy 
some livestock – we just wish that the fertiliser would come in time (Farmer, Mbinga 
district).  
 
But as mentioned by the last quote above, late delivery made negative effects to the yield. That 
might have been reflected the reality. Moreover, several non-recipient households reported that 
they had also increased their maize yields by purchasing commercial inputs. This might evidence 
the educational effects of NAIVS, or the effects of other input support initiatives to non-recipient 
households that were necessarily excluded from my regression analysis, although such omitted 
values might have affected the results. 
Any other contradictions between the quantitative and qualitative results may be 
explained by reporting errors in both types of data collection. Firstly, as previously noted, 
recipient farmers were originally wealthier than their non-recipient counterparts, and so were 
better positioned to pay the top-up. Accordingly, the aforementioned qualitative data confirms 
that the perception of a positive programme impact did not only derive from the intervention itself, 
but from the ability to purchase inputs from other sources because they had the means to invest 
in other agricultural inputs. 
Secondly, in the qualitative interviews, farmers as well as community leaders indicated 
that they expected the programme to continue if they provided positive feedback – confirmation 
bias (Copestake and Remnant, 2015). Furthermore, if farmers arranged interviews with me 
through village leaders, the latter might have given instructions as to the kind of response to be 
made and/or told them to make positive comments, because such feedback would affect the 
evaluation of their own performance as implementers of the programme. In interview, farmers 
also commented on the general benefits of using improved inputs, which did not necessarily mean 
programme-prescribed ones obtained through vouchers. This again arose through their own 
expectations or instructions from the leaders. Other than their own expectations, building trust 
between me and the informants in my quest for precise information would be difficult to establish 
in such a comparatively short visit to each village (normally, three to four days at most).  
 Thirdly, although it was comparatively difficult to make late changes to the household 
survey since the questionnaire was long and allowed for a wide range of variable responses, and 
it contained recall or measurement errors – particularly given that most farmers implemented 
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mixed-crop cultivation. Even so I suspect that there were more serious errors in reporting maize 
production and yields in respect of the qualitative research, owing to participant expectations 
around the continuation of the programme. 
The regression results that indicate a negligible programme impact on maize yields 
correlate with the various factors that hindered effectiveness, which were noted earlier in this 
chapter. This was not corroborated by most of the qualitative findings which tells positive story. 
However, although I acknowledge the data limitation regarding other initiatives, with the 
aforementioned plausible errors in the qualitative data I would suggest that there was no 
significant impact of voucher receipt on maize yields in the region. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed the emergent incongruity between qualitative and quantitative data 
findings in terms of the impacts of the NAIVS programme. The general trend of panel household 
survey results is towards improved input usage together with increased maize yields between 
rounds 3 and 4, which corresponds to the introduction of this subsidy programme. In order to 
determine whether or not the increase in maize yield was due to the programme, I analysed the 
panel data and qualitative findings. Firstly, I looked at the general trend of maize yields, which 
increased markedly in 2003/04, probably due to favourable weather conditions and the 
introduction of an input transport subsidy that year – which, paradoxically, also led to increased 
disparities between the yields of various farmers. 
Secondly, in the qualitative interviews, most key informants in the region suggested that 
recipient households increased their maize yields from 4–7 bags to 12–25 bags per acre by using 
inputs from the voucher package, although outcomes would have been also dependent on soil and 
weather conditions, and individual agronomic practices. 
Thirdly, regression results showed no statistically significant impact of voucher receipt 
on maize yield in 2011/12 in particular or, indeed, in any year of the programme. This might be 
due to the mixture of many hindering factors which were different from the programme design, 
such as late delivery of vouchers/inputs, lack of application of whole input package by farmers. 
As panel data suggest that the majority of the recipient farmers under study applied up to two 
bags of Urea only despite the prescribed input package with phosphate fertiliser and improved 
seeds, where 50 per cent of panel households reported that they had used Urea before the 
programme. Meanwhile, I can’t find displacement of previously purchased Urea by the panel 
recipient households.  
 Contradictory results between quantitative and qualitative results might have been due to 
reporting errors in quantitative data (Deaton, 1997) and confirmation bias in qualitative data 
(Copestake and Remnant, 2015). But I would say that confirmation bias affected more in the 
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qualitative interviews. As we have seen in section 6-3, input usage of farmers depended on the 
receipt of vouchers in the year. For example, the error comes from such as: with the widespread 
knowledge of immediate impact of improved inputs on yields, in the interview recipient 
households in any year of the programme reported on the increased yields of the year when they 
received vouchers, not on overall trend of maize yield during the programme period. As we saw 
in the Chapters 4, 5, and this Chapter, the implementation of the programme was found too 
complicated to be precisely recalled by the qualitative data on the impact of the programme, which 
got messy. The programme might have helped in some way their source of income through getting 
Urea with cheaper price. In those cases due to some tendency among majority of stakeholders 
(farmers, village leaders, government officials and agro-dealers) to favour the continuity of the 
programme, which encouraged their statement toward its positive evaluation. This was found to 
be correlated with those factors which militated against the positive impact of the programme, 
such as late delivery of vouchers, low quality of delivered inputs, some displacement of Urea and 
DAP, elite capture, and mis-targeting – all of which were discussed in chapters 4 and 5. Finally, 
the contradictory finding is due to the fact that non-recipient households increased input usage to 
a greater extent than their recipient counterparts, which made it difficult to discern the impact of 
the programme. It could indicate that the programme had an educational effect, or could be partly 
due to the other aforementioned initiatives. Such indirect effects of the programme on the wider 
economy are addressed in Chapter 8. 
Thus I would conclude in the line of quantitative results, that there was no significant 
impact of voucher receipt on maize yield in the region. 
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Chapter 7. Changing livelihoods through input subsidy 
 
‘They should continue for it helps farmers with school fees and other developments in the 
village. But if the programme finishes, farmers will only produce for their own 
consumption.’ (VVC chairman in Songea district) 
 
7-1. Introduction 
NAIVS aimed to reduce poverty and enhance household food security, especially that of small- 
scale farmers and vulnerable households. The benefit-cost analysis of a NAIVS impact study 
conducted as part of a Public Expenditure Review suggests that it was not profitable for the 
average farmer because of the inefficiency of input use (URT, 2014e). Existing studies in other 
countries suggest that since input subsidy programmes vary according to context, each had 
different results. Several studies suggest that Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) 
had positive impacts on household real incomes. Chirwa (2010) and Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne 
(2011) suggest that there were income gains by recipient households. Using an informal rural 
economy model, Dorward and Chirwa suggest household income gains were found more in 
poorer beneficiary households in poorer regions (Dorward and Chirwa, 2013). Lunduka et al. 
(2013) suggest that since better-off households benefitted most from FISP, the effects in reducing 
poverty were small and increased income inequality. In the case of Ethiopia Louhichi et al. find 
that using their farm-household model for a small number of smallholder farmers the income 
effects could be substantial such as more than 50 plus percent, although the overall impacts on 
farm incomes were limited; less than 1 percent (Louhichi et al., 2016). 
As to the cost benefit analysis of the programme level, there has been keen debate on 
whether positive benefits have been over-estimated or conversely, estimated as being negative, 
which depended mostly on the different nitrogen response rates used between their analysis (Jayne 
et al., 2013; Dorward and Chirwa, 2015; Jayne et al., 2015). In Zambia’s case, while Mason and 
Smale (2013) suggest that there was a small gain in economic well-being for smallholders, 
financial benefit-cost analysis of the input subsidy programme was well below one – which means 
that cost outweighs benefit (Mason et al., 2013). In Nigeria, Awotide et al. (2013) suggest that 
the seed voucher system had a positive statistically significant impact on total annual household 
income and consumption expenditure. 
To my knowledge, this chapter provides the first study on the impact of NAIVS on 
poverty, assets and other livelihood outcomes. This chapter attempts to trace livelihood outcomes 
from the programme’s impact on maize yields which was discussed in the previous chapter. In 
this chapter, I look at how NAIVS changed poverty, assets and farmers’ livelihoods and gender 
aspect of poverty using panel survey results and qualitative information. Firstly, I will examine 
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the impact of voucher receipt of NAIVS on income poverty, household assets and children’s 
educational attainment, as well as the impact of receiving more than three years of vouchers - the 
‘graduates’. Secondly, I look at the effects of NAIVS on livelihood outcomes, such as food 
security, crop production and the main activities of household heads. Thirdly, I look at the gender 
aspects of changing livelihoods brought about by subsidy. 
 
7-2. Impact on income poverty and household assets 
Poverty can be measured in different ways: objective or subjective poverty, relative or absolute 
poverty, utility or capabilities, income or non-income poverty. This section looks at the impact of 
the input voucher programme on income poverty and household assets in Ruvuma. 
 
7-2-1. Poverty measurement 
Sen explains the capability approach to welfare. ‘The capability of a person reflects the alternative 
combinations of functionings the person can achieve, and from which he or she can choose one 
collection’ (Sen, 1993: 31). The approach is based on a view of living as a combination of various 
‘doings and beings’, with quality of life to be assessed in terms of the capability to achieve 
valuable functionings’ (ibid.). Sen (1982; 1985) further argues that in different societies groups 
of people or even individuals have different choices, preferences and values concerning the same 
functions and capabilities. However, given that my research focuses on one region in Tanzania, 
where people share similar values and socio-economic characteristics, I will not address the issue 
of the different values ascribed to these capabilities. Ravallion (1998) also suggests that the 
capabilities which Sen and others have suggested to measure welfare can be determined by the 
‘utility’ function.  
However, measuring poverty in terms of money gives rise to several concerns, especially 
how we could transfer utility to money. Ravallion (1998) suggests that the ‘poverty line can be 
interpreted as a point on the consumer’s expenditure function, giving the minimum cost to a 
household of attaining a given level of utility at the prevailing prices and for given household 
characteristics’ (p.3). The utility function represents consumer preferences over consumption 
bundles. The poverty line is then calculated by measuring the distribution of real expenditure or 
equivalent expenditures to acquire the bundles of goods necessary to attain a given poverty level 
of utility. However, the homotheticity of preference, which means that the ratio of goods 
demanded by consumers will depend only on relative prices and not on income or scale, is rarely 
accepted (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). Thus, in order to analyse the impact of the subsidy 
programme on poverty, I have chosen to use the absolute income poverty line based on household 
real consumption expenditures. 
The dominant way of measuring the poverty line is based on the nutritional requirement 
for people to achieve certain activity levels (Deaton, 1997; Ravallion, 1998; Houghton and 
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Khandker, 2009) and has been examined in practice in many places. This nutritional requirement, 
however, varies according to age, weight and occupation. It is most popularly set at 2,100 calorie 
per adult per day in other countries, although in Tanzania, it is set as 2,200 calorie (URT, 2002: 
78). 
Since Tanzanian Household Budget Surveys conducted in recent years do not provide 
regional poverty estimates (URT, 2009a; URT, 2014b), we cannot control regional time-variant 
conditions when comparing poverty indices from different surveys. Considering the price 
differences among regions, I would not use the estimates of Household Budget Surveys to 
compare between the poverty estimates of Round 3 and 4 of my panel. 
Alternatively, methods for setting the poverty line using the survey data itself are Cost of 
Basic Needs (CBN) or Food Energy Intake (FEI). The former first estimates the cost for acquiring 
enough food for adequate nutrition – usually 2,100 calorie per person per day – and adds on the 
cost for other essentials such as clothing and shelter. When price information is lacking, the 
alternative is the latter, which plots household expenditure per capita against food consumption 
to determine the household expenditure level at which a household acquire enough food 
(Houghton and Khandker, 2009: 39). The CBN is preferable to the FEI in national household 
surveys where there are rural / urban differences in nutritional preferences, prices, household 
members’ activities and so on (Ravallion, 1998; Houghton and Khandker, 2009). However, in 
my research for Ruvuma there is not so much rural/urban difference in preferences, I would also 
consider to be able to apply FEI.  
I corrected the unit of measurement for the extreme outliers of the amounts consumed per 
adult equivalent, the median prices of non-durable goods and frequently purchased services, if 
their values were more than 20 times the respective median amount, as in most cases they had 
been miscoded for the unit of consumption. While Pan and Christiaensen (2010) utilised regional 
median price to calculate the purchased price of non-durable goods and frequently purchased 
services, I checked the unit price of each item carefully and was thus able to use the reported unit 
price of each household for these items. 
For the first analysis I used the same methodology as the Household Budget Survey, 
excluding the same non-food items from the calculation for total household consumption. For 
some frequent purchased services such as the wages or other costs of houseboys/girls, barber and 
beauty shops and expenses in hotels, some households have a high expenditure per adult 
equivalent, which I leave for later analysis of the share of whole consumption expenditure of these 
households. I used food CPI to adjust the time difference between the time of Household Budget 
Survey 2007 and the Round 3: the ratio of 196.0 (March 2009) to 147.6 (June 2007) = 1.3279 
(NBS, 2010). Inflation rate over the period from 2009 to 2013 is as high as about 64 per cent, and 
annual rates in 2009, 2011 and 2012 were over 12 per cent, while in 2010 it was 5.5 per cent51 
(Graph 10). 
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Graph 10: Annual inflation rate from 2009 to 2013 in Tanzania (%) 
 
Source: NBS (2010); NBS (2012); NBS (2014) 
 
For the poverty line calculation I used the food poverty line52 and basic needs poverty line53 for 
rural areas. I did not use the Fisher index54 (Deaton and Tarrozi, 1999), since the Household 
Budget Survey 2007 does not have a regional Fisher index as it produces only the ones for three 
areas, namely: Dar es Salaam, other urban and rural (URT, 2009a). Pan and Christiaensen (2010) 
used the median for the number of guest visiting days, but I used the actual number of guest days. 
They used the threshold age of becoming adult as 19, but in my own survey I used 17 referring 
to the threshold in one variable of the Poverty Score Card which are composed of variables 
which link to the poverty indices (Shreiner, 2013). They also used the mean of the average weight 
of the age/sex group of the sample households for calculations, whereas I used the actual average 
weight of the household.  
The population of Ruvuma is concentrated in Mbinga (36.9 per cent) and Tunduru (22.3 per 
cent) districts, where cash crops (coffee and cashew nuts) are cultivated, while the maize- 
producing districts Songea and Namtumbo, have the rest 40 per cent of the total regional 
population. If the farmers used inputs for other cash crops, as we saw in the last chapter, the 
impact on income poverty would be mixed, for they could raise income from the increase of cash 
crop production and might have benefitted from purchasing maize with a lowered maize price  
 
51 2 CPI series are combined (base, September 2009=100).  
52 The food consumption pattern reported by the poorest 50 per cent of the population is used as the basis 
for the food poverty line. The median quantity consumed per adult equivalent per day is tabulated for all 
food items whose consumption is recorded in the survey. The quantities of each item consumed are then 
adjusted by a constant factor so that the sum of their calorific values equal 2,200 calories per day, the 
minimum necessary for an adult. These quantities are then priced using median unit prices calculated from 
the survey data. The sum of these values gives the cost of meeting the minimum adult calorific requirement 
with a food consumption pattern typical of the poorest 50 per cent of the population. 
53 The share of expenditure on non-food items in the poorest 25 per cent of the population is calculated, 
whose fraction is used to increase the food poverty line to allow for non-food consumption. This is to 
make allowance for the fact that individuals need more than just food to live. 
54 It is used to adjust for price variation both over time and across different geographical areas, by using 
the price and quantity information from the surveys themselves. It can be thought of as representing a 
sort of ‘average’ consumption pattern between the two populations being compared. 
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due to increased maize production. 
In Round 3 data which I obtained from the World Bank the data for non-durable goods 
and frequently-purchased services for poverty estimates according to the methodology of HBSs 
is recorded for only 76 households. If we make a panel sample, only 41 households (32 recipient 
households plus 9 non-recipient households in Round 4) had non-durable goods consumption data 
in Round 3. As these numbers are so small compared to the number of the total panel sample (309 
households), I only attempt to calculate the food poverty line to compare with the national food 
poverty line. 
Using the original panel sample (637 households) Pan and Christiaensen report that the 
median real total consumption per adult equivalent is 165,000 TZS (Pan and Christiaensen, 2010: 
36), while the equivalent of my panel sample is calculated as 119,000 TZS, for which I used the 
adult equivalence scale employed by Household Budget Surveys in Tanzania (URT, 2009a: 82) 
(Appendix 17). Meanwhile, the mean total household consumption per adult equivalent is 
164,000 TZS. I followed the methodologies of the Household Budget Survey 2007 to calculate 
the total household consumption, by omitting outliers55. The way of detailed data cleaning is given 
in case required. I proceed with my analysis using this mean total household consumption per 
adult equivalent data. 
The poverty headcount ratios using the survey data itself based on the Cost of Basic Needs 
(CBN) or Food Energy Intake (FEI) methods are shown in Table 37. 
 
Table 37: Basic needs poverty headcount ratio using CBN (lower level) and FEI methods 
Variable Observation CBN FEI 
Round 3 309 0.52 0.41 
Round 4 309 0.56 0.38 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
These methods give different results. However, the ratio based on CBN in Round 4 looks very 
high compared to the one for rural areas reported by the Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2011/12 
(33.3 per cent) and considering that there was 7.1 per cent decrease of food poverty headcount 
ratio in rural areas from 2007 to 2011/12 reported by HBSs (URT, 2009a; URT, 2014b), a 4 per 
cent increase in poverty during the period is rather implausible. For this reason, I have taken the 
estimate based on the FEI method to look at the impact of subsidy on poverty. 
 
 
 
 55 I followed the methodologies taken by the Tanzania Household Budget Survey 2007 Technical notes 
URT (2009a) Household Budget Survey 2007 Dar es Salaarm: MoFEA and NBS: MoFEA, NBS. I revised 
outliers of consumer unit prices of food more than 20 times village median prices, and so on. 
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7-2-2. Assets 
To capture poverty dynamics and economic mobility of the households, to measure assets is 
suggested as better measurement by several researchers (Baulch and Hodinott, 2000; Zimmerman 
and Carter, 2003; Carter and Barrett, 2006). They suggest that flow measurement, i.e. income or 
expenditures, tends to have considerable measurement errors. Stock of assets controls largely the 
structural position of the people in the society and their ability to avoid poverty and move upwards 
in economic mobility. Thus I also look at the impact of voucher receipt on assets in order to look 
at the impact on poverty. 
Several studies of the Malawi programme suggest that FISP had no positive impact on 
household asset holdings (Holden and Lunduka, 2010; Ricker-Gilbert, 2011). Holden and 
Lunduka find that ‘welfare has improved on a broad scale’ (Holden and Lunduka, 2010: 20), but 
that subsidy receipt had no direct impact on asset accumulation. In Zambia and Nigeria, the 
beneficiary households tended to have fewer assets, though the impact of the subsidies on assets 
was not studied (Alene and Manyong, 2007; Mason et al., 2013). 
Based on the assets in the analytical framework I will now trace the general trend of the 
household assets of my panel sample households during the periods between Round 3 and 4. 
Among these assets, tables, radios, bicycles/motorbikes and motor vehicles and house roofs are 
suggested to be strongly correlated to poverty indices according to the Poverty Score Card for 
Tanzania (Shreiner, 2013). The Poverty Score Card uses ten proxy variables to measure poverty, 
which are closely correlated to poverty indices measured by household consumption data 
(Shreiner, 2006; Shreiner, 2010). 
I added beds and mobile phones, since many informants in the interviews suggested that 
they bought beds when they increased maize production with subsidised inputs, and mobile 
phones are important to get information on input and output markets. I observed that there is now 
mobile phone coverage in most villages (87 per cent in Round 4) whereas in Round 3 about 30 
per cent of the villages did not have coverage (Christiaensen and Pan, 2009a). 
Regarding capability, I looked at the impacts of input subsidies on various welfare 
indicators including primary school enrolment. I found the subsidies had a positive significant 
impact on primary enrolment as shown in the next section. 
 
7-2-3. Impact of voucher receipt on income poverty and assets 
In this section, I will analyse how NAIVS changed poverty of recipient households. In interviews 
and farmer group discussions, most of the recipient farmers informed me that their lives had been 
much improved through the increased maize/rice production following receipt of vouchers. They 
could increase food security, send children to school, improve their houses by for example, 
converting a mud house to a bricked one, or a thatched house to a terraced/corrugated iron 
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sheet/cement one, and they could buy household furniture, such as beds, sheets and mattresses, 
bicycles, motor bikes, cars etc. 
  
‘Because the vouchers were plentiful, we were able to build new houses, and buy beds 
and mattresses, and were able to cultivate a few [beans] near the households.’ (A farmer 
in farmer group discussion in Songea.) 
 
‘We get better shelter and buy mattresses and beds. There are fewer health problems, we 
can pay school fees and buy motorcycles.’ (Village meeting in Songea district.) 
 
‘The voucher programme improved the living of farmers. They bought bicycles, piki-piki 
(Swahili term for ‘motor-cycles’), houses, and TVs.’ (VEO in Songea district.) 
 
Another poor farmer in Tunduru stated that ‘what I normally do is to divide one bag of the 
fertiliser – half on the maize field and half on the rice field”, thus increasing maize and rice 
production from two bags each per acre to four bags and eight bags, respectively. ‘Due to 
increased production, I was able to build a brick house like my neighbours - before that I had a 
mud house.’ 
On quantitative information, as with the maize yield discussed in the last chapter, I am 
using fixed-effects panel data strategy with the following specification: 
 
Yit=δ*ti+αdi*di+βi (ti *di)+Xit+εit………………………………………………………….(1) 
 
 
The only difference from equation (1) in page 110 in the last chapter is Yit, which here is the 
outcome of income poverty reduction or assets variables, represented by poverty headcount ratio 
and number/category of assets, of individual household i in time t, that is, round 3 or 4, 
respectively. And the difference in outcome between matched recipient households and non- 
recipient households and in round 4 or round 3 is explained by each household’s time dummy, 
treatment dummy, intersection term and covariates in rounds 4 or 3, respectively. I include 
graduates – three-year voucher recipients – as one of the treatment variables. 
For covariates I include the indirect impact of the input subsidy, which Dorward and 
Chirwa suggest lowered maize prices and increased agricultural wages (Dorward and Chirwa, 
2013), on which they and Jayne et al. are now debating how to account these indirect impacts 
(Jayne et al., 2013; Dorward and Chirwa, 2015; Jayne et al., 2015). I will use my panel data for 
these variables. I also include here the real price of Urea, as representative of input price, since 
Urea represents about two-thirds of all fertilisers used by panel households. 
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Table 38: Descriptive statistics 
 Round 3 Round 4 
 Value at ith Percentile in Distribution*  Value at ith Percentile in Distribution*  
  10th  25th  50th  75th  90th  Mean 10th  25th  50th  75th  90th  Mean 
Dependent variables              
Poverty headcount (1=food poor, 0=not 
poor) 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  1.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  0.3  
Voucher receipt in any year 
(1=received, 0=not) 
0.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.8  0.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.8  
Voucher receipt in 2011/12 
(1=received, 0=not) 0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  0.5  
Graduates (1=voucher received in more 
than 3 years, 0=not) 
0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  0.4  
Whether household owns Radio 
(1=yes, 0=not) 
0.0  0.8  0.8  1.2  1.2  0.8  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.7  
Number of Tables  0.0  1.0  1.6  2.0  2.4  1.6  1.0  1.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.6  
Whether household has Modern House 
roof (1=yes, 0=no) 0.0  0.0  0.6  1.5  1.5  0.9  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.7  
Number of Bicycle, Vehicles, etc. 0.0  0.0  0.9  1.6  2.0  1.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  2.0  0.8  
Number of Beds 0.0  0.8  1.0  1.6  2.4  1.2  1.0  2.0  3.0  4.0  6.0  3.5  
Number of Mobile phones 0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  2.0  0.6  0.0  0.0  1.0  2.0  2.0  0.9  
Not sending children to primary school 
(not sending=1, sending=0) 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  
Explanatory variables              
Log of age of household head 3.4  3.6  3.8  4.1  4.4  3.9  3.5  3.6  4.0  4.2  4.5  3.9  
Gender of household head (1=male, 
0=female) 0.8  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.9  1.0  0.8  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.9  1.2  
Education category of household head 
(completed standard 5=1, not=0) 0.0  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.9  0.9  0.0  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.9  0.9  
Quality of parcels (Poor=1, Average=2, 
Good=3) 0.4  0.5  0.6  0.9  1.2  0.8  0.8  1.2  1.6  2.0  2.4  1.7  
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 Round 3 Round 4 
 Value at ith Percentile in Distribution*  Value at ith Percentile in Distribution*  
 10th  25th  50th  75th  90th  Mean 10th  25th  50th  75th  90th  Mean 
Total real non-farm income (in 
Thousand TZS) 
0.0  1.1  5.1  6.2  7.1  4.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.6  6.5  2.2  
Access of parcels to irrigation facilities 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.3  
Whether household members or 
relatives are in elected positions in the 
villages (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.0  0.0  0.8  1.2  1.2  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.8  1.0  1.2  0.6  
Access to saving and credit 
organisation (SACCO) (1=have access, 
0=not have access) 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  0.3  
Whether household members/relatives 
are VVC members (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  
Village variables 
Access to all-weather road (1=yes, 
0=no) 0.0  0.0  0.8  1.0  1.2  0.6  0.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.9  
Log of distance to town (kg) 2.4  2.8  3.6  4.1  4.7  3.3  2.2  3.3  3.7  4.2  4.8  3.5  
Whether village has input sales points 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2  0.2  
Log of number of maize buyers visited 
to village 0.0  1.8  2.4  3.3  3.4  2.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.4  2.4  0.9  
Whether village has mobile phone 
network (1=yes, 0=no) 0.0  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.9  1.0  0.0  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.2  0.9  
Log of real Urea price in village 
(Thousand TZS) 
0.0  0.0  3.7  4.8  5.5  2.6  0.0  0.0  3.2  3.9  4.3  2.3  
Log of real labour cost for land 
preparation per day in the village 
(Thousand TZS) 
0.0  7.4  8.1  8.5  9.4  6.4  0.0  7.0  7.7  8.2  9.0  6.0  
Log of maize sales real prices by 
household (Thousand TZS) 
0.0  0.0  0.0  5.4  6.2  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.2  
Note: * It represents percentiles counting from the smallest in value of each variable. The values are not adjusted by sample weight.  
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data (village variables are from village survey) 
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The descriptive statistics of the mean values of variables of ith percentiles (percentiles 
counting from the smallest value in distribution) is shown in Table 38. In general income poverty 
reduced a little, and several assets and social infrastructure were increased. Real total non-farm 
incomes reduced by almost half, which might reflect their focus on crop production induced by 
the programme. Within household assets, the average number of improved beds and mattresses 
increased three times and the number of mobile phones also increased while the number of radios 
decreased. This seems to indicate a shift from radio to mobile phone as a means of 
information/communication. Within explanatory variables, the average quality of parcels 
improved, which was probably due to the programme. Access to all weather road was increased, 
meanwhile unexpectedly maize buyers visits to the villages decreased, although there was 
increased maize production without export ban, with increased mobile phone communication, and 
maize prices recovered somehow in the season, the latter will be analysed in Chapter 8-3. The 
real Urea prices and real labour cost for land preparation reduced during the period, and are 
different from those discussed in Chapter 8, as the values in the table are not adjusted by sample 
weights. The real maize sales prices received by households reduced greatly, which might have 
been due to the increased maize production by the programme, which was partly facilitated by 
the increased access to irrigation facilities. 
The propensity score matching and respective regression results are shown from 
Appendices 18 to 23. The difference-in-difference estimate results suggest that neither voucher 
receipt in 2011/12 nor in any year of the programme had any impact on the poverty headcount 
ratio (Appendices 19 and 21). While the voucher recipients in any year of the programme were in 
general better-off, the recipients in 2011/12 were poorer, though this is weakly significant. 
Households whose heads had a higher education attainment and access to credit and saving 
associations (SACCO) and male-headed households were better-off. Households which had 
bigger non-farm income, higher quality parcels and more land for cultivation and resided in 
villages with access to input sales points were also better-off. Also this corroborates with poverty 
gap results: the reduction of average poverty gap among recipient households was smaller than 
the one of non-recipient households (9.5 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively). However, as the 
data for household consumption might be susceptible to reporting errors, I look at the impact on 
household assets. 
The difference-in-difference estimate results suggest that the voucher receipt in any year 
did not have a significant impact on household assets, except a weakly negative significant impact 
on having a modern house roof (Appendices 22 and 23), the latter is though, reasonably due to 
reporting error, but which suggests that voucher recipients already had a modern house roof before 
the programme, which means that they were originally better-off. However, this does not 
corroborate the information from many recipient farmers that they improved their roof through 
increased maize production by using subsidised inputs. The latter group were probably among a 
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few who could improve house roofs through subsidy. Meanwhile, membership of SACCO and 
residence in the villages where maize prices were higher had a significant positive impact on 
having a modern roof. 
Possession of other household goods, including radios, reveals a similar picture: A bigger 
non-farm income had a strongly significant positive impact on possessing household assets, 
except modern roofs. The residence of households in the villages where maize prices were high 
had a small but statistically significant positive impact on having more tables. This suggests that 
maize sales were among the funds used for buying tables. Although during the period the matched 
households in general increased their ownership of mobile phones and beds, recipient households 
already had more of these assets than non-recipient households before the programme. Household 
heads with greater education attainment and access to credit who lived in the villages closer to 
town were more likely to have more mobile phones. Living in villages with higher labour costs 
for land preparation had a positive significant impact on having more beds, as wages might be 
one of the non-farm income to buy them. 
I now disaggregate voucher receipt experience by year of voucher receipt. There are studies 
that demonstrate that early adopters were originally wealthier and used improved inputs before 
the subsidy programme (Pan and Christiaensen, 2010; Mathenge et al., 2014). Graph 11 shows 
that recipients in the pilot year were originally better-off than other groups and further reduced 
poverty in Round 4, and the recipient in 2011/12 were poorest and reduced poverty less than the 
former, while the poverty status of other recipients remained constant. This was because, as seen 
in Chapter 5, in the pilot year leaders selected the better-off households who had previously used 
inputs. The greater reduction in poverty of this group may be due to the higher number of years 
during which vouchers were received, which is seen in Table 39. The recipients in the pilot year 
had a higher ratio of receiving vouchers over all four years than the recipients in any year of the 
programme; conversely, the recipients in later years tended to receive vouchers for only one year 
compared to the recipients in the pilot year. It may indicate that these were the households who 
could afford to pay top-up and had the social power to be selected for vouchers by the village 
leaders throughout the period of the programme. If this were the case, receiving vouchers over a 
longer period seemed to reduce poverty. I will therefore examine this point. 
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Graph 11: Disaggregated change in poverty headcount ratio by year of voucher receipt 
 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
Table 39: Number of years of voucher receipt of recipients in pilot year and in four years 
Number of 
years 
Recipients in 
pilot year 
Ratio to 
total 
recipients 
Recipients 
in any year 
Ratio to 
total 
recipients One year 33 0.33 86 0.43 
Two years 23 0.23 51 0.26 
Three years 16 0.16 35 0.18 
Four years 28 0.28 28 0.14 
Total 100  200  
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
The propensity score matching results for graduates are shown in Appendix 24. However, 
difference-in-difference estimate results suggest that the fact of being graduates (voucher 
recipients in more than three years) does not show a statistically significant impact on either 
poverty headcount ratio or household assets. This might be due to that the sample size of graduates 
is small, which could not make precise estimate (Appendices 25 and 26). Acknowledging this 
limitation, if I aim to analyse on covariates, non-farm income had a significant impact on poverty 
reduction and on improving all household assets except for modern house roofs. This suggests 
that if households had a bigger non-farm income, they could move out of poverty. Higher 
education attainment by household heads reduced poverty, which is strongly statistically 
significant. Graduate households were more likely to have had radios, modern house roofs and 
more beds than other households before the programme. Generally, panel households increased 
the number of mobile phones and beds they owned during the period, as seen above. Reasonably, 
membership of SACCO had a statistically positive impact on having a modern house roof and 
more mobile phones. Interestingly, households in villages with less access to the mobile phone 
network were more likely to have a modern roof. 
The difference-in-difference estimate results suggest that again, being graduates had no 
significant impact on livestock keeping, whose results might be affected by the small sample size 
(Appendix 27). From before NAIVS graduates tended to keep more cows and goats than other 
households, which is statistically significant. Households having access to irrigation facilities and 
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belonging to SACCO, and in villages where mobile phone network is available have positive 
significant impact on number of goats kept. Meanwhile, interestingly, household members or 
relatives being VVC members have negative significant impact on number of goats. And 
households with bigger total non-farm income have positive significant impact on number of 
poultry kept, and more elderly-headed households tend to have more pigs. With the acknowledged 
data limitation I could conclude from here that graduates and wealthier households tended to have 
more numbers of livestock since before the programme. 
Difference-in-difference estimate results suggest that being graduates neither has a 
statistically significant impact on not sending children to primary school with the same 
acknowledged  data  limitation  (Appendix  28).  Households  with  elderly-heads  had  a weakly 
significant positive impact on sending children to primary school. This means that they were less 
poor which might be due to the bigger household size, thus they could afford to pay some of the 
costs associated with school. 
 
7-3. Effects of NAIVS on livelihoods 
We have seen that although the panel households in general reduced poverty during the two 
survey rounds, receiving vouchers did not have a significant impact either on reducing poverty or 
on improving the household assets of the recipient households. In this section, I will analyse how 
NAIVS changed the farmers’ livelihoods. ‘Livelihoods’ are defined as ‘capability, assets 
(including both material and social resources) and activities for a means of living’ (Chambers and 
Cornway, 1992). Since the programme aims to increase maize and rice production, I will look 
here at the change in food security and household activities through quantitative and qualitative 
information. Finally, I will look at the gender aspect of change in livelihoods, since the 
programme designed to target female-headed households. 
 
7-3-1. Effect of NAIVS on crop production and household food security 
At the national level, the FAO et al. (2015) report that although Tanzania has made economic 
growth since 1990, the proportion of undernourished people increased up to around 2010, and 
reduced after then up to 2013, which partly might be attributable to the effect of NAIVS. As for 
Ruvuma URT and WFP (2010) report that it has a high prevalence of borderline food consumption 
(25.1 per cent), where food insecurity is associated with lack of access to livestock and low 
income. Although a later report (WFP and World Bank, 2012) suggests an improvement in dietary 
intake in the southern region of the country, still the southern region has the second highest ratio 
(12.0 per cent in 2010/11) of borderline food consumption. The FAO defines food security as: 
‘when all people at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO et 
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al., 2015), which changed only slightly from the one defined in the World Summit on Food 
Security in 2009 (World summit on food security, 2009). I did not collect data on food preferences 
in my field research, thus in this section I only analyse the change in diet and dietary consumption.  
 From the qualitative information, the informants mentioned the positive impact of the 
programme on food security as following: 
 
‘Food becomes available, there is no shortage of food.’ (Village meeting in Songea 
district.) 
 
‘They will have enough food each year with increased production, and they will be able 
to contribute to other developmental activities in the village.’ (VVC chairmen, Songea 
district.) 
 
One farmer in Tunduru mentioned that they ate only cassava and had one to two meals per day 
before, but that now they eat maize and rice and can eat three meals per day. 
Meanwhile, these positive evaluations may be partly confirmation bias as some of the 
problems mentioned in the last chapter, such as ineffectiveness due to the late delivery of vouchers, 
increase of input prices, etc. were also heard. At a village meeting in Songea district, informants 
mentioned that since the inception of the programme production had increased but the price of 
maize had decreased; thus food availability had improved, but maize-surplus farmers had no more 
cash than previously. In remote villages in Mbinga, village leaders mentioned that the programme 
had had little impact, since few vouchers had been allocated to the village and the inputs and 
vouchers had been delivered late. I will now look in detail at the change in crop production and 
household food security of the farmer households through NAIVS, by using mixed methods.  
As we saw in Chapter 6, maize production per capita in Ruvuma increased by about 80 
percent from 2008/09, the year NAIVS started to 2011/12. Even with the population increase of 
11 per cent  (NBS, 2013c; NBS, 2013e; NBS, 2013b; NBS, 2013d; NBS, 2013a), regional maize 
production per capita increased by about the same rate after NAIVS was introduced (Table 40). 
Songea district was the biggest maize producer before NAIVS started, producing three times more 
maize per capita as the regional average. This production further increased since NAIVS started 
full operation of the programme, doubling in 2011/12. The second largest producer was 
Namtumbo district; however, its increase ratio after the programme was lower due to being 
allocated fewer vouchers. 
This increase in maize production coincided with the increase of fertiliser consumption 
since NAIVS started in Songea district, the main maize producer in the region, of Urea by 210 
per cent, of DAP by more than 550 per cent (Table 41). Thus we could assume that the programme 
increased maize production. 
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Table 40: Maize production per capita in Ruvuma region by district (tons per capita) 
Source: Ruvuma RS (2012a), NBS (2013a), NBS (2013b), NBS (2013c), NBS (2013d), NBS (2013e) 
 
Table 41: Fertiliser consumption in Songea district (Kilo tonnes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author adapted from Songea DC (2013) 
 
Many informants suggested that the voucher programme improved their household food security. 
In the farmer group discussion, poor female heads of household reported that before receiving 
subsidised inputs they had to buy maize in the lean period from February to April. Even when 
they received only Urea through vouchers, however, they increased their maize harvest so that 
the programme improved their household security. They could increase the number of meals from 
twice to three times per day and no longer had to buy maize every year in the lean period.  
On the other hand information from key informants on the food security situation varies a 
little within the region. 
According to the Round 4 village survey, from January to March, in the lean period, 
villagers still faced food shortages in 60 to 80 per cent of the villages and villagers in 50 to 70 per 
cent of the villages had to buy food. In two thirds of the surveyed villages the majority of the 
households used money to buy food from February to April. The longest period for the majority 
of households to buy food was found in Songea district where people bought food from December 
to March. In villages in Mbinga, on the other hand, the majority of households bought food only 
in March. Although the Songea district is the biggest maize producer, because maize is a food as 
well as cash crop and therefore brings in less cash with reducing sales prices, there is more food 
insecurity in rural areas in the lean period than there is in Mbinga where they have income from 
coffee. 
The manager of a farmer association in Songea district mentioned that the NAIVS was not 
2007/08
(1)
Ratio to
region
average in
2007/08
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
2011/12
(2)
Ratio to
region
average in
2011/12
Increase
ratio (2):(1)
Regional average 173 - 205 339 369 369 - 1.80
Songea Municipal 48 0.28 42 63 74 77 0.21 1.84
Songea District 505 2.92 492 960 1,022 964 2.61 1.96
Mbinga 113 0.65 163 292 326 321 0.87 1.97
Namtumbo 246 1.42 365 374 409 448 1.22 1.23
Tunduru 80 0.46 73 152 164 186 0.51 2.55
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Increase rate
from 2008/9 to
2011/12 (%)
UREA 2.50 2.40 3.73 6.57 7.45 210.4
Minjingu 1.64 1.84 1.97 1.85 12.8
DAP 0.34 0.46 0.67 2.23 2.97 552.7
CAN   1.38 1.72 1.82
NPK  0.80 0.02 0.03 0.07 -91.3
SA 1.32 1.39 1.42 1.43 1.47 5.8
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helping poor farmers, in part because the small amount of packaged subsidised inputs was not 
enough for farmers to sustain their livelihoods and that food security is very poor in the region, 
especially in the planting season. However, this contradicts the information from the Agricultural 
Extension Officer in Mbinga, who said that ‘the programme changed from food production to 
business so it increased farmers’ incomes.’ Also an agricultural officer in Songea Municipality 
suggested that ‘there is no food insecurity in the municipal council’, and an agricultural officer in 
the RAS suggested that the ‘programme is important for improving food security’. These different 
comments about the food security situation may be due to geographical difference within the 
region, where there are some poor rural areas of food insecurity in the lean period, while in general 
the programme increased food security. If this were true, the positive evaluation on food security 
might only be applied to fertile accessible areas or to wealthier farmers where they produce cash 
crops. 
In order to see the effect of NAIVS on household food security, I will first look at crop 
production and sales by panel households (Table 42). Maize and rice production increased, with 
maize production increasing more than that of rice. Contrary to the above quotes about lack of 
farmers’ inability to have crop sales, the sales ratios of both maize and rice to production amount 
of the households also increased during the period by 24 to 32 per cent, respectively. However, 
the real unit sales value decreased for maize by 30 per cent, and for rice by 50 per cent. These 
decreases in maize and rice prices might be due to the increased supply from subsidy in the area, 
or the fact that the maize/rice prices in Round 3 were high because of the food and input price 
crisis in 2008. For the latter, though, I deflated by CPIs reported by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) for the values in the table. Thus it should not have affected the real price. I will 
look in more detail at maize prices in the next chapter. 
The average real total crop sales value increased by 36 per cent during the period. Among 
the crops, coffee accounted for more than half in sales values, followed by maize, even with 
adjusted sample weight due to its big income effect, their ratios to total sales values dropped in 
Round 4, when rice and cashew increased their ratio in total sales. 
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Table 42: Crop production amount, real crop sales values and sales ratio to total production amount in the previous season (kg, thousand TZS) 
Note: Adjusted sampling weight by district. Increase ratio is deflated by average food CPIs of the harvest period (June – August) of each year (100=average February to 
April, 2013) 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
Average
production
Standard
deviation
Average
real sales
(thousand
Tsh.)
Standard
deviation
Ratio to
total sales
value (%)
Average
sales ratio
to
production
amount (%)
Standard
deviation
Average
production
Standard
deviation
Average
real sales
(thousand
Tsh.)
Standard
deviation
Ratio to
total sales
value (%)
Average
sales ratio
to
production
amount
(%)
Standard
deviation
Maize 1,084 1,925 94.0 302.9 20 14 0.2 1,958 3,093 181.0 547.5 27 46 0.3 1.8 1.9 32
Beans 313 2,845 18.7 63.8 4 26 0.3 170 380 44.1 153.9 7 57 0.2 0.5 2.4 32
Coffee 235 643 245.1 1,030.3 51 98 0.1 220 524 292.5 876.5 44 99 0.1 0.9 1.2 1
Banana 105 433 9.0 32.4 2 22 0.3 120 321 11.3 88.7 2 56 0.3 1.1 1.3 34
Millet 66 330 8.9 66.2 2 47 0.5 24 172 3.0 20.0 0 87 0.2 0.4 0.3 40
Sorghum 3 32 0.7 12.6 0 0 0.4 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 - 0.0 0.0 0
Wheat 15 72 3.4 22.2 1 25 0.4 21 87 1.9 12.2 0 0 0.2 1.4 0.6 -25
Rice 174 513 21.3 83.8 4 30 0.3 207 588 41.8 147.9 6 53 0.3 1.2 2.0 24
Cassava 354 1,006 5.7 71.2 1 29 0.2 289 910 3.5 16.2 1 58 0.3 0.8 0.6 29
Yams 3 23 0.3 5.0 0 7 0.2 16 187 0.5 5.6 0 69 0.4 5.7 1.7 62
Sweet potatoes 36 211 1.0 12.1 0 7 0.3 68 339 5.7 68.0 1 55 0.2 1.9 5.4 48
Irish potatoes 2 18 0.0 0.2 0 0 0.0 5 63 0.8 13.2 0 0 0.4 2.6 64.6 0
Groundnuts 81 421 16.5 113.4 3 15 0.4 30 271 17.9 190.7 3 72 0.3 0.4 1.1 57
Onions 3 18 0.9 9.4 0 0 0.4 18 218 3.0 34.8 0 75 0.1 7.0 3.3 75
Tomatoes 28 205 4.4 37.4 1 33 0.4 60 371 4.0 26.7 1 74 0.2 2.2 0.9 41
Other vegetables 0.0 0.2 0 35 0.5 55 249 1.3 7.7 0 68 0.3 - 124.9 33
Sunflower 21 95 11.1 58.5 2 51 - 10 39 15.3 239.5 2 81 0.3 0.5 1.4 30
Peas 0 4 0.1 1.3 0 0 - 21 83 3.0 14.4 0 0 0.2 80.9 39.3 0
Castor oil 0 6 0.0 0.0 0 51 0.5 3 50 1.7 29.4 0 59 - 7.8 - 8
Sugar cane 0.5 6.6 0 100 0.3 26 322 6.0 41.3 1 67 0.3 - 11.2 -33
Trees 92 1,399 1.0 17.5 0 0 0.2 2 43 3.5 40.5 1 68 0.2 0.0 3.4 68
Papaya 9 92 0.0 0.3 0 39 0.0 27 445 0.1 1.7 0 94 0.1 3.2 9.0 54
Other fruit 114 573 0.3 2.5 0 11 0.4 25 224 2.4 31.9 0 69 0.3 0.2 8.5 59
Tobacco 14 123 12.2 104.5 3 0 0.5 17 180 22.9 249.9 3 0 0.0 1.2 1.9 0
Cashew 38 145 16.4 66.0 3 8 0.0 76 302 49.4 231.7 7 91 0.1 2.0 3.0 83
Simsim 9 56 5.2 37.8 1 100 0.5 29 222 13.1 72.1 2 63 0.2 3.2 2.5 -37
Paprika 5 94 0.0 0.0 0 83 0.3 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 80 - 0.0 - -3
Other product1 16 82 3.5 24.5 1 64 - 22 171 4.0 30.7 1 100 0.1 1.4 1.1 36
Other product2 2 16 0.0 0.5 0 0 - 0.0 0.0 - 97 - 0.0 0.0 97
Total 480.3 733.5
Crop
Round 3 Round 4
Real
increase
ratio of
sales
value
(R4/R3)
Difference
in sales
ratio to
production
(R4-R3)
Ratio in
increase in
production
(R4/R3)
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I will now look at the consumption and purchase of crops by panel households. Table 43 
shows the real crop consumer prices deflated by the food CPI reported by NBS56, and the purchase 
ratio during the period of 2008/9 and 2012/13 of the panel households, respectively, which is reported 
by the method of seven-day recalling prior to the survey. It shows that the total daily calorie intake 
per adult eater equivalent dropped slightly during the two survey periods, while the diet became a 
little more diversified, that is less maize-based, and was shifted partly to cassava, probably due to 
its price falling substantially. About 45 per cent of the total calorie intake came from maize in Round 
3. WFP (2012) suggested that the calorie intake from maize in Ruvuma was the highest in the 
country, and the region was reported as having the country’s lowest diet diversity. However, 
maize’s share of total consumed calories decreased in Round 4, despite its reduced real unit 
consumer prices of grain, cob and flour. Meanwhile, reduction of maize consumption was 
supplemented by increased cassava consumption to double of its share, up to about 19 per cent of 
total calories, which was due to the lowering price of cassava flour relative to that of maize flour. 
Other items which increased their ratio in calorie consumption, although the share of these items 
among total calorie consumption was relatively small, were goat/sheep meat, soda/soft drinks, local 
beer, fish, fruits, tomatoes, etc., which mostly increased purchase ratio during the period. These 
items mostly increased the unit prices, thus this increased consumption was due mostly to the 
preferences for a diversified diet allowed by increased incomes resulting from increased crop sales 
among other income during the period. 
The real unit consumer pric of maize flour reduced only a little (4 per cent), while its real 
unit sales price dropped by 30 per cent, as seen above. The average maize grains real consumer unit 
price dropped from 850 to 260 TZS per kg, but the sample number of this data in Round 3 is so 
small (8 compared to 54 in round 4), thus the data might not be comparable. This suggests that 
maize surplus farmers did not gain much in Ruvuma, while maize net-buyers benefitted due to a 
small reduction in maize real consumer prices. In general, in Ruvuma rice is a cash crop, whose 
ratio to total calorie intake is about three per cent. The rice unit consumer price increased by about 
15 per cent, while its consumed calories retained almost the same share among the total calories 
consumed. 
The purchase ratio of maize and rice dropped during the period, to a third and about two- 
thirds of Round 3 respectively, which might be due to the increased production from subsidy. 
Cassava and beans also decreased their purchase ratio to about 60 per cent and by a third, 
respectively. It looks as if reducing food insecurity, through increased crop production and a small 
reduction in maize flour consumer prices along with the shift to more affordable cassava 
consumption have allowed panel households to diversify their diet by purchasing other products. It 
is however, also for these reasons that panel households are relatively better-off, as mentioned 
 
56 Combined two CPI series. 
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earlier.  
 
Table 43: Real consumer prices of food items, calories taken from food items per adult 
equivalent eater in the last 7 days (TZS, calorie) 
 
 
Note: Adjusted sampling weight by district. Consumer unit prices are real unit prices deflated by CPI for 
food items during the two survey periods 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
Mean real
consumer
unit price
(TZS/kg)
Mean
calories per
eater
Ratio to
total calorie
(%)
Mean
purchase
ratio (%)
Mean real
consumer
unit price
(TZS/kg)
Mean
calorie per
eater
Ratio to
total calorie
(%)
Mean
purchase
ratio (%)
Banana 382 503 2.2 7.7 498 191 0.9 6.1 1.30 0.4
Maize (grains) 850 1,556 6.8 2.8 260 998 4.5 0.3 0.31 0.6
Maize (cobs) - 197 0.9 2.3 - 31 0.1 0.5 - 0.2
Maize (flour) 597 10,336 45.2 13.1 572 9,756 43.6 4.2 0.96 0.9
Beans (dry) 1,163 1,769 7.7 23.3 1,083 1,434 6.4 14.8 0.93 0.8
Rice 1,307 859 3.8 27.7 1,503 901 4.0 19.1 1.15 1.0
Millet/sorghum - 0 0.0 0.6 - 17 0.1 - - -
Bread 2,021 38 0.2 9.2 1,387 20 0.1 14.2 0.69 0.5
Sweet potatoes 314 196 0.9 7.4 386 112 0.5 2.8 1.23 0.6
Casava (fresh) 185 919 4.0 5.7 460 585 2.6 5.2 2.49 0.6
Cassava (dry/flour) 691 2,646 11.6 5.0 206 4,392 19.6 2.9 0.30 1.7
Irish potatoes 382 85 0.4 5.5 498 75 0.3 8.2 1.30 0.9
Beef 2,957 90 0.4 23.3 3,655 100 0.4 18.2 1.24 1.1
Pork 2,270 83 0.4 23.0 2,450 81 0.4 27.8 1.08 1.0
Goat/sheep meat 2,551 38 0.2 8.7 3,183 69 0.3 12.4 1.25 1.8
Other meat 3,740 7 0.0 1.9 4,510 4 0.0 0.6 1.21 0.6
Chicken 2,407 70 0.3 7.1 6,573 31 0.1 3.1 2.73 0.4
Fresh fish 1,307 34 0.2 8.7 2,463 37 0.2 7.7 1.88 1.1
Dry/smoked fish 2,050 245 1.1 47.9 3,117 153 0.7 34.5 1.52 0.6
Eggs - 4 0.0 3.2 - 22 0.1 1.9 - -
Fresh milk 550 91 0.4 5.6 738 65 0.3 6.5 1.34 0.7
Cooking oil 2,280 1,066 4.7 68.4 2,539 831 3.7 83.2 1.11 0.8
Margarine, butter, etc. - 0 0.0 0.6 - 1 0.0 - - -
Fruits 313 76 0.3 10.3 330 133 0.6 9.5 1.05 1.8
Onions 2,117 27 0.1 52.2 1,295 37 0.2 77.7 0.61 1.4
Tomatoes 1,324 40 0.2 55.8 1,184 59 0.3 73.0 0.89 1.5
Cabbages - 0 0.0 1.6 852 0 - 1.9 - -
Peas 1,007 28 0.1 1.1 - 3 0.0 - - 0.1
Other vegetables 316 0.0 7.7 1,199 - - 21.7 3.80 -
Groundnuts 1,010 0.0 8.1 3,235 - - 4.5 3.20 -
Sugar 1,532 541 2.4 59.5 2,091 443 2.0 49.5 1.36 0.8
Coffee 832 0.0 3.6 5,200 - - 0.3 6.25 -
Tea 7,938 0.0 53.5 1,663 - - 24.5 0.21 -
Salt 1,408 18 0.1 90.3 829 17 0.1 89.3 0.59 0.9
Soda/soft drinks/juice 1,273 75 0.3 6.8 1,248 148 0.7 12.0 0.98 2.0
Beer local 324 1,146 5.0 24.8 314 1,619 7.2 21.3 0.97 1.4
Beer commercial 1,170 108 0.5 3.6 1,932 19 0.1 3.1 1.65 0.2
Cigarettes 3,120 8.7 - - 9.1 - -
Other tobacco 2,448 3.2 1,820 - 6.5 0.74 -
Restaurant - 2.9 1,950 - 1.0 - -
Restaurant on drinks - 1.3 - - 0.0 - -
Spices 1,333 1 0.0 1.0 1,899 - - 4.2 1.42 -
Snack - - - - 77 - - - -
Others - - - - 949 - - - -
Total calories 22,891 22,386
Total calories per day 3,270 3,198
Ratio of
calorie per
eater
R4:R3
Food items
Ratio of
unit price
R4:R3
Round 3 Round 4
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The Difference-in-Difference estimates show that there were statistically significant positive 
impacts of voucher receipt either in 2011/12 or in any one year of the programme, on total calorie 
consumed at the time of the survey if we do not control the village variables, whose impacts 
though disappear when we control the village variables (Appendices 29 and 30). 
This was not the case of being graduates (Appendix 31). However, the corresponding 
models for receipt in 2011/12 and in any year have negative coefficients on both time and voucher 
receipt, meaning that the matched panel households decreased their average calorie consumed per 
eater during the period and voucher recipients in these years had lower total calorie consumed 
than non-recipients, considering both rounds. Considering that input use supposed to bring the 
increase in maize production, the crop shares almost half of their total calorie consumption, the 
latter result on voucher receipt might be the enumeration or reporting error. And these did not 
control the village variables, some of which were considered in matching the households. Thus 
we would suggest that the no-significant impact from regression results of controlling village 
variables would be more plausible. 
On Appendices 29 ~31 there were unexpected results on access to all weather road such 
as negative coefficients for access to all weather road (in both cases of voucher receipt in 2011/12 
and in any year), whether village has permanent input sales points (in case of receipt in 2011/12 
and of graduates), and log of number of maize buyers in the villages (in the case of graduates) 
with total calorie consumption. The latter case would not be explained given the expected higher 
maize price with increased maize buyers, and since most farmers in Ruvuma are maize net-sellers. 
Other variables affecting the calorie consumption were that the households headed by elderly had 
positive impact on calorie consumed of the households. The reason for this would be elderly- 
headed households are supported by bigger number of farmers in the households, or they tend not 
to sell their products. The reasonable results were that the households headed by ones with higher 
education, cultivating lands with better soil quality, and earning bigger non-farm income had 
positive impact on calorie consumption of the households. 
Thus we could suggest that the panel farmer households increased maize and rice 
production partly due to the programme, which increased household food security by 
diversification of food consumption. This might be due to the fact that panel households were 
relatively better-off so the majority of them were the maize-surplus households who increased 
their maize sales. Meanwhile, from the Round 4 village survey we find that food insecurity still 
exists in the lean period in some areas, especially in rural areas in Songea district. Qualitative 
information also suggest that food insecurity happened when there was irregular rainfall, and 
particularly affected vulnerable households with female heads and sick or disabled heads. This 
suggests that the programme benefits did not reach them. 
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7-3-2. Main activities of household heads 
Among the diverse livelihood groups classified in the country, WFP (2010) reports Ruvuma is 
dominated by ‘big subsistence farmers’, who cultivate more than 2 ha. of land and are almost 
entirely dependent on agriculture, thus spending at least half their production for self- 
consumption. The subsequent report by WFP (2012) suggests that lack of livestock is associated 
with the incidence of food insecurity in Ruvuma.  
Table 44 shows the sectors of the main activities of household heads from Rounds 3 and 
4 of the panel survey. Although there were many ‘non-reporting-households’ in Round 4 (15 per 
cent), which is probably due to recording errors, it seems that they were tending to diversify their 
sectors from agriculture. Out of the reporting households, about 77 per cent were engaged in 
agriculture, which is almost the same as the national average (URT, 2014d: 28), and about 5 per 
cent in both rounds were engaged in industry and the service sectors. 
 
Table 44: Sectors of main activity of household heads (Ratio to total sample households, %) 
Sector Round 3 Round 4 
Agriculture 89.9 66.3 
Other 
primary 
1.6 1.6 
Industry 1.3 0.6 
Service 4.2 4.5 
Others - 3.9 
Not 
reported 
2.9 15.2 
Total 97.1 92.2 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
7-3-3. Case studies demonstrating the impact of vouchers on livelihoods 
In the traditional context of the study area, the elderly are invariably respected by villagers and 
thus have local power in this sense; however, here, I refer to the robustness of the young, that is, 
being active and mobile, and physically able to farm, with the propensity to access new 
agricultural technology and to have more entreprenership, and obtain trials. The following stories 
are taken from interviews with two rice farmers in the same village. Both of them seem to belong 
to better-off households who received vouchers, but they relate contrasting stories. The first case 
concerns the rice-farming household headed by a young man, who reported having increased his 
assets by increasing rice production. Although this farmer harvests rice, his story demonstrates 
how a young head of household who has entrepreneurship has succeeded in increasing rice 
income from receiving vouchers, in combination with belonging to the cow-owning and power- 
tiller groups. The second story is from an elderly head of household who is ward chairman of a 
political party, but is not healthy, and did not follow the guidance for input use, and whose rice 
harvest was therefore reported to have fluctuated during the period. In the first case, the impact 
of receiving vouchers was enhanced by other complementary inputs and supportive investment 
to achieve rice intensification. The second head of household decreased his rice harvest and 
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income from rice sales, but had cashew nuts and other crop productions from which he raised his 
income, and maintained his political role, for which he might have to invest time. 
 
Case story A 
A young farmer, married seven years ago in village A, started with one acre and mixed crops of 
maize and rice, from which he sold maize in the village. In 2008 he inherited his father’s land, 
and from 2010/11 he started to cultivate up to three acres in total. He received vouchers for rice 
in 2010/11 and 2011/12. With these he increased the area under rice cultivation from one to two 
acres on which he applied subsidised inputs and from which his rice harvest increased from five 
bags to 22 bags. The following year this increased to 29 bags, by applying inputs to one acre only. 
He received advice on input use from Village Agricultural Extension Officer (VAEO), VVC 
members and Village Executive Officer (VEO). He sold three bags of rice in 2009/10 for 225,000 
TZS. The top-up amount for vouchers in 2010/11 was 63,000 TZS and in 2011/12 he thought that 
the price would remain the same, but it went up to 121,000 TZS. He had to sell two bags of maize 
and three chickens to get subsidised inputs but in 2011/12 he sold 24 bags of rice for 408,000 TZS 
with five bags left for his own consumption. 
He demonstrates active entrepreneurship, which has allowed him to increase his assets: he 
belongs to one farmers’ group of cow-owners and another for power tillers. Since he is an original 
member of the former, he obtained a cow for milk. The breeding was successful, and from 21 
cows the group got 12 calves which were given to other people. The latter group had already 
bought the power tiller and shared it. 
Since the programme started he has not faced any food security problems. He obtained a 
cow from the cow-owners’ group (in 2011), added ten chickens (in 2010), bought a bicycle (in 
2011), a radio (in 2010), and furniture, bed and mattresses (in 2012). After he inherited land, he 
did not cultivate it for some years as being still young and without subsidy it was difficult to start 
cultivation. He is expecting to get vouchers this year, as well, for this is his third year. He 
processed rice and hired a car to bring it to town to sell in December, achieving higher prices than 
in the village. From this year’s sales he was expecting to buy a water pump (with 600,000 TZS) 
and inputs for one acre. 
 
Case story B 
In the same village a farmer, who is Ward chairman of a political party, owns twelve acres (three 
for rice, two for maize and cassava, respectively, and five for cashew nuts). He lives with his wife 
and two children. His daughter now (at the time of interview) is acting VEO. He obtained 
vouchers in three consecutive years. With the use of subsidised inputs his harvest increased from 
seven to ten bags per acre in 2009/10. However, it reduced to eight bags per acre in 2010/11, 
during which he reported that he was using only urea, whose performance was not good. In the 
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following year, even with voucher receipt, his harvest further decreased to only five bags per acre, 
which he reported was due to the irregular rainfall. However, he reduced his rice sales from 
1,660,000 TZS for 19 bags in 2010/11 to 800,000 TZS for ten bags in 2011/12. Around five bags 
were consumed at home, supplemented by other crops for food. 
He used his subsidised inputs by spreading fertilisers to all three acres, rather than one 
only, and hired labour to cultivate and weed the rice. The price of cashew nuts has increased from 
505 TZS per kg. in 1999 to 1,200 TZS per kg in 2011. Since he is not expecting to get more 
vouchers as he has already received them three times, he is going to buy commercial inputs, two 
bags of urea and five kg of improved seeds from a local agro-dealer. He is expecting to achieve 
higher production than last year. He mentioned that if he could get loans, he is willing to buy two 
bags of DAP, two bags of Urea and ten kg of improved seeds. 
 
7-3-4. Gender aspects of changes in livelihoods through subsidy 
Studies find that women play a considerable role in agricultural activities in developing countries 
(Gladwin, 2002; Boserup, 2007; World Bank et al., 2009). A FAO report using aggregate data 
suggests that women make up 43 per cent of the agricultural labour force in developing countries 
in general (SOFA team and Doss, 2011). The report also suggests that since women and men 
normally work together in the field, it is difficult to estimate women’s contribution to food 
production, but female-headed households have smaller farms and use less modern inputs, thus 
have lower productivity. Meanwhile, studies suggest that women and men have different roles in 
agricultural activities. Historically, African women worked with the hoe in agriculture to produce 
food crops to feed the family (Bryceson, 1995). Although recent political change, neo-liberal 
market policies and development have brought some educated women options for non- 
agricultural activities such as diversifying into small trading activities in East Africa, most rural 
women still cultivate food crops with the hoe to feed their families. Men tend to cultivate cash 
crops to obtain cash, while women tend to cultivate food crops in order to give nutrition to children, 
which is regarded as women’s role in most societies. However, women have also other roles such 
as doing the housework, working in their husbands’ plots as family labour, raising cash through 
non-farm activities or cash crop cultivation (World Bank et al., 2009; Holmes and Jones, 2013). 
During fieldwork in Tanzania, I observed intra-household gender roles, and the dual or 
triple roles of women. The two families with whom I stayed for four months while I was in Dar 
es Salaam both belong to the local elite, where both husbands had been government bureaucrats, 
and both wives had regular outside work. They had migrated from a rural area in their younger 
days and are Christian and Muslim, respectively. Although the wives had ‘house-girls’ who stayed 
at home and assisted them with the housework, before going to and after coming back from work 
the wives manage all the household work, including taking care of children. The men, on the other 
hand, after coming back home, just sat in the room waiting to be served. These house-girls were 
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both teenagers, and had been brought by neighbours or relatives from their home towns. They 
were not educated and had found it difficult to make a living. They were given free board and 
lodging and some additional salary. There are two classes of women here, the one owns a more 
privileged position than the other, having better education, bigger economic and social power.  
One wife mentioned that ‘without women, men can’t do anything at home. Only women 
can manage the houses, not the husbands.’ These wives had enough income to have a house-girl 
to assist them at home, and lived in an urban area where there are some machines and infrastructure 
to help with the household work, but despite this - and although I did not conduct a time-use 
survey to examine the gender difference of time use for ‘work’ (Whitehead, 1999) - I observed 
that there was a considerable difference between women’s and men’s work time per day. 
In the Ruvuma and Mbeya regions which I visited for my fieldwork, I observed the same 
when I visited friends’ houses where the wives were school teacher, politician, or council officer. 
In the villages, I often observed that women were working in the crop fields. In the interviews, 
male heads sometimes informed me that wives also help with the farming while doing housework. 
In the afternoon, I saw many men in the bar drinking the local brew while women were working 
in the field or at home. I saw often only women working in the field, such as cropping beans in 
Mbinga. Women have dual duties in the field and at home. The panel households in Ruvuma also 
showed the dual roles of rural women, whereby women reported agriculture as the first activity, 
and the majority reported household work as the second activity. This intra-household gender 
difference was due to the patriarchal culture in sub-Saharan Africa in which women are 
recognised as the ‘possession of men or whole community’ and ‘submissive’ (National 
Organisation for Legal Assistance, 2009). 
The patriarchal system leads to gender inequity in land ownership in Africa and in Tanzania. 
Given that agriculture provides 82 per cent of the occupation of the rural population in Tanzania, 
land is essential for their food security. Several authors have reported that women have less access 
to land, especially in Africa (Whitehead and Bloom, 1992; World Bank, 2007; Holmes and Jones, 
2013), which made their position vulnerable when it came to possessing the output even from the 
land they were cultivating. Without adequate documentation, people in Africa sometimes face 
their land becoming titled by outsiders. In Africa there were land reform movements in the 1990s, 
when new land laws were enacted in Uganda, Tanzania, Zanzibar, Mozambique, Zambia, Eritrea, 
Namibia and South Africa. Several women’s groups have been active in these land reforms in 
Africa, including Tanzania. In Tanzania, the 1999 Land Act and Village Land Act shifted land 
administration to village level, where each community is now in charge of registration, 
adjudication, land titling and disputes. The reform was made to prevent the appropriation of land 
by outsiders, to settle land disputes within communities and to promote the operation of the land 
market (Tripp, 2004). Even though these Acts recognise ‘the right of all persons, including women, 
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to own property, including land, as found in international human rights standards’ (National 
Organisation for Legal Assistance, 2009), the reforms did not provide sufficient attention to 
gender (Izumi, 1999), and there was ‘silence of laws’ regarding the rights of widows to share the 
properties of deceased husbands, which is still decided by the customary laws (Peterman, 2011).  
Recently, land disputes in rural areas have increased in Tanzania because of gaps in current 
legislation and policies, and people’s lack of information about their rights (Mugabi, 2013). A 
female Tanzanian friend, who was born in the Kagera region, a remote western part of Tanzania, 
told me that ‘women can’t inherit land’. Thus when I told her about my data which reports that 
some women owned land, she suggested that even if women reported that they have land, ‘they 
don’t actually ‘own’ land, only ‘use’ their husband’s land in customary practices even now’. Even 
though the Land Act overrides the customary law if this denies women the right to use, transfer 
and own land, common practice has not changed due to the increasing scarcity of land because of 
population pressure, and its increased commercialisation (Tripp, 2004). 
Land ownership confers the right to make decisions about the output of the land as well as 
to sell or transfer it. Less access to land ownership makes female-headed households more 
vulnerable. Whitehead and Bloom (1992) suggest that sometimes women have their own farm as 
independent farmers so the output from these fields is owned by them. But as land is becoming 
more scarce, accelerating rural differentiation and increased requirement for cash income so that 
men migrated for urban wage labour or trade, women often are engaged in subsistence agriculture 
in the field of men as ‘family labour’. Women have less cash for more intensified production by 
having plough, buying seeds and fertilizers, thus resulting in low productivity. ‘Planners (of the 
programme) have unwittingly created a formidable barrier to women’s access to new inputs’ (ibid: 
51). Women use fewer modern seeds and other agricultural technologies (Peterman, 2010). 
Recognising the gender difference in power in the society, which leads to female-headed, 
especially widow-headed, households being poorer and more vulnerable and having less access 
to agricultural extension and other agriculture-related services, recent input subsidy programmes 
in sub-Saharan Africa have targeted female-headed households as a priority. Fisher and Kandiwa 
(2014) found that the programme in Malawi reduced the gap in the adoption of modern seeds 
between male-headed and female-headed households. On the contrary, others find that female- 
headed households were found less likely to benefit from subsidies in Malawi (Ricker-Gilbert et 
al., 2011; Chibwana et al., 2014), although there was less bias in the use of fertilisers between 
male-controlled and female-controlled plots (Chirwa et al., 2011b). Since it started as a response 
to a food and input price crisis, NAIVS also aims to prioritise female-headed households as 
beneficiaries. I will look below at their changing livelihoods since NAIVS started. 
Throughout the survey rounds, the heads of some panel households changed due to the 
migration of household heads and change in the marital status. From Round 3 to 4 panel 
households have an increasing ratio of female-headed households, the share increasing from 8 to 
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10 per cent. Female-headed households were composed of ‘widows’ followed by ‘married’ (48 
per cent and 32 per cent, respectively) in Round 3, while in Round 4, 63 per cent gave their marital 
status as ‘widow’. Most of the ‘married’ female-headed households in Round 3 had changed to 
male-headed, meaning that more than half of the husbands had been away in the Round 3 period. 
During the period, 60 per cent of the households becoming female-headed were headed by 
widows. In a patrilineal society, it is difficult for them to inherit land from their late husbands. 
However, the panel data suggests that even those female-headed households which were 
smaller in size than the average household reported that they owned land, and female-headed 
households even shared a slightly higher ratio of inheriting land to other households. Dancer 
informs us that the practice of giving land to daughters has been observed in some areas, although 
the widow has little control over dispositions or the right to inherit family or clan land (Dancer, 
2015). This merits further investigation. While the average size of land owned by male-headed 
households decreased during the period from Round 3 to Round 4, that of female-headed 
households increased by half. The size of the cultivated land of female-headed households 
increased to more than double that reported in Round 3, while that of male-headed households 
reduced a little same during that period (Table 45). This increase of assets by female-headed 
households could be due to change towards households headed by more income earners, even as 
widows, and their prioritised access to voucher receipt, as shown below. 
 
Table 45: Size of land owned and cultivated of the panel households in Round 3 and 4 (ha.) 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
During the two rounds, both household size and the number of farmers in the households 
increased for both male-headed and female-headed households (Table 46). Both are bigger in the 
former than in the latter, which means that female-headed households have less human capital. 
However, the increase ratio during the period of both household size and number of farmers in 
the household was bigger in female-headed households than in male-headed ones. As for 
household mobility, of all the Round 4 panel households about 75 per cent of household members 
moved out of the house, either marrying or attempting to live on their own. Opposed to the 
conventional wisdom of men migrating out for work, the ratio of out-migration of female 
members was higher than the one of male members, whose reason for migration was probably 
due to marriage.  
Male-headed Female-headed Male-headed Female-headed
Land owned 7.0 1.9 6.2 2.8
Land cultivated 2.7 1.1 2.6 2.4
Bought / received land in last 4 years 1.8 1.0 3.9 1.0
Sold/gave land in last 4 years 1.7 0.4 2.0 0.0
Rent-in land 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.8
Rent-out land 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.4
Round 3 Round 4
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Table 46: Average household size and number of farmers of panel households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
On the ownership of land, about three quarters of the parcels of the panel households were owned 
by one household member. For the rest a quarter of the parcels were reported that they shared 
among all the household members. It was the traditional custom of the country, as Nyerere 
mentioned ‘(t)he property which is important to the family, and thus to the individual members 
of it, is held in common’ (Nyerere, 1967: 9). It was found that household heads and wives have 
about the same share of ownership among household members, namely about 15 per cent of the 
parcels. I can’t observe here any intra-household gender difference. More than half the parcels 
were distributed to the children and ten per cent was owned by grandchildren of the household 
head, which showed decreasing size of land ownership per generation unless the children buy 
more plots later. On cultivation, more than 80 per cent of the parcels were cultivated by more than 
two household members, indicating that in most cases almost all household members above five 
years old participated. I cannot see again any intra-household gender difference in cultivating 
other household members’ land. 
In Round 4, compared to male-headed households, most of the female-headed households 
(94 per cent) focused on maize as the first crop, with cassava and beans as the second crop, due 
to the fact that they focus more on household food security, as has been observed in other countries 
(World Bank, 2007; World Bank et al., 2009). Table 47 shows disaggregated data on the size of 
crop plot area by gender of household heads. From Round 3 to 4, while male-headed households 
decreased their plot area a little, female-headed households increased the plot area by 20 per cent, 
though their size is still about 60 per cent of the male-headed households. The same tendency of 
change during the period was found in maize, rice and cashew, while beans and coffee – the cash 
crops was the opposite: male-headed households increased their plot sizes while the female- 
headed households decreased them. Female-headed households increased their maize plot areas 
with a larger ratio than other crops to more than 60 per cent of all the plot area. This shows, firstly, 
that all the panel households increased their maize plot areas probably due to the programme. 
Secondly, due to their more vulnerable position female-headed households are more concerned 
with household food security and thus increased their food crop area, as has been observed in 
other countries (World Bank, 2007; World Bank et al., 2009). Their focus on maize cropping also 
gives reason that input subsidies for maize is prioritised to female-headed households, who 
cultivated less land than male-headed households. Their continued focus on food cropping might 
Household
members
Farmers
Household
members
Farmers
Male-headed households 6.5 3.0 7.7 4.2
Female-headed households 5.7 2.0 6.0 3.3
All households 6.4 2.9 7.5 4.1
Round 3 Round 4
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also be due to the fact that, as observed earlier in the panel data analysis, they did not have enough 
household members to cultivate cash crops, which normally require more labour than food crops, 
or that they did not get access to knowledge or support for cash cropping because they did not 
have enough capital, except for increased household income as shown below. 
 
Table 47: Average size of main crop plot area per household by gender of household heads (ha.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
I will now show the change of household income between male-headed and female-headed 
households (Table 48 and Graph 12). Total household income consists of total non-farm income 
(wages from regular or temporary jobs, net income from non-farm business, pensions, State or 
NGOs’ assistance, gifts, remittances, with in kind being valued in cash), sales from processed 
food products (beer, milling, oil, prepared food), sales of livestock, sales from animal products 
(milk, cheese, honey, meat, eggs), crop sales, land sales/rent-out in the past four years. Female- 
headed households increased by a little bigger rate the real total household income; female-headed 
households increased by 47 per cent while male-headed households by 45 per cent. The total crop 
sales, being the first share of all the items, increased its share for male-headed households by 16 
percentage point, less so for female-headed households (8 percentage point). This made the crop 
sales share the biggest part of the household income, even for the female-headed households, who 
had the highest share in non-farm income in Round 3. Meanwhile, as Graph 12 shows, female- 
headed households maintained all the non-farm income during the time male-headed panel 
households reduced, although their shares to the total household income for both groups decreased. 
Female-headed households increased the share of processed food products and livestock sales 
by 7 percentage point and 6 percentage point, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Round 3 Round 4
Increase
ratio (%)
Round 3 Round 4
Increase
ratio (%)
Maize 0.77 0.99 28.8 1.33 1.40 5.3
Rice 0.05 0.13 147.1 0.18 0.16 -11.0
Beans 0.35 0.29 -18.5 0.45 0.45 1.0
Coffee 0.08 0.08 -8.2 0.30 0.35 16.8
Cashew 0.07 0.11 58.8 0.65 0.39 -40.4
Tobacco 0.00 0.00 - 0.04 0.00 -100.0
Total 1.32 1.58 19.4 2.95 2.76 -6.4
Female-headed households Male-headed households
Variable
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Table 48: Real annual farm / non-farm income of male-headed / female-headed households 
(base year=2009, in thousand TZS, %) 
 
 
 
Note: Deflated by annual average CPI of all items. Amounts of land sales and land rent out were for the 
past four years. 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data; NBS (2010); NBS (2014) 
 
Graph 12: Real annual total crop sales value and all non-farm income disaggregated by gender 
of heads of households (base year=2009, in thousand TZS) 
Note: Deflated by annual average CPI of all items. 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data; NBS (2010); NBS (2014) 
 
Among the total increase of crop sales, coffee, maize, and rice increased; the latter two was 
probably due to the increased production by subsidy. Meanwhile, male-headed panel households 
focused less on maize. They have a greater share of cash crops such as coffee, due to the fact that 
households in Mbinga account for half the parcels. Another reason was due to, as seen below, 
female-headed households had higher probability to receive vouchers than male-headed 
households. Since female-headed households had a higher share of food cropping, they had 
smaller increase in crop sales. Meanwhile, the female-headed households had constant real non- 
farm income while male-headed households decreased it, the reason for which I don’t have 
information, which suggests female-heads had constant regular income from employment and 
other activities, which made them increase total household consumption per adult equivalent by 
more than male-headed households (Graph 13). This is rather contradictory to the finding that 
agricultural wages have increased. Among the total household consumption the ratio of the 
Male-headed
households
Ratio to
total
Female-headed
households
Ratio to
total
Male-headed
households
Ratio to
total
Female-headed
households
Ratio to
total
All non-farm income 409.8 0.42 229 0.52 275.2 0.19 221.6 0.34
Processed food products 17.9 0.02 0 0.00 73.7 0.05 46.0 0.07
Livestock sales 60.2 0.06 19 0.04 99.7 0.07 62.6 0.10
Animal product sales 31.6 0.03 21.8 0.05 150.1 0.11 16.5 0.03
Crop sales 519.5 0.53 173 0.39 985.3 0.69 308.2 0.47
Land sales 47.4 0.05 0.2 0.00 36.3 0.03 0.0 0.00
Land rented out 2.7 0.00 0 0.00 2.5 0.00 2.0 0.00
Total household income 1,089 442.8 1,584 654.9
Round 3 Round 4
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amount of food consumption of the female-headed households was 41 per cent, which is more 
than twice the ratio of the male-headed households. 
 
Graph 13: Real total annual household consumption per adult equivalent (Base year=2009, 
Thousand TZS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Deflated by CPI of all items averaged February – April of each year  
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data; NBS (2010); NBS (2014) 
 
In qualitative interviews with widowed heads of household, most reported that they could not 
receive vouchers. The reasons for this were that they were not able to pay top-up, or they could 
not contribute to village activities physically or financially, which were the criteria for eligibility 
applied in the village. Even when they were selected for vouchers and went to the village office 
to buy inputs, they were repeatedly told by village leaders to come back on the next day until they 
gave up. This discriminatory behaviour by village leaders was due to the fact that the widows 
were ‘powerless’. The same stories were also heard from elderly male farmers. 
Meanwhile, in other villages informants reported that widowed heads of household 
received only Urea from subsidy, for ‘they were treated specially’. In village H, an informant 
mentioned that an agro-dealer told female-headed farming households ‘if you pay 15,000 TZS I 
can give you one bag of Urea,’ while asking them to sign vouchers for all types of inputs including 
the ones for seeds and first application fertiliser. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the top-up amounts 
for one bag of Urea fluctuated, but increased up to 44,000 ~ 50,000 TZS. Since the widow heads 
do not have the capacity to pay top-up for a full set, they were given the choice of only receiving 
Urea, but sometimes signed for vouchers for the full set, indicating frauds by village leaders. 
Intra-household mutual help through receiving vouchers was also observed. One widow in a 
village in Mbinga was unable to pay top-up, so her son received the voucher instead of her and 
gave her maize out of his production. Her intra-household power might have increased because 
she brought vouchers to her son.  
The difficulty experienced by female-headed households in receiving vouchers does not 
corroborate with my panel data. Panel data shows that even though the female-headed households 
- 150 - 
 
represent a small ratio (10.4 per cent) of all the panel households, they were prioritised to receive 
vouchers. 72 per cent of all the female-headed households received vouchers in four years while 
the ratio of male-headed recipient households was 65 per cent. Also in 2011/12, the surveyed 
season, 42 per cent of female-headed households received vouchers compared to 30 per cent of 
male-headed households. All the female-headed voucher-recipient households received Urea with 
vouchers. They also tended to receive more maize seed vouchers than male-headed households, 
28 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively. However, other than subsidised inputs, only one female- 
headed household out of seven purchased commercial hybrid seeds. It looks more difficult for 
them to purchase hybrid seeds than the male counterparts. 
The prioritised access of female-headed households to vouchers was made on the sample 
bias toward ‘female elites’ – being elected for positions in the villages - of the panel sample. Table 
49 shows the gender-disaggregated ratio of female-headed and male-headed panel households 
with household members having been elected in the villages. As seen in Chapter 5, about 60 per 
cent of the panel households have members elected in the villages. Nearly half the female-headed 
panel households reported having members in elected positions, which suggests that they are 
relatively ‘elite’ households. Here, again, given that such a high percentage are ‘elite’, there may 
be some errors in reporting or definition of ‘being elected’ for some positions. Higher ratios of 
female household heads than of male household heads are in the positions of VEO and VVC 
members. VEO, who are government bureaucrats designated by the DED (District Executive 
Director), come from outside the village for a couple of years and thus tend to have their houses 
in town, where they stay in the holidays. There were some female VEOs in my survey villages, 
though I was able to meet only one. A high ratio of female heads of household working in public 
services and government was also found in the activity sector in panel data. Meanwhile, the higher 
ratio of VVC members reflects the gender-sensitive design of the programme, which plans a VVC 
composed of six members, half of whom are women and half men. For the initial sampling for 
the panel survey, they made ‘household random sampling within a village’ (Sarris, 2004), 
although, in a practical sense, the sample households tended to be selected from more accessible 
households in the villages, which made them relatively better-off and likely to have a higher ratio 
of village leaders. The relatively high percentage of ‘elites’ among female-headed panel 
households allowed them to be prioritised in the distribution of vouchers. 
 
Table 49: Ratio of households with members in elected positions in the villages in Round 4 (%) 
Note: Kitongoji: Hamlet; 10 cell: neighbouring household group; VEO: Village Executive 
Officer  
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
village
chairman
Kitongoji
chair
10 cell
leader
Member
of village
council
VEO VVC None
Any
position
Male-headed households 9.4 17.4 22.1 26.1 1.4 2.5 38.0 61.0
Female-headed households 3.2 3.2 16.1 22.6 3.2 6.5 58.1 45.0
All households 8.8 16.0 21.5 25.7 1.6 2.9 40.1 59.0
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The panel data shows that female-headed households have less access than the average ratio of 
all the households to the extension services, 20 per cent for the former and 38 per cent for the 
latter, whose tendency in other parts of the world is suggested by existing studies (World Bank et 
al., 2009; Holmes and Jones, 2013). The ratio of receiving extension services for maize of total 
female-headed households (10 per cent) is less than that of male-headed households (15 per cent). 
We could not compare the change of ratio of access to credit as the questionnaires are different 
on these questions. However, we can see that the ratio of belonging to savings and credit 
associations (SACCOs) of female-headed households has been constantly slightly higher (33 per 
cent in Round 3 and 24 per cent in Round 4) than that of male-headed households (30 per cent 
and 19 per cent, respectively). However, the average amount of borrowed money among all the 
panel households has been unchangingly three times as much as that borrowed by female-headed 
households. Despite membership, female-headed households could get less credit than male-
headed households, which is probably due to their smaller land and crop income. 
Even with this inferior position in access to extension services and credit, because of the 
increase of input use availed from access to subsidy, female-headed households achieved higher 
increase in maize yields compared to male-headed households during the period (Graph 14). This 
may be due to the higher rate of receiving vouchers by female-headed households. 
 
Graph 14: Average maize yields of panel households by gender (kg/acre) 
Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009a); Author’s data 
 
Thus, unlike the findings from qualitative interviews that the female-headed households had 
difficulty in accessing input vouchers, the panel study results show that female-headed households 
were prioritised to have access to vouchers. This was probably due to their average total 
household income being originally almost the same as male-headed households (Graph 13), which 
enabled them to pay top-up despite the fact of their having access to even smaller amounts of credit 
than male-headed households. It suggests that they were originally better-off female- headed 
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households who have constant non-farm income while the land owned and cultivated was smaller 
in size than male-headed households. Thus they increased their maize yield with a higher ratio 
than male-headed households due to subsidy receipt, which made their income higher than the 
male-headed households in Round 4 (Graph 13).  
Since no gender disaggregated representative sampling was originally included in the 
panel design, the female-headed panel households represented a better-off segment of female- 
headed households in general. Thus, given the programme priority to target female-headed 
households if they can pay top-up, they were prioritised to be eligible for vouchers. However, as 
the panel results and informants suggested, widow-headed households in general had difficulty in 
accessing knowledge through extension, had smaller land, less credit, a smaller cash income than 
male-headed households, because they focussed on food crops and less family labour, and were 
thus less able to contribute to village activities. All these conditions made it difficult for them to 
get access to input vouchers, which is the general picture of female-headed households in the 
region. Studies suggest that for household food security, it is better for subsidy programmes to 
target women in the sense that if women raise more crops, they tend to improve the nutrition of 
their children while men have less propensity to do so (World Bank et al., 2009; Holmes and 
Jones, 2013). Furthermore, given their vulnerable situation, women should not only be well- 
targeted by input subsidy programmes but also given prioritised access to land, extension and 
credit. 
 
7-4. Conclusion 
In the villages, many informants mentioned that the programme did have a positive impact on 
their livelihood, such as the purchase of household assets, renovation of houses and ability to send 
children to school. Meanwhile, others informed that the programme had only small effects, due 
to the ineffectiveness caused by its late delivery, the low quality of inputs or illegitimate use of 
vouchers. The panel data shows that in general income poverty reduced a little, several household 
assets and social infrastructure such as access to road and mobile phone network were increased, 
while non-farm income was reduced, which might reflect the concentration of their activities on 
crop production, which was induced by the programme’s provision of inputs. Maize sales prices 
were reduced, which was probably due to the increased maize production induced by the 
programme.  
However, the regression results suggest there was no statistically significant impact of 
voucher receipt on income poverty, household assets, or on sending children to primary school. 
This was the same among graduates of the programme – who received more than three years of 
vouchers, although this result might be affected by small sample size, not leading to precise 
estimates. Given the differences between qualitative and quantitative results, there must be 
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confirmation bias in qualitative information and reporting errors in quantitative data, as in the 
case of impact on maize yields seen in Chapter 6; however, I would say the error might have been 
bigger in the qualitative information. This comes from the complex implementation of voucher 
management as seen in Chapter 4, elite capture, late delivery, receipt of only Urea, resale of 
vouchers, etc., which meant the programme had no impact on the poverty and assets of the 
recipients. 
The panel households increased maize and rice production and their sales ratio, and average 
total crop sales value was increased, among which the share of coffee sales was more than half, 
followed by maize, rice and cashew nuts. Meanwhile, the unit sales value of maize and rice was 
decreased from Round 3 to 4. The panel households could purchase more diversified food because 
of increased crop production, increased crop sales, and reduced maize consumer prices, but also 
by shifting their consumption from maize to cassava whose unit sales value decreased more than 
the one of maize. Maize consumer price reduced a little, while its sales price reduced by 30 per 
cent, which benefit maize poor net-buyers. Thus the programme seemed to bring them food 
security with diversification of food consumption. 
However, there were also mixed findings on the impact of voucher receipt on household 
food security: the difference-in-difference model does not show that there was a statistically 
significant impact of voucher receipt on calorie consumption of the households. There was 
general increase of main crop production and sales of the panel households during the period – 
thus general food availability was increased, which corresponds to the information from the 
interviews with many informants in the field that the programme improved their household food 
security through increased production, but which might not necessarily have been attributed to 
the programme. The reason for the contradictory findings is correlated with the complex voucher 
management and confirmation bias in qualitative data. 
Although a few female heads of household who received vouchers were able to improve 
their food security, there are some villages where food is insecure in the lean period even in the 
top maize producer in the region, Songea district. This is especially the case for vulnerable 
households, such as those headed by elderly people or females. 
The female-headed panel households had less land and fewer opportunities to have 
extension services, earned less crop sales income and had less credit. Even so, the female-headed 
panel households showed that they had a higher rate of receiving vouchers than the average of 
male-headed households. They increased maize yields and total household consumption per adult 
equivalent more than the male-headed households. However, this favourable situation of female- 
headed households is probably due to the sampling, who has more various capitals (natural, 
physical and political) than other vulnerable female-headed households. As many female heads 
of households I met in the villages could not get input vouchers, in general female- or widow- 
headed households have less access to inputs and thus less income, leading to food insecurity, 
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which would reflect the average situation of these households. The subsidy programme should 
keep targeting these vulnerable households as a priority. 
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Chapter 8. Indirect impacts of NAIVS on the wider economy 
 
If the input prices go high we sell it to the shops… and if the prices go down, we sell among 
ourselves. Now we are getting the benefits of this voucher system because it keeps the maize 
price low. (A farmer in a Group Discussion in Songea) 
 
 
8-1. Introduction 
In Chapter 3, I presented the theory of change I use to study the impacts of subsidies on poverty 
and farmers’ livelihoods. The NAIVS programme aims to achieve national food security through 
increased maize or rice production. Also the theory of change is based on the assumption that the 
real maize price would be lowered following input subsidy. We saw in Chapter 7 that, according 
to the panel data, maize production increased by 80 per cent, while maize real producer unit prices 
dropped by 30 per cent. These are measured by recalling prices in the last agricultural season, which is 
supposed to be sold mostly in the harvest period. , Meanwhile, real consumer prices dropped by very 
little, namely 4 per cent, which are also measured in both years by 7-day recalling in the lean 
season of the same agricultural season. The drop in the producer price might be attributable to the 
increased maize supply in the region; however, the real consumer price has not dropped as much. 
Existing studies on Malawi’s experience suggest that Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
(FISP) increased maize production and thus improved national food security (SOAS et al., 2008; 
Dorward et al., 2010), although there were critiques that this was due to the favourable weather 
and economic conditions in those years. Using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) and 
Partial Equilibrium models, several studies show that FISP should lead to falls in the price of 
maize in the absence of interventions or macro-economic or other changes affecting maize prices. 
Buffie and Atolia (2009) estimate long-run falls in food prices of 2-5 per cent, with short-run falls 
of 9 per cent in Malawi. Chirwa and Dorward (2013) suggest that real maize prices in Malawi fell 
by 8-40 per cent. Using market and district-level panel data, the study by Gilbert et al. (2013b) 
estimates that in Malawi and Zambia, where a large-scale input subsidy programme has been 
implemented since the early 2000s, doubling the size of the programme would reduce real maize 
prices by 1.2-2.5 per cent and 1.8-2.8 per cent respectively, through increased maize production. 
Increase of real agricultural wages relative to maize price in Malawi and Ghana was found 
after the introduction of input subsidy by Chirwa and Dorward (2013) and Filipski and Taylor 
(2011). With increased use of improved inputs, more labour is required for such tasks as weeding, 
which thus is expected to raise local agricultural wages in a relatively closed labour economy. 
Dorward and Chirwa (2013) find that there was increased real wage since the introduction of 
Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) in Malawi.  
- 156 - 
 
 The input subsidy programmes are expected to raise the input demand with the increased 
awareness on the effects of inputs, if they target to the poor farmers who did not use inputs, and 
the prices are affordable. Economic theory suggests if their need for inputs would thus increase, 
it would increase the input prices by creating competition between agro-dealers. However, 
farmers sometimes purchase less commercial inputs than otherwise they would have in the 
absence of the programme – ‘crowding out’. Studies suggest that ‘crowding-out’ of inputs were 
less when the subsidy programmes target to poor farmers and where the commercial demand was 
low (Xu et al., 2009a; Ricker-Gilbert, 2011; Mason and Jayne, 2013). Liverpool-Tasie (2012b) 
finds that the voucher programme increased the link between farmers and input suppliers, thus 
increasing private input demands in Nigeria. There has been keen debate on the amount of 
‘crowding out’ of subsidy programmes (Jayne et al., 2013; Dorward and Chirwa, 2015; Jayne et 
al., 2015). As to the international input market prices, on the other hand, Hernandez and Torero 
(2013) used panel data from Urea-producing countries to show that the concentration of 
production by fertiliser companies made global fertiliser prices high, which reduced fertiliser use 
and affected farmers’ income in developing countries.  However, as mentioned in 4-4-
1, the scale of the programme in terms of Urea was medium - 42 per cent of the requirement 
without displacement-, but with substantial fraud, missing vouchers, leakage to wealthier farmers 
and subsequent possible displacement, this ratio could be reduced to even about half – a quarter, 
or a little less of the requirement, thus the indirect impact of the programme onto maize and input 
prices and agricultural wages would be expected to some extent. Also as the programme targeted 
the promising regions in the country, we could expect the indirect impact of the programme onto 
national food security. 
On this discussion in this chapter I provide empirical evidence of the panel data as well as 
data from national-level government and private sector and local governments, to look at the 
programme’s contribution to national food security and its indirect impacts on maize wholesale 
prices, local agricultural wages, input prices and private sector development in the region. 
 
8-2. Contribution to national food security 
Data from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFC) indicates that 
from 2000/01 to 2011/12 maize production in Tanzania increased twofold, with bigger increases 
in the years in which subsidy programmes began, namely 2003/04 and 2009/10 (Graph 15) 
(MAFC, 2012). Food has not been in such short supply in recent years, although the trade position 
of maize in Tanzania has changed year by year (URT, 2013d). However, there was a report that 
undernourishment worsened up to 2010, since when it has improved (FAO et al., 2015). Famine 
Early Warning System Network (FEWS Net) monitoring reports also reveal that food insecurity 
alarms were observed almost every year in some parts of the country (2015). Meanwhile, for 
national food security reasons the country has intervened in the maize trade, for example, by the 
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frequent placing of export bans in recent years (Table 50). However, many criticised this ban, 
pointing out that it ‘can reduce the welfare of producers as well as consumers’ (World Bank, 
2009a). The program document cautioned that an export ban should be a temporary measure to 
avoid facing the influence from the world high food prices, otherwise low maize prices would 
damage the profitability from input use from NAIVS, thus hampering the efficiency of NAIVS 
expenditure. It suggests that the expected increased maize production would reduce maize prices. 
However, due to high regional maize demand from neighbouring countries, the regional maize 
price would stay high. This, accompanied by lift of export ban and elimination of trade barriers 
(road blocks, weigh bridges, non-transparent taxation, non-tariff barriers, etc.), would make profit 
from using improved inputs (ibid.: 30). It was therefore expected that the ban would be lifted as 
NAIVS promoted increased production. 
 
Graph 15: Maize production in Tanzania (ton) 
 
Note: The data for the year 2011/12 is estimated. Source: MAFC (2012) 
 
Table 50: Recent chronology of export bans in Tanzania 
Date Event 
Jan. 2007 Export ban lifted 
Jan. 2008 Export ban reintroduced 
May 2008 Export ban lifted 
Jan. 2009 Export ban reintroduced 
Oct. 2010 (or Apr 
2010)* 
Export ban lifted 
May 2011 Export ban reintroduced 
Jan. 2012 Export ban lifted 
Note: *As cited in the source. 
Sources: Author modified from World Bank (2009b); MAFAP (2013) 
 
Graph 16 shows the data of maize production per capita and the Self Sufficiency Rate (SSR) 
reported by MAFC. It shows that from 2001/02 to 2011/12, national maize production per capita 
increased by about a quarter. It further shows that with the introduction of each subsidy 
programme, maize production per capita increased in 2002/03 as well as in 2008/09. During the 
first subsidy programme (2003/04-2007/08), maize production remained constant. Since the 
NAIVS was introduced, maize production per capita has continued to increase. Since the NAIVS 
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started full operation in 2009/10, SSR has also remained high, above 100 per cent. The SSR is 
measured by comparing national production to the requirements for food and other uses such as 
seed, feed, losses and trade (URT, 2012a). It seems that national food security has improved due 
to the programme. The panel data results also show the increase of maize yields of both recipient 
and non-recipient households as seen in the Chapter 6, which contributes national food security. 
 
Graph 16: National maize production per capita and Self Sufficiency Ratio (kg, %) 
Note: Population data from 2002/03 to 2011/12 were interpolated by annual increase reported by World 
Bank (2015). Data for 2011/12 was the production forecast for the season. SSR follows a simple food 
adequacy principle whereby production is related to requirement encompassing consumption and other uses 
based on requirement parameters (URT, 2012a). 
Source: MAFC (2012); URT (2006b); URT (2014a); World Bank (2015a) 
 
However, as reported by FAO et al. (2015) and FEWS Net (2012; 2015) and the village panel 
results, there was still a high level of food insecurity in some areas in the country. Also, as we 
saw in Chapter 6, in Ruvuma village panel survey results in Round 4 show that in two-thirds of 
the villages surveyed, the majority of the households used money to buy foods in the lean period, 
i.e. February to April, partly due to the irregular rain. Thus although national maize production 
increased to satisfy the demand at national level, food insecurity continued in certain areas in the 
country because of weather such as irregular rainfall, market conditions, lack of infrastructure and 
transport facilities, as well as exporting due to the demand from other countries. 
 
8-3. Maize prices 
In the villages, farmers complained about unstable maize market prices season by season and year 
by year. Several informants mentioned that ‘there is no market for maize, so we have to face price 
fluctuation and sell at lower prices without knowing the real price in other places.’ Another reason 
for price fluctuations, mentioned by several informants, was the frequent export bans mentioned 
above. In this section, I will look at the change in maize prices in relation to NAIVS under the 
frequent imposition of export bans. 
 Several informants, including the manager of National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA), 
- 159 - 
 
and several studies reported that the surplus of maize in Ruvuma is taken to Arusha, Dar es Salaam 
and Dodoma (Famine Early Warning Sytems Network, 2010; Barreiro-Hurle, 2012b) (Refer to 
Figure 1). I will therefore look at the change in maize real wholesale prices in these towns and 
Songea. Graph 17 shows that the real wholesale maize price in Songea Town was constantly 
lower than that in the other markets, which is due to the costs of management and transport. If we 
see in detail, we can see that the export bans were placed in most cases when the real prices were 
about to become high, which met the stated objective of food security. The data shows that the 
export ban in 2008 was placed during the international food price hikes, and was lifted in May 
2008, and was reintroduced in January 2009, which approximately corresponds to the time at 
which NAIVS started (pilot was placed since September 2008), and when the international maize 
prices were expected to continue to be high. However, the export ban was still in place even after 
maize prices dropped in all the towns from January to October 2010. With the export ban, maize 
prices remained constant up to the sales season in 2010, that is, the election season57. We may 
assume that the export ban was continued not only to assure food security but also to benefit urban 
consumers with lower maize prices. As Chinsinga suggests in the case of Malawi, maize in 
Tanzania is a ‘political crop’ (Chinsinga, 2012b). Meanwhile, since April 2011, the price in 
Songea district has dropped and was stagnant until March 2012, even during the export ban and 
up to after two months of lift of export ban, whereas prices in other consumer markets have 
increased. This is probably due to the price distortion at each sales point, considering the costs and 
import and export parity prices. This distortion was due to policy interventions which favoured 
urban consumers (Westlake, 1987).  
This hit the maize-surplus farmers in Ruvuma heavily, as many informants reported: 
‘farmers waited for a long time to sell maize in the villages, to the point that in the end they did 
not want to sell it. The maize was rotten, since the middlemen bought from them at a very low 
price’. A farmer in village A in Songea district also mentioned that ‘the price of maize last year 
(2011) was 250 TZS per kg, while this year (2012) it has increased up to 500 TZS per kg.’ Several 
informants believed that the lower price was due to the export ban. A farmer in group discussion 
in Songea district thought that ‘the (maize) prices go up and down, and most times when you hear 
the borders are closed and no maize should be taken outside, you find that the prices are low.’ 
Because of this experience, farmers did not buy inputs in the 2011/12 planting season, which 
reduced maize production, and the NFRA failed to buy maize until January/February in 2012, 
when the price went up. A NFRA officer informed me that the export bans were removed in 
January 2012 because of maize farmers’ complaints about low prices in2011, and because good 
weather was expected in 2012. After the lift of the export ban, the government bought 89 per cent 
of the maize produced (Ruvuma RS, 2012a) priced at 350 TZS per kg. It did so in part because of  
 
57 The election was held in October 2010. 
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Graph 17: Monthly average real maize wholesale prices in major consumer towns (Dodoma, 
Dar es Salaam, and Arusha) and Songea town (TZS per kg) 
Source: URT (2013b); NBS (2012); NBS (2010); NBS (2014)  
 
a shortage of maize in other parts of the country, according to the Monitoring Report of the FEWS 
Net (2012), which warned of a shortfall of rain in the long rain season (March– April) in 2012, 
and because of high demand from Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo, 
which made maize prices high compared to the previous five years. Thus in 2012 the private sector, 
including the buyers from Kenya, bought maize at 300 TZS per kg, which went up during the year 
to 500 TZS per kg. Actually, when I visited the Farmers’ Association Cooperative in Songea town 
(SODECO) on 28 November 2012, the price board showed their unit maize purchase price was 
510 TZS per kg. NFRA Songea officer reported that their unit maize purchase price from farmers 
increased very little between 2005/06 and 2010/11, namely to, 190TZS, 210 TZS, 230 TZS, 260 
TZS, 294 TZS, 300 TZS each year, after which in 2011/12 it jumped to 350 TZS. Graph 18 shows 
that lean season prices were higher than the ones in the previous crop sales seasons, especially in 
Songea district, which corroborates information from wealthier farmers: ‘we sell maize from 
December to January when the prices become high’. In Songea town there are two places for 
farmers to sell maize: SODECO and NFRA. While SODECO pays farmers on the spot, NFRA 
pays farmers one or two months later. According to the manager of SODECO, they pay farmers 
more than NFRA; e.g. in the 2012/13 season, NFRA started to buy maize at 350 TZS per kg, 
while SODECO bought at from 370 to 380 TZS per kg. Normally, farmers have to bring maize 
by themselves to SODECO. Without means of transportation and lacking capital, however, poor 
farmers sell to the middlemen who visit the village. Many villagers complained about the ‘unstable 
market’ which results from this fluctuation in prices and the recent drop in maize prices has not 
0
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much benefited maize producers. The Manager of SODECO suggested that ‘we need a market 
where farmers can sell maize at more stabilised prices’. He said that the MAFC organised a 
meeting to set up the zonal58 board for  mixed crops, inviting farmers’ representatives and agro-
dealers, but that there has been no further development on this. 
The drop in maize prices is corroborated by several studies reporting that export bans have 
caused lower maize prices for maize farmers in surplus areas, such as in Ruvuma, compared to 
these major consumer markets (Dodoma, Dar es Salaam, and Arusha) (Barreiro-Hurle, 2012a; 
Angelucci F. et al., 2013; MAFAP, 2013). In their study, Diao et al. (2013) suggest that export 
bans have a modest effect on price indices at country level, while there was a negative effect on 
maize surplus areas by lowering maize prices by about 7–26 per cent, which negatively affects 
the maize-surplus farmers while it benefits the maize-deficit poor farmers. 
With long period of placement of export bans since NAIVS started (September 2008), real 
maize prices have been declining generally in Ruvuma. Thus it is difficult to differentiate the 
effects of lowering maize prices either from the export ban or NAIVS. Table 51 above shows that 
a comparison of the crop sales prices in Dar es Salaam and Songea district during these three years. 
Since there was no export ban in both harvest seasons in 2008 and 2012, we can compare findings 
without its effect. During the period the real maize price in Dar es Salaam increased by 15 per cent, 
while the one in Ruvuma dropped by 8 per cent. The decrease in maize consumer price also 
corroborates the finding from my panel data in Ruvuma, which suggest a reduction of 4 per cent 
during the period. This benefits maize net-buyers. This corroborates the words at the beginning 
of the chapter spoken by a poor farmer in a group discussion in Songea district: ‘now we are 
getting the benefits of this voucher system because it keeps the maize price low (to buy maize).’ 
In Dar es Salaam, with the last lifting of the export ban the price increased to a higher level than 
when NAIVS started. This was probably due to the fact that there were other sources and buyers 
of maize in Dar es Salaam, including import and export. This corroborates the findings of Dabalen 
and Paul (2015) from 20 markets in Kenya and Tanzania, that the export ban increased the 
wholesale maize price by 17 per cent in Dar es Salaam, while in maize surplus areas producer 
prices did not increase and therefore did not benefit maize-producers.  
 
8-4. Impact on agricultural wages 
In this section I analyse real agricultural wages relative to maize prices in Ruvuma region. I 
found that only a few panel households used hired labour, although a village survey suggests that 
labour is highly needed from December to January, when maize is planted in the region. Nearly 
three-quarters of the villages report in Round 4 (corresponding to the season 2012/13) that the 
agricultural daily wage increased greatly compared to the 2007/08 season which was surveyed  
 
58 In the plan of MAFC there were seven zones in the country (interview with manager of SODECO).  
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in Round 3 (Christiaensen and Pan, 2009b). 85 per cent of the villages report that wages increased 
by much or a little. In 2012 (Round 4), 41 per cent of the total labour cost was used for land 
preparation, followed by 25 per cent for harvesting and 20 per cent for weeding. Since there is no 
data for the labour costs of harvesting in 2008 (Round 3), and given that the use of improved inputs 
requires more labour for weeding, I compare the change of total labour costs of land preparation 
and weeding during the period (Table 52). 
 
Table 51: Total real daily labour costs for land preparation and weeding in 2008 and 2012 (TZS) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Christiaensen and Pan (2009b); Author’s data 
 
The biggest increases in the total real daily labour costs for land preparation as well as for weeding 
were found in Tunduru. There was a ten per cent increase in the cost of weeding in Songea and 
Mbinga. Meanwhile, together with the cost of land preparation, a greater increase was found in 
Tunduru and Namtumbo, in which the cost of land preparation increased by 20 per cent. 
Meanwhile, the total labour cost in Songea and Mbinga remained constant. Despite differences 
between districts, the average real wage for labour in the region increased by 10 per cent during 
the period. 
I have used the panel data shown in Tables 53 and 54, that is, on the maize prices and the 
daily labour cost, to examine real wages relative to maize prices. These reveal that the real total 
labour cost relative to maize prices increased by 12 per cent during the two survey periods (Table 
52). This increase could be attributed to the introduction of subsidy, which contains the hybrid 
seeds which requires more labour demand especially for weeding and harvesting due to increased 
production. The real increase in agricultural wages benefits the labour-surplus food-deficit poor 
farmer households and improve food security. The real increase in agricultural wages was found 
by several studies of Malawi (SOAS et al., 2008; Dorward et al., 2010; Chirwa et al., 2011a).  
 
8-5. Input prices 
As previously mentioned, in order to solve the problem of market distortion made by 
previous ‘government-procured and distributed’ input subsidies, NAIVS uses the private sector 
to procure and deliver inputs to the villages. Under NAIVS, input market prices and top-up prices 
were set in principle by competition between agro-dealers in each village. Meanwhile, I observed 
that in NAIVS the district government suggested the prices to be sold at in each village (‘bei 
elekezi’=Swahili term for ‘suggested price’), which aimed to protect farmers from bargains driven 
2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012
Songea 5,291 4,926 0.9 2,778 2,956 1.1 8,069 7,882 1.0
Tunduru 2,778 4,433 1.6 3,333 4,039 1.2 6,111 8,473 1.4
Mbinga 3,935 3,448 0.9 2,778 2,956 1.1 6,713 6,404 1.0
Namtumbo 6,944 8,506 1.2 5,000 5,172 1.0 11,944 13,678 1.1
Total 3,935 4,269 1.1 3,333 3,448 1.0 32,837 36,437 1.1
Land preparation WeedingRatio of
increase
Ratio of
increase
Ratio of
increase
Total
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by agro-dealers taking advantage of the given demand. I have to note that this is not in accordance 
with the programme design: ‘the Government does not intervene in…setting prices of agricultural 
inputs’, in order to promote private sector development (World Bank, 2009a). Meanwhile, several 
informants reported that some agro-dealers did not sell at these suggested prices. In some villages, 
when agro-dealers set higher prices than ‘bei elekezi’, it seemed that there was also space for 
negotiation between the VVC/village government and agro- dealers on setting the prices. However, 
due to imperfect market conditions there was a power imbalance between the two parties where 
agro-dealers won in most cases. This could be seen in the remarks made by a Ward Agricultural 
Extension Officer in Songea district: ‘negotiation with agro-dealers is difficult. Up to two years 
ago all agro-dealers charged the same input prices, which made it difficult to discuss with them, 
since there was no difference between their prices. While last year (2011/12) they set whatever 
prices they wanted, since they were not sure whether they could work with vouchers when they 
brought inputs to villages, and also since there were only a few agro-dealers in the village. It was 
then again difficult to discuss with them, since they said that they were in difficult situation’. 
On the other hand, I heard that in some villages the VVC assigned each farmer to go to a 
pre- determined agro-dealer, so that agro-dealers would not lose any inputs brought to the villages. 
Here there was no free market where villagers could choose a better option for buying inputs. 
Villagers suspected collusion between the VVC and agro-dealers, whereby farmers sometimes 
had to buy inputs at higher prices under this ‘non-free’ market.  
In this section I will use the data from local government and an input supplier company as 
well as the results from the panel village survey. Acknowledging that the first two data will not be 
precisely the prices the farmers had to pay, I will analyse the general trend of input prices before 
and after NAIVS started. Firstly, I will analyse the real market prices and their increase ratio in 
Songea and Tunduru towns (Tables 53 and 54). The data is developed from two different series of 
data. The one for 2007/08 and 2008/09 are the statistics of input market prices59 in each district in 
corresponding years reported by Ruvuma RS office, while the data for later years are input market 
prices reported by each district government. 
The real prices of Urea and DAP increased between the two survey years, i.e. 2007/08 
and 2011/12. With an increase of about 60 per cent, the price of DAP rose much more than that 
of Urea, which increased by 22 per cent in both towns. All the input prices decreased after the 
input price crisis ended in 2009/10, especially Urea. After that, the price of Urea increased by 
about 60-75 per cent until 2011/12, seemingly rising every year. The price of DAP also increased 
by about 15-25 per cent during the period. In comparison, the price of MRP decreased by 8 per 
cent. 
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Table 52: Real input market prices and their increase ratio in Songea town (%) 
Source: Calculation from Ruvuma RS (2012g); Songea district (2012b); Songea district (2012c); 
NBS(2012); NBS(2010) 
 
Table 53: Real input market prices and their increase ratio in Tunduru town (%) 
Source: Calculation from Ruvuma RS (2012g); Tunduru DC (2012a); Tunduru DC (2012b); Tunduru DC 
(2012c); NBS(2012); NBS(2010) 
 
Considering that most inputs were imported, in order to examine the trend of import prices, I 
will use the Free on Board (F.O.B.) price data obtained from the Tanzania Fertilizer Company 
(TFC), an input- supplying company that shares about 25-30 per cent60 of the Urea market in the 
country. The above trend of input prices in Songea and Tunduru towns corroborates the import 
price data of Urea and DAP given by the TFC (Graph 19) (TFC, 2012). The real import price of 
Urea, converted into Tanzanian shillings at the exchange rate reported by the Bank of Tanzania, 
increased by 90 per cent from December 2009 (corresponding to the 2009/10 agricultural season) 
by November 2011 (2011/12 season), and that of DAP increased by 74 per cent, which is higher 
than the increase seen in markets in Ruvuma (Table 55).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 The document reports the data ‘with subsidy’ and ‘without subsidy’. I take the price ‘without subsidy’ as 
market price data here. 
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Increase
ratio from
2007/08 to
2008/09
Increase
ratio from
2008/09 to
2011/12
Increase
ratio from
2009/10 to
2011/12
Increase
ratio from
2007/08 to
2011/12
UREA 41,176 50,521 31,683 - 50,382 0.23 0.00 0.59 0.22
MRP (powder) - - 30,693 - 28,244 - - -0.08 -
MRP (particles) - 36,667 30,693 - 30,534 - -0.17 -0.01 -
DAP 35,294 94,792 45,545 - 57,252 1.69 -0.40 0.26 0.62
Maize hybrid seeds - - 31,683 - 34,351 - - 0.08 -
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Increase
ratio from
2007/08 to
2008/09
Increase
ratio from
2008/09 to
2011/12
Increase
ratio from
2009/10 to
2011/12
Increase
ratio from
2007/08 to
2011/12
UREA 44,706 62,500 31,188 38,636 54,580 0.40 -0.13 0.75 0.22
MRP (powder) - - - 14,091 12,595 - - - -
MRP (particles) - 40,625 - 16,818 14,885 - -0.63 - -
DAP 38,824 101,042 54,455 58,182 61,832 1.60 -0.39 0.14 0.59
Maize hybrid Seeds - - 32,178 23,636 24,046 - - -0.25 -
Rice seeds - - 22,277 28,182 23,664 - - 0.06 -
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Graph 18: Annual average real F.O.B. prices of Urea and DAP (base year=2008, in TZS per 
50 kg) 
Note: The price of Urea is from Yuzhny (port in Russia), and the price of DAP is from Tampa (port in 
U.S.A.). The prices are adjusted by a combination of two CPI series. 
Source: Calculation from NBS (2010), NBS (2012), TFC (2012), Bank of Tanzania (2015) 
 
Table 54: Annual average real F.O.B. prices of Urea and DAP and real increase ratio (base 
year=2008, %) 
 
Note: The price of Urea is from Yuzhny (port in Russia), and the price of DAP is from Tampa (port in 
U.S.A.). Source: Calculation from NBS (2010), NBS (2012), TFC(2012), Bank of Tanzania(2015) 
 
 
Table 55: Management and transport costs after F.O.B. (US dollars, per ton) 
C.I.F. Ex-warehouse Margin Transport Total 
120 60 50 50-70 280-300 
Source: Information from TFC (Dec. 2012) 
 
Given the difference in the prices seen above in the markets in Ruvuma in 2009/10, TFC did not 
seem to be the major source in the region in the year, while the prices of Urea are almost in line 
with the market prices in Songea and Tunduru towns, thus TFC might be the major supplier. 
The officer of TFC informed me that the cost for management after F.O.B. and transport 
per ton, i.e. Cost, Insurance and Freight (C.I.F.), was 120 US dollars (equivalent to 189,480 TZS 
61 ); the management cost for after warehouse was 60 US dollars (equivalent to 94,740 TZS); the 
margin for TFC was 50 US dollars (equivalent to 78,950 TZS); and the transport cost to the 
regions was around 50-70 US dollars (equivalent to 78,950 TZS-110,530 TZS) depending on the 
location of the regions (Table 56). In total, 280-300 US dollars per ton (equivalent to 442,120 TZS-
473,700 TZS) was incurred on top of F.O.B. prices, which would be the input prices at the capital 
 
60 Information from the manager of TFC in Dar es Salaam (December 2012). 
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Real increase
ratio from
2008/9 to
2011/12
Real increase
ratio from
2009/10 to
2011/12
urea 15,313 17,262 25,958 40,581 93.4 90.5
DAP 35,958 24,151 41,660 51,758 5.1 73.6
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cities in the regions, to which the additional cost for transport and management by agro-dealers is 
added to make the input prices at the village levels. Thus the cost per 50 kg would be 14-15 US 
dollars (22,106 TZS-23,685 TZS). This cost would be as much as 56 per cent of the F.O.B price 
of Urea per ton in 2011/12, and the total price plus cost at the regional capital would be 62,687-
64,266 TZS. With the additional cost required to bring inputs to the villages, this price would 
almost match the Urea price reported by the informants in the villages (67,250 TZS in 2011/12, 
Table 57). 
 
Table 56: Average input market prices and real rates of increase from village survey (TZS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Average reported price among villages62. Deflated by CPIs of all 
items. Source: Christiaensen and Pan (2009b); Author’s data; NBS 
(2010); NBS (2012) 
 
Table 57 suggests that the village survey data also shows the increase of real input prices. This 
corroborates many villagers’ claims that there were big increases in fertiliser prices during the 
survey period. Meanwhile, the prices of seeds were reported not to have changed much. Several 
informants (a local government officer and agro-dealers) mentioned that the increasing input 
prices were due to exchange rate; increase in fuel prices, which increased transportation cost; rise 
in international input prices; and the bargaining by the agro-dealers under the secured demand 
because of NAIVS. Hernandez and Torero (2013) suggest the relative concentration of the 
producer countries where few companies were producing fertilisers made higher the input prices 
in recent years, which might be also the cause of Tanzanian case, as several multinational 
companies supply fertilisers, such as Yara Tanzania Ltd. High input prices also seemed to relate 
to the lack of capacity of small agro-dealers in some years. The VEO in Village G in Songea 
district mentioned that ‘last year there was a shortage of inputs in the district, as some agro-dealers 
were so small that they could not buy many inputs. This made the input price high.’ 
Next I analyse the subsidy price of inputs – face value of vouchers - during the period, 
which was designed to be about half market prices, plus a ‘remoteness premium’ that varies by 
the average distance of each district from the port (for Urea and DAP) or point of production (for 
MRP and seed) (World Bank, 2009a: 41). These are determined by the projected market prices of 
the year at the time before the budget of the year is approved, and thus are supposed to change  
 
61 Exchange rate 1 US dollar = 1,579 TZS as of 20 December, 2012 (Bank of Tanzania, 2015). 
62 The questions in the questionnaire were different in two surveys: in Round 3 they asked the price in 
the survey year, while in Round 4 they asked the price in the previous year. 
Round 3 Round 4
Real rate of
increase
urea 51,829 67,250 0.23
DAP 80,567 83,681 0.03
Total 132,396 150,931 0.11
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every year. After the pilot programme, which corresponded to the input price crisis in 2008/09, the 
programme revised the voucher package (World Bank, 2009a). One large revision was the 
reduction of the amount of Urea in the package from two bags (100 kg) to one (50 kg). This 
revision aimed to reduce the top-up amount for farmers but also to increase the number of 
recipient every year. After the pilot programme, which corresponded to the input price crisis in 
2008/09, the programme revised the voucher package (World Bank, 2009a). One large revision 
was the reduction of the amount of Urea in the package from two bags (100 kg) to one (50 kg). 
This revision aimed to reduce the top-up amount for farmers but also to increase the number of 
recipient farmers within the determined programme budget. This reduced the face value of the 
voucher for packaged Urea by 50 per cent. However, informants from the Farmers’ Association in 
Songea and several farmers suggested that one bag of Urea per acre of maized cultivation is not 
sufficient. Actually, several wealthier farmers who were well-informed on agronomic techniques 
informed me that they were using two bags of Urea per acre, by adding another bag of Urea 
themselves. 
Another revision made to the programme was the introduction of a ‘free market’ in 
subsidised phosphate fertilizer. In 2008/09, probably due to the especially escalated price of DAP 
because of the international input price hikes, and that MRP has come to be produced in the 
country, different face values for phosphate fertilisers were applied: 30,000 TZS for MRP, and 
47,000 TZS for DAP, although during the year 80 per cent of phosphate fertilisers were MRP, the 
rest being DAP. After the price of DAP went down in late 2008, the programme document 
developed in May 2009 suggests that ‘farmers could choose the type of phosphate fertilizer based 
on the market prices and location-specific technical efficiency of each one’ (World Bank, 2009a: 
40). The programme thereafter issued only one face value of phosphate fertiliser, which has 
dropped since 2009/10, after which different face values of voucher for MRP and DAP were no 
longer set. However, as Tables 53 and 54 show above, the prices of these two inputs in towns 
differed substantially, thus the top-up rate for DAP was higher than that for MRP, which made it 
difficult for farmers to take DAP. This arrangement was probably due to the fact that MRP was 
produced nationally and the Tanzanian government wanted to promote its use among farmers63. 
Despite the government’s intention, informants suggested that MRP was not so technically 
popular because ‘it was difficult to apply’, and ‘DAP was more effective to grow maize than 
MRP’. 
However, due to the different prices as we saw in Tables 53 and 54, more than a third of 
the panel households received MRP combined with Urea and maize seeds compared to only about 
10 per cent who obtained DAP with other inputs. 
Another revision made, indicated by the data from RS, was that since 2009/10 OPV maize 
seed vouchers have no longer been distributed, although I heard in few villages in Mbinga and 
Tunduru that farmers bought OPV seeds with vouchers. This means that voucher management 
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practice in the field might have been flexible so that if OPV seeds were better suited to the location 
and the agro-dealers brought them to the village, farmers could buy them subsidised by the face 
value of a maize hybrid seeds voucher. The reduction of types of inputs of voucher package could 
have also been due to the high transaction cost of managing different types of input with different 
face values. 
The average face values of vouchers in the voucher package in Ruvuma according to the 
data from RS are shown in Table 58. I acknowledge though the limitation of using government 
data of input prices which could vary much depending on the agro-dealers due to undeveloped 
market especially in rural areas in the region. For the price adjustment in different times, I use the 
average Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all items for the months when normally the vouchers 
arrived and the farmers paid top- up, that is, November to February in the following year. Since 
there is no regional CPI in Tanzania, I recognise the limitation of applying national-level CPI to 
the prices in such remote rural areas as villages in Ruvuma. Average real face values of vouchers 
for inputs reduced from 2008/09 to later years, due mainly to the reduction of the subsidised Urea 
amount in the voucher package since 2009/10, but the value also decreased further thereafter. 
Urea had the biggest drop, by about 60 per cent from 2008/09 to 2009/10 and a further 24 per 
cent from 2009/10 to 2011/12. Phosphate fertiliser decreased its face value by 14 per cent during 
the same period. Meanwhile, the face value of the maize seeds remained almost constant. Thus 
the face value of the whole voucher package decreased from 2009/10. This occurred under the 
increase of the real market prices of each input of whole voucher package, as seen above. That 
would have made farmers face increased real top-up amounts to get these subsidised packages. 
Due to the effects of input price hikes in 2008, different face values were applied for the 
same inputs supplied in different times, in 2008/09 and 2009/10, which accommodated the 
different procurement costs by input supplier companies. However, it seems that the  ‘remoteness 
premium’, varying the prices depending on the distance from the port in each district, was not 
applied. This suggests that this ‘premium’ disappeared and farmers in remote areas incurred the 
cost of remoteness as part of ‘top-up’. Rather, district government determined ‘suggested prices’ 
for each village, including the price of inputs as well as management costs, such as transport, 
storage, guards, etc. for agro-dealers. Also the project document suggests that ‘in 2008/09 the face 
value of a voucher for a 50-kilogram bag of Urea varied between TZS 24,000 for locations near 
Dar es Salaam and TZS 27,000 for more remote areas. For DAP the face value ranged from 
TZS 45,000 to TZS 48,000’ (World Bank, 2009a: 41). However, the RS data suggest that the 
face value for Urea in 2008/09 was 24,000 TZS (nominal. Table 58 shows the real price of two 
bags (100 kg)), which does not seem to be in line with the plan  
 
63 Information from manager of TFC Dar es salaam (December, 2012). 
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Table 57: Average real face values of vouchers in Ruvuma  
 
Note: Deflated by CPI for all items (base: average of Mar. – Apr. 2009). Average of different values 
among districts taking into account differences in distribution of hybrid maize seeds, OPV, MRP and 
DAP in 2008/09, and the fluctuating face value of Urea in 2009/10. 
Sources: Author, adapted from Ruvuma RS (2012b) Ruvuma RS (2012d), Ruvuma RS (2012e), Ruvuma 
RS (2012c), Ruvuma RS (2012a). 
 
above, since Ruvuma is a very remote area from the port. For DAP it was 47,000 TZS, which is 
almost in line with what the document suggested. Considering that farmers in Ruvuma received 
Urea most, either in full package or only Urea or with another input, the programme did not 
benefit the farmers in the region, at least in the pilot year.  
Now I will use the data of input market prices in Songea and Tunrudu towns reported by 
district governments (Tables 59 and 60). Market data has been available since 2007/08, thus I can 
compare market prices before the programme with the top-up prices after the programme was 
introduced, in order to see the change in payment for inputs by voucher-recipients before and after 
the introduction of NAIVS. For phosphate fertiliser, only the market price of DAP in 2007/08 is 
available, although the rate of farmers who took up DAP with subsidy was small. Meanwhile the 
data of top-up prices of MRP in Tunduru seems problematic. The data tells us that in 2008/09 
even voucher-recipient farmers had to face increased payments for Urea and DAP than the previous 
year, due to international high input prices. After the crisis ended and the programme was revised, 
in 2009/10 the top-up prices for Urea and DAP decreased substantially. The drop in the top-up 
amount for Urea was due to halving the subsidised amount of Urea since 2009/10. Since then, the 
input prices have increased again, especially that of Urea, these increasing by 170 per cent and 250 
per cent in these towns, respectively. A lower increase was found in DAP, with 73 per cent and 
36 per cent in Songea and Tunduru, and in MRP, with 54 per cent. This made the top-up amount 
for the fertiliser package double between 2009/10 and 2011/12, corroborating farmers’ complaints 
about the increased price of  fertilisers since the year 2010/1164. Although the top-up for seeds 
showed a modest increase in Songea and decreased in Tunduru, the top-up amount for the full 
package increased by about 85 per cent in Songea town, and by a little less, i.e. 60 – 70 per cent 
in Tunduru town during the period.  
 
 
2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
 % change
from 2008/9
to 2009/10
% change
from 2008/9
to 2011/12
% change
from
2009/10 to
2011/12
Urea 50,000 19,970 20,000 15,267 -60.1 -69.5 -23.6
Phosphate fertiliser 36,121 24,752 23,636 21,374 -31.5 -40.8 -13.6
Maize seeds 15,315 16,832 18,182 15,267 9.9 -0.3 -9.3
Rice seeds - 10,891 10,909 15,267 - - 40.2
Package with Maize seeds 96,013 61,658 61,818 51,908 -35.8 -45.9 -15.8
Package with Rice seeds - 55,804 54,545 51,908 - - -7.0
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Table 58: Real top-up prices and market price and increase ratio in Songea town (%) 
Note: Data from 2008/09 to 2011/12 are top-up prices. Deflated by CPI for all items (base: average of 
Mar.–Apr. 2009). 
Source: NBS (2010); NBS (2012); Ruvuma RS (2012g); Songea district (2012a), Songea district (2012b); 
Songea district (2012c) 
 
Table 59: Real top-up prices and market prices and real increase ratio in Tunduru town (%) 
Note: Data from 2008/09 to 2011/12 are top-up prices. Deflated by CPI for all items (base: average of 
Mar.–Apr. 2009). 
Source: NBS (2010); NBS (2012); Tunduru DC (2012a), Tunduru DC (2012b); Tunduru DC (2012c) 
 
As seen above, though the programme tried to mitigate the crisis of input prices in 2008/09, 
farmers faced higher payment for fertilisers in that year even with subsidy compared to the 
previous year. In 2009/10, the top-up payment for fertilisers decreased greatly with the decrease 
of their market prices to the previous level. However, since then the top-up payment in real terms 
has increased to more than double, especially that of Urea which has increased by 170-250 per 
cent, i.e. up to three to four times the real top-up price in 2009/10 during the period. 
This corroborates claims made by many farmers of increases in the prices of fertilisers, 
which meant they were unable to pay the top-up and gave up even when they were selected or 
shared the package fifty-fifty with another farmer. This is reflected in the revision of the 
programme which removed the beneficiary selection criteria targeting small-scale farmers 
(MAFC, 2011). Also the face values of inputs did not change despite the increase of input  
 
 
64 Interview with key informants in Songea and Tunduru districts. 
2007/08
market
price
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Increase ratio
from 2007/08
to 2008/09
Increase ratio
from 2008/09
to 2009/10
Increase ratio
from 2008/09
to 2011/12
Increase ratio
from 2009/10
to 2011/12
UREA 41,176 50,769 12,457 - 33,588 0.23 -0.75 -0.34 1.70
MRP - 5,417 5,941 - 9,160 - 0.10 0.69 0.54
DAP 35,294 45,617 20,792 - 35,878 0.29 -0.54 -0.21 0.73
UREA + MRP - 56,185 18,398 - 42,748 - -0.67 -0.24 1.32
UREA + DAP 76,471 96,385 33,250 - 69,466 0.26 -0.66 -0.28 1.09
Maize hybrid seed - - 14,851 - 19,084 - - - 0.28
Urea+MRP+Maize - - 33,250 - 61,832 - - - 0.86
Urea+DAP+Maize - - 48,101 - 88,550 - - - 0.84
2007/08
market
price
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Increase
ratio from
2007/08 to
2008/09
Increase
ratio from
2008/09 to
2009/10
Increase
ratio from
2008/09 to
2011/12
Increase
ratio from
2009/10 to
2011/12
UREA 44,706 75,000 11,386 18,636 39,313 0.68 -0.85 -0.48 2.45
MRP - 9,375 -24,752 -6,818 -6,489 -3.64 -1.69 -0.74
DAP 38,824 51,923 29,703 34,545 40,458 0.34 -0.43 -0.22 0.36
UREA+MRP - 84,375 -13,366 11,818 32,824 -1.16 -0.61 -3.46
UREA+DAP 83,529 126,923 41,089 53,182 79,771 0.52 -0.68 -0.37 0.94
Maize hybrid seeds - - 15,347 5,455 8,779 -0.43
Rice seeds - - 11,386 17,273 8,397 -0.26
Urea+DAP+maize - - 56,436 58,636 88,550 0.57
Urea+DAP+rice - - 52,475 70,455 88,168 0.68
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prices in later years of the programme; this might have been due to constraints on the programme 
budget, which had already been planned. Even with an increased demand for inputs in the country 
through NAIVS, given that most of the inputs were imported, input prices were vulnerable to 
price fluctuation on the international market. Data on top-up prices reveals the programme was 
increasingly out of the reach of poor farmers. 
 
8-6. Private sector development 
Private sector development is a new characteristic of market-smart subsidy which differs from 
the previous subsidy programmes in which government purchased and distributed the subsidised 
inputs (URT, 2014e). The new subsidy aims to reduce market distortion by introducing a free-
market supply and demand system, and by promoting competition among agro-dealers. Though 
agro-dealers were criticised for colluding on prices in the region, they played an essential part in 
implementing NAIVS. They brought the inputs to the villages, where mostly there had been no 
input sales points previously. With raised awareness of the inputs through NAIVS, the farmers’ 
demand for inputs was raised, even when paying commercial prices. Graph 20 was developed by 
combining the data of import quantity and value of nitrogen and phosphate fertilisers from 
FAOSTAT (2015) and the fertiliser amount provided by NAIVS from URT (2014e). The average 
ratio of types of subsidized phosphate fertilizer (DAP and MRP) actually taken by farmers is 
calculated from the panel data as shown in Table 8 in the section 4-4-6, which is 1: 3, respectively. 
These shares in 2008/09 and 2012/13, however, might not reflect the reality because of the pilot 
year arrangement and the introduction of new phosphate fertilizer (Minjingu Mazao) in the latter 
years. The Graph shows that in some years the subsidised amount exceeded the imported quantity 
of the fertiliser in the year: which might have been because the subsidised fertiliser was used from 
the one imported in previous year or the reporting error of the two series, if the URT data reflects 
the true amount of subsidised fertilisers in each year, the error of FAOSTAT might have suffered 
from missing data, or if the all of the officially claimed amount of subsidised fertiliser was not 
actually issued for vouchers in the end due to the lack of fertiliser amount. Acknowledging this, 
even with fluctuation year by year, subsidized nitrogen and phosphate fertilisers amounts share 
as much as 92 per cent and 79 per cent of total import amount per year on average. This suggests 
that the scale of the programme in the national input market was quite high, different from the 
one (about 42 per cent) estimated from the data of number of Urea vouchers, so that the high 
impact of the programme onto the wider market could be expected if this were true. 
The data shows that nitrogen fertilisers import amount was decreasing since NAIVS 
started. The import amount of nitrogen fertilisers jumped in 2009, and thereafter gradually 
decreased to around the same level as in 2005, the highest amount before NAIVS. At the same 
time, however, import value increased. This suggests that there was displacement of commercial 
inputs, as suggested by Jayne and Rashid (2013: 556), but the decrease in import quantity seemed 
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to be affected by the increase in the unit value since 2011/12, as we saw in the previous section. 
Meanwhile, the import quantity of phosphate fertiliser remained almost constant, with a big 
increase in 2011, then a decrease in 2012. This was probably due to the change in government 
policy towards promoting MRP. MRP is produced nationally, but was not so popular among 
farmers. Thus they increased import of DAP or other phosphate fertilisers from 2011. Then the 
import amount was decreased in 2012 when the new type65 of Minjingu was introduced. In all, 
import value of these fertilisers increased since 2009 compared to the period prior to the 
introduction of NAIVS, then decreased in 2012. 
 
Graph 19: Import quantity and value of nitrogen and phosphate fertilisers in Tanzania in 2003 
– 2013 (kilo tons in nutrients, million US dollars) 
Source: Author, developed from FAOSTAT (2015); URT (2014e); Author’s data. 
 
In order to encourage more private agents to become agro-dealers for inputs, extensive 
training activities for prospective as well as ongoing agro-dealers were conducted by the Citizen 
Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA) as part of the NAIVS programme. During 2010/11 and 
2011/12, the number of trained agro-dealers in Ruvuma rose to 268. Among those trained, 66 per 
cent (as many as 177 dealers) entered NAIVS business (URT, 2014e). Although increasing the 
number of agro-dealers was effective, there were many reports from informants that after being 
assigned to the input subsidy business, many new small agro-dealers did not have enough capacity 
to do business with NAIVS. After they were given loans to buy inputs by TFC or NMB, they 
therefore ran away with the money without providing the full amount of inputs which are supposed 
to deliver or, in some cases, any inputs at all to the villages. The manager in TFC Songea office, 
who said that one of the TFC’s roles was to monitor input business including NAIVS in the area, 
suggested that ‘such small agro-dealers who became agro-dealers and ran away after getting credit 
money had known that they could take advantage of the opportunity to obtain loans or make 
65 Information from several informants. The new type is called ‘Minjingu Mazao’ (‘Minjingu for crop’ in 
Swahili), which improved the application easier and in its content – including nitrogen. 
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money out of NAIVS business’. Since there were so many such cases, especially up to 
2010/11when the biggest number of vouchers were distributed, the system of assigning agro-
dealers was changed from 2012/13. Under the new system, input supplier companies who were 
assigned by MAFC in each region would assign their agro-dealers and be responsible for them. In 
2013 1,600 agro- dealers were assigned as agents of seed and fertiliser companies in the country. 
The number of agro-dealers dealing with vouchers increased up to 2010/11 and reduced 
in 2011/12. In Songea district, in 2008/09 there were 75 agro-dealers, in 2009/10 there were 92, in 
2010/11 there were 104, and in 2011/12 among 145 agro-dealers 59 were selected to deal in 
vouchers. Meanwhile, while NAIVS increased the amount of temporal storage for inputs in 
villages only for four or five months, permanent input sales points have not increased so much in 
the villages. Village survey results in Round 4 suggest that only five villages had permanent access 
points for inputs. Highest access was found in Songea district with three-quarters of the villages 
having access, while in Tunduru 15 per cent of the villages had input points. Villages in Mbinga 
and Namtumbo reported that they still did not have permanent sales points for agricultural inputs 
in Round 4. The reason for this lack of permanent sales points seems to lie with the thin profits 
and high management costs of the input business. 
On the other hand, in every district there was a big agro-dealer who covered a major part 
of the district. For example, one big agro-dealer dealt with about 65 per cent of the input business 
in a district, and about 20 per cent of the vouchers distributed in the region. Several small agro-
dealers mentioned that the district government favoured their friends, who are big agro-dealers, 
thus the small agro-dealers could not have permission to do input business. In the pilot year, the 
system of delivery of subsidised inputs was different: farmers had to come to town to visit the 
stores of the agro-dealers to collect the inputs; since 2009, however, the agro-dealers have had to 
bring inputs to the villages, put up stalls and employ guards there, which has made it costly, 
especially for small-scale agro-dealers. Furthermore, competition with other agro-dealers did not 
allow them to make a big profit.  
One small agro-dealer in Tunduru mentioned that the ‘assignment of agro-dealers for 
NAIVS by the district government was not fair’. Due to this favouritism, some small agro-dealers 
have left the business with NAIVS. Other reasons for their giving up NAIVS business were the 
competition between agro-dealers and the low input prices suggested by the district governments. 
According to the district government officers, these prices are calculated by including input prices 
and other managerial costs, such as transport cost to each village, cost for guard and storage, etc. 
However, small agro-dealers mentioned that they were too low, so that small-scale agro-dealers 
in Mbinga and Tunduru suggested that ‘the district government does not know the cost of 
business’. Another difficulty reported by agro- dealers in staying in the input subsidy business 
was the late redemption made by NMB. They made redemption from after 15-30 days (one agro-
dealer), or in April–May, August, or sometimes, even, not until the following season (a big agro-
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dealer). Several agro-dealers mentioned that ‘they wanted to get extra money from us for asking 
them to pay us sooner’. 
Agro-dealers suggested that input business with NAIVS gives them a small profit. Big 
agro- dealers, however, could benefit from doing big business even with a small profit per unit, 
because of the scale of economy. Thus when I asked them whether they wanted to continue the 
input business even after the subsidy ended, big agro-dealers said they did, as there was increasing 
demand for inputs in the villages. Meanwhile, the small agro-dealers would not be able to do so 
for the business brings them too thin a profit. 
I heard in some villages, especially in remote villages in Mbinga, that there was only one 
agro- dealer to provide each input. Furthermore, in these villages I often heard that there was 
collusion between the agro-dealers and leaders at village as well as at ward or higher levels. Thus 
I observed that generally if there was competition, the farmers made fewer complaints of collusion. 
Although still I heard in one village in Songea district where they had three or four agro-dealers 
that the quality of inputs was not good, they could identify which agro-dealers’ inputs were not 
performing well, so that in the following year they would not select these agro-dealers. Thus 
competition is important for good private sector development. 
Although many cases of fraud were reported, the number of input agro-dealers in the 
region has increased through the NAIVS programme. Several informants including agricultural 
officers and agro-dealers mentioned that there was increased input demand since NAIVS was 
introduced. Although there were already big agro-dealers who covered most business in the 
districts, training has brought many new agro-dealers into the input business and they have 
expressed their intention to continue because of this increased demand. This increase in agro-
dealers who will continue the input business will bring competition between agro-dealers which 
will lower the prices and provide better services and access to and use of inputs by farmers more 
easily. Their training includes giving advice to farmers on input use. In this way NAIVS has 
provided a positive impact on private sector development. 
 
8-7. Conclusion 
Because of the medium proportion of the subsidised fertiliser amount to total requirement (42 per 
cent, Author’s calculation), we could expect the impact of the programme onto wider economy, 
such as national food security, maize and input prices, local agricultural wages, and private sector 
development. Thus I looked at these impacts. 
Because of increased maize production, NAIVS seemed to gradually improve national 
food security, which was accompanied by the frequent placement of export bans. Comparing the 
periods without the imposition of export bans between June and December in 2008 and in 2012, 
real maize prices seem to have lowered in Ruvuma, which would benefit poor maize-buyers. 
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While the price increased a little in Dar es Salaam. These different price movements were probably 
due to the facts that the two markets were fragmented, thus had different buyers in both places 
including exporting, and that Dar es Salaam had other sources of maize supply than Ruvuma, 
including imports. Meanwhile, real agricultural wage rates relative to maize prices in Ruvuma 
increased by 12 per cent from 2008 to 2012, which was partly due to the increased demand for 
labour because of using improved inputs. This would have benefitted poor labour-surplus farmers. 
However, with the increase of real input import prices in recent years and the face value 
of vouchers remaining constant at the same time, the real top-up amount of the voucher package 
has increased, especially that for Urea since 2010/11. This made it increasingly difficult for poor 
maize farmers to pay the top-up amount necessary to receive subsidy, as well as to purchase 
commercial inputs. Even with increased demand in the country, input prices could not be lowered 
since most of the inputs relied on imports, which made the input market in the country vulnerable 
to the fluctuation of the world input market prices. 
Meanwhile, although several cases of misbehaviour, fraud and collusion with village 
leaders and farmers were reported, the private sector played an important part in the programme in 
the delivery of inputs to the villages and to farmers. I found that vouchers were delivered with 
inputs even to very remote villages in Ruvuma. With ascertained increased demand by NAIVS 
for inputs in the villages, agro-dealers made profits, even though they reported these were small. 
Big agro-dealers could cover whole regions by using their own means of transport and wait for late 
redemption by NMB, while some small agro-dealers had to give up due to competition and lack 
of financial resources to facilitate the business with NAIVS. However, even small- to medium-
scale agro-dealers, as well as big ones, intended to continue the input business in the region after 
NAIVS ends, since they knew that there was increased demand and had established links between 
themselves and farmers for the input business. This would promote the private sector and increase 
competition. Thus I could say that the input private sector development in the region was to some 
extent achieved through NAIVS. However, the increased input demand was hampered by the 
increased price of Urea in recent years, which caused a decrease in import quantity, namely its 
consumption at national and regional level. 
 
- 176 -  
Chapter 9. Discussion 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss my findings. Firstly, I will analyse how the programme’s 
implementation and impact have differed from the theory of change described in Chapter 3, and 
the fact that political influence has brought to the forefront of my discussion the analytical 
framework for social relations. Secondly, and taking this shift into consideration, I will answer 
the research sub-questions, mainly as regards the period from 2008 to 2012 and, for some sub-
questions, by looking at the earlier rounds of panel surveys. Thirdly, I will summarise these 
findings in order to answer the research question. 
 
9-1. Theory of change which best reflects the reality and analytical framework for 
social relations 
As we have seen previously in Chapter 4 to Chapter 8, there was a substantial difference between 
the original design and rules of NAIVS and its actual implementation: leakage to wealthier 
farmers; missing vouchers; late delivery of inputs and vouchers; and farmers not taking the whole 
input package, or reselling vouchers or sharing them with other farmers. These realities of 
implementation, due to socio-economic, administrative and political factors, caused the 
programme to be relatively ineffective and inefficient and thus the idealised theory of change 
described in Chapter 3 could not be realised.  
The theory of change which best reflects the reality is found in Figure 7. Leakage to non-
intended beneficiaries, frauds and illicit behaviours were all prevalent, reducing the programme’s 
efficiency. However, the panel results did not show any displacement of previously-purchased 
commercial inputs. Despite the bad weather, regional government data suggest an increase in 
maize yields, and production and data from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and 
Cooperatives show an increase in national food security since NAIVS started. However, the 
observed impact on maize yields could not be attributed to the programme because of spill-over 
effects which brought a higher increase ratio in input use among non-recipient households than it 
did among recipient households, such as those found in Ruvuma.  
 The panel data analysis suggests that input use had no statistically significant impact on 
the maize yields, household food security or poverty of recipient households. This might be due 
to the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies of the programme, caused by the things mentioned above. 
The qualitative information, however, reveals improvements in maize yields and food security, 
and a drop in poverty levels, which might be due to confirmation bias.  
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Figure 7.  Theory of change which best reflects the reality 
Note: This figure is adapted from Figure 2 (page 29); text in italics in the red boxes has been added.  
Source: Author’s development
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NAIVS increased input supply. Despite the leakage to wealthier farmers, we could not find any 
displacement of previously-purchased commercial inputs in the panel data. As mentioned above, 
increase in input use / demand was found among non-recipient farmers as well as recipients. 
Because of this increased demand and the rise of international input market prices, we found the 
input price was higher during the research period, which made it difficult for poor farmers to 
obtain inputs.  
We found that most panel farmers were maize net-sellers who reduced the purchase ratio 
of maize. As maize is the primary calorie-intake food, and other main crop purchase ratios were 
also reduced as farmers may have used inputs for other crops, we found that despite the lower 
maize prices, the panel households’ net farm income increased. However, as mentioned above, 
increased income from maize could not be attributed only to the programme. Net maize-buyer, 
labour-surplus poor farmers benefitted from a lower real maize price and an increased agricultural 
labour wage arising from increased maize production, which is only partly attributable to NAIVS. 
Thus long-term impacts such as poverty reduction and long-term asset accumulation may indeed 
have been realised, but they were brought about not only by NAIVS but also by other initiatives 
such as Kilimo Kwanza, which is different from the idealised theory of change (Figure 2). 
Furthermore, if this higher real farm income and increased input use among farmers were 
sustained, input demand would be increased in the long run.  
The same political and social factors which caused the programme to be inefficient also 
prevented realisation of the idealised theory of change. Here, the analytical framework for social 
relations can express how the politics, power and special interests of each agency distorted and 
manipulated the programme activities through, for example, elite capture, leakage of 
vouchers/inputs to unintended target groups, missing vouchers, frauds/illicit behaviours, 
bargaining over input prices by input suppliers and agro-dealers, etc. where more power is 
retained by the higher rungs of the ladder shown in the Figure 3.  
 
9-2. Analysis on Research sub-questions  
Research sub-question 1: Who received NAIVS vouchers? 
The beneficiary selection criteria sometimes differed from the official criteria of the programme, 
and varied among villages. The most important criterion was the ability to pay top-up, the crucial 
element of the programme design, as paying a contribution would supposedly increase the 
incentive for farmers to use subsidised inputs. However, in many cases this caused problems as 
small-scale poor farmers – small-scale operation originally being another beneficiary criterion - 
could not afford to pay the top-up. This has been especially the case since 2010/11 as many farmers 
claimed the prices of fertilisers have increased. This was due to a price increase on the 
international market, given that most inputs were imported. Furthermore, the nominal face values 
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of vouchers did not change, despite the increase in input prices in the later years of the programme. 
The increase in input prices saw a decrease in the ratio of the vouchers’ face value to the input 
prices, i.e., to less than 50 per cent. Data on top-up prices reveal that the programme was 
increasingly out of the reach of poor farmers. Thus they gave up participation even when they 
were selected or shared the package with another farmer in order to reduce the payment due. The 
difficulty in paying top-up experienced by poor farmers caused a revision to the targeting of the 
programme from small-scale farmers to middle-scale farmers (MAFC, 2011). However, this shift 
made the land criterion ambiguous. Originally this was ‘less than one hectare of maize or rice 
cultivation’ but in reality, the criterion actually disappeared, at least in Ruvuma, as most farmers 
cultivated maize over more than one acre. 
The three-year exit strategy was not actually implemented in many cases. Many village 
leaders stated that they selected those households who had not received vouchers, as they wanted 
to avoid being criticised for ‘favouritism’ by targeting only a few farmers for the whole three 
years. This led to a thin distribution of vouchers, leaving more than half of the recipient households 
with only one or two years’ receipt. 
Sometimes selected households sold vouchers to other wealthier farmers and agro-dealers 
or, in a few cases, returned the vouchers because they were unwilling to use inputs and/or could 
not pay top-up and/or preferred to have money. The reasons given by farmers in the panel survey 
for not wanting to receive vouchers were that they did not have sufficient cash, or could not obtain 
sufficient credit, to pay the top-up; and that they did not want to try to obtain credit at all. 
Qualitative data confirms that vouchers were sold in the pilot year in particular, when many 
selected farmers did not know the effects of the inputs, and that this phenomenon reduced as more 
farmers became aware of those effects. Another reason for selling or returning vouchers was the 
increase in real input prices. 
Logit estimate results suggest that the selected and recipient households in the pilot year 
tended to use improved inputs prior to the programme. This situation was not in line with the 
programme selection criterion: ‘priority is given to farming households [that] have used little or 
no fertiliser and improved seed with maize or rice over the last five years.’ (World Bank, 2009a: 
26). As mentioned above, since the pilot year many farmers have sold or returned vouchers. 
Voucher recipient farmers in that year thus ended up being the farmers who had used inputs 
previously. Still several informants suggested that in later years, the practice of selling vouchers 
or subsidised inputs continued to some extent and the benefit of the programme thus ended up 
going to the wealthier farmer households. 
Logit estimate results find that the recipient households in any year of the programme 
were more likely to be leaders, have previously used inputs, be better-off, and have less off-farm 
income. It may be inferred that any significant elite capture was evidenced in later years: as the 
number of distributed vouchers increased and more people learnt about the programme, vouchers 
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were increasingly captured by the elites. Furthermore, NAIVS led them to focus on maize 
cropping.  
My panel sample households were about 14 per cent more likely to receive vouchers in the 
pilot year than was the case with the original whole panel sample for rounds 1-3; and my panel 
samples were found to be 36.7 per cent more likely to receive vouchers in any given year of the 
programme, which is more than twice the ratio found in respect of the whole panel sample. These 
biases imply that my panel sample households were the wealthier segment of the whole sample, 
which affects further analysis of the impact of voucher receipt on maize production and poverty. 
 
Research sub-question 2: Did NAIVS increase the maize yields of recipient 
households?  
MAFC (2012) data shows that from 2001/02 to 2011/12, national maize production per capita 
increased by about a quarter. They further show that maize production per capita has continued 
to increase since NAIVS was introduced. Parallel with the growth in production across the whole 
country, Regional Secretariat (RS) data (2012a) suggest that maize production in Ruvuma Region 
increased by 137 per cent during the period. Combining this with the slight decrease in average 
maize plot area of the panel households during the period (1.49 ha. to 1.40 ha.), and considering 
that maize was continuously cultivated on almost 96 percent of the plot area  (1.44 ha. and 1.35 ha.), 
it can be assumed that maize yields also increased even during the poor weather conditions of the 
2011/12 season. This increase in maize yields was in line with the data about increased fertiliser 
consumption in Songea district since 2008/09, an increase which was probably due to the 
programme and which partly contributed to the increase in maize yields. 
During the period from Round 3 to 4, maize yields all showed a significant increase on 
average, with a growth rate of more than 30 per cent. Despite the non-recipients’ higher rate of 
growth, the difference between the yields of recipient and non-recipient households widened. This 
could have been due to the fact that recipient households tended to be wealthier and were thus in 
a position to deploy other beneficial inputs. It looks as though the recipient households tended to 
focus on achieving high maize yields, due to NAIVS, which is consistent with the relative 
intensification of maize cultivation in terms of plot areas. 
Turning to the impact of the programme on maize yields, using instrumental variables to 
control for endogeneity and using propensity score matching, the difference-in-difference 
estimate results suggest that neither voucher receipt in 2011/12 nor in any other year of the 
programme had a statistically significant impact on maize yields. These findings seem to 
contradict the positive impact of NAIVS on maize yields in general, as reported above, which is 
probably due to leakage to wealthier farmers; a higher increase ratio in the maize yields of non-
recipient households than that of recipients; reporting errors in voucher receipt: poor non-
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recipients who sold or did not receive vouchers are officially recorded as having reported they 
received vouchers in the panel survey, so that households which reported themselves as ‘non-
recipient in 2011/12’ or ‘never-recipient’ increased their input use and maize yields; or the thin 
distribution of vouchers to ‘never-recipient’ households. In controlling for the use of improved 
seeds, male-headed households were found to increase their maize yield by about 50 per cent, 
which is statistically significant. One of the reasons for this was probably the fact that male heads 
of household were more likely to have access to training and information on agronomic practices 
than their female counterparts. 
However, much qualitative data confirms that the use of subsidised inputs by recipient 
farmers had a substantial impact on maize yields. The contradictions between the quantitative and 
qualitative results may be explained by the effects of other initiatives which were omitted from 
the regression analysis; or by the fact that as recipient farmers were wealthier, they had other 
agronomic investment which brought higher yields, the result of which was counted in qualitative 
information. Alternatively, the qualitative information may have been susceptible to confirmation 
bias: farmers and leaders made positive comments as they expected the programme would 
continue if they did so, while it was difficult to build trust, in terms of my quest for precise 
information, in such a short visit to each village. Although quantitative survey caused fatigue 
among respondents because of the long questionnaire, and contained errors in reporting and 
recalling due to the complicated voucher management, because of the possible confirmation bias 
in the qualitative survey, and of the higher increase ratio of maize yields among non- recipients 
than recipient households, I would suggest that voucher receipt had no significant impact on maize 
yields in the region. 
 
Research sub-question 3: Did NAIVS reduce poverty and food security, and 
increase the assets of recipient households? 
Qualitative information suggests that recipient farmers reduced their poverty, becoming able to do 
such things as buy beds, mattresses and bicycles, send their children to school and change house 
roofs. Female-headed households, in particular, reported that they had improved food security to 
the point of not having to buy food in the lean season, increased the number of meals from two to 
three per day, and could even sell surplus maize. From Round 3 to 4, the matched panel 
households on average reduced their income poverty a little, and increased several assets such as 
beds and mobile phones, as well as physical infrastructure such as access to all weather roads. 
The average of their real total non-farm income was reduced by almost half, while crop sales 
increased by about 90 per cent, which might reflect the focus on crop production induced by the 
programme. 
However, difference-in-difference with propensity score matching estimates suggests 
that neither voucher receipt in 2011/12 nor any other year of the programme had any impact on 
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poverty headcount ratio, which is probably due to the leakage to wealthier farmers, displacement 
of the commercial purchase of inputs, thin distribution of vouchers, or the bias towards the 
wealthier farmers of the panel sample households. Furthermore, the reduction of the average 
poverty gap among recipient households was smaller than that among non-recipient households 
(9.5 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively). While the voucher recipients in any year of the 
programme were relatively better-off in terms of income poverty throughout the surveyed years, 
the recipients in 2011/12 were relatively poorer throughout the surveyed years, which means that 
the poorer households were selected as the programme went on. 
In no year did voucher receipt have a significant impact on household assets, except a 
weakly negative significant impact on having a modern house roof, and the latter is reasonably a 
reporting error. This does not corroborate the qualitative data that recipients improved their roof 
through the increased maize production achieved by using subsidised inputs. Considering the 
contradictory quantitative evidence and plausible confirmation bias, the subsidy probably allowed 
only those few to improve their house roofs. A bigger non-farm income had a strongly significant 
positive impact on possessing household assets, except house roofs. Although during the period 
the matched households in general increased their ownership of mobile phones and beds, the 
recipient households already had more of these assets than non-recipient households before the 
programme, which means that they were originally better-off. 
The fact of being graduates (voucher recipients for more than three years) does not show 
a statistically significant impact on either income poverty or household assets. This might be due 
to the graduates being a small sample, which applies to all regression analysis on graduates. With 
this acknowledgement of data limitation, the non-farm income of graduates had a significant 
positive impact on reducing income poverty and on improving all household assets except for 
modern house roofs. Nor did graduating from the programme have a significant impact on 
livestock keeping. Even previous to NAIVS, graduates tended to keep more cows and goats than 
other households, which is statistically significant. Similarly, graduation had no statistically 
significant impact on not sending children to primary school. Elderly-headed households had a 
weakly significant positive impact on sending children to primary school, which implies they 
were less poor as their households were big, with younger working-age children caring for school-
age children, and they could thus afford to pay some of the costs associated with school. 
As noted above, since NAIVS started full operation, national food security has improved, 
partly due to the programme. However, there were mixed findings on food security in Ruvuma. 
Contradicting the improved food security reported by qualitative data, the panel village survey 
results find that villagers still faced food shortages in most - 60 to 80 per cent - of the villages and 
that villagers in the majority - from 50 to 70 per cent - of the villages had to buy food in the lean 
period. Informants suggest that the volume of the packages’ subsidised inputs is too small for 
farmers to have any income from sales. Meanwhile, the panel data shows a general trend of 
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increased crop sales: the average sales ratio to total production of maize and rice increased by 24 
and 32 per cent, respectively, and the average real total crop sales increased by 36 per cent during 
the period, although it should be remembered that the panel households were relatively better-off. 
In general, the programme increased food security; the contradiction as regards food security in 
Ruvuma might be due to the geographical differences in food security in the region: there are 
some poor areas where food is insecure in the lean period because of soil quality, low rainfall and 
lack of infrastructure and transport facilities. 
Total household calorie consumption was slightly reduced, but diversified. The probable 
reason for reduced calorie consumption was that previous calorie consumption had focused on 
maize, which has the most calories per kg of the main crops, but that with diversification, calorific 
consumption was reduced but nutritionally diversified, which is better in nutritional terms. The 
diversification was made possible by purchases made with an increase in income available from 
crop sales which was partly brought about by the programme. Households reduced their maize 
consumption and increased their consumption of cassava, whose real unit consumer price reduced 
more than that of maize. The real maize unit sales price dropped by 30 per cent, which suggests 
that maize surplus farmers did not gain much in Ruvuma, while maize net-buyers benefitted a 
little due to a small reduction in maize real consumer prices. The purchase ratio of maize and rice 
dropped during the period, to a third and about two-thirds of Round 3 respectively, which might 
be due to the increased production brought about by subsidy. 
Turning to programme impact, the difference-in-difference estimates suggest that 
voucher receipt had no statistically significant impact on calorie consumption at the time of the 
survey. This means that non-recipients also improved their food security, as seen in the increase 
of their crop production. 
 
Research sub-question 4: Did receipt of NAIVS input vouchers have any gender 
impacts?  
During fieldwork, I noticed women’s triple roles (childcare, housework and outside work)66 and 
found women’s work time per day was considerably longer than that of men. Furthermore, in a 
patriarchal society such as Tanzania widows are not allowed to inherit the land of deceased 
husbands. Although they own smaller plots of land than male-headed households, surprisingly, 
the female-headed panel households increased the size of the land owned and for cultivation, while 
the area of land owned by panel households in general decreased or remained constant, on average, 
from Round 3 to Round 4, respectively. This means that land rights were also given to widows in 
Ruvuma. This might be due to a small sample size, or these panel female heads of household may 
have been wealthier, with regular non-farm income such as from regular employment; they were 
also more likely to belong to village elites. The panel sample might therefore not be representative 
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of average female-headed households. Because they have other income, such as from petty trade, 
etc., female-headed households tend to focus on food cropping with less land than male-headed 
households. 
Qualitative information suggests that female-headed households found it difficult to get 
vouchers. Even when they were selected for vouchers, either they faced discrimination from 
village leaders and, being ‘powerless’, ended up not getting any inputs (which was also the 
experience of elderly male-headed households); or they were forced to be a part of the 
manipulation of voucher management. 
The female-headed households on the panel were more likely to receive vouchers, with 
72 per cent receiving vouchers while the average of male-headed households was 65 per cent. 
This was probably because they were prioritised to receive vouchers and were relatively better-
off, tending to have regular non-farm income from, for example, public services and government 
employment. As nearly half these households had elected household members in the village, they 
were relatively powerful. The original panel sampling were better-off; this seems to be particularly 
the case for female-headed panel households. The female-headed households tended to increase 
maize yields and household consumption expenditures by more than the male-headed households. 
However, this contradicted other panel results and qualitative information, which was 
probably partly because the panel female-headed households were ‘female-elites’. Widow-headed 
households in general had difficulty in benefitting from the programme, as they were unable to 
pay top-up or meet the requirements for contributing to village activities. With more difficulty in 
accessing extension services, and with less land, less credit, less family labour and a smaller cash 
income than male-headed households because they focussed on food crops, widow-headed 
households were less able to contribute to village activities. All these conditions made it difficult 
for them to get access to input vouchers, which is the general picture of female-headed households 
in the region. 
 
Research sub-question 5: Did NAIVS lower maize prices and increase agricultural 
wages? 
For the purpose of food security, the Tanzanian government and several local governments have 
put frequent export bans in place in recent years, which have lowered maize prices. With the long 
period of export bans since the pilot for NAIVS started (September 2008), data show that real 
maize prices have been declining generally in Ruvuma. Excluding the effects of the export ban, 
when we compare the harvest seasons in 2008 and 2012, the real maize price in Dar es Salaam 
increased by 15 per cent whereas that in Ruvuma dropped by 8 per cent. This decrease in the 
maize consumer price also corroborates the finding from my panel data in Ruvuma, which suggests 
a reduction of 4 per cent during the period. This benefits poor maize net-buyers, many of whom 
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are small-scale farmers. 
Meanwhile, as several studies suggest that export bans have caused lower maize prices 
which have affected maize farmers in surplus areas, such as Ruvuma Region, the low maize prices 
hit maize- surplus farmers in Ruvuma, especially in the harvest season in 2011. It was  when the 
real wholesale prices recorded in Songea town were the lowest in the last five years. Many 
informants believed that the lower maize price was due to the export ban. Without means of 
transportation and lacking capital, poor farmers sell their maize at a low price to the middlemen 
who visit the village. Many villagers complained about the ‘unstable market’ which results from 
this fluctuation in prices, and the recent drop in maize prices has not much benefited maize 
producers. 
As for agricultural wages, nearly three-quarters of the panel villages report that the 
agricultural daily wage increased greatly compared to the 2007/08 season which was surveyed in 
Round 3 (Christiaensen and Pan, 2009b). Panel village data suggest that despite differences 
between districts, the average real wage for labour in the region increased by 10 per cent during 
the period and that the real wages relative to maize prices increased by 12 per cent. Given the 
medium scale (estimated as 42 per cent of requirement) of the programme, these increases could 
be attributed to the increased labour demand which stemmed from the introduction of subsidy. 
This increase in wages helped poor labour-surplus farmers. 
 
Research sub-question 6: Was the private sector promoted by NAIVS? 
In order to solve the problem of market distortion caused by previous input subsidies which were 
procured and distributed by governments, NAIVS uses the private sector to procure inputs and 
deliver them to storage facilities in the villages. Under NAIVS, input market prices and top-up 
prices were set, in principle, by competition between agro-dealers in each village. However, the 
practice was found to be different to some extent in Ruvuma. Firstly, the district government 
suggested the sale prices for each village (‘bei elekezi’= Swahili term for ‘suggested price’), 
claiming that this would protect farmers from bargains driven by agro-dealers who were taking 
advantage of the given demand. This was not in accordance with the programme design of using 
the free market. Despite this policy ordinance, I heard farmers in some villages claiming that the 
‘bargained price’ set by agro-dealers was more than these suggested prices. This situation varied 
depending on the fluctuation in input market prices, and the extent of competition among agro-
dealers and their certainty of being involved in the voucher business in that year: if they knew they 
would not be involved, they would charge a higher price to compensate for the costs and risks  
 
66 This is different from the ‘triple burden’ of racial oppression, sexual domination and class, 
suggested by feminist scholars. 
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claiming that this would protect farmers from bargains driven by agro-dealers who were taking 
advantage of the given demand. This was not in accordance with the programme design of using 
the free market. Despite this policy ordinance, I heard farmers in some villages claiming that the 
‘bargained price’ set by agro-dealers was more than these suggested prices. This situation varied 
depending on the fluctuation in input market prices, and the extent of competition among agro-
dealers and their certainty of being involved in the voucher business in that year: if they knew they 
would not be involved, they would charge a higher price to compensate for the costs and risks 
which followed an uncertain volume of sales. In some villages, it seemed that there was also space 
for negotiation between the VVC/village government and agro-dealers on setting the prices. 
However, due to imperfect market conditions there was a power imbalance between the two 
parties and agro-dealers won in most cases. 
Secondly, I heard that in some villages the VVC assigned each farmer to a pre-determined 
agro-dealer, so that agro-dealers would not lose any of the inputs brought to the villages. Here, 
again, there was no free market in which villagers could choose a better option for buying inputs. 
Villagers suspected collusion between the VVC and agro-dealers whereby farmers sometimes had 
to buy inputs at higher prices. 
Agro-dealers suggested that the input business with NAIVS gave them a small profit. 
Small agro-dealers have struggled to continue this business because of the competition between 
agro-dealers and the thinness of the margin between suggested prices and the costs for 
transportation, putting up stalls and employing guards. Furthermore, several agro-dealers claimed 
there had been late redemption by the National Microfinance Bank, which also made it difficult 
for small dealers to sustain their business. 
Although many cases of fraud were reported and there were already big agro-dealers who 
covered most of the districts in the input business, training through NAIVS has brought in many 
new agro-dealers. If these dealers are still in business with NAIVS, they have expressed their 
intention to continue even after the programme finishes, because of the increased demand. As a 
result of the programme, we found input agro-dealers delivering inputs to even very remote areas 
in the region where previously no such option had existed. The number of input agro-dealers 
developing the input business has therefore increased in the region. In this way, NAIVS has 
provided a positive impact on private sector development. 
 
Finally, I will look at my research question: 
Research question: How did NAIVS impact on poverty reduction and the livelihoods 
of farmers in Ruvuma Region in Tanzania? 
I found mixed results as to the impact of the programme on poverty and farmers’ livelihoods in 
Ruvuma. Qualitative data confirms that the programme brought about poverty reduction and 
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improved food security, allowing recipients to buy beds, mattresses and bicycles, improve house 
roofs, send children to school and increase the number of meals from two to three per day, or 
meaning they no longer had to buy maize every year. According to the panel data the activities of 
household heads were increasingly diversified, although they still mainly engaged in agriculture. 
Conversely, the panel regression results find that NAIVS had no statistically significant impacts 
on poverty, assets or food consumption. 
With regard to food security, the panel village survey in Round 4 suggests as many as 60 
to 80 per cent of the villages experienced food insecurity in the lean season, which was also 
reported by some informants. It seems that there were geographical differences in food security, 
which particularly affected vulnerable households, such as female- and elderly-headed 
households. There was, therefore, no significant improvement in food security. The panel data 
did not suggest that calorie consumption increased; however, generally food consumption was 
diversified, probably because of the increased income from crop sales, especially of coffee and 
maize, which was partly due to the programme. 
Among the reasons for the mixed results given by qualitative and quantitative research 
on the programme’s impact on poverty and food security are complex voucher management, 
reporting errors in the quantitative data, and confirmation bias in the qualitative information. 
These limitations might also be due to the sampling bias towards respondents who are better-off 
than the average households. However, considering the leakage to wealthier farmer households 
and to the households which used inputs prior to the programme, elite capture and vouchers going 
missing as the programme expanded, as well as the fact that as real input prices rose, vouchers 
tended to be captured by wealthier households and elites, I would say that there was confirmation 
bias in the qualitative information, and that NAIVS was largely inefficient and ineffective in terms 
of its specific objectives, that is, targeting small-scale farmers for poverty reduction. Thus the 
panel regression results, that is, that there was no significant impact on poverty or food security, 
are more plausible. 
Furthermore, considering the high ratio of farmers selling vouchers (30 ~ 40 percent or 
more in some years) due to lack of financial capital, higher liquidity of cash transfer might help 
these poor farmers more, as this could be used for other purposes and thus have a greater effect 
on the reduction of poverty.   
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Chapter 10. Conclusion 
 
10.1. Summary of findings 
Input subsidies have played a crucial but contentious role in development in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) in the last 50 years. The late 1970s saw widespread debate about ‘state failure’ in these 
countries, some of which were almost bankrupted by the cost of open-ended universal fertiliser 
subsidies.  International financial institutions first supported these subsidies but later withdrew 
their support and have since moved to an opposing extreme, backed up by ‘ideological’ neo-
liberal ideas. The previous state-managed delivery of low cost fertilisers to farmers had flaws that 
needed to be addressed. Input subsidies were therefore removed in the 1980s – 90s by the 
Structural Adjustment Programme. Since the millennium, new doubts have arisen as to whether 
the market alone is capable of rectifying poverty, and new ‘market-smart’ subsidies have been 
framed and explored in many SSA countries. These target small-scale vulnerable farmers and aim 
to improve marginal productivity and avoid displacement by using coupons / vouchers, and by 
promoting the private sector for input procurement and delivery in order to avoid the market 
distortion which traditional subsidies used to face.  
Detailed studies evaluating their performance have recently been undertaken. This thesis 
has contributed to a growing body of evidence on the effectiveness of reducing rural poverty by 
means of input subsidies by using a secondary literature review, an analysis of existing data sets 
and a detailed mixed-methods primary field work study of Ruvuma Region in Tanzania, along 
with an overview of five countries’ programmes. It provides an overview of the programme’s 
generic features and an analysis of the design, implementation issues, and impacts of these 
subsidies in SSA, as well as the challenges which must be considered for future development in 
the region.  
The NAIVS programme is a ‘market-smart’ subsidy as it originally targeted small-scale 
farmers by using vouchers and used the private sector for input procurement and delivery. The 
theory of change (Figure 2) assumes that small-scale recipient farmers could increase maize yields 
and production through the use of subsidised inputs; and that if they received vouchers for three 
years they could accumulate enough income to reduce poverty and purchase commercial inputs by 
themselves, this result allowing their ‘exit’ from the programme. This intended outcome is 
influenced by market and weather conditions and the country’s food security policies, and 
hindered by leakage to wealthier farmers and mis-targeting. 
Quantitative and qualitative data in Ruvuma suggests that since NAIVS started, average 
maize yields in the region, average maize production and sales of the panel sample households 
have all increased, even in the poor weather conditions of 2011/12. These increases must be due 
to increased input use, which is partly ascribed to the introduction of NAIVS. Panel data suggests 
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that the yield, production and sales of other main crops have also increased during the period. 
This is corroborated by the panel households’ reduced purchase of main crops, and the 
diversification of maize consumption into several purchased food items, albeit with a small 
reduction in total calorie consumption, which was made possible from increased income from 
crop sales. Diversification of farmers’ diet included the shift from maize to cassava consumption. 
The surplus maize was for sale, which was corroborated by increased maize sales. 
However, the increase in maize yields did not seem to be attributable only to the 
programme but also to other initiatives such as Kilimo Kwanza. While qualitative data confirms 
that the programme had a positive impact on maize yields, the accumulation of assets such as 
beds, mattresses, bicycles, modern house roofs and the ability to send children to school, as well 
as bringing about improvements to food security, the panel regression results did not show any 
significant impact on the poverty and food security of recipient farmers. Although acknowledging 
a little sampling bias toward wealthier farmers, data limitations regarding other initiatives, and a 
plausible confirmation bias, I would suggest that the substantial flaws in implementation which 
hindered the effectiveness of the programme mean that voucher receipt had no significant impact 
on maize yields, poverty and food security in the region. This contradiction might also be due to 
the higher rate of increase in input use by non-recipient households than recipient households, 
which may be partly due to the spill-over effect of NAIVS or other initiatives such as Kilimo 
Kwanza. This occurred even with the expected positive impact due to the relatively large scale of 
the programme, which is estimated to be 42 per cent of the requirement. 
The thesis has highlighted how programme design and implementation are key for the 
effectiveness and efficiency of ‘market-smart’ input subsidy programmes in SSA, by providing a 
mixed-methods case study. Contrary to the original design of the programme, the study reveals 
that vouchers were obtained by middle-scale farmers who had used inputs prior to the 
programme’s pilot year, due to the high input and top-up prices in the food and input price crisis. 
It also reveals a lack of awareness among poor farmers of the effects of the inputs, and of the 
NAIVS programme itself. Later, although poor farmers became increasingly aware of the 
programme, increasing real top-up prices from year to year made it difficult for them to obtain 
vouchers, or they ended up selling vouchers to other farmers. The leakage to wealthier farmers 
was the reason the programme failed to promote new users of inputs through the provision of 
subsidy, as had been the aim.  
Qualitative data confirms that village leaders used their power to distribute their vouchers 
to their families and ‘friends’, such as farmers who contributed manually or financially to village 
activities or who accepted that the leaders should receive an extra payment for the work of voucher 
management. Meanwhile, they did not give vouchers to the selected poor and vulnerable farmers, 
without giving any reason for their failure to do so. Thus, in many villages, farmers claimed 
that leaders were showing ‘favouritism’, even where leaders stated that they had demonstrated 
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‘egalitarian’ voucher distribution. Furthermore, politicians and leaders above village level also 
used their influence to capture the vouchers. The thesis suggests that there were frequent reports 
of elite capture and illicit behaviour. 
Both qualitative and quantitative research, therefore, find that the actual implementation 
differed much from that in the design. Flaws in the ‘process’ in the theory of change (Figure 2), 
such as the late delivery of vouchers, thin voucher distribution by village leaders resulting in 
farmers receiving vouchers for only ‘one’ or ‘two’ years, the diversion of vouchers to richer 
farmers and the sales of vouchers by poorer recipients all hindered the realisation of the intended 
programme ‘impact’, namely an increase in maize yields, a reduction in poverty and greater 
household food security. Thus, the idealised theory of change did not work as had been intended 
(Figure 7). Vouchers were delivered late, which led to farmers taking up only a part of the voucher 
package. Elite capture and resale of vouchers by farmers were common in various countries like 
Malawi (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Jayne and Rashid, 2013) and Zambia (Mason and Smale, 
2013); thin distribution of vouchers in order to prevent accusations of ‘favouritism’ was also 
found in Malawi (Cullen and Lawson, 2005) and is probably common in some other SSA 
countries. All these unforeseen tendencies made the programme relatively ineffective and 
inefficient. In fact, it simply helped elite and better-off farmers to expand the gap between them 
and their less fortunate counterparts, as was suggested by the analytical framework (Figure 3). 
Meanwhile, the reselling of vouchers or inputs naturally created a ‘cash transfer’ to poorer 
recipients, who may have also benefitted from lower consumer prices for maize. As Maliro (2011) 
suggests, there might be a process ‘that fertiliser ends further up the rural wealther distribution 
than was intended in the plans, and this is not unusual in the history of subsidised fertilizers in 
Africa’ (p.150).  
 In order for the subsidy programme’s idealised theory of change to be realised, it is 
necessary to develop carefully a clear programme design and an adequate implementation plan, 
to achieve timely input delivery to farmers, to prevent interference such as leakage to wealthier 
farmers and fraud, and to allow space for flexible modifications such as the revision of the face 
values of vouchers, if needed.  
The World Bank accepted the request from the Tanzanian government to support 
financially all five years of the programme period, even with counterpart fund. Though having 
raised its popularity among farmers NAIVS was finalised in 2013/14 as it originally designed 
(World Bank, 2012). Since 2014/15, the new input support programme has been initiated, 
composed of input subsidy and loan provision, but gradually shifting from the former to the latter 
for financial sustainability. This shift to loan provision is intended to support ‘graduate’ farmers 
of the input subsidy, who need credit to buy more inputs to apply to their maize plots. It is also 
intended to provide opportunities for non-recipient farmers to gain access to the inputs more easily 
than before.       
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‘Life is difficult’ (Maisha ni ngumu in Swahili). I often heard this phrase from many of 
our research assistants – survey enumerators, translators, software programmers - when they 
apologised for asking me for better payment, or to be paid in advance. However, they were still 
better-off than small-scale farmers, for they had the techniques to get skilled work in order to 
obtain a monetary income. All of them were struggling to survive: disabled farmers approached 
me to ask for assistance for their children to get education, and even the better-off such as 
drivers/mechanics and school teachers, who have a regular monetary income, complained that it 
was difficult to support their families. Merchants and guest-house owners were better-off still but 
even they were struggling to get access to more resources. In a society such as this, where the 
institutional capacity is weak, an informal social network – they speak often of ‘friends’ and 
building up ‘trust’ - is important for mutual benefits. A mechanic, for example, might obtain the 
‘trust’ of a merchant who needed to have his car taken to Dar es Salaam for repair, or get better 
and quicker service from hospitals or local administration by being ‘friends’ with old clients such 
as doctors and transport police officers. In a society where there is a ‘private realm’ (Ekeh, 1975), 
informal networks are important to get better access to resources and services, indeed, for survival. 
Given their existence, I would argue that the effects of the input subsidy were reduced by poor 
institutional management capacity at the lower end, and because the subsidy was the target of 
struggle among farmers, village leaders, government officers, politicians, and agro-dealers, leading 
to situations such as fraud, and farmers reselling cheaply or giving subsidised inputs or vouchers 
free to the leaders who asked for them in order to prevent unwanted consequences. The subsidy 
thus brought social tension and differentiation between the powerful elites and agro-dealers who 
benefitted from it, and small-scale, vulnerable farmers who did not. This is how the analytical 
framework actually worked. 
Problems of ‘elite capture’ and fraud, which was frequently heard from the qualitative 
evidence in my study, are also seen in other countries, such as Malawi and Zambia, and occur 
under a wide variety of different organisational and delivery arrangements. From the analysis of 
these causes - being due to patron-client relationship or being captured for their own benefit by 
politicians, government officers, and traders, devising a way to avoid such effects of reducing 
cost-effectiveness would need to involve voucher delivery that does not go through these 
administrative cadres. Thus the subsidies could be delivered more accurately using modern 
technologies like point-of-sale devices or mobile phones (Ellis et al., 2009; ODI, 2013), which 
were tried in Malawi, Zambia and Nigeria recently, but whose impact are yet to be studied.   
On the other hand, my study finds a substantial number of resale of vouchers, upwards of 
30 – 40 percent in some years from quantitative evidence; a number of informants, including VVC 
members, agricultural extension officers, and farmer focus groups, suggested resale was because 
of high input prices, lack of awareness of effects of input use and preference for local seeds. 
Considering such limitations, for improving the livelihood chances of, or reducing poverty among, 
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the poorest in rural areas of a country like Tanzania, subsidising agricultural inputs, which is 
agriculturally-focused, voucher-based social protection programme, is not the most appropriate 
way. It might be that a targeted / conditional social cash transfer would be more appropriate in 
terms of being a more flexible instrument enabling use for their other acute living needs.  
There were also positive impacts. As earlier mentioned, the study found a positive impact 
on increase in input use by farmers, which brought increased maize yields and production. It also 
found positive indirect impacts on reducing poverty. The real unit consumer price of maize flour 
reduced only by a little, while the real maize grain prices dropped by 62 per cent, which suggests 
a large increase in the milling margin. The real unit sales price also dropped by 30 per cent, 
suggesting that maize surplus farmers did not gain much in Ruvuma, while poor maize net-buyers 
benefitted due to a small reduction in the real consumer prices of maize. The real agricultural wage 
relative to maize prices in Ruvuma increased by 12 per cent during the two survey periods, which 
would have helped poor, labour-surplus farmer households. Though they are relatively ‘powerful’ 
female-headed households, panel female-headed households had prioritised access to vouchers, 
which could change the intra- and inter-household gender-unequal relationship in the 
communities. Many female-headed households, however, could not benefit from the programme 
and remained poor. Although challenges exist, I observed that the private sector developed and is 
expected to expand even after the subsidy finishes in Ruvuma, which represents a quite significant 
positive impact as regards better access to inputs for rural farmers in the future.  
 
10.2 Implications for theory 
In Chapter 3 I presented the analytical framework for the input subsidy programmes. The theory 
of change of NAIVS (Figure 2) presents how the input subsidy programmes are intended to work; 
however, my qualitative and quantitative findings confirm that social and political relations, as 
shown in the analytical framework for the impact on social relations (Figure 3), undermined this 
theory of change and prevented its realisation as intended (Figure 7).  
The idealised theory of change (Figure 2) assumes that input subsidy programmes require 
only technocratic analysis. It assumes that the subsidised inputs provided would increase maize 
yields and reduce poverty, with some allowance for leakages. This theory of change also includes 
expected impacts on food prices, input markets and rural wages, which were analysed in the 
empirical chapters of the thesis. However, the results did not find the expected impacts in the 
theory of change. 
Possible technical reasons for this - that the programme was poorly conceived and/or 
designed and/or implemented - were analysed in the empirical chapters. Another possibility is 
that the theory of change itself is flawed. An alternative hypothesis is that there are political 
economy forces at work which prevent the objectives of the programme from being achieved, 
even if it is perfectly conceived, designed and implemented. This is where the analytical 
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framework in social relations becomes relevant. 
Input subsidies are not just technocratic programmes; they are interventions in the social 
relations of communities and the political economy of governance structures. Unless these 
relationships and dynamics are properly understood and analysed, the reasons that external 
interventions such as input subsidies fail to achieve their expected impacts will never be fully 
understood. 
The thesis thus reveals that studies of input subsidy programmes require not only 
economic analysis but also social and political analysis. The theory of change which best reflects 
the reality (Figure 7) and analytical framework for social relations (Figure 3) use economic 
analysis but place social and political analysis at the forefront, in which a mixed-methods 
approach is used.  
 
10.3 Implications for methodology 
Input subsidy programmes are inherently complex: it is easy to lose sight of their aims, design 
and implementation plans and there are often flaws in implementation brought about by 
mismanagement and fraud (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2013a). In order to grasp how the programmes 
have been implemented and how farmers have experienced them, the mixed-methods approach is 
ideal as it measures the impacts of the programmes and the real causes of these impacts by hearing 
the stakeholders’ opinions of the programmes. Adopting this approach allows us to identify the 
real causes of the problems in these complex systems and find solutions and ways of improving 
which could not be obtained through a single-method approach. With the resurgent interest in 
these programmes in SSA expected to continue in coming years, and in order for these programmes 
to be effective and efficient, it is necessary to devise best programme design and implementation 
in the SSA context. Mixed-methods research into these programmes should therefore be promoted 
in order to look in detail at how they were implemented and where they were flawed. Few mixed-
methods studies on input subsidy programmes have been conducted so far except for the studies 
on Malawi’s FISP by Chirwa and Dorward (2013). 
The thesis suggests that the theory of change which best reflects the reality and an 
analytical framework based on social and political relations and political economy are most 
appropriate for analysis of the design, implementation and impact of the input subsidy programme, 
such as Yuksel (2012)’s fascinating analysis of the input support programme in Kenya which uses 
an actor-oriented approach. The thesis argues that given that input subsidies often suffer from 
elite capture and illicit behaviour, a study of social and political relations is crucial in grasping 
how the subsidies function and what their impact is. 
As the thesis suggests, a mixed-methods approach is crucial in evaluating the impact of the 
input subsidies: impact is measured by a quantitative approach, while a qualitative approach 
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allows explanation of the quantitative results. First, we are to analyse who obtained the vouchers; 
then, what impact the input subsidy programme has had. The social and political relations between 
actors involved is important in all development programmes whose design and implementation 
are influenced by social and political agencies. A socio-political approach is therefore 
indispensable to carry out the first of these analyses, and a political economy framework enables 
the second. 
 
10.4 Implications for policy 
Social, economic and agronomic contexts and food security policies vary among SSA countries. 
Nevertheless, this thesis’s unique mixed-methods detailed study of the programme design and 
implementation of ‘market-smart’ subsidies provides generic lessons for more effective and 
efficient input subsidies which could be explored in SSA. I would suggest that if the programme 
design were carefully and clearly developed according to the local context, and its implementation 
were closely monitored and flexibly adapted to the market and social contexts, a ‘market-smart’ 
subsidy in SSA which targets poor and vulnerable households, and whose inputs are provided by 
private actors, could promote input access for poor small-scale farmers unable to buy commercial 
inputs. Such a programme could reduce poverty and food insecurity sustainably. 
There are several challenges to overcoming the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of 
subsidy programmes. The thesis argues that in order to reduce the effects of differentiation and 
displacement, input subsidies must maintain focus on their objective of improving access to inputs 
for small-scale, vulnerable farmers; and develop their design in such a way that vouchers actually 
reach this group (Ellis et al., 2009; FAO, 2015b). They can function as social protection 
programme, if targeting properly small-scale farmers. While, as Ellis and Maliro (2013) suggest, 
in targeting vulnerability to hunger, input subsidy programmes could complement social cash 
transfer programmes, with the former targeting small-scale farmers and the latter targeting 
landless, labour-less farmers. At the same time, the private sector should be promoted through 
training and the provision of credits, in order to avoid market distortion and expand the service 
area for inputs. 
If elite capture and illicit behaviour are to be eliminated, the institutional mechanisms 
used to deliver vouchers and inputs need reconsideration. One possibility would be to put in place 
improved independent programme monitoring and evaluation. For the cash transfer programmes 
to be held accountable to beneficiaries and communities, a grievance mechanism has been 
included in some programmes. ODI (2013) reports such a mechanism in all the five social transfer 
programmes under study, including the ones in Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique. Its 
implementation varies, however, as some of the beneficiaries think that receiving a cash transfer 
is among their ‘rights’ (ODI 2013: 50). In her evaluation of the cash transfer programme in 
- 195 - 
 
Indonesia, Barca (2012) mentions that the grievance mechanism is not socialised among villagers 
and suggested that socialisation was necessary in order for the programme to be accountable.  
An ex-post evaluation which identifies problems afterwards does nothing to improve the 
programme’s effectiveness or reduce inefficiencies. Independent programme monitoring and 
evaluation would improve outcomes if monitoring and evaluation are participatory, and contain 
independent ‘grievance’ mechanisms and/or use ‘action research’ which identifies errors in 
targeting to be corrected during implementation. Such actions could promote a long-term solution, 
namely the strengthening of local, especially lower-level, institutional management capacity and 
the improvement of governance at all levels. Another possibility, as piloted in Zambia and 
implemented in Nigeria, would be to provide subsidy by e-voucher, which could prevent elite 
intervention in voucher delivery. 
Considering the recent surge in input prices which has made it difficult for poor small-
scale farmers to benefit from the subsidy because of the increasing price of top-up, it would be 
better to provide commodity-denominated subsidies rather than price-denominated subsidies such 
as NAIVS. This would fit the concept of the ‘input subsidy’ which ties inputs to exchange rather 
than money. Failure to maintain this tie has meant programme implementation has differed from 
programme design in various ways, as illustrated by NAIVS. 
In order to raise the effectiveness of input use, access to credit and other productivity-
enhancing infrastructure, such as irrigation, roads and output markets, should be developed, and the 
necessary food security policies, such as policies for crop trade and import tariffs, should be 
implemented. In order for farmers to continue to use inputs, it is vital to raise the profitability of 
input use with higher maize producer prices. One way to stabilise maize producer prices would 
be to promote producers’ access to market price information so that they do not sell at prices 
suppressed by buyers in imperfect market conditions; another is a stable, government-guaranteed 
maize price in season. The establishment of farmers’ associations which collectively store and 
market maize, such as the Warehouse Receipt System (IFAD, 2012) could also help farmers to 
reduce crop storage loss and obtain better prices through collective bargaining.  
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Appendix 1. List of qualitative research activities (key-informant interviews, farmer 
group discussions and extended village meetings) 
No. Interviewee Date District Village 
1 Mr. David Rohrbach / World Bank 
officer 
15 Oct. 
2012 
Dar es 
Salaam 
 
2 Mr. Masaaki Homma / JICA officer 19 Oct. 
2012 
Dar es 
Salaam 
 
3. Mr. Yoichiro Kimata / JICA officer 19 Oct. 
2012 
Dar es 
Salaam 
 
4 Mr. Kamhabwa / MAFC officer 23 Oct. 
2012 
Dar es 
Salaam 
 
5 Prof. Kimbi / Sokoine University of 
Agriculture 
2 Nov. 2012 Morogoro Morogoro 
town 
6 Prof. Gabagambi / Sokoine University 
of Agriculture 
2 Nov. 2012 Morogoro Morogoro 
town 
7 Mr. Andrew Tarimo / Agriculture 
Officer, RS, Ruvuma 
4 Nov. 2012 Songea 
Municipality 
Songea town 
8 Mr. Nachoa M. Zacharia / Municipal 
Director 
5 Nov. 2012 Songea 
Municipality 
Songea town 
9 Mr. Helibert Filipo Tindwa / farmer 5 Nov. 2012 Songea 
District 
Matimila 
10 Mr. Francis Tindwa / Agriculture 
Officer 
6 Nov. 2012 Songea 
Municipality 
Songea town 
11 Mr. Onesmo Ngao / Agriculture Officer, 
RS Ruvuma 
7 Nov. 2012 Songea 
District 
Songea town 
12 RAPCO manager/ agro-dealer 7 Nov. 2012 Songea 
District 
Songea town 
13 NFRA officers 7 Nov. 2012 Songea 
District 
Songea town 
14 Mr. Simba / District Agriculture Officer 9 Nov. 2012 Tunduru Tunduru town 
15 Village chairman and VEO 10 Nov. 
2012 
Tunduru Nampungu 
16 M. Issa Alivo Taka / WAEO 10 Nov. 
2012 
Tunduru Nampungu 
17 Farmer group discussion 10 Nov. 
2012 
Tunduru Nampungu 
18 Ms. Amina Daudi / VEO 10 Nov. 
2012 
Tunduru Nampungu 
19 Group discussion with VVC Chairman / 
secretary / member 
11 Nov. 
2012 
Tunduru Nampungu 
20 Mr. Mohamed Athmani / lowest-income 
farmer 
11 Nov. 
2012 
Tunduru Nampungu 
21 Mr. Omari Zuberi / CUF chairman / 
highest-income farmer 
11 Nov. 
2012 
Tunduru Nampungu 
22 Mr. Mohamed Makonganya / middle- 
income farmer 
11 Nov. 
2012 
Tunduru Nampungu 
23 Manager of Namuynyu store (TFC 
agent) 
12 Nov. 
2012 
Tunduru Nampungu 
24 Mr. Issaya Tito Mbilinyi / agro-dealer 15 Nov. 
2012 
Songea Songea 
25 Village key stakeholder meeting 16 Nov. 
2012 
Mbinga Tukuzi 
26 Mr. Turuka / VAEO 16 Nov. 
2012 
Mbinga Tukuzi 
27 Mr. Ridhiki / VEO 17 Nov. 
2012 
Mbinga Tukuzi 
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28 Group discussion with Faustin and Jaiza 
Mbano/VVC chairman / member 
17 Nov. 
2012 
Mbinga Tukuzi 
29 Mr. Kelvin Emanuel / farmer 19 Nov. 
2012 
Mbinga Tukuzi 
30 Farmer group discussion 19 Nov. 
2012 
Mbinga Tukuzi 
31 Mr. Vernant Nbungu 19 Nov. 
2012 
Mbinga Tukuzi 
32 Focus Milinga / farmer 19 Nov. 
2012 
Mbinga Tukuzi 
33 Village key-stakeholder meeting 22 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
34 Ms. Ernest Ponela / VVC chairman 23 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
35 Famer group discussion 23 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
36 Mr. Saidim Suleimani / WAEO 23 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
37 Mr. Ahoye J. Mbecha / Village 
chairman 
23 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
38 Mr. Erasto Oraph Mapunda / VEO 23 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
39 Mr. Bakari Athman Kawina / WEO 26 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
40 Mr. Simon Mbecha / farmer 26 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
41 Mr. Eric Komba / farmer 26 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
42 Mr. Ally Mamba / farmer 26 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
43 Ms. Adehelma Ponela / agro-dealer 26 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
44 Mr. Bigambo Ladsiaus / MVIWATA 
(Farmer Association) officer 
27 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
Municipality 
Songea town 
45 Ms. Rosemary John Haule / agro-dealer 27 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
Municipality 
Songea town 
46 Mr. Furaha Mohamedi / SODECO 
(Sogea Development Cooperative) 
manager 
28 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
Municipality 
Songea town 
47 Mr. Siarra Daud / TFC manager 28 Nov. 
2012 
Songea 
Municipality 
Songea town 
48 Ms. Grace Aloyce Msolle/ MAFC 
officer 
2 Dec. 2012 Dar es 
Salaam 
 
49 Mr. Kamhabwa / MAFC officer 3 Dec. 2012 Dar es 
Salaam 
 
50 Dr. Msolla / MAFC manager 3 Dec. 2012 Dar es 
Salaam 
 
51 Mr. Mkangwe / MAFC officer, Ulanga 
Agricultural Research Institute 
5 Dec. 2012 Dar es 
Salaam 
 
52 Mr. Salum K. Mkumba / TFC manager 12 Dec. 
2012 
Dar es 
Salaam 
 
53 Mr. Gabriel / Ruccodia 11 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Morogoro 
54 Mr. Renatus Phiri / Village chairman 16 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Morogoro 
55 Mr. Mohamed Mohamed Ally / VEO 16 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Morogoro 
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56 VVC chairman 16 Nov. 
2012 
Namtumbo Likuyu 
57 Village chairman 18,  20  Feb. 
2013 
Namtumbo 
District 
Milayoyo 
58 Village meeting 19 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Morogoro 
59 Mr. Saidi M. Suleimani / WAEO 19 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Morogoro 
60 Mr. Ahoyer J. Mbecha / Village 
chairman 
23 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
61 Village meeting 24 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Mlete 
62 Village meeting 24 Feb. 
2013 
Namtumbo 
District 
Naikesi 
63 Village chairman 26 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Madaba 
64 Mr. Jameson Konga/WEO 26 Feb. 
2013 
Namtumbo 
District 
Ligera 
65 Mr. Rubora / WAEO 27 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Madaba 
66 VEO 27 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Madaba 
67 Mr. Imam Hassani Jaruka / VVC 
chairman 
27 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Madaba 
68 Mr. Stephen & Ms. Fiona Van Aardt / 
managers of Kisimbaguri Estates Ltd. 
27 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Madaba 
69 Mr. Emanuel Daud Mkiakasungula / 
MADABA Agrochemical (agro-dealer) 
28 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Madaba 
70 Ms. Clementina Kilumile / manager of 
Clementina Shop (agro-dealer) 
28 Feb. 
2013 
Songea 
District 
Madaba 
71 Ms. Daria Nduguru/ VVC chairman and 
Mr. Azizi Ligera / secretary, VVC 
2 Mar. 2013 Songea 
District 
Muhukuru 
Barabarani 
72 Mr. Paskal Nlanzi / Village chairman 2 Mar. 2013 Songea 
District 
Muhukuru 
Barabarani 
73 Ms. Sonia Adriani Mrops / VEO 2 Mar. 2013 Songea 
District 
Mhukuru 
Barabarani 
74 Ms. Jenitha Daud Millinga / VEO 8 Mar. 2013 Mbinga Tukuzi 
75 Mr. Isaya Marcus Kumburu / village 
chairman 
10 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Lipumba 
76 Village chairman 10 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Lupiringa 
77 Antoni Mwingira / VVC chairman 10 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Lupiringa 
78 Village chairman 12 Mar. 
2013 
Tunduru Sisi kwa sisi 
79 Mr. Ansgali Komba / VVC chairman 13 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Lipumba 
80 Village chairman 13 Mar. 
2013 
Tunduru Mbesa 
81 Mr. Michael Nduruguru / farmer 14 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Mkwaya 
82 Mr. Huaman Kisawala / VEO 15 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Mkwaya 
83 Village chairman 16 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Mkwaya 
84 Village meeting 17 Mar. 
2013 
Tunduru Wenje 
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85 Village chairman 17 Mar. 
2013 
Tunduru Mchoteka 
86 Farmer group meeting 17 Mar. 
2013 
Tunduru Mchoteka 
87 VEO 20 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Litrongi 
88 Mr. Osmund Komba / CCM secretary 21 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Litrongi 
89 Farmer 21 Mar. 
2013 
Tunduru Angalia 
90 VEO 24 Mar. 
2013 
Tunduru Chiungo 
91 VVC chairman 24 Mar. 
2013 
Tunduru Chiungo 
92 Mr. Mathuew Longiuo Kapinga / village 
chairman 
25 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Kipololo 
93 Mr. Rapahel John Chlyenga / WAEO 25 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Kipololo 
94 Village chairman 26 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Kipololo 
95 Mr. Damas Kapinga 26 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Kipololo 
96 Village meeting 26 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Namakambale 
97 VVC chairman and other farmers 26 Mar. 2- 
13 
Mbinga Namakambale 
98 Mr. John E. Nyangali / VEO 27 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Kipololo 
99 Mr. Linus A Kapinga / VVC Chairman 27 Mar. 
2013 
Mbinga Kipololo 
100 Village meeting 30 Mar. 
2013 
Tunduru Namiungo 
101 Village key stakeholder meeting 8 Apr. 2013 Mbinga Mpepai 
102 Mr. Revocatus Kyaruzi / WAEO 8 Apr. 2013 Mbinga Mpepai 
103 Mr. Ditrick H. Mapunda/ village 
chairman 
8 Apr. 2013 Mbinga Mpepai 
104 Mr. Dastan Oswad Komba / VVC 
chairman 
9 Apr. 2013 Mbinga Mpepai 
105 Mr. Korman Felix Komba / VVC 
chairman 
13 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Kingerikiti 
106 Mr. Richard Rapahel Katale / WAEO 14 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Kingerikiti 
107 Mr. Hubert Odo Hyera / elderly farmer 14 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Kingerikiti 
108 WAEO 14 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Kingerikiti 
109 VEO 15 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Kingerikiti 
110 Village chairman 15 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Kingerikiti 
111 Mr. Buana Hyera / ex-village chairman 16 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Kingerikiti 
112 Mr. Lusius Jonas Ponela / village 
chairman 
18 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Ndondo 
113 Mr. Raphael Nomba / VVC chairman 18 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Ndondo 
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114 Village stakeholder meeting 18 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Ndondo 
115 Village chairman 19 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Ndondo 
116 Mr. Mbaga Isdory Komba / village 
chairman 
22 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Mahenge 
117 VAEO 22 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Mahenge 
118 Mr. Alfred B. Hyera / VVC chairman 23 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Mahenge 
119 Mr. Sekundo H. Hyera / village 
chairman 
25 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Kitura 
120 VVC chairman 25 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Kitura 
121 Mr. Inglibert Hyera / farmer 26 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Kitura 
122 Mr. Paul Hyera / farmer 27 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Kitura 
123 Village meeting 29 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Mango 
124 Mr. Rashidi Abilahi Rashidi / WAEO 29 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Mango 
125 Mr. Joseph Ndimbo / VVC chairman 30 Apr. 
2013 
Mbinga Mango 
126 Mr. John / Techno service (Agro-NGO) 1 May 2013 Mbinga Mbinga town 
127 VAEO 2 May 2013 Mbinga Madaba 
128 Mr. M. Mbunda Andoya, Andoya 
Hydro Electric Company / agro-dealer 
4 May 2013 Mbinga Mbinga town 
129 Mr. Kamhabwa / MAFC officer - 
voucher section 
8 May 2013 Dar es 
Salaam 
 
130 Mr. M. Nyanda / MAFC Statistics Unit 
officer 
8 May 2013 Dar es 
Salaam 
 
131 Mr. David Rorbach / World Bank 
officer 
11 Jun. 2013 Dar es 
Salaam 
 
132 Dr. Msolla / MAFC Manager – voucher 
section 
13 Jun. 2013 Dar es 
Salaam 
 
133 Mr. Kamhabra / MAFC officer – 
voucher section 
9 Oct. 2013 Dar es 
Salaam 
 
134 Mr. Aretas F. Ndoro / Yara Tanzania 
Ltd. 
12 Oct. 
2013 
Dar es 
Salaam 
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Appendix 2. Checklist for qualitative interviews 
 
I. Key informant interviews 
I-1. Agricultural officer at Regional Secretariat, Ruvuma 
1. Did you know about NAIVS? If so, how did you hear about NAIVS? How was it implemented 
in Ruvuma? 
2. How were you informed about the targeting criteria for selecting beneficiaries of NAIVS? 
How were you informed about its implementation of beneficiary selection? 
3. Has NAIVS made any changes on input use of farmers in Ruvuma? 
4. Have the number of local agro-dealers for inputs increased in Ruvuma? 
5. Have the number of local agro-dealers for outputs (maize/rice) increased in Ruvuma? 
6. Did input price lower after NAIVS started in Ruvuma? 
7. Did output price lower after NAIVS started in Ruvuma? 
8. Has NAIVS had any effects on the livelihoods of farmers in Ruvuma? 
9. Has NAIVS had any other effects in Ruvuma? 
10. What did you expect from NAIVS? Were these expectations achieved? If not, what is the 
request? 
 
I-2. District Executive Director 
1. Did you know about NAIVS? If so, how did you hear about NAIVS? How was it implemented 
in this district? 
2. How were you informed about the targeting criteria for selecting beneficiaries of NAIVS? 
How were you informed about its implementation of beneficiary selection? 
3. Has NAIVS made any changes on input use of farmers in this district? 
4. Have the number of local agro-dealers for inputs increased in this district? 
5. Have the number of local agro-dealers for outputs (maize/rice) increased in this district? 
6. Did input price lower after NAIVS started in this district? Why? 
7. Did output price lower after NAIVS started in this district? Why? 
8. Has NAIVS had any effects on the livelihoods of farmers in this district? 
9. Has NAIVS had any other effects in this district? 
10. What did you expect from NAIVS? Were these expectations achieved? If not, what is the 
request? 
 
I-3. District Agriculture and Livestock Development Officer 
1. How were you informed about NAIVS? How was NAIVS implemented? 
2. How were you informed about the targeting criteria for selecting beneficiaries of NAIVS? 
How were you informed about its implementation of beneficiary selection? 
3. Has NAIVS made any changes on input use of farmers in this district? 
4. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice productivity of recipient farmers in this district? 
5. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice production of recipient farmers in this district? 
6. Have the number of local agro-dealers for inputs increased in this district? 
7. Have the number of local agro-dealers for outputs (maize/rice) increased in this district? 
8. Did input price lower after NAIVS started in this district? Why? 
9. Did output price lower after NAIVS started in this district? Why? 
10. Has NAIVS had any effects on the livelihoods of farmers in this district? 
11. Has NAIVS had any other effects in this district? 
12. What did you expect from NAIVS? Were these expectations achieved? If not, what could it be 
implemented better? 
 
I-4. Agricultural extension officers 
1. How were you informed about NAIVS? How was NAIVS implemented? 
2. How were you informed about the targeting criteria for selecting beneficiaries of NAIVS? 
How were you informed about its implementation of beneficiary selection? 
3. Has NAIVS made any changes on input use of farmers? 
4. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice productivity of recipient farmers? 
5. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice production of recipient farmers? 
6. Did you train farmers / agro-dealers on how to use subsidized inputs? If not, who trained? 
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7. Have the number of local agro-dealers for inputs increased? 
8. Have the number of local agro-dealers for outputs (maize/rice) increased? 
9. Did input price lower after NAIVS started? Why? 
10. Did output price lower after NAIVS started? Why? 
11. Has NAIVS had any effects on the livelihoods of farmers? 
12. Has NAIVS had any other effects? 
13. What did you expect from NAIVS? Were these expectations achieved? If not, what could it be 
implemented better? 
 
I-5. Famer associations/cooperatives 
1. How were you informed about NAIVS? How was NAIVS implemented? 
2. How were you informed about the targeting criteria for selecting beneficiaries of NAIVS? 
How were you informed about its implementation of beneficiary selection? 
3. Has NAIVS made any changes on input use of farmers? 
4. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice productivity of recipient farmers? 
5. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice production of recipient farmers? 
6. How did NAIVS relate to your activities? 
7. Did you train farmers / agro-dealers on how to use subsidized inputs? If not, who trained them? 
8. Have the number of local agro-dealers for inputs increased? 
9. Have the number of local agro-dealers for outputs (maize/rice) increased? 
10. Did input price lower after NAIVS started? Why? 
11. Did output price lower after NAIVS started? Why? 
12. Has NAIVS had any effects on the livelihoods of farmers? 
13. Has NAIVS had any other effects? 
14. What did you expect from NAIVS? Were these expectations achieved? If not, what could it be 
implemented better? 
 
I-6. Agro-dealers 
1. How were you informed about NAIVS? How was NAIVS implemented? 
2. How were you informed about the targeting criteria for selecting beneficiaries of NAIVS? 
How were you informed about its implementation of beneficiary selection? 
3. Has NAIVS made any changes on input use of farmers? 
4. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice productivity of recipient farmers? 
5. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice production of recipient farmers? 
6. How did you relate to NAIVS? Did you distribute and buy vouchers from farmers? 
7. Did you train farmers / agro-dealers on how to use subsidized inputs? If not, who trained them? 
8. Have the number of local agro-dealers for inputs increased? 
9. Have the number of local agro-dealers for outputs (maize/rice) increased? 
10. Did input price lower after NAIVS started? Why? 
11. Did output price lower after NAIVS started? Why? 
12. Has NAIVS had any effects on the livelihoods of farmers? 
13. Has NAIVS had any other effects? 
14. What did you expect from NAIVS? Were these expectations achieved? If not, what could it be 
implemented better? 
 
I-7. District Voucher Committee members 
1. How were you selected as DVC members? How were you informed about NAIVS? Did you 
go to seminars/ training? 
2. How was NAIVS implemented? How is the mechanism for voucher distribution and 
redemption? How did you monitor / relate to VVCs? 
3. What are the targeting criteria for selecting beneficiaries of NAIVS? Was it implemented 
accordingly? 
4. Has NAIVS made any changes on input use of farmers? 
5. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice productivity of recipient farmers? 
6. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice production of recipient farmers? 
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7. Have the number of local agro-dealers for inputs increased? 
8. Have the number of local agro-dealers for outputs (maize/rice) increased? 
9. Did input price lower after NAIVS started? Why? 
10. Did output price lower after NAIVS started? Why? 
11. Has NAIVS had any effects on the livelihoods of farmers? 
12. Has NAIVS had any other effects? 
13. What did you expect from NAIVS? Were these expectations achieved? If not, how could it be 
implemented better? 
 
I-8. Village Executive Officers and Village leaders 
1. How were you informed about NAIVS? How was NAIVS implemented? 
2. How were you informed about the targeting criteria for selecting beneficiaries of NAIVS? 
How were you informed about its implementation of beneficiary selection? 
3. Has NAIVS made any changes on input use of farmers in the village? 
4. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice productivity of recipient farmers in the village? 
5. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice production of recipient farmers in the village? 
6. Have the number of local agro-dealers for inputs increased in the village? 
7. Have the number of local agro-dealers for outputs (maize/rice) increased in the village? 
8. Did input price lower after NAIVS started in this village? Why? 
9. Did output price lower after NAIVS started in this village? Why? 
10. Has NAIVS had any effects on the livelihoods of farmers in this village? 
11. Has NAIVS had any other effects? 
12. What did you expect from NAIVS? Were these expectations achieved? If not, how could it be 
implemented better? 
 
I-9. Village Voucher Committee members 
1. How were you selected as VVC members? How were you informed about NAIVS? Did you 
go to seminars/ training? 
2. How was NAIVS implemented? What is the mechanism of beneficiary selection, recording 
and them, and reporting to DVC? 
3. What are the targeting criteria for selecting beneficiaries of NAIVS? Was it implemented 
accordingly? 
4. Has NAIVS made any changes on input use of farmers in the village? 
5. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice productivity of recipient farmers in the village? 
6. Has NAIVS increased maize/rice production of recipient farmers in the village? 
7. Have the number of local agro-dealers for inputs increased in the village? 
8. Have the number of local agro-dealers for outputs (maize/rice) increased in the village? 
9. Did input price lower after NAIVS started in this village? Why? 
10. Did output price lower after NAIVS started in this village? Why? 
11. Has NAIVS had any effects on the livelihoods of farmers in this village? 
12. Has NAIVS had any other effects? 
13. What did you expect from NAIVS? Were these expectations achieved? If not, how could it be 
implemented better? 
 
 
II. Farmer group interviews 
 
II-1. Recipients 
1. Why did you decide to take vouchers? 
2. Did the subsidized inputs make profitable compared to the costs? 
3. How do you think of allocation of vouchers? How do you think about its implementation 
process of NAIVS? 
4. Did you change input use from commercial source after receipt of NAIVS? If you increased 
it, was it found to be profitable? 
5. Have you changed your livelihood after introduction of NAIVS? If so, how? 
6. Has NAIVS had any other effects in the village? 
7. Has NAIVS improved your living? If so, how? 
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8. What did you expect from NAIVS? Were these expectations achieved? If not, what is the 
request? 
 
II-2. Non-recipients 
1. Did you know about NAIVS? If so, from which source and how were you informed? Were 
you selected as beneficiaries? If so, why did you not decided to take vouchers? 
2. How do you think about the subsidized inputs? Do you think it makes profitable compared to 
the costs? Do you think that NAIVS improved their living of recipient farmers? 
3. How do you think of allocation of vouchers? How do you think about its implementation 
process of NAIVS in your village? 
4. Did you change any input use from commercial sources after introduction of NAIVS? If you 
increased it, why? Did you find it profitable compared to costs? 
5. Have you changed your livelihood after the time of introduction of NAIVS to your village? 
6. Has NAIVS had any other effects in the village? 
7. What did you expect from NAIVS?  Do you have any request to NAIVS to be 
changed/improved? 
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mbo 
District Code 
1=Songea rural 
2=Tunduru 
3=Mbinga 
4=Namtumbo 
Village code 
1=Mlete 
2=Muhukuru_Barabarani 
3=Morogoro 
4=Madaba 
5=Sisi kwa sisi 
6=Namiungo 
7=Namakambale 
8=Tuwemacho 
9=Chiungo 
10=Angalia1 
11=Mchesi 
12=Wenje 
13=Mchoteka 
14=Mbesa 
15=Kitanda 
16=Nampungu 
17=Namakungwa 
18=Litorongi 
19=Lipumba 
20=Mkwaya 
21=Ndondo 
22=Chiulu/Chiula 
23=Kingerikiti 
24=Kibandai ‘A’ 
25=Mango 
26=Langiro Asili 
27=Mahenge 
28=Tukuzi 
29=Ulolela 
30=Kipololo 
31=Mpepai 
32=Kitura 
33=Ligera 
34=Mlilayoyo 
35=Naikesi 
36=Likuyu/Sekam 
anga 
Appendix 3. Household survey questionnaire 
 
Panel survey for Ruvuma 2013 
(To be answered by household head or most knowledgeable 
household member)* 
 
 
Date of interview:  day  month  year 
 
 
 District Ward Village Name of 
household head 
Recipient (1) / 
Non-recipient HH 
(2) 
Name      
Code      
Note: Ward and village code are the same 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: To identify the household, use the name of the household head of last time and 
the corresponding code from the village list drawn up in 2009. 
 
 
 Name Code/id 
number 
Respondent (use code from household roster)   
Enumerator   
Supervisor   
Data enterer   
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Note to Enumerator – please use following codes throughout the questionnaire 
 99 if the respondent does not know, does not remember or refuses to answer 
(in other words answer is not necessarily zero) 
 88=Not Applicable (question irrelevant for the respondent) 
 In all other cases blanks or empty spaces will be interpreted as zeros 
 
 
 
Whenever during the interview the respondent refers to local units (bags, tins, debe, pishi, 
etc., make 
sure to return to this page and record or estimate in kilograms the weight, or in liters the 
content of the local units used by this particular respondent for this particular product. 
 
Remember 1Ha=2.47 acres 
 
Product Local unit Weight in kgs Content in liters 
    
    
    
    
LOCAL UNIT CONVERSION CHART 
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1. Household information 
First, please write the names of the household member list in 2009 in (A2). Then please write 
the new household member names in (A2). Ask who is the current household head and put 1 
for him/her. 
(A1) 
ID 
(A2) 
Household member name 
(A3) Current 
household 
head 
Put 1 for 
household 
head 
(A4) Sex 
1=Male 
2=Female 
(A5) 
Age 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
8     
9     
10     
11     
12     
13     
14     
15     
 
2. Receipt of input voucher 
 
V3. Were any household members selected as eligible for a voucher in the following years? 
(1=yes, 2=no) 
 
2012/13 
(A) 
2011/12 
(B) 
2010/11 
(C) 
2009/10 
(D) 
2008/9 
(E) 
     
 
V4. Did they receive any voucher in these years? (1=yes, 2=no) 
 
2012/13 
(A) 
2011/12 
(B) 
2010/11 
(C) 
2009/10 
(D) 
2008/9 
(E) 
     
 
Note: Look at the 1st column of the 1st page whether this household is recipient 
sample HH or non-recipient sample HH. 
 
If the household is non-recipient sample household and if yes in any column in V4, 
stop the survey. If not go to section A. 
 
If the household is recipient sample household, look at the answer for 2008/9 
year. 
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We would like to ask you some questions about your household. We consider someone a member of the household if they usually live and eat in the household and all 
persons who were members of the household during our last visit (i.e. Mar 2009). First we would like to ask you who is still the member of the household and ask some 
questions. 
(A1) 
ID 
(A2) 
Name 
(A4) Is 
[NAME] 
1=still a 
member of the 
household, 
2=not member 
of the 
household, 3= 
new 
household 
member 
 
If 1 or 3 go to 
A8. 
 
If 2, go to A5; 
(A5) If 
[NAME] is no 
longer a 
member of the 
household, 
What has 
happened? 
1=died 
2=married and 
moved 
3=moved to 
live on his 
own 
4=divorced 
5=other 
(specify) 
(A6) 
If the [NAME] 
moved, Where did 
[NAME] move to? 
1=within the 
district; 
2=to another 
district within the 
region; 
3= regional capital; 
4=another region in 
TZ; 
5=to Dar es 
Salaam; 
6=to another 
country 
7=others 
(A8) Relationship to head of the 
household 
2=First spouse 
3=Child of head and first spouse 
4=child of head only 
5=child of first spouse only 
6=grandchild 
7= Niece, nephew 
8=Parent or parent in law 
9= brother/sister or brother/sister in law 
10=daughter  or son in law 
11=adopted child 
12=Second wife/husband 
13=Third wife / husband 
14=child of head and second wife 
15=child of second wife/husband only 
16=child of third wife / husband only 
17=other (specify) 
(A9) 
Marital status (if 
 15 years old) 
1=unmarried 
2=married 
3=separated/divor 
ced 
4=widowed 
5=other 
88=N/A 
(A10) 
For how many 
months has 
[NAME] been 
absent during the 
past year? (Zero if 
less than 1 month) 
(A11) 
Health status 
1=good 
2=average 
3=not good 
4=others 
(specify) 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
11         
12         
13         
14         
15         
16         
A. Household roster –demographic characteristics, education and health 
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Note for enumerators. We now continue with some further questions about the CURRENT household members above 5 years old. To limit mistakes, repeat 
ALL household names listed above and indicate which ones are still present! Then proceed with follow up questions for the current members above 5 years old. 
(A1) 
ID 
(A2) 
Name (repeat names of household 
members listed above) 
(A12)For members 
Highest grade completed 
0=pre-school 
1=Standard 1, 2=Standard 2, …, 8=Standard 8 
9=course after primary educ. 
10=Form I 
11=Form II 
12=Form III 
13=Form IV 
14=course after second. educ. 
15=Form V 
16=Form VI 
17=Course after Form VI 
18=Diploma course 
19=Other certificate 
20=Some but not finished university 
21=Completed University Degree 
22=Adult education only 
23=No education 
For household members of 15 years or older, is [NAME] 
an elected position 
1=village chairman 
2=Kitongoji chair 
3=10 cell leader 
4=member of village council 
5=village execution officer 
6=village voucher committee 
7=none of the above 
a member in a primary 
society, sacco, vicoba, 
funeral society, or other 
economic group 
 
1=yes 
2=no 
A member in a religious, 
youth, women\s or other 
social group 
 
1=yes 
2=no 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
10      
11      
12      
13      
14      
15      
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ID 
(from 
A1) 
Household 
member Name 
[repeat all names 
from Section A 
except children 5 
or below] be sure 
that ID numbers 
correspond with 
those in section 
A. 
Main activity (time spent) Second main activity (time spent) If none of the two main activities mentioned in 
the previous two questions involved work on 
own farm, then how many months did NAME 
spend on the family farm last year 
(Answer only if main or secondary activity is 
NOT self employment in agriculture or livestock) 
 If codes 1-5 or 14 in col (B3)  If codes 1-5 in col (B6) 
In the past year (2012) or during 
the time he/she was a member of 
this household if not member for 
the whole year, [NAME] spent 
most of his/her time as (see 
activity code below)? 
What is 
sector of 
employmen 
t? (see code 
below) 
How many months 
were spent in the past 
year (2012) doing this 
activity? (Use half 
months if needed) 
Last year (2012), 
[NAME’s] spent 
second most of 
his/her time while a 
member of the 
household as? 
Activity code 
What 
is 
sector 
of 
employ 
ment? 
How many 
months were spent 
past year (2012) 
doing this 
activity? 
(Use fraction of 
months if 
needed)) 
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6) (B7) (B8) (B9) 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
Activity code 
1=regular wage earner in private sector 
2=regular wage earner in public sector 
3=irregular wage earner 
4=self employed w/o employees 
5=unpaid family worker 
6=student 
7=looking for work 
8=not working and not looking for work 
9=household work 
10=retired, pensioner 
11=too old, too young 
12=disabled 
13=other 
14=self employed with employees 
Sector of employment 
Primary sector 
1=agriculture 
2=fishing 
3=livestock 
4=mining and quarrying 
5=other primary 
17=forestry 
 
Industrial sector 
6=manufacturing/production/crafts 
7=construction 
8=other industry 
9=processing 
Service sector and government 
10=wholesale/retail/shop 
11=restaurant/food preparation 
12=repair work 
13=transport, storage and communication 
14=banking, finance, real estate and business 
15=public service, army, education, health 
16=other service and government 
B. Activities of Household Members aged more than 5 years 
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How much income (cash and in kind) have the different household members  ( 5 years old) received from non-farm activities over the past year (2012)? If the 
individual was not a member of the household for the full year, list only their income during the time they were a member. 
D1. 
Hous 
ehold 
mem 
ber 
ID 
(from 
A1) 
D2. Household 
member Name 
[repeat all names of 
household members 
listed in Section B], 
D3. Total wages (in cash and 
in kind) received in all 
regular wage jobs  (‘000 Tsh) 
D4. Total wages received (in 
cash and in kind) in occasional 
wage jobs (‘000 Tsh) 
D5. Total net income from 
non-farm business 
(‘000Tsh) (N.B. have to 
calculate from investment 
and gross income if they 
are doing their own 
business) 
D6. Total 
amount of 
pensions 
received 
(‘000 Tsh) 
D8. Total amount received from all 
kinds of State and other institutional 
assistance (e.g. NGO), except 
pensions (‘000Tsh) 
D9. Total amount 
received or 
brought back as 
remittances (‘000 
Tsh) 
D10. Total amount 
received as gifts 
from neighbours, 
relatives, family, 
etc (‘000 Tsh). 
In cash Value in kind In cash Value in kind Investment Gross 
income 
In cash Value in kind In cash Value in kind 
(D1) (D2) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (D6) (A) (B)   
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
Note: D3B : 
D4B : 
D7B : 
D9 : 
D. NON-FARM INCOME 
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 A. Amount B. Unit 
(1=ha; 
2=acre) 
G1. What is the total amount of land your household 
owns now? 
  
G2. Among household members who (list ID no. from 
A1) owns* land? State the size of land each person has? 
(if more than two people have one land, put them in one 
column) 
 
1)   
2)   
3)   
4)   
5)   
G3. What is the total amount of land your household 
cultivated (both owned & rented) during the last 
cropping season (2011-2012)? 
  
*’owning land’ includes either owning land or owning products from the land. 
 
 
 A. 
Amoun 
t 
B. Unit 
(1=ha; 
2=acre) 
C. 
Value/ 
Rent 
(000 
TSH) 
G4. Did HH buy/receive any 
agricultural land over the past four 
years? 1=yes, bought 2=yes received as 
gift; 3=received from village or govt; 
4=inherited 5= not bought or received 
 G5. If bought or 
received, state 
amount and 
value: 
   
G6. Did HH sell/give away any 
agricultural land over the past 4 years? 
1=yes, sold, 2=yes gave as gift; 3=gave 
to village or govt; 4=did not sell; 5= not 
sold or gave away 
 G7. If sold/given 
away, state 
amount and 
value; 
   
G8. Did HH rent in any land for 
agriculture during the past cropping 
season? 1=yes, 2=no 
 G9. If rented, 
state amount and 
rent paid 
   
G10. Did HH rent out any land for 
agriculture during the past cropping 
seasons? 1=yes, 2=no 
 G11. If rented, 
state amount and 
rent received 
   
G. AGRICULTURAL LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE (CROP PRODUCTION) 
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Parcels operated during last cropping season (2011- 2012) We would now like to ask you about your last year’s crop, in particular how many 
parcels you operated, the characteristics of these parcels, what you grew on them, how much inputs you used on them etc. 
 
Note: 1) G18 total = G3 in page 18 2) 1 km= 1,000 m, 1 mile=1.6 km 
 
 
Parcel 
numbe 
r 
G18. Size G19. 
Distance 
from HH 
compoun 
d (km) (0 
if next to 
compoun 
d) 
G28.Wha 
t is the 
general 
slope of 
the 
parcel 
1=very 
steep 
2=gentle 
slope 
3=mostly 
flat 
G29. Is 
land 
parcel: 
1=fully 
owned 
by HH 
2=partly 
owned 
by HH 
3=under 
long term 
leasehold 
4=Rente 
d 
5= other 
G50. If 
the 
parcel 
is 
owned 
by HH, 
is it 
owned 
by 
which 
membe 
r? 
(Specif 
y 
name) 
G51. 
By 
which 
HH 
membe 
r is this 
parcel 
mainly 
cultivat 
ed? 
(name- 
Specify 
) 
G30. 
Soil 
quality 
1=Goo 
d 
2=Medi 
um 
3=Poor 
G31. 
Distance 
from 
nearest 
all 
weather 
road 
G32. What kind of 
improvements does 
this plot have such as 
bunding, terracing, or 
mulching 
1=rock bunds 
2=soil bunds 
3=mulching 
4=terraces 
5=grass lines 
6=other 
7=none 
G33. 
Irrigated? 
1=yes; 2=no 
G34. If yes, 
state type of 
irrigation 
1=gravitation 
irrigation/floo 
ding 
2=sprinkler 
3=drip 
irrigation 
G35. How was 
the land 
cultivated last 
year 
1=by hand 
2=by animal 
traction 
3=by tractor 
4=was not 
cultivated 
(fallow) 
5=other 
(A) 
Amoun 
t 
(B) 
Unit 
1=ha 
2=acr 
es 
(1) (2) 
P1               
P2               
P3               
P4               
P5               
P6               
P7               
P8               
P9               
P10               
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
G17. How many parcels of land did you operate (includes rented land) this past year (2011- 2012)? 
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For each of the parcels answer the following questions regarding the crops cultivated last year (2011-2012) in each parcel (follow sequence 
of plots indicated above). 
G36. 
Parcel 
No 
Repea 
t the 
parcel 
numbe 
rs 
from 
above 
G37. Type 
of 
cultivation 
1=mono- 
crop 
2=mixed 
crop 
G38. 
Crop code 
(if mixed, repeat parcel 
number and list crop 
names 
G39. 
Number of trees if 
applicable 
G40. Production last year of 
each crop 
G41. 
crop 
damage due 
to 
pest/insect 
attacks? 
1=none 
2=little 
3=somewha 
t 
4=a lot 
G42 
Pesticides 
used? 
 
1=yes 
2=no 
G43 
Organic 
fertilizer 
used? 
1=yes 
2=no 
If no go 
to next 
parcel 
G44. If yes in 
G43, what was 
used? 
1.=manure 
2.=compost, 
3.=others 
(specify) 
G45. If used, how 
much was used? 
(code below) 
Crop 1 
(A) 
Crop 2 
(B) 
Crop 
1 
Crop 
2 
Crop 
3 
Tree 1 
(A) 
Tree 2 
(B) 
Amou 
nt 
Unit Amou 
nt 
Unit A. Amou 
nt 
B.    
Unit 
(A) (B) (C) Na 
me. 
No. Na 
me 
No. (1) (2) (1) (2) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
P1                   
P2                   
P3                   
P4                   
P5                   
P6                   
P7                   
P8                   
P9                   
P10                   
 
 
Units for production (G40) 
1=kg 
2=liter 
3=100kg bags 
4=20kg tins/debe 
5=5kg tins 
6=bunch (specify weight in front) 
7=root bag (specify weight in front) 
8=cups (specify weight in front) 
9=pieces 
10=others (specify) 
 
 
Fertilizer units (G45) 
1=cows 
2=chickens 
3=other animals (specify) 
4=kg 
5=lter 
6=others (specify). 
Crop code (G38) 16=pumpkin 32=paprika  
1=maize 17=carrottes 33=soya beans 
2=beans 18=sweet pepper 34=others 
3=coffee 19=cabbage  Tree (G39) 
4=banana 20=other vegetables  1=mango 
5=millet 21=simsim (sesame)  2=abocado 
6=sorghum 22=peas  3=banana 
7=wheat 23=castor oil  4=timber tree 
8=rice 24=sugar cane  5=lemon 
9=cassava 25=papaya  6=orange 
10=yams 26=other fruit  7=others (specify) 
11=sweet potatoe 27=others, specify   
12=Irish potatoe 28=tobacco   
13=groundnuts 29=cashew   
14=onions 30=sunflower   
15=tomatoes 31=avocado   
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Answer fertilizer in last 
year 
G36 
. 
Parc 
el 
No 
Rep 
eat 
the 
parc 
el 
num 
bers 
from 
abov 
e 
G46 Amount of fertilizer (kg) used G47 Of those of which G46 obtained from input voucher G48 Seeds (kg) used G49 Of G48 obtained 
from input voucher 
Urea 
(A) 
Phosphorus fertilizer 
(B) 
1. NPK 
2. SA 
3. CAN 
Select (C) 
Urea 
(A) 
Phosphorus fertilizer 
(B) 
1. NPK 
2. SA 
3. CAN 
Select (C) 
Traditional 
(A) 
Modern 
(B) 
Modern 
Amount Unit 
(cod 
e 
belo 
w) 
1=D 
AP 
2=M 
RP 
(Mi 
njin 
gu) 
Amoun 
t 
Uni 
t 
(co 
de) 
Ty 
pe 
Am 
oun 
t 
Unit 
(cod 
e) 
Am 
ount 
Unit 
(cod 
e 
belo 
w) 
1=D 
AP 
2= 
MR 
P 
(Mi 
njin 
gu) 
Amount Unit 
(cod 
e 
belo 
w) 
Ty 
pe 
Am 
ount 
Unit 
(cod 
e) 
Am 
ount 
Unit 
(cod 
e) 
1=OP 
V 
2=hyb 
rid 
3=oth 
er 
Am 
ount 
Unit 
(cod 
e) 
1=OP 
V 
2=hyb 
rid 
3=oth 
er 
Amou 
nt 
Unit 
(code) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
P1                         
P2                         
P3                         
P4                         
P5                         
P6                         
P7                         
P8                         
P9                         
P1 
0 
                        
 
Units 
1=kg 
2=liter 
3=100kg bags 
4=20kg tins/debe 
5=5kg tins 
6=bunch (specify weight in front) 
7=root bag (specify weight in front) 
8=cups (specify weight in front) 
9=pieces 
10=others (specify) 
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G54. What was the production and sales of main annual crops in the past year (2011-2012)? (Answer all the produced crops. State units and conversion rates to 
kg in the local unit conversion table). If some products haven’t been completely harvested, give estimated total production. Note: F+H+J+K=D 
 A. Produced in 
the past year 
2011-2012? 
1=yes 
2=no 
D. 
Total 
production 
E. Units for 
production 
and sales 
(apply to all 
cols) 
F. Amt sold G. Total 
value of sales 
(Tsh. 000) 
H. Amt used for 
household 
consumption 
I. Month the bulk of the 
crop was harvested 
(1=Jan, 2=Feb, …, 
10=Oct, 11=Nov, 12=Dec 
J. Estimated 
loss since 
harvest due to 
drying, 
rats/mice, pests 
K. Amt still 
stored 
Maize          
Beans          
Coffee Arabica          
Banana          
Millet          
Sorghum          
Wheat          
Rice          
Cassava          
Yams          
sweet potatoes          
Irish potatoe          
Groundnuts          
Onions          
Tomatoes          
other Vegetables          
Sunflower          
Peas          
Castor oil          
Sugar cane          
trees for timber or firewood          
Papaya          
Other fruit          
Tobacco          
Cashew          
Simsim          
Paprika          
Other product (code from prev. 
page) G39 
         
 
Unit code 
1=kg 
2=liter 
3=100kg bags 
4=20kg tins 
5=5kg tins 
6=bunch (specify weight in front) 
7=root bag (specify weight in front) 
8=cups (specify weight in front) 
9=pieces 
10=other (specify)   
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Planting this seasonyear (2012 – 2013) 
Please list all the parcels from above, and indicate the crop planted on each parcel this seasonyear (2012 – 2013), as well as the inputs used. 
G17a. How many parcels of land do you operate (includes rented land) this season (2012-13)?  
Parcel 
numbe 
r 
G18a. Size G52. Do you cultivate this 
parcel this seasonyear? 
1=yes; 
2=no 
G53. Crop code 
(if no crop, put zero), if mixed, indicate all the crops 
(A) 
Amo 
unt 
(B) 
Unit 
1=ha 
2=acres 
Crop 1(1) Crop 2(2) Crop 3(3) 
P1       
P2       
P3       
P4       
P5       
P6       
P7       
P8       
P9       
P10       
P11       
P12       
P13       
P14       
 
Crop code 10=yams 20=other vegetables 32=paprika 
1=maize 11=sweet potatoe 21=simsim (sesame) 33=soya beans 
2=beans 12=Irish potatoe 22=peas 34=others 
3=coffee 13=groundnuts 23=castor oil  
4=banana 14=onions 24=sugar cane  
5=millet 15=tomatoes 25=papaya  
6=sorghum 16=pumpkin 26=other fruit  
7=wheat 17=carrottes 27=others, specify  
8=rice 18=sweet pepper 28=tobacco  
9=cassava 19=cabbage 29=cashew  
  30=sunflower  
  31=avocado  
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We would now like to ask you some questions about your experience in input voucher for fertilizer and seeds. 
 
V1. Do you know that the government has distributed fertilizer and/or seed vouchers ? (1=yes; 2=no) 
If yes, go to V2.  If no, go to V3. 
 
V2. If yes, how did you learn about it? 
(1=village council; 2=radio; 3=neighbour; 4=extension agent; 5=input trader; 6= other, specify) 
 
2012/13        (this year)     2011/12 (last year) 
V3a 
 
 
V4aa 
 
V4ba 
 
 
 
 
 
V6a 
 
V7a 
V. INPUT VOUCHER 
V3 Were any household members selected for the voucher 
in this year? (1=yes; 2=no) If no, go to next year. 
1= Yes 
2=No 
 Urea 
A 
DAP 
B 
Minjingu 
C 
Maize 
improve
d seeds 
D. 
Rice 
improved 
seeds E. 
V4a. If yes in V3, select input type they received voucher 
(1=yes; 2=no). 
     
V4b.  If yes in V4a, who got vouchers (list ID No. from A1), for each input?  (select 1=yes; 2=no) 
1)      
2)      
3)      
4)      
5)      
V6. What was the subsidy value per voucher each selected 
person received (‘000 TSH)? 
     
V7. Did the person use it for either maize/rice production ? (1=yes, 2=no) If no, go to V8. If yes, go to V12. (answer it 
for each person) 
1)      
2)      
3)      
4)      
5)      
 
1= Yes 
2= No 
Urea 
A. 
DAP 
B. 
Minjin 
gu 
C. 
Maize 
improved 
seeds 
D. 
Rice 
impro 
ved 
seeds 
E. 
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2012/13         (this year      2011/12 (last year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urea 
A. 
 
DAP 
B 
Minji 
ngu C. 
Maize 
improved 
seeds D 
Rice 
impr
oved 
seeds 
E 
  
Ure
a 
A. 
 
DAP 
B 
Minjin 
gu C 
Maize 
improved 
seeds D 
Rice 
improv
ed 
seeds E 
V8. If the person did use vouchers other than buying the stated good (urea, dap or minjingu, seeds), what did the 
person do with them (answer it for each person). If you answer 3, go to V9, if you answer either 4 or 5 go to V11, if 
you answer others go to next crop or V12: 
1=She/he returned it, 2=She/he gave them away, 3=She/he used it for other agricultural production than maize/rice, 
4=She/he used it to buy the other “voucher”goods (fertilizer/seed), 5=She/he used it to pay for other purchases or 
sold it, 6=others (specify) 
V8a  
1)            
2)            
3)            
4)            
5)            
V9. If the person used it for agricultural production, for what agricultural products did she/he use it? 
1=Coffee, 2=Cashewnuts, 3=Tobacco, 4=Other crops (specify) 
V9a  
1)            
2)            
3)            
4)            
5)            
V10. If the person used voucher for other products, why did she/he do? 
1=voucher was delayed, 2=it brings more income, 3=these products are not important for this 
place; 4=others (specify) 
  V10 
a 
 
V11. If the person used it for other purchases or for resale, how much did the person get per voucher? (‘000 TSH) 
(state the value for each person) 
V11 
a 
 
1)            
2)            
3)            
4)            
5)            
V12. 
A. Did you hear that people sold vouchers to other people? (1=yes, 2=no) 
B. If yes, was it many (1=many; 2=some; 3=few) 
A B V12 
a 
A B 
Go to next year. Go to nex year 
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2010/11              2009/10 
V3c 
 
 
 
 
 
V4ac 
 
V4bc 
 
 
 
 
 
V6c 
 
V7c 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V8c 
V3b. Were any household members selected for the voucher 
in this year? (1=yes; 2=no) If no, go to next year. 
1= Yes 
2=No 
 Ure
a 
A 
DA
P 
B 
Minji 
ngu C 
Maize 
improv
ed 
seeds 
D. 
Rice 
improved 
seeds E. 
V4ab. If yes in V3, select input type they received voucher 
(1=yes; 2=no). 
     
V4bb.  If yes in V4a, who were selected? (list ID No. from A1), for each input select 1=yes; 2=no) 
1)      
2)      
3)      
4)      
5)      
V6b. What was the subsidy value per voucher each selected 
person received (‘000 TSH)? 
     
V7b. Did the person use it for either maize/rice production ? (1=yes, 2=no) If no, go to V8b. If yes, go to V12b. (answer 
it for each person) 
1)      
2)      
3)      
4)      
5)      
V8b. If the person did use vouchers other than to buy the stated good (urea, dap or minjingu, seeds), what did the person 
do with them (answer it for each person). If you answer 3, go to V9, if you answer either 4 or five go to V11b, if you 
answer others go to next crop or V12b: 
1=She/he returned it, 2=She/he gave them away, 3=She/he used it for other agricultural production than maize/rice, 
4=She/he used it to buy the other “voucher”goods (fertilizer/seed), 5=She/he used it to pay for other purchases or sold it, 
6=others (specify) 
1)      
2)      
3)      
4)      
5)      
 
1= Yes 
2= No 
Ure
a 
A. 
DA
P 
B. 
Minjin 
gu C. 
Maize 
improved 
seeds 
D
. 
Rice 
improved 
seeds E. 
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2010/11 2009/10 
V9c 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V10c 
 
 
V11c 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V12c 
 
 
 
Go to next year. 
 
If the person used the voucher to buy fertilizer or seeds, 
 2012/1
3 (A) 
2011/
12 (B) 
2010/
11 (C) 
2009/10 
(D) 
2008/9 
(E) 
V13. Where did the person buy them? 
1=in the village; 2=in the district town; 3= other, specify 
     
V14. Did the person receive any technical advice on how to use any of these 
three inputs? (1=yes; 2=no) 
     
V15. If yes in V14, who gave technical advice? 
1=government, 2=Cooperative/primary society; 3=Donor or other publicly 
funded project, 4=Processing company; 5=Farmers’s group; 6=private; 
7=others 
     
V9b. If the person used it for agricultural production, for what agricultural products did she/he use it? 
1=Coffee, 2=Cashewnuts, 3=Tobacco, 4=Other crops (specify) 
1)      
2)      
3)      
4)      
5)      
V10b. If the person used voucher for other products, why did she/he do? 
1=voucher was delayed, 2=it brings more income, 3=these products are not important for this area; 
4=others (specify) 
  
V11b. If the person used it for other purchases or for resale, how much did the person get per voucher? (‘000 TSH) (state 
the value for each person) 
1)      
2)      
3)      
4)      
5)      
V12b. 
A. Have you hear that people sold vouchers to other people? (1=yes, 2=no) 
B. If yes, was it many (1=many; 2=some; 3=few) 
A B 
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B 
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V16. If the selected person did not buy inputs when they were selected for the voucher, why they did not buy inputs? (multiple answers possible) 
I wanted to buy inputs, but: 
1=I did not have cash and did not have anybody / credit organizations to lend me money to pay top-up 
2=I did not have cash and did not want to take credit to pay top up 
3=I did not have cash and could not take credit to pay the top up; 
4=I did not have cash and could not find credit to pay the top up; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I did not want to buy inputs, for: 
5=I don’t think putting this amount of fertilizer will increase the yields sufficiently to be profitable 
6=I don’t think the maize or rice prices will be high enough to pay back the investment 
7=If the weather is bad, I won’t be able to pay back the loan 
8=The top up price was too high 
9=There was not good agro-dealers in the village 
10=There was not good administration of vouchers in the village 
11=I had already planted my crops 
12=I had already put fertilizer on my crops 
13=there was not sufficient guidance on how to use the package best 
14=others ... specify 
 
V17. If you have received voucher, did input voucher increased your agricultural production? (1=yes; 2=no) 
V18. If you have received voucher, did input voucher improved your life?  (1=yes; 2=no) 
V19. If yes in V18, what did it improve? (1= house improved; 2= food increased; 3=things in the house bought (specify things); 4=helped children to go to school; 
5=others (specify) 
 
 
V20. What is the problem of voucher programme, e.g. corruption, favouritism, etc.? Your opinion about input voucher. 
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How much of various inputs did you use and buy for the production of last year (2011-2012)’s crop? 
 A. 
Used 
last 
year 
1=yes 
2=no; 
if no, 
go to 
F for 
non 
blocke 
d   
items. 
B. 
Total used 
H. Source of inputs 
1= purchase from 
traders; 
2=purchase by input 
voucher from traders; 
3=purchase from 
government; 
4=purchase from 
neighbours/relatives; 
5=received from 
neighbours/relatives 
(reason for receipt go 
to J); 
6=received from 
others (specify) 
(reason go to J) 
7=grew him/herself 
J. Reason for receipt 
of inputs from these 
sources in H.5 & 6 
1=I did not have 
enough money and 
find difficulty to get 
credit 
2=There is no any 
credit organization to 
provide me credit 
3= I did not want to 
get credit from credit 
organizations 
4=Others (specify) 
G. Financing 
source to pay 
for inputs 
1= cash 
2=fcredit 
3=gvt voucher 
4=other gift 
5=others 
(specify) 
C. 
Quantity 
Purchased 
/receipt in 
H. 
D. 
Value 
spent 
for 
quantity 
purchas 
ed 
(‘000 
Tsh.) 
F. Were 
the inputs 
or services 
easy to get 
assuming 
you had 
financing 
(1=yes, 
2=no) 
I. If no in F, 
specify reason 
1=high price 
2=bad 
infrastructure 
3=late delivery 
of inputs 
4=far from the 
place where the 
service is 
available 
5=there is no 
agro-dealer in 
the village 
6=other 
(specify) 
B1. 
Amou 
nt 
B2. Unit 
1=kg 
2=liter 
3=shilli 
ngs 
(‘000Ts 
h) 
H1. Traditional seeds           
H2. Improved seeds           
H3. Organic fertiliser           
H4. Inorganic fertiliser           
H5. Chemicals (insecticides herbicides)           
H6. Veterinary services           
H7. Other livestock related services and 
inputs (feed, transport, etc. except labour) 
          
H8. Animal or machinery hire for 
ploughing etc. 
          
H9. Transport of farm products           
H10. Other production expenses 
(specify) 
          
H. FARM INPUTS 
-242-  
 
 
How much of various inputs did you use and buy for the production of this year (2012-2013)’s crop? 
 A. 
Used this 
year 
1=yes 
2=no; if 
no, go to 
F for non 
blocked 
items. 
B. 
Total used 
H. Source of inputs 
1= purchase from 
traders; 2=purchase 
by input voucher 
from traders; 
3=purchase from 
government; 
4=purchase from 
neighbours/relatives 
; 5=received from 
neighbours/relatives 
(reason for receipt 
go to J); 6=received 
from others 
(specify) (reason go 
to J) 
7=grew him/herself 
J. Reason for receipt 
of inputs from these 
sources in H. 5 & 6 
1=I did not have 
enough money and 
find difficulty to get 
credit 
2=There is no any 
credit organization 
to provide me credit 
3= I did not want to 
get credit from 
credit organizations 
4=Others (specify) 
G. 
Financing 
source to 
pay for 
inputs 
1= cash 
2=credit 
3=gvt 
voucher 
4=other gift 
5=others 
C. 
Quantity 
Purchas 
ed/recei 
pt in H. 
D. Value 
spent 
for 
quantity 
purchased 
(‘000Tsh.) 
F. Were the 
inputs or 
services easy 
to get 
assuming you 
had financing 
(1=yes, 2=no) 
I. If no in F, 
specify 
reason 
1=high price 
2=bad 
infrastructur 
e 
3=late 
delivery of 
inputs 
4=far from 
the place 
where the 
service is 
available 
5=there is 
no agro- 
dealer in the 
village 
6=other 
(specify) 
B1. 
Amou 
nt 
B2. Unit 
1=kg 
2=liter 
3=shilling 
s (‘000 
Tsh.) 
H22. Traditional seeds           
H23. Improved seeds           
H24. Organic fertiliser           
H25. Inorganic fertiliser           
H26. Chemicals (insecticides herbicides)           
H27. Veterinary services           
H28. Other livestock related services and 
inputs (feed, transport, etc. except labour) 
          
H29. Animal or machinery hire for 
ploughing etc. 
          
H30. Transport of farm products           
H31. Other production expenses 
(specify) 
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I. LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION AND SALES 
I1. Did your household have any livestock during any period last year (2012)?  1= yes 
2=no 
If NO, go to animal product section.  IF YES, how many animals does your household own now and last year (2012)? 
 D. 
Number 
now 
A. Number 1 
year ago (Feb. 
– Mar. 2012) 
B. Acquisitions since Feb. - March last year C. Diminishments since Feb. - March last year 
(1) # 
bought 
(2) 
Total spent 
(‘000 Tsh) 
(3) # 
born 
(4) # obtained as gift 
or by exchange of 
labour or other 
goods or services 
(1) # 
sold. 
(2) Total 
payment 
received(‘000 
Tsh) 
(3) # 
killed 
for cons. 
(4) # given as gift or in 
exchange of labour or 
other goods or services 
(5) # died 
/stolen 
I2. Draft bullocks or oxen            
I3. Cows and male cattle            
I4. Goats/sheep            
I5. Pigs            
I6. Horses mules donkeys            
I7. Poultry (chicken, ducks, 
turkeys, guinea fowl) 
           
I8. Rearing fish            
I9. Others (specify)            
Production of animal products over the past year (since last Feb. - March (in 2012)): 
H10. Did your household produce any animal or bee products last year? (1=yes, 2=no). 
 A. Did your household produce any of the following animal products 
1=yes; 2=no 
B. Total production 
last year 
C. Unit D. Quantity sold 
last year 
E. Value of 
sales (‘000 Tsh) 
I11. Milk      
I12. Cheese, butter, yoghurt      
I13. Honey      
I14. Meat (Beef, goat/sheep, pork) 
(from animals slaughtered) 
     
I15. Eggs      
I16. Caught fish (processed, stored)      
 
Unit code 
1=kg 
2=liter 
3=100kg bags 
4=20kg tins 
5=5kg tins 
6=bunch (specify weight in 
front) 
7=root bag (specify weight in 
front) 
8=cups (specify weight in 
front) 
9=piece 
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J1. Did you hire workers for the farm for last year’s (2011 - 2012) crop? If yes, go to J2. If no, go to next section.  1=yes 
2=no 
 
J4. 
Parcel 
No. 
J2. How many days of 
hired labor did you use 
last year for the parcels 
J3. How many days did the hired labour work at these work? 
A.   Cultivatio 
n 
B. Pruning C. Cutting 
branches 
D. Weeding E. Harvesting F. Washing and 
processing 
G. Transport to 
collection 
center 
H. Other 
(specify) 
P1          
P2          
P3          
P4          
P5          
P6          
P7          
P8          
P9          
P10          
J. HIRED FARM LABOUR 
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… (1=yes; 2=no)? If no, go to next section. 
 
 
  
 
K1. Have you processed any farm products from crops/other plants during the past twelve months (since March 2012) (beer, butter, vegetable oil,…) 
 
 
 
 A0. During the past twelve months list all products 
made from crops and other plants by household 
members (beer, shea butter , 
vegetable oil, etc)  (see codes in last column) 
A. Total production last year B. Total 
amount sold 
C.Total 
sales last 
year 
‘000 Tsh 
D. Total cash 
production 
expenses during 
last year (tools, 
containers, labour, 
etc.) ‘000 Tsh 
A1. 
unit 
A2. amount 
K2.       
K3.       
K4.       
K5.       
K6.       
K7.       
 
Product codes (A0) 
1=beer/wine/strong 
drink 
2=maize or rice flour 
3=yam or cassava flour 
4=oil 
5=prepared/cooked 
food 
6=other, specify 
…. 
Production unit code (A2) 
1=kg 
2=liter 
3=100kg bags 
4=20kg tins 
5=5kg tins 
6=bunch (specify weight in 
front) 
7=other (specify weight 
infront) 
K. PROCESSING OF FARM PRODUCTS 
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If no, go to the next section. If yes, we would like to ask you during which period of the year you sold the harvest of your two main products (e.g. 
maize, beans, bananas, rice, simsim…, except coffee and cashew nuts) Note to enumerator: if any crops were sold, this section should be filled 
out (cross-check with G54F in page 12) 
 A0. 
Use 
crop 
codes 
from 
page 16 
A1. When 
was most of 
the crop 
harvested? 
(1=Jan;2=Fe 
b; …; 
12=Dec) 
A2. When 
did you sell 
most of your 
crop? 
 
(1=jan;2=feb 
; …; 
12=dec) 
A3. How much did you 
sell them? 
A4. What 
was the total 
value for 
which you 
sold it (‘000 
Tsh) ? 
A5. Where did you sell it? A6. Whom 
did you sell 
it to? 
(specify 
code from 
below) 
A7. Why did you sell then? 
(code below) 
(a) 
Unit (see 
below) 
(b) 
Amount 
(a) 
1=at  home 
2=at the market 
3=collection 
center 
(b) 
Distance 
from home 
(kms) 
(a) 
1st reason 
(b) 
2nd reason 
L2.            
L3.            
L4.            
L5.            
L6.            
L7.            
L8.            
L9.            
L10.            
 
Unit code (A3) 
1=kg 
2=liter 
3=100kg bags 
4=20kg tins 
5=5kg tins 
6=bunch (specify weight in front) 
7=root bag (specify weight in front) 
8=cups (specify weight in front) 
9=pieces 
10=other (specify)   
 
Whom sold to? (A6) 
1=private person 
2=retail trader 
3=wholesale trader 
4=farmers’s group 
5=cooperative 
6=other, specify 
 
 
Main reason why sold then? (A7) 
1=I needed cash immediately 
2=I do not have storage place 
3=The harvest deteriorates quickly after harvest. 
4=I don’t have transport to bring the goods to the market. 
5= Traders only come now. 
6=I did not expect to get a better price. 
7=other, specify 
L. MARKETING OF CROPS 
L1. Did you sell any of the products you produced last year (2012)? (1=yes, 2=no)   
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M1 Have you participated in the farmer field school program?     
(1=yes,2=no) If no go to M3. 
 
M2 If so, why? 
(1=they address our needs; 2=I learn a lot about crops of interest to me; 
3= they are very knowledgeable; 4=it is cheap; 5=we asked them to come .....) 
 
M3 Have you consulted with extension agents in the last year (2012) beyond the farmer field school (1=Yes; 2=No)    
 
M4. If no in 
M3, go to the 
next section. If 
yes, for which 
crops have you 
consulted an 
extension agent 
in the last year? 
(use crop codes 
from Section 
XXX) 
M5 On what 
activities was 
the advise? 
1=Cultivation 
2=Pruning 
3=Weeding 
4=Harvesting 
5=Washing 
and processing 
6=Others 
M6 Have 
you 
followed the 
advice given 
1=yes; 2=no 
M7 What was the main 
source of extension? 
   
1=Government 
2=Cooperative/primary 
society-; 3=Donor or 
other publicly funded 
project 
4=Processing company; 
5=Farmers’s group; 
6=private; 7=others 
Crop 1     
Crop 2     
Crop 3     
Crop 4     
Crop 5     
 
 
Crop codes 
1=maize 
2=beans 
3=coffee 
4=banana 
5=millet 
6=sorghum 
7=wheat 
8=rice 
 
9=cassava 
10=yams 
11=sweet potatoe 
12=Irish potatoe 
13=groundnuts 
 
14=onions 
15=tomatoes 
16=pumpkin 
17=carrottes 
18=sweet pepper 
 
19=cabbage 
20=other vegetables 
21=simsim (sesame) 
22=peas 
23=castor oil 
 
24=sugar cane 
25=papaya 
26=other fruit 
27=others, specify 
28=tobacco 
 
29=cashew 
30=sunflower 
31=avocado 
32=paprika 
33=soya beans 
34=others 
M. EXTENSION 
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P. Access to credit 
P1. Does any member of your household belong to some institutions like SACCO, ROSCA or VICOBA (1=yes, 2=no) 
P2. If you borrowed money, how much money did you borrow for buying inputs (‘000 TSH)? 
P3. For how many months have you borrowed the money? 
 
 
 
 
 
P4. How many outstanding loans do various members of your household have now (including those from previous 
years? (number) 
P5. What is the total amount of loans your household owes now? (‘000 Tsh) 
P6 How much interest do these loans have per year (‘000 Tsh)? 
P7. Have you given out any loans to other people? (1=yes, 2=no) 
P8. If yes, what is the total amount of loans you have given out to other people now? (‘000 TSH) 
P9. How much (average) interest do you collect on these loans per month? (‘000 TSH) 
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T. MAJOR SHOCKS AND OTHER TEMPORARY EVENTS THAT NEGATIVELY OR POSITIVELY AFFECTED THE HOUSEHOLD’S LIVING 
CONDITIONS IN the past 4 years 
SHOCKS ARE EVENTS THAT OCCUR SUDDENLY. THEY GENERALLY DO NOT LAST FOR MORE THAN A FEW DAYS OR WEEKS. THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF SHOCKS (E.G. LOSS OF ASSETS, OR LACK OF FOOD) MAY BE FELT FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. 
In the past 4 years (since last survey in 2009) have the living conditions of your household been negatively or positively been affected by any of the following 
[SHOCKS]? 
 
ID  In which years did the last two shocks occur? 
(1)  Year 1 (2)  Year 2 
1 Major harvest losses due to wild animals, 
birds, livestock, insects, pests 
  
2 Fire/house burnt down   
3 Theft of household assets   
4 Unemployment from paid job   
5 Loss of livestock (death, theft, illness; 
NOT SALE) 
  
6 Eviction, loss of land (NOT SALE), e.g. 
following divorce, ..., 
  
7 Substantial post harvest maize loss   
  (a) ID No. of the household 
member from A1 
(b) Year (a) ID No. of the 
household member 
from A1 
(b) Year 
8 Major illness not resulting in family 
member 
    
9 Death of household member     
10 Death of person outside of household who 
provided important financial support  
   
11 Divorce   
12 Inheritance   
13 Other (specify)   
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F. POVERTY SCORECARD 
1. How many household members are 17-years-old or 
younger? 1= Four or more 
2= Three 3= Two 4=One 
5=None 
2. Do all children ages 6 to 17 attend school? 1=No 2=Yes, or no 
children aged 6 to 17 
3. Can the female head/spouse read and write? 1=No 
2=Yes, but not in Kiswahili nor English 3=No female head/spouse 
4=Yes, only in Kiswahili 
5=Yes, in English (regardless of others) 
4. What is the main building material of the floor of the main dwelling? 
1=Earth 2=Concrete, cement, tiles, timber, or other 
5. What is the main building material of the roof of the main dwelling? 
1=Mud and grass 
2=Grass, leaves, bamboo 
3=Concrete, cement, metal sheets (GCI), asbestos sheets, tiles, or other 
6. How many bicycles, mopeds, motorcycles, tractors, or motor vehicles 
does your household own? 
1=None  
2=One  
3=Two or more 
7. Does your household own any radios or radio cassettes? 
1=No 
2=Yes 
8. Does your household own any lanterns? 
1=No 
2=Yes 
9. Does your household own any irons (charcoal or electric)? 
1=No 
2=Yes 
10. How many tables does your household own? 
1=None 
2=One 3=Two 
4=Three or more 
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A. FOOD, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 
On 
av
era
ge, 
ho
w 
ma
ny 
pe
opl
e 
we
re 
pre
se
nt 
in 
the 
ho
us
eh
old 
an
d 
par
tici
pat
ed 
in 
the 
me
als 
in 
the 
las
t 7 
da
ys
? 
Al
so 
ind
ica
te 
the 
nu
mb
er 
of 
vis
ito
rs 
wh
o 
par
tici
pat
ed 
in 
the 
me
als 
an
d 
the 
nu
mb
er 
of 
da
ys 
the
y 
did 
so.
U1 
Househol d Members  Visitors   
 (1) Adults (2) Children (3) Adult (4) # days (5) Children (6) # days 
(A) Male       
(B) Female       
How much of each of the following food items has the household (including meals prepared for visitors) 
consumed over the past 7 days.  Enumerators - let wife assist as she may be more familiar with food 
consumption than the man. 
Item Description Cod 
e 
Total 
amount 
consumed 
Unit of Qty 
1=kg, 2=liter, 
3=pieces, 
4=gram, 
5=other 
Purchased (incl. food bought while 
temporarily away from home by household 
members and visitors over past 7 days. 
Consumption 
out of home 
produce 
Obtained 
as gift 
Qty. Value (TSH) Qty Qty 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Banana 101       
Maize (grains) 102       
Maize (cobs) 103       
Maize (flour) 104       
Beans (dry) 105       
Rice 106       
Millet/sorghum 107       
Bread 108       
Sweet Potatoes (Fresh) 109       
Casava(Fresh 110       
Cassava(Dry/Flour) 111       
Irish Potatoes 112       
Beef 113       
Pork 114       
Goat/sheep meat 115       
Other meat 116       
Chicken 117       
Fresh Fish 118       
Dry/Smoked fish 119       
Eggs 120       
Fresh Milk 121       
Cooking oil 122       
Margarine,Butter, etc 123       
Fruits 124       
Onions 125       
Tomatoes 126       
Cabbages 127       
Peas 128       
Spinach 129       
Other Vegetables 130       
Groundnuts 131       
Sugar 132       
Cooking oil 133       
Coffee 134       
Tea 135       
Salt 136       
Soda/soft drinks/ juice 137       
Beer local 138       
Beer commercial 139       
Cigarettes 140       
Other Tobacco 141       
Restaurant exp on food Food 142       
Restaurant exp on drinks 143       
Spices 144       
Biting 145       
Others (specify) 146       
H. Household Consumption Expenditure 
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Part B: Non-Durable Goods and frequently purchased services (During Last 30 days) 
 
 
Item 
 
 
Code 
Unit of 
Quantity 
1=kg 
2=liter 
3=pieces 
4=gram 
5=other 
Purchases Home Produced Obtained as gift 
Quantity Value 
(‘000sh) 
Quantity Value 
(‘000sh 
Quan 
tity 
Value 
(‘000sh 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Household expenditures         
Rent of rented house 201        
Maintenance and repair expenses 202        
Water 203        
Electricity 204        
Paraffin (kerosene) 205        
Charcoal 206        
Firewood 207        
Others 208        
Personal care         
Matches 210        
Washing soap 211        
Bath soap 212        
Tooth paste 213        
Cosmetics 214        
Handbags, travel bags etc 215        
Batteries 216        
Newspapers and magazines 217        
Others 218        
Transport& communication         
Tyres, Tubes, spares, etc. 220        
Petrol, diesel etc. 221        
Taxi and/or bus fares 222        
Stamps, envelopes, etc 223        
Air time & service fee for mobile phones 224        
Expenditure on fixed phones 225        
Others 226        
Health expenditures         
Consultation Fees 230        
Medicines etc. 231        
Hospital/Clinic charges 232        
Traditional doctors fees/medicines 233        
Others 234        
Other service         
Sports, theaters etc 240        
Dry Cleaning and Laundry 241        
Houseboys/girls, Shamba boys etc. 242        
Barber and beauty shops 243        
Expenses in hotels, lodging places 244        
Milling expenses 245        
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Part C: SEMI-DURABLE AND DURABLE GOODS AND SERVICES (During Last 365 days) 
 
 
Item Description 
Code Purchases 
 
Value (‘000 TSh) 
Free 
(obtained 
as gift) 
Value 
(‘000 Tsh) 
(1)  (2) (3) 
Clothing  
Men’s clothing 301   
Women’s clothing 302   
Children’s wear 303   
Clothing Material and tailoring 304   
Men’s Footwear 305   
Women’s Footwear 306   
Children’s Footwear 307   
Other Footwear and Repairs 308   
Furniture, Carpet, Furnishings etc  
Furniture Items (chairs,sofas, tables,beds,cupboards, chest of 
drawers, wardrobes, book cases) 
401   
Carpets, Mats, etc. 402   
Curtains 403   
Bedding Mattresses 404   
Blankets and bed sheets, etc. 405   
Mosquito nets 406   
Insecticide for mosquito nets or spraying the compound 407   
Other and Repairs 409   
Household Appliances and Equipment  
Electric iron/Kettles/cooking pots etc. 421   
Charcoal and Kerosene stoves 422   
Electronic gas/stoves 423   
Water heater 424   
Electronic Equipment (TV. dish antenna, decoder, etc.) 425   
Radio/cassette player/stereo equipment 426   
Computer/printer 427   
Bicycles 428   
Motorcar, pick-ups, etc. 429   
Motor cycles 430   
Phone Handsets (Both Fixed and Mobile) 431   
Refrigerator/freezer 432   
Other equipment and repairs 433   
Jewelry, Watches etc. 434   
Glass/Table Ware, Utensils & Electric goods  
Plastic Basins 441   
Plastic plates/tumblers 442   
Jerry cans and Plastic buckets 443   
Enamel and metallic utensils 444   
Switches, plugs, cables, bulbs etc 445   
Others and repairs 449   
Education  
Schools fees including PTA 601   
Boarding and Lodging 602   
School uniform 603   
Books and supplies 604   
Other educational expenses 609   
Other services  
Expenditure on household functions 801   
Insurance Premiums 802   
Other services N.E.S. 809   
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 E. HOUSEHOLD ASSETS 
 A. 
Numbe 
r 
owned 
today 
C. If sold today, 
how much they 
are worth in 
total (‘000Tsh)? 
D1. How much did 
the household spend 
(‘—000 Tsh) for 
purchase of the 
following items 
during last year 
(2012)? 
D2. How much did 
the HH spend (‘- 
000Tsh) for repair 
of the following 
items during last 
year? 
Consumer durables     
F18. Radio/cassette player/stereo 
equipment 
    
F19. TV set/video     
F20. Dish antenna/decoder     
F21. Telephone fixed     
F22.  Cell phone     
F23. Computer/printer     
F24. Refrigerator/freezer     
F25. Sewing machine     
F26. Chairs     
F27. Sofas     
F28. Tables     
F29. Beds     
F30. Cupboards, chest of drawers, 
boxers, wardrobes, bookcases 
    
F31. Electric gas/stove     
F32. Other stove     
F33. Water heater     
F34 Books (not school books)     
F35 Watch     
F36 Canoe     
F37 Bicycle     
F38 Motor vehicle     
F39 Motor bike     
Production tools     
F61 hoe**67     
F41 Wheel barrow     
F42 Plough for animal traction.     
F43 Tractor     
F44 Trailer for tractor, 
harvester/reaper, plough for tractor, 
harrow 
    
F45 Sprayer and/or fogger     
F46 Water pumping set     
F47 Milking machine     
F48 Milling machine     
F49 Coffee pulping machine     
F50 Tobacco curing machine     
F51 Cashew machines     
F52 Incubator     
F53 Fishing net and other fishing 
equipment 
    
 
 
67 **Indicates that the item was not included in the first or second round 
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 A. 
Numbe 
r 
owned 
today 
C. If sold today, 
how much they 
are worth in 
total (‘000Tsh)? 
D1. How much did 
the household spend 
(‘—000 Tsh) for 
purchase of the 
following items 
during last year 
(2012)? 
D2. How much did 
the HH spend (‘- 
000Tsh) for repair 
of the following 
items during last 
year? 
F54 Beehives     
F55 Sugar cane processing machine     
F56 Irrigation Pump*68     
F60 Power tillar**     
Buildings     
F57 Storage building for agric products     
F58 Tobacco curing hut     
F59. Animal shed     
 
 
D NON-CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE 
Items Description Code Value during last12 months (‘000Tsh) 
(1)  (2) 
Taxes and duties paid 901  
Pension and social security contribution 902  
Remittances, gifts and other transfers including title 903  
Contributions  to funerals and other functions 904  
Others (like subscriptions, interest to consumer 
debts, etc 
909  
 
F60 Do you have any non-farm enterprise assets (not your house, land, consumer durables, farm 
equipment or non-farm equipment mentioned above)? (1=yes, 2=no) (A)   
 
F61 If yes, and if sold today, is their total value?    
1=less than 100,000 Tsh 
2=between 100,000 and 250,000 Tsh 
3=between 250,000 and 500,000 Tsh 
4=between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Tsh 
5=between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000 Tsh 
6=between 2,000,000 and 5,000,000 Tsh 
7=over 5,000,000 Tsh 
 
F62 Did you acquire any of these non-farm enterprise assets (not your house, land, consumer 
durables, farm equipment or non-farm equipment mentioned above) 
during the past four years (1=yes; 2=no)?     
 
F63 If yes, how much did you pay in total (‘000 TSH)?  
  
 
We would like to thank you very much for your time and cooperation. 
 
68 * indicates that the item was not included in the first round. 
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Alama ya Wilaya 
1=Songea vijijini 
2=Tunduru 
3=Mbinga 
4=Namtumbo 
5=Songea mjini 
Alama ya kijiji 
1= Mlete 
2= Muhukuru barabarani 
3=Morogoro 
4=Madaba 
5=Sisi kwa sisi 
6=Namiungo 
7=Namakambele 
8=Tuwemacho 
9=Chiungo 
10=Angalia 1 
11=Mcheshi 
12=Wenje 
13=Mchotekari 
14=Mbesa 
15=Kitanda 
16=Nampungu 
17=Namakungwa 
18=Litorongi 
19=Lipumba 
20=Mkwaya 
21=Ndondo 
22=Chiulu/Chiula 
23=Kingeriti 
24=Kibandai A 
25=Mango 
26=Langiro asili 
27=Mahenge 
28=Tukuzi 
29=Ulolela 
30=Kipololo 
31=Mpepai 
32=Kitura 
33=Ligera 
34=Mlilayoyo 
35=Naikesi 
36=Likuyu/Sekam 
anga 
Appendix 4. Village survey questionnaire 
Panel survey for Ruvuma 2013 
 
Village Questionnaire (February – March 2013) 
(to be answered by village committee/council or focus group of knowledgeable 
villagers) 
 
Date of interview:  day  month 
 
 District Ward Village 
Name    
Code    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note – codes for ward and village are the same 
 
 Name 
Enumerator  
Supervisor  
Data enterer  
 
Note to Enumerator – please use following codes throughout the questionnaire 
99= respondent does not know, does not remember or refuses to answer, but 
the answer is not necessarily zero 
88=not applicable (question irrelevant for the respondent) 
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Information about Village Respondents 
May we please ask you a few questions about yourselves before we start the interview? 
 
A1. How many people are present in the meeting?    
A.2.A. Is the village chairman present?  (1=yes; 2=no) 
If no, go to A3. B. how many years served as chair    
A.3 A. Is village executive officer present? If no, go to A4. 
B. Years served as Mtendaji ya kijiji （village executive officer）   
A.4 Number of other elected officials present    
A.5 How many people present have completed: A. no formal schooling 
  B. some primary C. primary d. some secondary   
e. form IV  f. form VI   
A.5. How many people live in the village now? 
 
(incl. those temporarily away) 
A.6 How many households live in the village? 
 
 
A7. Out of which how many farmer households? 
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Geographical and agro-ecological information about the village 
 1. 
Jan 
2. 
Feb 
3. 
Mar 
4. 
Apr 
5. 
Ma 
y 
6. 
Jun 
7. 
Jul 
8. 
Aug 
9. 
Sep 
t 
10. 
Oct 
11. 
Nov 
12. 
Dec 
B1. In which months does it 
normally rain and how 
much does it rain in each of 
those months? (0=no rain; 
1= little bit of rain; 
2=moderate rain; 3= lot of 
rain) 
            
B2. How did the rains last 
year compare to normal in 
each month (1=much above 
normal; 2=somewhat above 
normal; 3=around normal; 
4=somewhat below normal; 
5=much below normal)? 
            
B3. Indicate for the following crops during which months they are normally planted (P), 
weeded (W), harvested (H) and sold (S) in this village 
B3a.1 Maize (P, W, H)             
B3a.2Maize (S)             
B3b.1 Paddy rice (P, W, 
H) 
            
B3b.2 Paddy rice (S)             
B3c.1 Beans (P, W, H)             
B3c.2 Beans (S)             
B3d.1 Cassava (P, W, H)             
B3d.2 Cassave (S)             
B3e.1 Coffee (P, W, H)             
B3e.2 Coffee(S)             
B3f.1 Tobacco (P, W, H)             
B3f.2 Tobacco (S)             
B3g.1 Cashew (P, W, H)             
B3g.2 Cashew (S)             
B4. When the following fertilizers are utilized? 
B4a. DAP/Minjingu (maize)             
B4b. Urea (Maize)             
B4c. SA/CAN/NPD (maize)             
B4d. DAP/Minjingu (rice)             
B4e. Urea (rice)             
B4f. SA/CAN/NPK (rice)             
B5. Which month of the 
year the food is shortage? 
(0=there is no shortage of 
food; 1=a little bit of 
shortage; 2=some; 3=food is 
of very shortage) 
            
B6. What is the month when 
people use money to buy 
food? (0=people do not use 
money for food; 1=people 
use little money; 2=people 
use money; 3=people use 
some money; 4=people use 
much money) 
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B7. Rainfall received in parcel last year compared to normal in past (1=much above normal; 2=somewhat 
above normal; 3=around normal/average; 4= somewhat below normal; 5=much below normal)    
 
B8. In which year and how did the irregular rainfall affect since March 2009? (1=much affected; 
2=affected; 3=average,  4=not affected) 
 
 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 
Heavy rainfall     
Rain did not come timely     
Drought     
Flooding     
Hailstorm     
 
B9. How many households in the village grow maize? (1=most of the households, 2=half of the 
households, 3=a few households, 4=none) 
 
 
B10. How many households in the village grow rice? 
 
 
B11. Which crop most of the households grow in the village? (1=maize, 2=rice, 3=coffee, 4=cashew nuts, 
5=tobacco, 6=others (specify)) 
 
 
B12. What is the distance to the nearest town (km)? 
 
 
B13. How many hours does a truck take to go to the nearest town during the dry season? Hours A 
Min B 
 
 
B14. How many hours does a truck take to go to the nearest town during the rainy season? Hours A 
 Min B    
 
Socio-economic information about the village 
Is there a …… in the village? A. 
1=yes 
2=no 
B. If yes, did 
services start 
since 
1= last year 
2= bw 2 and 5 
years ago 
3= > 5 yrs ago 
C. If no, distance to nearest similar facility? 
1. 
In 
km 
2. In 
minutes 
(usual 
mode of 
transport 
). 
3. Code 
1=foot 
2=bicycle 
3=motorcycle 
4=public transport (bus, taxi) 
5=private transport (car, truck) 
C1. Bore hole for water      
C2. Village well      
C3. Public water tap      
C4. Market to buy crops      
C5. Market to sell food      
C6. All weather road (tarmac)      
C7. All weather road (gravel)      
C8. Electricity      
C9. Possible to receive cell phone      
C10. Bus service to nearby town?      
C11. Village bank or other formal 
credit society or association 
     
C12. Agricultural Extension agent      
C13. Veterinary service      
C14. Sales point for agricultural 
inputs (fertilizer, seeds,…)? 
     
C15. Primary society      
C16. Warehouse Receipt System      
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C19. Solar      
C20. Others (taja)      
 
C17. Is there tractor in the village? (1=yes, 2=no)      
 
If yes, how many tractors are there in the village?    
 
C18. Is there truck in the village? (1=yes, 2=no)      
 
If yes, how many trucks are there in the village?    
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C. Information on shocks 
 
I would like to ask you about important shocks that have taken place in this village over the past 10 yrs, IS 
THERE ANY POINT OF REFERENCE INDICATING 10YRS AGO?   Shocks are events which 
happen unexpectedly and which can cause substantial damage to people’s livelihoods. 
Event description A. 
Has it ever 
taken place in 
your village 
since 10 years 
ago (i.e. since 
the 1993 
drought)? 
 
1=Yes; 2=No 
 
If “No”, go to 
next event. 
B 
 
How many 
times did 
the event 
occur over 
past 10 
years? 
C 
 
In which years did this 
event occur starting 
with the most recent 
year? 
D 
 
No. of households in 
the village was affected 
by this event starting 
with most recent year? 
(1) 
Year1 
(2) 
Year2 
(3) 
Year3 
(1) 
Year1 
(2) 
Year2 
(3) 
Year3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
D1. Fire         
D2. Flood         
D3. Drought         
D4. Irregular rainfall 
pattern (too late, too 
early, …) 
        
D5 Unexpected drop in 
maize prices from one year 
to the other 
        
D6 Unexpected increase 
in maize prices from one 
year to the other 
        
D7 Unexpected drop in 
rice prices from one year 
to the other 
        
D8 Unexpected increase 
in rice prices from one 
year to the other 
        
D9 Unexpected drop in 
coffee prices from one 
year to the other 
        
D10 Unexpected increase 
in coffee prices from one 
year to the other 
        
D11. Unexpected drop in 
tobacco prices from one 
year to the other 
        
D12. Unexpected 
increase in tobacco prices 
from one year to the other 
        
D13. Unexpected drop in 
cashew prices from one 
year to the other 
        
D14. Unexpected increase 
in cashew prices from one 
year to the other 
        
D15. Sudden decline in 
local employment 
opportunities 
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D16 Collapse in 
remittances 
        
D17 Epidemic (malaria, 
cholera, …) 
        
D18. Pest,/insect attacks         
D19 Animal disease         
D20 Banditry/thefts         
D21 Others (Specify)         
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D. Labor and input market information 
 
 
We would like to ask you some questions on the daily standard agricultural wage rate for adults.  Note that this 
rate should be the sum of the remunerations received in cash as well as those received in kind, 
i.e. the cost of non-cash wage items such as meals, part of the harvest, etc.? If compensation for hired labor is 
typically not expressed in daily wage rates, we would like to ask you how much it typically costs to perform a 
number of tasks and how many man days it typically takes. We would first like to ask you about the daily 
agricultural wage rates for adults. 
Activities (A) 
Unit 
(1=Sh. 
/day, 
2=Sh./ 
acre) 
(B) 
Cultiva 
te 
(C) 
Plantin 
g 
(D) 
Weedi 
ng 
(E) 
Cuttin 
g 
weeds 
(F) 
Harves 
ting 
(G) 
Prunin 
g 
E.1 What was the adult agricultural wage 
rate last seasonyear (2011-2012) for each 
of the following activities (Tsh/day) ? 
       
1)   Coffee        
2)    Cashew nuts        
3)   Tobacco        
4)   Maize        
5)   Rice        
6)   Beans        
7)   Cassava        
8)   Others        
 
E.2 Did the agricultural daily wage rate increase compared to six years ago (2007)?     
(1. increased much  2. increased a bit 3. about the same 4. decreased a bit 5. decreased much) 
 
E.3 the total labor cost of preparing 1 acre of land last year and how long does it take on average  A 
 (Tsh) B  (days) 
 
E.4 the total labor cost of weeding 1 acre of land last year and how long does it take on average  
A  (Tsh) B  (days) 
 
E.5 What was on average the total labor cost of preparing 1 acre of land in the six years  ago (2007) 
  (Tsh) 
 
E.6 Where does hired labor mostly come from? 
`   
(1=this village; 2=neighboring villages; 3=this district; 4=this region; 5=other regions; 6=outside Tananzia)? 
 
E.7 During the peak season month for labour demand do some village members go to other villages 
 
or town to work? (1=yes, 2=no)? 
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E. Marketing information 
 
F1. What are the highest prices and lowest prices to sell and buy each crop? And which month was the 
highest and lowest price? And how many kilograms for the unit of crops? 
 Unit (Kg) (1) To 
sell/ 
(2) To 
buy 
Lowest price Highest price 
Price (Tsh.) Month 
(number) 
Price (Tsh.) Month 
(number) 
Maize 
(green) 
 (1)     
 (2)     
Maize (ripe)       
      
Rice  (1)     
 (2)     
Cassava 
(green) 
 (1)     
 (2)     
Cassava 
(ripe) 
      
      
 
F2. What is the market price of 1 bag of Urea and how many kg does it contain? A.  price 
(TSH) B.  kg 
 
F3. What is the top-up price for voucher of Urea last year?  (Sh.)  (kilo) 
 
 
F4. What is the market price of 1 bag of DAP and how many kg does it contain? A. price 
 
(TSH) B. kg 
 
 
F5. What was the top up price of 1 bag of DAP last year? 
 
 
F6.What is the market price of 1 bag of Minjingu and how many kg does it contain? A. price 
 
(TSH) B. kg 
 
 
F7. What was the top up price of 1 bag of Minjingu last year? 
 
 
F8. What is the market price of 1 bag of maize improved seeds? 
 
 
F9. What was the top up price for voucher of 1 bag of maize improved seeds last year? 
 
 
F10. What is the market price of 1 bag of rice improved seeds? 
 
 
F11. What was the top up price for voucher of 1 bag of rice improved seeds last year? 
 
 
F12. How many input-dealers are there in the village?    
 
F13. At the sales point for agricultural inputs mentioned in C13, is fertilizer typically physically available when 
needed (1=yes; 2=no)?    
 
F14. How many different traders/companies visited the village last year to buy maize?   
 
F15. How many different traders/companies visited the village last year to buy rice?    
 
F16. How many different traders/companies visited the village last year to buy coffee?    
 
F17. How many different traders/companies visited the village last year to buy cashew nuts?    
 
F18. How many different traders/companies visited the village last year to sell inputs?   
Thank you so much for time and your collaboration. 
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Appendix 5. Methodology of ordering and weighting panel data 
 
1. Ordering panel data 
In Round 3, there are 839 household records from 892 households. 691 households gave data on 
household members / guests. Only 675 households have individual data and 637 households have 
all food consumption and selected semi-durable goods consumption, non-durable goods 
consumption data. I only use these. In Round 3 data, 19 households have reported more than one 
household head. I took the oldest reported member as head of these households. I corrected the 
extreme outlier consumer unit price more than median prices (30 cases). I corrected the extreme 
outlier amount consumed per adult equivalent 20 times more than the median amount; in most 
cases, they had a miscoded unit of consumption. I corrected the median price of non-durable 
goods and frequently-purchased services 20 times more than median prices. Most of these cases 
were due to the misspecification of a unit amount. Pan and Christiaensen (2010) suggested that 
they utilised a regional median price for calculating the purchased price of non-durable goods and 
frequently-purchased services but I checked the unit price of each item carefully and therefore 
used the reported unit price of each household. 
 
For the first analysis, I used the same methodology as with the Household Budget Survey (HBS), 
excluding the same non-food items from the calculation for the total household consumption. For 
some frequently-purchased services, such as houseboys/girls, barber and beauty shops and 
expenses in hotels, some households have a high expenditure per adult equivalent, which I leave 
for later analysis of the share of whole consumption expenditure of these households. I used food 
CPI to adjust the time difference: 147.6 (June 2007) to 196.0 (March 2009) = 1.3279 from NBS 
website (CPI summary from 2002 – 2010). 
 
For the poverty line calculation, I used the food poverty line and basic needs poverty line for rural 
areas. Therefore, I did not use the Fisher Index, as the HBS 2007 has no Fisher Index for the 
regions but only for Dar es Salaam and other urban and rural areas69. Pan and Christiaensen (2010) 
used the median for the number of guest visit days but I used participants’ own data. Pan and 
Christiaensen used the threshold age of becoming adult as 19 but in my own survey I considered 
it to be 17. They also used the mean average weight of sample age/sex group for the purposes of 
calculation, whereas I used each household weight. 
 
In Round 3, there were only data from 194 heads of household (households) as to whether they 
received vouchers or not. 144 households reported that they had received vouchers while 50  
69 URT (2009a) Household Budget Survey 2007 Dar es Salaarm: MoFEA and NBS: MoFEA, NBS. 
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households reported that they had not. I took the 144 households for Round 4 as recipient 
households, and picked randomly from other households on the panel to represent non-recipient 
households, by 1.5 times of recipient households from the same villages. I dropped three villages 
(one village in Tunduru and two villages in Mbinga) where no households reported that they had 
received vouchers in Round 3. I will look at the household / village characteristics of these villages 
later. I surveyed 349 households in 33 villages in Round 4. 
 
There were high ratio of households (494 households out of 688 households = about 72% of the 
households responded) who said that they were not applicable for voucher receipt that I treated 
the households who declared themselves non-applicable as non-recipients. I only sampled 25 
households among the households who reported as non-recipients in Round 3 and added other 80 
households as non-recipient households. I will also look into the characteristics of the dropped 25 
households who reported as non-recipients in 2008/9. 
 
Among these 349 households, only 309 households have all the food, semi-durable goods and 
frequently-purchased items and non-durable goods consumption data in both rounds. These 
households compose my panel sample. The voucher receipt experiences of my panel sample 
households during the period of both rounds are shown in Chapter 5. 
 
Here I have to reiterate that my panel sample households are over-represented in the Mbinga and 
Tunduru districts where cash-crops (coffee and cashew nuts) are cultivated, as cash-cropping 
households were the focus of the study by the World Bank/FAO. In Mbinga in particular 40% 
more than the population ratio cultivates these crops. Meanwhile, Namtumbo is under-represented 
by 54%. This over-representation might negatively affect the analysis of the impact of voucher 
receipt on the maize yield of my panel sample households; however, as regards its impact on 
income poverty, it might skew the results towards showing a higher impact if the respondents in 
question used vouchers for growing cash crops to increase cash income. I will control the districts 
in the regression. 
 
In Round 3 data, only 76 households have data for non-durable goods and frequently-purchased 
services for poverty estimates according to the methodology of HBSs. If we make a panel sample, 
only 41 households (32 households were recipients plus 9 households were non-recipients in 
Round 4) have non-durable goods consumption data in Round 3. As these numbers are so small 
compared to the number of the total panel sample (322 households), I only attempt to calculate 
the food poverty line compared with the national poverty line. 
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2. Weighting panel data 
As the panel household distribution is skewed toward cash-growing regions, in the analysis 
sample weighting was made with the indices as shown in the following table: 
 
Table 5.1. Sample weight indices 
 Census: 
Agricultural 
households in 
2011/12 
Census: 
Agricultural 
households in 
rural villages 
Ratio of 
Agricultural 
households to 
region total (%) 
Ratio of panel 
sample to 
region total 
(%) 
 
Over- 
sampled 
 
Weight to 
be made 
Songea District 32,983 30,410 15.41 16.18 0.83 1.21 
Songea  Municipality 37,025 8,072 4.09    
Mbinga  District 85,811 79,375 40.23 51.46 1.28 0.78 
Namtumbo  District 33,633 31,414 15.92 8.41 0.53 1.89 
Tunduru District 53,299 48,022 24.34 23.95 0.98 1.02 
Total 242,751 197,292 100.00 100   
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Appendix 6. Strategic guideline for implementation and procedure for NAIVS for 
2011/1270 
 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Cooperatives 
18, Oct. 2011 
 
Re: Strategic guideline for implementation and procedure to use voucher for Agricultural input 
subsidy for 2011/12 
 
1. Government budgeted 119.97 Billion Tsh. for 2011/12. It is for distributing inputs for 1,8 
million households in 96 districts in 20 regions, which shows below Attachment No.1 
3. Target for Process of voucher 
(i) Subsidy would arrive in time to the households which were determined by VVC, 
Village government and Village assembly. 
(ii) Assure correct way of use of improved seeds and fertilizer to increase production, 
food security and income for farmers. 
(iii) Assure that each District develops correct data of no. of target farmers and voucher 
distribution in each village. 
(iv) Increase capacity of openness and use of agricultural inputs of District, Ward and 
village to strengthen delivery of inputs and to give training of agricultural technique 
to farmers on correct use of agricultural inputs. 
(v) To connect agro-dealers with NMB to pay loan to buy agricultural inputs 
(vi) To put system of agro-dealers to be paid through NMB after they sell inputs to farmers 
through vouchers 
 
4. Issues to consider 
To increase efficiency on execution of plan of agricultural input subsidy through voucher, the 
following issues are to be considered: 
(i) To create VVC which would determine beneficiary households and monitor closely 
that inputs be delivered to the target farmers and that be used correctly to increase 
production 
(ii) All the Voucher committees do evaluation and create quarterly reports of 
implementation of plan of Agricultural input subsidies and distribution at each level. 
(iii) Agricultural inputs be delivered to the area whose use would increase production. 
(iv) Subsidies would be delivered to the households who have merit for 3 years’ period. 
Beneficiary households of the past three years ( 2008/9 to 2010/11) cannot apply to 
the subsidy at 2011/12. 
(v) Households who have received input subsidy for 3 years and are prepared to buy rely 
on agricultural inputs are recommended to get loans through groups such as SACCOS, 
AMCOS or by sell their crops through Warehouse Receipt System. 
(vi) List of agro-dealers is given to Ministry of Agriculture before 28th October, 2011. 
After that date the request for its change should be made with explanation to Ministry 
and which is the last decision. 
(vii) After the vouchers are reached to the Regions, they would be delivered to the districts 
within 48 hours. And each District must assure that voucher be distributed to village 
within 3 days. 
(viii) To be prohibited to transfer voucher from one district to another without approval of 
Ministry. 
 
5. Funds for supervision 
District government guarantees to separate budget for monitoring of plan of agricultural input 
subsidies as one activity of District. And, money for monitoring is given by Ministry of  
 
70 Author’s translation from Swahili to English. 
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Agriculture on condition that it would be explained of receipt and use before the end of the fiscal 
year 2011/12. 
 
6. Responsibilities of agro-dealers before being paid by Bank 
After bringing inputs to farmers and receiving voucher, agro-dealers would do the following: 
(i) To prepare list of households who were given inputs and no. of vouchers per each 
input which is approved by VVC. Copy of the list is remained at the village. 
(ii) To entrust District livestock officer do verification and put records of households, 
voucher with form of verification of voucher of NMB and form which is established 
to put payment for the companies who distributed inputs. 
(iii) To entrust NMB to issue voucher and form verified by District livestock officer for 
payment. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This execution of the plan of subsidy is given openness and sustainability and be satisfied with 
procedure, agro-dealers achieve without change. If there is any problem in execution and 
monitoring of agro-dealers, steps to follow are to be made according to advice. 
 
Attachment No. 2 
 
1. Ministry of Agriculture, food and 
cooperatives Responsibility of Ministry 
- Separate money for subsidies on Ministry’s budget 
- Prepare voucher with budget and put amount of voucher to regions according to the 
criteria 
- Put report of voucher distribution for each region 
- Give education of execution and monitoring of input subsidy to farmers to use different 
ways (publication, radio, magazine, public meetings, etc.) before and on the agricultural 
season 
- Cooperate with NMB on accomplishment of use of voucher for delivery of input to 
farmers 
- Give direction for creation of committee of monitoring of procedure of vouchers at 
region, district and village, 
- Ascertain for farmers that procedure for voucher would be taken into account the criteria 
of criteria put 
- Cooperate with PO-RALG on transfer vouchers at different levels which accomplishes 
provision of agricultural input subsidy to farmers according to the its procedure 
- Ascertain that vouchers be ready and distributed to the village before the beginning of 
agricultural season 
 
2. NVSC 
NVSC is created by Ministry and meet each quarter of the year under its chairman and 
Primary secretary of Ministry. The members are: 
- Minister of MAFC ---- Chairman 
- Primary secretary of MAFC ------ Secretary 
- Representative of Ministry of Finance, Economy and planning --- Member 
- Representative of Office of Prime Minister-RALG 
- Director of office concerned in MAFC 
- Representative of Agricultural input companies 
- Representative of Agro-dealers 
- NMB 
- Representative of farmers’ group 
- Representative of Community-based organizations 
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- Director of Assistant to agricultural input 
 
Responsibilities of NVSC 
- Prepare policy, guideline and direction with regard to execution of plan to use vouchers 
- Arrange criteria for distribution of vouchers at the region with: 
(i) Regions whose rain and soil are suited for maize and rice farming 
(ii) Whole area is cultivated with maize and rice 
(iii) Amount of maize and rice harvested 
(iv) No. of households whose area is more than 1 acre for maize and rice farming 
(v) Area used under irrigation (production of maize and rice) 
- Recommend direction which is used by District on distribution of voucher to villages 
- Ascertain for Voucher programme that it would be given money on time 
- Evaluate report of execution and make revision if it is useless 
- Ascertain for procedure of voucher openly and accomplish as government things intended 
- Approve budget of programme for the year which is given by Ministry of Finance, 
Economy and Planning 
- Approve reports of execution of each quarter of the year 
 
3. RVC Members are: 
- RC – Chairman 
- RAS – Secretary 
- Regional Agricultural Adviser – member 
- Representative of each DVC directed by District council 
- Representative of farmers’ groups 
- Representative from NMB 
Caution; Chairman of RVC is able to invite organization or individual which are of use 
Responsibilities of RVC 
- Prepare estimation of needs of agricultural inputs (fertilizer, improved seeds and ?) and 
approved by secretary of NVSC 
- Receive vouchers from MAFC and distribute at each district under security of Police 
- Issue report of distribution of voucher at each district if it is with Ministry, DVC, 
WVC, and VVC, Input companies and agro-dealers. 
- Ascertain that areas with irrigation method which is cultivated on giving vouchers 
- Monitor and evaluate execution of procedure of voucher on schedule of visit each 
District 
- Ascertain input to be used according to the guideline 
- Evaluate data collected from District on production of food crops, especially maize 
and rice, area cultivated maize and rice, area with irrigation with no. of farmers who 
produce these crops 
- Receive and arrange reports of execution and procedure of voucher and entrusted by 
MAFC. 
 
4. DVC 
Each district government involved with procedure of voucher creates DVC whose members 
are: 
- DC – Chairman 
- DED (District / Municipal/ city) – Secretary 
- DAS (District / Municipal / City) – Member 
- District councilor(s) 
- Chairman of District government 
- Representative from Farmers’ group 
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- Representative from Agricultural input agro-dealers’ association 
- Representative from citizen’s organizations 
- Representative of Input company 
- District agricultural / livestock officer 
- District Community development officer 
- Representative from NMB 
Caution: Chairman of DVC is able to invite organization or individual which is seen as useful. 
Responsibilities of DVC 
- Receive vouchers of agricultural input from Regional commissioner and distribute to 
VVC 
- Develop reports on distribution of voucher of agricultural inputs for each village if it is 
necessary with RVC, WVC and VVC 
- Collect and pass reports of production of maize and rice, use of inputs and other 
reports concerned for each ward and village 
- Select ward and village which profit from procedure of voucher (whose area has 
qualification of maize and rice production) 
- Ascertain that cultivated area with irrigation method would be given on voucher 
distribution 
- Use criteria which recognize the amount of voucher to be given for each village 
- Monitor and evaluate execution and procedure of voucher whose schedule of visit to 
each ward and village 
- Issue village government report on amount of voucher distributed and give direction 
for creation of VVC and criteria used for selection to committee members on 
commitment and procedures utilized 
- Hold seminar for village government, VVC on giving instructions on aims and correct 
use of voucher on giving agricultural input subsidy 
- Educate VVC on criteria for selection of beneficiary HHs and distribution of vouchers 
- Select and confirm agro-dealers which give service to farmers on the following 
procedure: 
1) Agro-dealers request DVC to distribute inputs and announce village that 
they would be expected to distribute inputs 
2) Names of supplicants are sent to village assembly which asks opinion 
3) DVC confirms name of agro-dealer taking into account of opinions of 
village assembly 
4) DVC ascertains each village be given at least two agro-dealers 
- Ascertain agro-dealers do business at ward or village 
- Evaluate receipt of agricultural input at district which argues shortage in distribution of 
inputs 
- Cooperate with CBOs, financial organizations and cooperative society for saving and 
loans for target of making farmers able to get loan to buy inputs 
- Receive complaints concerned with execution of subsidy programme with voucher from 
ward and village and give to RVC for 2011/12 by using attachment No. 3 
- Ascertain District Agricultural / livestock officer and to do reconciliation of agro-dealers 
in cooperation with NMB. 
 
5. WVC 
Each ward which benefits from execution of input subsidy programme creates WVC 
whose members are following: 
- WEO – Chairman 
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- WAEO – Secretary 
- Ward Councillor – member 
- Community development officer 
- Representative of farmers 
 
Responsiblities of WVC 
WVC  will  have  big  responsibilities  of  following  up  and  monitoring  execution  of  subsidy 
programme for voucher distribution at villages concerned. 
 
6. Village level 
VVC is created with 6 members which have 3 men/women who are not village government 
officers and whose criteria are: 
(i) Be model farmer at the village 
(ii) Be ready to monitor and give explanation on use of voucher and inputs to their 
farmers 
(iii) Have qualification of leader 
(iv) Be able to read and write 
 
These 6 members are recommended by village government and proved by Village assembly.  
There chairman and secretary are selected. And agriculture officer is member at VVC. 
 
Responsibility for VVC 
VVC has the following work: 
- Educate farmers on the criteria for selecting HHs and select beneficiary HHs with 
cooperation of Village/Ward Executive officer 
- Develop cash book of HHs who satisfy criteria for receiving input subsidy, who 
received and would receive them through vouchers. 
- Select HHs who are eligible and desire to receive vouchers with chairmen of hamlets 
which is approved by Village governments and Village assembly. Criteria for 
beneficiaries are: 
(i) Follow the guideline of the village concerned 
(ii) Have persisting work in the village and his/her prime activity is maize or rice 
farming 
(iii) Household who have the area which could be harvested and in that area it can 
have 1 acre of maize or rice 
(iv) Household don’t have capacity to buy agricultural inputs from market price but 
have capacity to top-up 
(v) Household which is headed by special groups, especially widows and disabled 
are given 1st priority. 
(vi) Household have already signed to the agreement document with village 
government on correct use of agricultural inputs and execution of agricultural 
good practice71. 
 
Look: Subsidy would be given to the households for 3 years’ period 
 
- Bring the list of households who would be beneficiaries for vouchers to the district and 
display copy at the announcement board at village 
- Receive voucher, hold meeting openly and develop schedule with special time for 
distributing voucher to the targeted beneficiaries. 
 
 
71 The author has not heard any such document. 
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- Agro-dealers and VEO plan special date for selling inputs through vouchers and voucher book 
be remained with VEO. 
- Monitor use of agricultural inputs at beneficiaries. 
- Bring reports of execution to village governments, village assembly, and VVC, and DVC. 
 
Responsibility of HHs 
- Prepare area which will be used to cultivate maize or rice 
- Receive vouchers from VVC 
- Use vouchers to buy agricultural inputs for intended aims 
- Use inputs for good agricultural practices following the advice from Agricultural officers 
- Write  signatures to agreement  document  with village government  on correct use of 
agricultural inputs and execution of good agricultural practices. 
 
Caution: Not allowed to sell or exchange voucher of agricultural inputs and anything more than 
intended for inputs. 
 
Others 
(i) National Voucher Meeting 
This meeting is held once in year to ascertain accomplishment of work of the passed year. And it 
will discuss and pass decision which relate to execution and efficiency of procedure of voucher 
of following year. This decision together with criteria used for voucher distribution matches with 
weather condition of the area concerned, voucher with amount of subsidy. And decision is 
concerned with evaluation of execution of voucher programme. Members of the meeting is 
coming from: 
- National community sevice 
- RAS 
- District 
- Private sector: Fertilizer company (3), Seed company (3), and Pesticide company (3) 
- Farmers’ group and CBO (3) 
- NGOs (5) 
 
Responsbilities of National meeting 
- Establish report of execution of the passed year and suggest change or improvement for 
committee of operation 
- Break down and pass criteria used to distribute vouchers at region and district 
- Pass distribution of voucher to targeted region and district by using guidelines issued and 
procedure of voucher 
- Discuss and pass suggestions of programme and budget for the year concerned. 
 
(ii) Sector of Agricultural input 
Responsibilities of sector of Agricultural input 
- Secretary of NVC: 
(i) Help Chairman of NVC and prepare for meetings of NVC 
(ii) Write minutes of NVC 
(iii) Prepare and develop various reports of inputs 
- Monitor and evaluate execution of the project 
(iv) Initiate system of evaluation and execution of the programmme with separation 
from evaluation of MAFC 
(v) Prepare and publish bid for preparing system of evaluation and take report related 
to the execution of the programme 
(vi) In cooperation with Evaluation by District and connect report of execution of the 
programme 
(vii) Monitor execution and evaluation of the work of the programme, results of the 
programme and success which comes from and goals which the programme 
helped 
(viii) Prepare report of execution linked to character accepted at the programme 
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- Plan, arrange and accomplish work of the programme 
(i) Prepare budget and annual work plan of execution of the programme 
(ii) Connect agro-dealers for accomplishment of the work: develop estimate of the 
needs of inputs and distribution and prepare report from distribution of the region, 
district and village 
(iii) Complete bid related to input delivery in time 
(iv) Mobilize and educate on procedure of voucher 
(v) Prepare specialists and adviser on completion of the programme related to 
presentation of instructions, monitoring and evaluation of execution  
- Make District government to provide experts, data and reports of execution of the 
programme from National input committee 
- Pass policy and aims of procedure of voucher like going together with aims of the 
programme 
- Arrange and strengthen close relation and participants of procedure of voucher like NMB, 
AGRA, CNFA, IFDC, IDA, community organization, farmers’groups, and private 
organizations. 
- Prepare report of examination of numbers in time and make report to treasurey of World 
Bank 
- In cooperation with tool of news at region, give instructions adequate to important points 
and use of vouchers 
- Arrange actual needs, delivery, distribution and use of agro-inputs. 
 
(iii) District Voucher stakeholder meeting 
This meeting is held National Voucher stakeholder meeting twice a year. This meeting 
discusses work procedures, annual budget and report of district work. 
 
Members of the meeting: 
- Members of DVC 
- Rep. from District government 
- Rep. from RAS 
- Rep. from private fertilizer company 
- Rep. of private seed company 
- Rep. from Agro-dealer association of agricultural input 
- Rep. from NGOs 
- Rep. from farmers’ group 
 
Responsibility of the meeting 
- Study distribution of voucher in the villages which takes into account procedures planned 
by NVC 
- Discuss and study recommendation of work plan and annual budget of National Voucher 
stakeholder committee at District level 
- Pass report of work and provide recommendation for NVC. 
 
(iv) Complaints and solutions 
Levels of regions, districts, wards and village do procedure of receipt and are occupied with 
complaints concerned execution of plan of agricultural input subsidy in the areas where they 
manage following procedures: 
- Provide address and tel. no. and name of chairman of voucher committee at the level 
where there is guarantee of receipt of complaints at the committee. Compalints of level 
of village are going to levels of wards, the ones of wards go to district, the ones of district 
go to region. 
- Put procedure of accepting complaints of execution at the levels of monitoring. Reports 
of accepting complaints are in the section of reports of execution of the plan of 
agricultural input subsidy. In cooperation with MFAC, address, tel. no. and normal letter 
go to following address: 
Office of director responsible for agricultural input, MFAC 
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(v) Participation of private sector 
Agro-dealer 
Agro-dealer distributes inputs in accordance with the procedures of voucher on the basis of 
the following criteria: 
(i) Have shop of inputs in the village or ward concerned 
(ii) Have education related to administration of agricultural input business 
(iii) Have expertise of agricultural input business 
(iv) Have experience of business of agricultural input in the district 
(v) Have business license 
(vi) Have registration and be given ID No. of TIN from TRA 
(vii) Have account from NMB in the district concerned 
(viii) Have capacity of delivery of inputs up to village all the time 
(ix) Have registration of MFAC as a seller of seeds, fertilizer and pesticides (TPRI). 
 
Roles of agro-dealers 
- Guarantee that he has agro-inputs which satisfy the needs 
- Agro-dealers know use of inputs sold at the shops 
- Receive voucher with money from farmers and sell inputs concerned 
- Bring voucher used at the District office of agriculture and livestock for verification 
before bringing them to the Bank 
- Preserve stock of the inputs they bought from company concerned and show it if 
necessary 
- When Agro-dealers asks for payment of distribution of inputs they show invoice of sales 
of inputs which shows that they bought them where with cashbook which shows goods 
which are entered and are sold. Also they are joined to list of farmers whom they served. 
 
Responsibilities of company 
- Bring and sell agro-inputs to agro-dealers 
- Follow up sales of inputs which guarantee quality of inputs which show at markets 
- Provide education of correct use of inputs 
 
Responsibilities of NMB 
- Prepare for Agri. Voucher deposit form and open to agro-dealers which shows after sales 
of inputs with verification of voucher 
- Receive and verify voucher used sell inputs from agro-dealers after evaluated by District 
agricultural and livestock officer and pay 
 
(vi) Following up and evaluation 
Procedure of distribution of inputs with voucher is held with monitoring, follow-up and 
evaluation from Ministry, region, district, ward up to village. Ministry communicates 
procedures in the way of developing report which take into account in the following: 
- Procedure and distribution of agro-inputs 
- Distribution in time 
- Verification of beneficiary farmers 
- Verification of farmers who bought inputs with using vouchers 
- Verification of farmers who use inputs 
- Verification of crops used improved seeds and fertilizers in relation to production with no 
use of improved inputs 
- Measure capacity of agro-dealers which accomplish distribution of inputs in relation to 
the needs 
- Evaluate data of buying and sales of inputs 
- See vouchers of agro-inputs which was sold in relation to the list of target farmers coming 
from VVC 
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- Evaluate procedure and easiness of returning money of subsidy from NMB to agro- 
dealers 
- Break down problem of craftsmanship at step of execution of procedure of vouchers 
 
(vii) Important issues which are taken into account 
- Vouchers are not allowed to transfer to the person who are not selected by VVC 
- Use of voucher which have place to be written: Farmer of one place cannot use voucher 
in another place 
- Use of voucher after May 2012 
- Government servants, leaders and executive officer cannot participate at agro-business 
with subsidy of vouchers 
- Tools of government monitor closely on performance of agro-dealers and Executive 
officers. In these they would advice failures 
- No. and type of voucher given to target farmers: 
(i) 1 voucher of improved seeds (for maize 10 kg. or 15 kg for rice) 
(ii) 1 voucher for planting fertilizers (50 kg of 1 bag of DAP, or 2 bags of 50 kg of 
Minjingu) 
(iii) 1 voucher for boosting fertilizer which is 1 bag of 50 kg of UREA 
These amounts of voucher are sufficient at the 1 acre of cultivating crops 
concerned 
 
- Responsibility of District agricultural officer who go to pick up copy of ‘agricultural 
Voucher deposit form’ from NMB for records 
- District has plan of constructing capacity of agro-dealers at village, ward and district 
levels 
- Farmers are motivated to invest and establish groups like SACCOS, VICOBA and 
Warehouse Receipt System which enable to get loan for agro-inputs after finishing plan 
of subsidy through voucher 
 
Step to be taken by farmers to buy inputs 
1. Farmers are informed that subsidy is not enduring thing but only for 3 years 
2. Farmers are motivated to accompany various groups like SACCOS, AMCOS and are 
motivated to sell crops which pass plan of Warehouse Receipt System which enable to get 
loan. 
3. Farmers are motivated to enter to the contract farming which benefits farmers 
4. Farmers are enabled to get cultivating land title document and license of house which give 
guarantee of loan of inputs 
5. Farmers are motivated to construct process of placing saving at the financial institution after 
selling crops 
6. Farmers are advised to buy inputs at the time of sales of crops 
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Appendix 7. Panel sample distribution and voucher receipt experience 
District Village Recipient 
HHs 
Non- 
recipient 
HH 
Total HHs District 
total 
District 
total 
recipients 
Songea Mlete 17 0 17 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
44 
Muhukuru 7 4 11 
Morogo 8 1 9 
Madaba 12 1 13 
Tunduru Sisi kwa sisi 2 3 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
Namiungo 2 3 5 
Namakambale 4 7 11 
Tuwemacho    
Chiungo 4 3 7 
Angalia 1  
2 
 
3 
 
5 
Mchesi 1 2 3 
Wenje 5 2 7 
Mchoteka 7 1 8 
Mbesa 3 6 9 
Kitanda 5 0 5 
Nampungu 2 1 3 
Namakungwa 3 3 6 
Mbinga Litorongi 7 2 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
Lipumba 12 6 18 
Mkwaya 13 3 16 
Ndondo 7 6 13 
Chiulu/Chiula    
Kigerekiti 8 6 14 
Kibandai A 2 6 8 
Mango 3 3 6 
Langiro Asili 7 8 15 
Magenge 8 4 12 
Tukuzi 6 4 10 
Ulolela    
Kipololo 14 0 14 
Mpepai 4 6 10 
Kitura 8 6 14 
Namtumbo Ligera 2 1 3 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
21 
Milayoyo 12 1 13 
Naikesi 5 2 7 
Likuyu/Sekamanga 2 1 3 
Total  204 105 309 309 204 
Source: Author’s data 
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Appendix 8. Determinants of the probability of households being selected for voucher in the 
pilot year 
Average marginal effects of logit estimates v3 v3 
 dfdx/ (se) dfdx/ (se) 
Log of age of household head -0.072 0.009 
 (0.154) (0.127) 
Gender of household head (if male=1, female=0) 0.117 0.042 
 (0.378) (0.325) 
Education (If household head has completed standard 5=1, if not=0) 0.109 0.049 
 (0.248) (0.189) 
Whether household head is sick/disabled (Sick/disabled=1, if not=0) 0.113 0.068 
 (0.285) (0.241) 
Log of number of farmers in the household -0.114 -0.083 
 (0.352) (0.285) 
If household received training on input use (yes=1, no=0) -0.244 -0.044 
 (0.670) (0.515) 
Log of household size -0.085 -0.092 
 (0.365) (0.294) 
Log of amount of cash income -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.040) (0.031) 
Log of number of bullocks -0.055 -0.063 
 (0.463) (0.336) 
Log of number of cows 0.170 0.112* 
 (0.268) (0.170) 
Log of number of goats 0.087* 0.036 
 (0.128) (0.102) 
Log of number of pigs -0.086 -0.043 
 (0.182) (0.137) 
Log of number of chickens 0.044 0.018 
 (0.099) (0.074) 
If household members belong to credit associations/bank 0.044 0.119 
 (0.489) (0.334) 
Quality of land (Poor=1, Average=2, Good=3) -0.003 0.044 
 (0.203) (0.161) 
Log of land owned area -0.010 0.058 
 (0.164) (0.135) 
Log of area of land cultivated 0.092 0.050 
 (0.221) (0.174) 
Log of amount of remittance/gift received from relatives/friends -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.049) (0.038) 
Log of amount of contribution to social functions 0.056 0.009 
 (0.103) (0.076) 
Whether household member belongs to religious/ social group -0.034 -0.053 
 (0.251) (0.189) 
Access to irrigation facilities -0.068 -0.052 
 (0.236) (0.189) 
House roof made of metal/stone/concrete 0.041 0.091 
 (0.253) (0.202) 
Log of amount of total household consumption -0.050 -0.015 
 (0.143) (0.111) 
Whether household members/relatives are elected for position in village -0.011 0.032 
 (0.229) (0.181) 
Whether household member belongs to primary society, SACCO, or other 
economic group 
0.036 -0.061 
 (0.515) (0.350) 
Whether household member/relative is VVC member 0.134 0.085 
 (0.316) (0.235) 
Log of amount of urea used for maize plots in 2007/8 0.021 0.032** 
 (0.049) (0.037) 
Log of amount of maize improved seeds used in 2007/8 0.169** 0.142** 
 (0.191) (0.154) 
Whether village has access to health centre (yes=1, no=0) -0.193  
 (0.532)  
Whether village does not have access to water facilities (no access=1, access=0) -0.200*  
 (0.313)  
Whether village has market access (yes=1, no=0) -0.038  
 (0.450)  
Whether village has gravel roads (yes=1, no=0) -0.194  
 (0.339)  
Log of distance to town 0.021  
 (0.133)  
Whether village has agricultural agents (yes=1, no=0) -0.169*  
 (0.236)  
Whether village has points for input sales (yes=1, no=0) 0.406**  
 (0.516)  
Whether village has access to bank (yes=1, no=0) 0.052  
 (0.315)  
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Log of number of visited maize buyers in village 0.102***  
 (0.092)  
Whether village has cell phone network (yes=1, no=0) 0.216**  
 (0.289)  
Number 221 292 
Pseudo R-squared 0.213 0.107 
Note: The table provides marginal effects based on logit models. dfdx=marginal effects; se=standard error. 
Models for being selected for vouchers in the pilot year are estimated: in the left column the model uses 
only individual variables and in the left it uses also village variables. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 9. Determinants of the probability of voucher receipt in the pilot year 
Average marginal effects of logit estimates v4 v4 
 dfdx/ (se) dfdx/ (se) 
Log of age of household head -0.035 -0.082 
 (0.125) (0.152) 
Gender of household head (if male=1, female=0) 0.015 0.093 
 (0.338) (0.397) 
Education (If household head has completed standard 5=1, if not=0) -0.010 0.092 
 (0.195) (0.253) 
Whether household head is sick/disabled (Sick/disabled=1, if not=0) 0.123 0.159 
 (0.248) (0.287) 
Log of number of farmers in the household -0.048 -0.099 
 (0.293) (0.356) 
If household received training on input use (yes=1, no=0) -0.153 -0.310 
 (0.588) (0.889) 
Log of household size -0.079 -0.099 
 (0.303) (0.366) 
Log of amount of cash income -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.032) (0.040) 
Log of number of bullocks 0.047 0.168 
 (0.334) (0.458) 
Log of number of cows 0.001 0.010 
 (0.175) (0.258) 
Log of number of goats 0.035 0.083* 
 (0.105) (0.130) 
Log of number of pigs -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.138) (0.177) 
Log of number of chickens 0.008 0.007 
 (0.076) (0.100) 
If household members belong to credit associations/bank 0.060 -0.044 
 (0.335) (0.490) 
Quality of land (Poor=1, Average=2, Good=3) 0.060 0.006 
 (0.167) (0.205) 
Log of land owned area 0.038 -0.005 
 (0.138) (0.166) 
Log of area of land cultivated 0.062 0.096 
 (0.180) (0.225) 
Log of amount of remittance/gift received from relatives/friends 0.001 0.001 
 (0.039) (0.049) 
Log of amount of contribution to social functions 0.012 0.061 
 (0.078) (0.104) 
Whether household member belongs to religious/ social group -0.057 -0.015 
 (0.195) (0.251) 
Access to irrigation facilities 0.003 0.045 
 (0.190) (0.228) 
Houseroof is metal/stone/concrete 0.064 0.059 
 (0.212) (0.259) 
Log of amount of total household consumption 0.016 -0.021 
 (0.115) (0.146) 
Whether household members/relatives are elected for position in village 0.019 -0.048 
 (0.185) (0.225) 
Whether household member belongs to primary society, SACCO, or other 
economic group 
-0.008 0.131 
 (0.348) (0.506) 
Whether household member/relative is VVC member 0.111 0.116 
 (0.236) (0.308) 
Log of amount of urea used for maize plots in 2007/8 0.034** 0.018 
 (0.038) (0.048) 
Log of amount of maize improved seeds used in 2007/8 0.114** 0.129** 
 (0.137) (0.170) 
Whether village has access to health centre (yes=1, no=0)  -0.065 
  (0.541) 
Whether village does not have access to water facilities (no access=1, access=0)  -0.044 
  (0.313) 
Whether village has market access (yes=1, no=0)  -0.064 
  (0.455) 
Whether village has gravel roads (yes=1, no=0)  -0.083 
  (0.341) 
Log of distance to town  -0.013 
  (0.135) 
Whether village has agricultural agents (yes=1, no=0)  -0.101 
  (0.233) 
Whether village has points for input sales (yes=1, no=0)  0.449** 
  (0.515) 
Whether village has access to bank (yes=1, no=0)  0.033 
  (0.319) 
Log of number of visited maize buyers in village  0.064* 
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  (0.091) 
Whether village has cell phone network (yes=1, no=0)  0.106 
  (0.291) 
Number 292 221 
Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.182 
Note: The table provides marginal effects based on logit models. dfdx=marginal effects; se=standard error. 
Models for having received vouchers in the pilot year are estimated: in the right column the model uses 
only individual variables and in the left it uses also village variables. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 10. Determinants of the probability of households/relatives having VVC 
members in the pilot year 
Average marginal effects of logit estimates vouchercat 
 dfdx/(se) 
Log of age of household head -0.015 
 (0.220) 
Gender of household head (if male=1, female=0) -0.141 
 (0.445) 
Education (If household head has completed standard 5=1, if not=0) 0.015 
 (0.276) 
Whether household head is sick/disabled (Sick/disabled=1, if not=0) -0.082* 
 (0.450) 
Log of number of farmers in the household 0.055 
 (0.381) 
Log of household size -0.034 
 (0.396) 
Log of amount of cash income -0.010 
 (0.042) 
Log of number of bullocks -0.020 
 (0.394) 
Log of number of cows 0.016 
 (0.212) 
Log of number of goats 0.009 
 (0.136) 
Log of number of pigs 0.007 
 (0.189) 
Log of number of chickens -0.003 
 (0.099) 
If household members belong to credit associations/bank -0.042 
 (0.468) 
Quality of land (Poor=1, Average=2, Good=3) 0.067* 
 (0.225) 
Log of land owned area 0.031 
 (0.168) 
Log of area of land cultivated 0.031 
 (0.225) 
Log of amount of remittance/gift received from relatives/friends -0.000 
 (0.052) 
Log of amount of contribution to social functions -0.004 
 (0.101) 
Whether household member belongs to religious/ social group 0.169*** 
 (0.256) 
Access to irrigation facilities 0.056* 
 (0.210) 
House roof is metal/stone/concrete -0.030 
 (0.286) 
Log of amount of total household consumption 0.025 
 (0.157) 
Whether household members/relatives are elected for position in village 0.114*** 
 (0.307) 
Whether household member belongs to primary society, SACCO, or other 
economic group 
0.080 
 (0.469) 
Whether household used urea one year before the programme 0.002 
 (0.051) 
Whether household used maize improved seeds one year before the programme 0.037 
 (0.158) 
Number 284 
Pseudo R-squared 0.255 
Note: The table provides marginal effects based on logit model. dfdx=marginal effects; 
se=standard error. A model for household members or relatives having VVC members in pilot 
year is estimated including village variables. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
-283-  
Appendix 11. Determinants of the probability of households not received vouchers 
after being selected for vouchers in the pilot year 
Average marginal effects of logit estimates noreceipt noreceipt 
 dfdx/ (se) dfdx/ (se) 
Log of age of household head 0.089** 0.103* 
 (1.125) (0.547) 
Gender of household head (if male=1, female=0) 0.020 0.023 
 (1.239) (0.595) 
Education (If household head has completed standard 5=1, if not=0) -0.007 0.033 
 (0.616) (0.336) 
Whether household head is sick/disabled (Sick/disabled=1, if not=0) -0.014 -0.038 
 (0.675) (0.438) 
Log of number of farmers in the household -0.018 -0.034 
 (0.673) (0.422) 
Household received training on input use (yes=1, no=0) 0.110 0.089 
 (1.107) (0.679) 
Log of household size 0.020 0.011 
 (0.808) (0.443) 
Log of off-farm cash income 0.003 0.002 
 (0.105) (0.048) 
Log of number of cows 0.034* 0.052** 
 (0.486) (0.222) 
Log of number of goats -0.007 0.002 
 (0.244) (0.143) 
Log of number of pigs -0.022 -0.026 
 (0.453) (0.213) 
Log of number of chickens 0.017* 0.004 
 (0.252) (0.115) 
If household members belong to credit associations/bank 0.061 0.037 
 (1.048) (0.497) 
Quality of land (Poor=1, Average=2, Good=3) -0.020 -0.009 
 (0.469) (0.236) 
Log of land owned area -0.007 0.007 
 (0.346) (0.199) 
Log of area of land cultivated -0.018 -0.007 
 (0.552) (0.248) 
Log of amount of remittance/gift received from relatives/friends -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.122) (0.061) 
Log of amount of contribution to social functions -0.014 0.001 
 (0.278) (0.114) 
Whether household member belongs to religious/ social group 0.014 0.005 
 (0.565) (0.291) 
Access to irrigation facilities -0.055** -0.037 
 (0.686) (0.335) 
Houseroof is metal/stone/concrete -0.021 0.012 
 (0.567) (0.300) 
Log of amount of total household consumption 0.008 -0.016 
 (0.333) (0.168) 
Whether household members/relatives are elected for position in village 0.022 0.004 
 (0.565) (0.275) 
Whether household member belongs to primary society, SACCO, or other economic group -0.024 -0.028 
 (1.172) (0.524) 
Whether household member/relative is VVC member 0.013 -0.020 
 (0.685) (0.379) 
Whether household used urea one year before the programme 0.023  
 (0.483)  
Whether household used maize improved seeds one year before the programme 0.002  
 (0.992)  
Whether village has access to health centre (yes=1, no=0) -0.036**  
 (1.556)  
Whether village does not have access to water facilities (no access=1, access=0) -0.082**  
 (0.961)  
Whether village has market access (yes=1, no=0) 0.131  
 (1.093)  
Whether village has gravel roads (yes=1, no=0) -0.138  
 (1.568)  
Log of distance to town 0.004  
 (0.298)  
Whether village has agricultural agents (yes=1, no=0) -0.099  
 (1.020)  
Whether village has access to bank (yes=1, no=0) -0.062  
 (1.461)  
Log of number of visited maize buyers in village 0.010  
 (0.251)  
Log of number of bullocks  -0.064 
  (0.551) 
Log of amount of urea used for maize plots in 2007/08  -0.002 
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  (0.056) 
Log of amount of maize improved seeds used in 2007/08  -0.001 
  (0.204) 
Number 146 292 
Pseudo R-squared 0.361 0.134 
Note: dfdx=marginal effects; se=standard error. The table provides marginal effects based on logit 
models. Models for not receiving vouchers after being selected in the pilot year are estimated: In the 
left column the model does not include the number of bullocks and uses the input use experience, in 
the right it does not include the village variables nor the input use experience but includes number of 
bullocks and the input use in 2007/08. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Appendix 12. Determinants of the probability of receiving vouchers in any year of the 
programme 
Average marginal effects of logit estimates dfdx/ (se) dfdx/ (se) 
Log of age of household head -0.011 -0.054 
 (0.160) (0.125) 
Gender of household head (if male=1, female=0) -0.115 -0.155 
 (0.465) (0.347) 
Education (If household head has completed standard 5=1, if not=0) -0.006 0.021 
 (0.291) (0.197) 
Whether household head is sick/disabled (Sick/disabled=1, if not=0) -0.125 -0.091 
 (0.315) (0.250) 
Log of number of farmers in the household 0.016 -0.015 
 (0.400) (0.306) 
Log of household size 0.020 0.069 
 (0.421) (0.321) 
Log of off-farm cash income -0.023 -0.028** 
 (0.048) (0.034) 
Log of number of cows -0.172* -0.072 
 (0.328) (0.186) 
Log of number of goats 0.011 -0.002 
 (0.150) (0.111) 
Log of number of pigs -0.049 -0.013 
 (0.222) (0.149) 
Log of number of chickens 0.030 0.056** 
 (0.120) (0.082) 
If household members belong to credit associations/bank -0.055 0.170 
 (0.569) (0.402) 
Quality of land (Poor=1, Average=2, Good=3) -0.022 0.033 
 (0.221) (0.167) 
Log of land owned area 0.021 0.052 
 (0.213) (0.150) 
Log of area of land cultivated 0.062 0.043 
 (0.262) (0.189) 
Log of amount of remittance/gift received from relatives/friends -0.008 0.003 
 (0.057) (0.042) 
Log of amount of contribution to social functions 0.014 -0.013 
 (0.118) (0.080) 
Whether household member belongs to religious/ social group -0.008 -0.012 
 (0.298) (0.206) 
Access to irrigation facilities -0.053 -0.021 
 (0.273) (0.215) 
Houseroof is metal/stone/concrete 0.092 0.074 
 (0.299) (0.206) 
Log of amount of total household consumption 0.074 0.080** 
 (0.171) (0.118) 
Whether household members/relatives are elected for position in village 0.019 0.067 
 (0.250) (0.188) 
Whether household member belongs to primary society, SACCO, or other 
economic group 
0.269* -0.054 
 (0.667) (0.435) 
Whether household member/relative is VVC member 0.237** 0.125 
 (0.502) (0.286) 
Whether household used urea one year before the programme 0.273*** 0.241*** 
 (0.277) (0.185) 
Whether household used maize improved seeds one year before the 
programme 
0.047 0.104 
 (0.628) (0.422) 
Whether village has access to health centre (yes=1, no=0) 0.200  
 (0.603)  
Whether village does not have access to water facilities (no access=1, 
access=0) 
0.073  
 (0.341)  
Whether village has market access (yes=1, no=0) -0.212  
 (0.520)  
Whether village has gravel roads (yes=1, no=0) -0.111  
 (0.370)  
Log of distance to town -0.050  
 (0.177)  
Whether village has agricultural agents (yes=1, no=0)Agriext -0.141*  
 (0.271)  
Whether village has points for input sales (yes=1, no=0) 0.122  
 (0.585)  
Whether village has access to bank (yes=1, no=0) 0.138  
 (0.356)  
Log of number of visited maize buyers 0.035  
 (0.100)  
Whether village has cell phone network (yes=1, no=0) -0.101  
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 (0.312)  
If household received training on input use (yes=1, no=0)  0.189 
  (0.631) 
Log of number of bullocks  0.086 
  (0.408) 
Number 198 292 
Pseudo R-squared 0.300 0.185 
Note: dfdx=marginal effects; se=standard error. The table provides marginal effects based on logit models. 
Models for receiving vouchers in any year are estimated: in the left column the model includes village 
variables but not includes receiving training on input use nor the number of bullocks, while in the right 
column it includes opposite to this. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 13. Voucher recipient propensity score logit model (voucher receipt in 2011/12) 
 
Voucher receipt in 2011/12 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Z value 
Probability  of 
more than z 
value 
 
Log of household head age 
 
-0.02546 
 
0.388922 
 
-0.07 
 
0.948 
Gender of household head (1=male, 0=female) -0.00236 0.239482 -0.01 0.992 
Household heads having completed standard 7 (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.05701 0.182537 -0.31 0.755 
Sick/disabled household heads (1=yes, 0=no) 0.379142 0.224785 1.69 0.092 
Log of number of farmers in the household -0.21496 0.314207 -0.68 0.494 
Average slope of parcels cultivated (1=very steep, 
2=average, 3=mostly flat) 
-0.19464 0.330959 -0.59 0.556 
Log of landholding (acre) -0.17419 0.125521 -1.39 0.165 
Log of amount of contribution to social organisations 
(Thousand TZS) 
0.051339 0.086923 0.59 0.555 
Log of total annual household consumption (Thousand 
TZS) 
0.04866 0.115166 0.42 0.673 
Whether household head belongs to religious / social 
groups (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.066053 0.185357 0.36 0.722 
Whether household head was elected for positions (1=yes, 
0=no) 
0.385128 0.200451 1.92 0.055 
Whether household head was in VVC (1=yes, 0=no) 0.178718 0.246193 0.73 0.468 
Log of usage amount of urea (kg) 0.141809 0.042351 3.35 0.001 
Log of usage amount of improved seeds (kg) 0.280957 0.143473 1.96 0.05 
Village has market (1=yes, 0=no) -0.10079 0.244786 -0.41 0.681 
Log of distance to town (km) 0.0576 0.070571 0.82 0.414 
Village has input sales points (1=yes, 0=no) 0.272134 0.335477 0.81 0.417 
Constant -0.79772 1.600822 -0.5 0.618 
Note: the common support option has been selected. 
The region of common support is [.09255678, .96561197]. 
 
 
Description of estimated propensity 
score in region of common support 
 
 Estimated propensity score   
  
Percentile 
 
Smallest 
  
1% 0.097881 0.092557   
5% 0.1170156 0.092963   
10% 0.139482 0.097881 Observation 216 
25% 0.2081425 0.102287 
Sum of 
Weight 
216 
 
50% 
 
0.3090957 
  
Mean 
 
0.355451 
  Largest Standard 
Deviation 
0.19753 
75% 0.4654767 0.858854   
90% 0.6601106 0.892885 Variance 0.039018 
95% 0.7432452 0.936104 Skewness 0.892795 
99% 0.8928846 0.965612 Kurtosis 3.126766 
 
*****************************************************
* Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks. 
Use option detail if further details on output are required. 
****************************************************** 
The final number of blocks is five, which ensures that the mean propensity 
score does not differ between treatments and controls in each block. 
********************************************************** 
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Step 2: Test for balancing propensity score 
Use option detail if further details on output are required. 
********************************************************** 
Balance is achieved. 
This table shows the inferior boundary, number of treatments, and 
number of controls in each block. 
 
Inferior  
of block v41112   
Total of pscore 0 1 
0.0925568 42 8 50 
0.2 66 24 90 
0.4 23 23 46 
0.6 8 15 23 
0.8 0 7 7 
Total 139 77 216 
Note: Common support option has been selected. 
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Appendix 14. Impact of voucher receipt in 2011/12 on maize yield 
 Controlling for 
urea 
Controlling for 
improved maize 
seeds 
 Log of maize yield Log of maize yield 
 Marginal effects 
(Standard error) 
Marginal effects 
(Standard error) 
Time (Round3=0, Round4=1) 0.890*** 0.841*** 
 (0.226) (0.229) 
Voucher receipt in 2011/12 (1=yes, 0=no) 0.108 0.159 
 (0.220) (0.223) 
Intersection term of time and voucher receipt -0.278 -0.202 
 (0.332) (0.341) 
Log of household head age 0.075 0.093 
 (0.324) (0.336) 
Gender of household head (1=male, 0=female) 0.361 0.544** 
 (0.255) (0.243) 
Household heads having completed standard 7 (1=yes, 0=no) 0.140 0.133 
 (0.162) (0.165) 
Sick/disabled household heads (1=yes, 0=no) 0.111 0.183 
 (0.234) (0.230) 
Log of number of farmers in the household -0.213 -0.197 
 (0.244) (0.252) 
Average slope of parcels cultivated (1=very steep, 2=average, 
3=mostly flat) 
0.045 -0.017 
 (0.275) (0.279) 
Log of landholding (acre) 0.129 0.121 
 (0.111) (0.114) 
Log of amount of contribution to social organisations (Thousand 
TZS) 
-0.041 -0.012 
 (0.058) (0.057) 
Log of total annual household consumption (Thousand TZS) -0.142 -0.078 
 (0.122) (0.110) 
Whether household members/relatives belonged to religious / 
social group (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.374* -0.145 
(0.204) (0.164) 
Whether household members/ relatives were elected for positions 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.119 0.011 
(0.163) (0.157) 
Whether household members/ relatives were VVC members 
(1=yes, 0=no) max) 
-0.069 -0.211 
(0.234) (0.250) 
Linear prediction 0.589***  
 (0.218)  
Village has market (1=yes, 0=no) 0.408 0.254 
 (0.508) (0.514) 
Log of distance to town (km) -0.076 -0.037 
 (0.131) (0.135) 
Village has input sales points (1=yes, 0=no) -0.581 -0.425 
 (0.416) (0.413) 
Mobile phone network (1=yes, 0=no) -0.212 0.129 
 (0.350) (0.324) 
Residuals 0.156***  
 (0.040)  
Linear prediction  0.761** 
  (0.331) 
Residuals  0.203** 
  (0.095) 
Constant 4.451*** 4.353*** 
 (1.462) (1.483) 
Number 363 363 
Pseudo residuals 0.199 0.172 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. Errors are 
calculated using the delta method. In the left column the model controls for use of urea by training on 
input use as an instrumental variable. In the right column the model controls for use of improved seeds 
by belonging to SACCO as an instrumental variable. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 15. Voucher recipient propensity score logit model (voucher receipt in any one 
year) 
 
Voucher receipt in any one year 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Z value 
Probability  of 
more than z 
value 
 
Log of household head age 
 
-0.6694584 
 
0.415872 
 
-1.61 
 
0.107 
Gender of household head (1=male, 0=female) -0.4200181 0.271039 -1.55 0.121 
Household heads having completed standard 7 (1=yes, 
0=no) 
0.208131 0.207038 1.01 0.315 
Sick/disabled household heads (1=yes, 0=no) 0.0009641 0.255229 0 0.997 
Log of number of farmers in the household 0.4805359 0.336908 1.43 0.154 
Average slope of parcels cultivated (1=very steep, 
2=average, 3=mostly flat) 
-0.1294073 0.360581 -0.36 0.72 
Log of landholding (acre) 0.0260887 0.134359 0.19 0.846 
Log of amount of contribution to social organisations 
(Thousand TZS) 
-0.0474446 0.090196 -0.53 0.599 
Log of total annual household consumption (Thousand TZS) 0.2220723 0.124767 1.78 0.075 
Whether household head belongs to religious / social groups 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.0609893 0.226797 0.27 0.788 
Whether household head was elected for positions (1=yes, 
0=no) 
0.5374811 0.217803 2.47 0.014 
Whether household head was in VVC (1=yes, 0=no) 0.584715 0.354657 1.65 0.099 
Log of usage amount of urea (kg) 0.2553411 0.053277 4.79 0 
Log of usage amount of improved seeds (kg) 0.5609707 0.359143 1.56 0.118 
Village has market (1=yes, 0=no) -0.2016598 0.258755 -0.78 0.436 
Log of distance to town (km) 0.068076 0.077417 0.88 0.379 
Village has input sales points (1=yes, 0=no) -0.1795154 0.378255 -0.47 0.635 
Constant 0.6732821 1.718058 0.39 0.695 
Note: the common support option has been selected. 
The region of common support is [.19880223, .99995837]. 
 
 
Description of estimated propensity 
score in region of common support 
 
 
 Estimated propensity score   
 
Percentile Smallest 
1% 0.2131462 0.198802   
5% 0.2957141 0.204536   
10% 0.3889459 0.213146 Obs 219 
25% 0.529505 0.216592 Sum of Wgt. 219 
 
50% 
 
0.7213971 
  
Mean 
 
0.702735 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.223414 
75% 0.907823 0.999825   
90% 0.9708361 0.999896 Variance 0.049914 
95% 0.9972571 0.999936 Skewness -0.41133 
99% 0.9998958 0.999958 Kurtosis 2.057641 
 
***************************************************
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
***************************************************
*** The final number of blocks is 6 
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This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score is not 
different for treated and controls in each block 
**********************************************************  
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
********************************************************** 
The balancing property is satisfied 
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated and 
the number of controls for each block. 
 
Inferior    
 
 
Total 
of block voucher1  
of pscore 0 1 
0.1988022 0 1 1 
0.2 16 6 22 
0.4 24 29 53 
0.6 18 32 50 
0.8 6 27 33 
0.9 1 59 60 
Total 65 154 219 
-292-  
Appendix 16. Impact of voucher receipt in any one year on maize yield 
 Controlling for 
urea 
Controlling for 
improved maize 
seeds 
Log of maize yield   
 Marginal effects 
(Standard error) 
Marginal effects 
(Standard error) 
Time (Round3=0, Round4=1) 0.900*** 0.909*** 
 (0.297) (0.302) 
Voucher receipt in any one year (1=yes, 0=no) -0.101 0.076 
 (0.231) (0.231) 
Intersection term of time and voucher receipt -0.235 -0.256 
 (0.340) (0.347) 
Log of household head age 0.140 0.157 
 (0.324) (0.337) 
Gender of household head (1=male, 0=female) 0.359 0.581** 
 (0.266) (0.248) 
Household heads having completed standard 7 (1=yes, 0=no) 0.108 0.107 
 (0.158) (0.161) 
Sick/disabled household heads (1=yes, 0=no) 0.024 0.114 
 (0.239) (0.233) 
Log of number of farmers in the household -0.147 -0.147 
 (0.248) (0.261) 
Average slope of parcels cultivated (1=very steep, 2=average, 
3=mostly flat) 
0.230 0.199 
 (0.279) (0.283) 
Log of landholding (acre) 0.154 0.105 
 (0.107) (0.109) 
Log of amount of contribution to social organisations (Thousand 
TZS) 
-0.026 -0.005 
 (0.057) (0.057) 
Log of total annual household consumption (Thousand TZS) -0.169 -0.098 
 (0.129) (0.114) 
Whether household members/relatives belonged to religious / 
social group (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.357 -0.107 
 (0.218) (0.167) 
Whether household members/ relatives were elected for positions 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.152 -0.065 
 (0.163) (0.161) 
Whether household members/ relatives were VVC members 
(1=yes, 0=no) max) 
-0.053 -0.179 
 (0.238) (0.257) 
Linear prediction 0.595**  
 (0.242)  
Village has market (1=yes, 0=no) 0.360 0.241 
 (0.517) (0.524) 
Log of distance to town (km) -0.089 -0.033 
 (0.132) (0.135) 
Village has input sales points (1=yes, 0=no) -0.500 -0.319 
 (0.432) (0.422) 
Mobile phone network (1=yes, 0=no) -0.266 0.161 
 (0.358) (0.311) 
Residuals 0.158***  
 (0.040)  
Linear prediction  0.706** 
  (0.349) 
Residuals  0.211** 
  (0.092) 
Constant 4.366*** 4.120*** 
 (1.446) (1.468) 
Number 372 372 
Pseudo residuals 0.181 0.155 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. Errors are calculated 
using the delta method. In the left column the model controls for use of urea by training on input use as 
an instrumental variable. In the right column the model controls for use of improved seeds by training on 
input use as an instrumental variable. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 17. Adult equivalence scale 
Age groups 
Sex 
Male Female 
0 – 2 0.40 0.40 
3 – 4 0.40 0.48 
5 – 6 0.56 0.56 
7 – 8 0.64 0.64 
9 – 10 0.76 0.76 
11 – 12 0.80 0.88 
13 – 14 1.00 1.00 
15 – 18 1.20 1.00 
19 – 59 1.00 0.88 
60 + 0.80 0.72 
Source: Household Budget Survey 2007 Report 
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Appendix 18. Propensity score matching for voucher receipt in 2011/12 
The treatment is v41112 
 
v41112 Freq. Percent Cum. 
    
0 207 67.87 67.87 
1 98 32.13 100 
    
Total 305 100  
The table shows sample distribution of receiving vouchers in 2011/12 (=1) and not receiving 
vouchers in 2011/12 (=0) groups. 
Estimation of the propensity score  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =- 156.58249 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -141.37639 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -141.21383 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -141.21374 
Probit regression Number of obs  =246 
 LR chi2(16) =30.74 
 Prob > chi2 =0.0145 
Log likelihood=-141.21374 
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0982 
Voucher receipt in 2011/12 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z P>z  
[95% Confidence 
interval] 
        
Log of household head age 0.2960005 0.3341167 0.89 0.376  -0.358856 0.9508572 
Sex of household head -0.029746 0.2720977 -0.11 0.913  -0.563048 0.5035553 
Education level of household head -0.09205 0.181764 -0.51 0.613  -0.448301 0.2642008 
Whether household head is bad health 0.2039094 0.2133064 0.96 0.339  -0.214163 0.6219822 
Log of number of farmers in the household 0.0980743 0.3004575 0.33 0.744  -0.490812 0.6869601 
Average soil quality of parcels 0.0218845 0.2973226 0.07 0.941  -0.560857 0.6046262 
Log of land owned -0.119095 0.1183673 -1.01 0.314  -0.35109 0.1129012 
Log of contribution amount to village activities 0.0274624 0.078531 0.35 0.727  -0.126456 0.1813803 
Log of total household consumption per adult 
equilvalent 
0.15742 0.1085865 1.45 0.147  -0.055406 0.3702456 
Average access to irrigation facilities of parcels -0.517331 0.563062 -0.92 0.358  -1.620912 0.5862507 
Whether household members or relatives are in 
elected positions in the village 
0.1784946 0.1847983 0.97 0.334  -0.183703 0.5406926 
Whether household head belongs to SACCO 0.286952 0.2038072 1.41 0.159  -0.112503 0.6864068 
Whether household members or relatives are in 
VVC 
0.2231761 0.2251528 0.99 0.322  -0.218115 0.6644674 
Whether the village has access to input sales 
points 
0.6605032 0.3209018 2.06 0.04  0.0315473 1.289459 
Log of number of maize buyers in the village 0.1075111 0.0737344 1.46 0.145  -0.037006 0.2520279 
Whether the village has access to mobile phone 
network 
0.1458992 0.1872104 0.78 0.436  -0.221026 0.5128249 
Constant -2.784114 1.192424 -2.33 0.02  -5.121223 -0.447006 
Note: The table provides likelihood of being graduates based on probit model. The model 
for receiving vouchers in 2011/12 is estimated. The common support option has been 
selected. The region of common support is [.12943347, .88299271] 
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Description of the estimated propensity score in region of common 
support Estimated propensity score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table shows the percentile distribution counting from the bottom of the estimated 
propensity score in region of common support. The least 13 th percentile of the sample in the 
region has the 1% probabilities on the participation to the programme and about 80 th ~ 88th 
percentile of the sample has 99% probabilities. 
 
*****************************************************
* Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
*****************************************************
* The final number of blocks is 5 
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity 
score is not different for treated and controls in each block 
 
*********************************************************
* Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
*********************************************************
* The balancing property is satisfied 
 
The table shows the number of treated and the number of controls for each block which has certain 
inferior bound in the propensity score. The left column indicates the number of voucher non- 
recipients in 2011/12 and the right column shows the number of recipients. 
Inferior    
of block v41112   
of pscore 0 1 Total 
    
0.1294335 27 9 36 
0.2 104 37 141 
0.4 17 18 35 
0.6 6 16 22 
0.8 0 2 2 
    
Total 154 82 236 
Note: the common support option has been selected. 
******************************************* 
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.1333417 0.1294335   
5% 0.1471731 0.1313777   
10% 0.1683902 0.1333417 Obs 236 
25% 0.2298322 0.1356887 Sum of Wgt. 236 
     
50% 0.3061657  Mean 0.343591 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.16375 
75% 0.3997136 0.7943176   
90% 0.6053674 0.7981146 Variance 0.026814 
95% 0.7193064 0.8555462 Skewness 1.244609 
99% 0.7981146 0.8829927 Kurtosis 4.089123 
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Appendix 19. Impact of voucher receipt in 2011/12 on poverty 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Poverty headcount 
ratio 
Poverty headcount 
ratio 
Poverty headcount 
ratio 
Poverty 
headcount ratio 
 dydx /(se) dydx/(se) dydx/ (se) dydx /(se) 
Time (Round3=0, 
Round4=1) 
-0.237 -0.163 -0.100 -0.390 
(0.473) (0.515) (0.499) (0.465) 
Voucher receipt in 2011/12 0.302* 0.301 0.318* 0.306* 
(1=received, 0=no) (0.163) (0.182) (0.169) (0.166) 
Intersection of Time and 
voucher receipt in 2011/12 
0.016 0.010 -0.020 0.003 
(0.200) (0.218) (0.209) (0.200) 
Log of household head age 0.360 0.298 0.363* 0.296 
 (0.218) (0.237) (0.209) (0.197) 
Sex of household head 
(1=male, 0=female) 
0.029 0.021 -0.015 -0.053 
(0.130) (0.145) (0.137) (0.130) 
Whether household head 
completed standard 5 (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.326*** -0.362*** -0.365*** -0.340*** 
(0.098) (0.107) (0.104) (0.101) 
Log of number of farmers in 
the household 
0.196 0.141   
(0.153) (0.166)   
Averaged soil quality of 
parcels (1=Poor, 2=Average, 
3=Good) 
-0.145 -0.198 -0.181  
(0.118) (0.128) (0.122)  
Log of size of cultivated land 
(acre) 
-0.322***    
(0.089)    
Averaged access to irrigation 
facilities of parcels (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.032 -0.052 -0.068  
(0.115) (0.124) (0.122)  
Whether household members 
or relatives are in elected 
positions in the village 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.125 0.050 0.038 0.005 
(0.093) (0.099) (0.096) (0.088) 
Whether household head 
belongs to saving and credit 
organisation (SACCO) 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.243** -0.212** -0.207** -0.198** 
(0.095) (0.106) (0.100) (0.095) 
Whether household members 
/ relatives are VVC members 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.075 -0.124 -0.103 -0.074 
(0.122) (0.134) (0.129) (0.122) 
Whether household has 
modern house-roof (1=yes, 
0=no) 
 -0.033   
 (0.118)   
Village variables 
    
Access to market (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.016 0.275 0.096 -0.089 
(0.834) (0.911) (0.882) (0.805) 
Access to all-weather road 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.128 0.138 0.182 0.149 
(0.349) (0.391) (0.371) (0.344) 
Log of distance to town (km) 0.145 0.078 0.153 0.228 
 (0.360) (0.401) (0.382) (0.360) 
Whether village has 
permanent input sales points 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.184 -0.046 -0.052 0.087 
(0.565) (0.617) (0.594) (0.578) 
Log of number of maize 
buyers in the village 
0.124 0.116 0.146 0.193 
(0.162) (0.182) (0.172) (0.164) 
Whether village has mobile 
phone network (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.411 -0.444 -0.322 -0.203 
(0.388) (0.424) (0.398) (0.366) 
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 -0.017 -0.019 -0.022 -0.012 
 
Log  of  real  urea  price in 
village (Thousand TZS) 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) 
Log of real labour daily cost 
for land in the village 
(Thousand TZS) 
-1.936 -2.054 -1.982 -2.476 
(1.773) (2.009) (1.885) (1.766) 
Log of real maize sales prices 
by households (Thousand 
TZS) 
0.012 0.024 0.027 0.027 
(0.059) (0.064) (0.063) (0.062) 
Constant 11.118 11.832 10.956 13.909 
 (10.130) (11.388) (10.741) (10.249) 
Number 132 130 132 141 
Residuals 0.423 0.340 0.332 0.293 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. 
dfdx=marginal effects; se=standard error. Errors are calculated using the delta method. Different 
column represent results using different independent variables. Column (1) does not use the 
variable of modern houseroof. Column (2) does not use the variable of land size for cultivation, 
column (3) does not use number of farmers in the households nor land size for cultivation, nor of 
modern houseroof, on top of excluded variables for column (3), column (4) does not use variable 
for soil quality. Real prices are calculated by CPI (base year=2009). 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 20. Propensity score matching for voucher receipt in any one year of the 
programme 
The treatment is voucher1 
voucher1 Freq. Percent Cum. 
    
0 102 33.44 33.44 
1 203 66.56 100 
    
Total 305 100  
The table shows sample distribution of receiving vouchers in any year (=1) and not receiving 
vouchers in any year (=0) groups. 
Estimation of the propensity score  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -149.06073 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -132.32286 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -131.71132 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -131.70487 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -131.70487 
 
Probit regression 
       Number of obs =240  
      LR chi2(17) =  34.71 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0068  
Log likelihood = -131.70487  
Pseudo R2  = 0.1164 
Voucher receipt in any year Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Log of maize yields 0.0531935 0.0395754 1.34 0.179 -0.02437 0.13076 
Log of household head age -0.4571851 0.3755911 -1.22 0.224 -1.19333 0.27896 
Sex of household head -0.2346842 0.2782773 -0.84 0.399 -0.7801 0.310729 
Education level of household head 0.1259401 0.1888371 0.67 0.505 -0.24417 0.496054 
Whether household head is in bad -0.0791109 0.2252815 -0.35 0.725 -0.52065 0.362433 
Log of number of farmers in the 
household 
0.4020094 0.3000727 1.34 0.18 -0.18612 0.990141 
Average slope of parcels -0.230695 0.3326282 -0.69 0.488 -0.88263 0.421244 
Log of land owned 0.0406415 0.122766 0.33 0.741 -0.19998 0.281259 
Log of contribution amount to village 
activities 
-0.0044246 0.0809137 -0.05 0.956 -0.16301 0.154163 
Log of total household consumption per 
adult equivalent 
0.2494343 0.1072811 2.33 0.02 0.039167 0.459701 
Whether household head belongs to 
religious group 
0.2585279 0.1935373 1.34 0.182 -0.1208 0.637854 
Whether household members or 
relatives are in elected position in the 
village 
 
0.3089814 
 
0.1872112 
 
1.65 
 
0.099 
 
-0.05795 
 
0.675909 
Wehther household members or 
relatives are in VVC 
0.6062033 0.3234813 1.87 0.061 -0.02781 1.240215 
Whether the village has access to 
market 
-0.4185851 0.2398174 -1.75 0.081 -0.88862 0.051448 
Log of distance to town 0.0705447 0.0723251 0.98 0.329 -0.07121 0.212299 
Whether the village has access to input 
sales points 
0.182444 0.3130508 0.58 0.56 -0.43112 0.796012 
Whether the village has mobile phone 
network 
0.3350118 0.2071261 1.62 0.106 -0.07095 0.740971 
Constant 0.3495794 1.531078 -0.23 0.819 -3.35044 2.651278 
Note: The table provides likelihood of being graduates based on probit model. The model for 
receiving vouchers in any year is estimated. The common support option has been selected. The 
region of common support is [0.26190214, 0.99833101] 
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Description of the estimated propensity score in region of common 
support Estimated propensity score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table shows the percentile distribution counting from the bottom of the 
estimated propensity score in region of common support. The least 26 th ~ 29 th 
percentiles of the sample in the region has the 1% probabilities on the participation to the 
programme and about 99 th percentile of the sample has 99% probabilities. 
 
***********************************************
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
*********************************************** 
The final number of blocks is 6 
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score is not different for treated 
and controls in each block 
 
***************************************************
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
***************************************************
The balancing property is satisfied. 
 
The table shows the number of treated and the number of controls for each block which has 
certain inferior bound in the propensity score. The left column indicates the number of 
non-recipients in any year and the right column shows the number of recipients in any 
year. 
Inferior    
of block voucher1   
of pscore 0 1 Total 
    
0.2 1 3 4 
0.3 9 1 10 
0.4 26 25 51 
0.6 28 75 103 
0.8 9 61 70 
    
Total 73 165 238 
Note: the common support option has been selected. 
************************************
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
*******************************************
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.2905345 0.261902   
5% 0.3670591 0.268492   
10% 0.4613078 0.290535 Obs 238 
25% 0.5923545 0.295835 Sum of Wgt. 238 
     
50% 0.6976195  Mean 0.691766 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.165588 
75% 0.8215132 0.972629   
90% 0.8955993 0.994704 Variance 0.027419 
95% 0.9447695 0.995994 Skewness -0.44208 
99% 0.9947042 0.998331 Kurtosis 2.673806 
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Appendix 21. Impact of voucher receipt in any one year on poverty 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Poverty 
headcount ratio 
Poverty 
headcount ratio 
Poverty 
headcount 
ratio 
Poverty 
headcount ratio 
 dydx/ (se) dydx/ (se) dydx/ (se) dydx/(se) 
Time (Round 3=0, Round4=1) -0.096 -0.134 -0.046 -0.139 
(0.155) (0.152) (0.151) (0.138) 
Whether household received 
voucher in any one year (1=received, 
0=no) 
-0.195** -0.197** -0.149* -0.188** 
(0.082) (0.081) (0.083) (0.083) 
Intersection of Time and voucher receipt 
in any one year 
0.111 0.145 0.132 0.117 
(0.117) (0.112) (0.113) (0.112) 
Log of household head age 0.026 0.035 0.106 0.067 
(0.111) (0.109) (0.111) (0.111) 
Sex of household head (1=male, 
0=female) 
-0.180** -0.177** -0.169** -0.200** 
(0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) 
Whether household head completed 
standard 5 (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.185*** -0.176*** -0.183*** -0.200*** 
(0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) 
Average soil quality of parcels
 (1=poor, 2=average, 
3=good) 
-0.123* -0.121* -0.122*  
(0.068) (0.065) (0.066)  
Log of non-farm income (Thousand 
TZS) 
-0.036*** -0.035***   
(0.010) (0.010)   
Averaged access to irrigation facilities of 
parcels (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.064    
(0.079)    
Whether household members / 
relatives are in elected positions (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.037 -0.049 -0.034 -0.046 
(0.054) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) 
Whether household head belong to 
savings and credit organisations 
(SACCO) (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.047 -0.046 -0.082 -0.092 
(0.066) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
Whether household members / 
relatives are VVC members (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.120 -0.110 -0.099 -0.099 
(0.084) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) 
Village variables 
    
Access to all-weather road (1=yes, 
0=no) 
0.047 0.047 0.065 0.039 
(0.099) (0.097) (0.098) (0.099) 
Log of distance to town (km) 0.049 0.031 0.022 0.026 
(0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Whether village has permanent input 
sales point 
0.246* 0.258** 0.246* 0.221* 
(0.132) (0.131) (0.132) (0.129) 
Log of number of maize buyers 0.033 0.039 0.040 0.034 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) 
Whether village has mobile phone 
network (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.150 -0.126 -0.139 -0.136 
(0.130) (0.124) (0.126) (0.126) 
Log of real labour daily cost for land 
preparation (Thousand TZS) 
-0.534 -0.486 -0.418 -0.432 
(0.461) (0.445) (0.449) (0.443) 
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Log of real  maize prices 
(Thousand TZS) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Log of size of cultivated 
land (acre) 
  -0.111**  
  (0.050)  
Constant 4.129 3.853 3.238 3.251 
 (2.704) (2.636) (2.661) (2.604) 
Number 357 370 370 374 
Residuals 0.174 0.162 0.142 0.121 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. 
dfdx=marginal effects; se=standard error. Errors are calculated using the delta method. Column 
(1) uses all the listed variables except for land size for cultivation. On top of this excluded 
variable, Column (2) does not include variable on access to irrigation facilities. Column (3) 
includes land size for cultivation but does not include the variable on access to irrigation facilities 
nor non-farm income. On top of the excluded variables for Column (3) Column (4) does not 
include the average soil quality nor the land size for cultivation. Real prices are calculated by 
CPI (base year=2009). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 22. Impact of voucher receipt in any one year on ownership of household assets 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. dfdx=marginal effects; 
se=standard error. Errors are calculated using the delta method. Tables, bicycles (Do not own=0, Own one 
table or bicycles, etc.=1, Own more than two=2), Radio (Own radio=1, Do not own=0), Modern house roof 
(Have modern house roof=1, Do not have=0), Real prices are calculated by CPI (base year=2009). *,   **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Radio Tables Modern house 
roof 
Bicycles, motor 
vehicles, etc. 
 dydx/ (se) dydx/(se) dydx/(se) dydx/(se) 
Time (Round 3=0, Round4=1) 0.009 0.323 0.238* 0.232 
(0.138) (0.218) (0.142) (0.215) 
Whether household received 
voucher in any one year 
(1=received, 0=no) 
0.273*** -0.024 0.211*** 0.203* 
(0.074) (0.116) (0.076) (0.115) 
Intersection of Time and 
voucher receipt in any one year 
-0.016 0.124 -0.173* -0.249 
(0.102) (0.160) (0.105) (0.158) 
Log of household head age 0.135 -0.070 0.053 0.029 
(0.098) (0.154) (0.101) (0.153) 
Sex of household head (1=male, 
0=female) 
0.049 0.197* 0.059 0.001 
(0.070) (0.110) (0.073) (0.109) 
Whether household head 
completed standard 5 (1=yes, 
0=no) 
0.043 0.054 0.031 0.120 
(0.051) (0.081) (0.053) (0.080) 
Average soil quality of parcels 
(1=poor, 2=average, 3=good) 
0.051 0.021 0.070 0.090 
(0.058) (0.092) (0.060) (0.091) 
Log of non-farm income 
(Thousand TZS) 
0.027*** 0.040*** 0.016* 0.058*** 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) 
Whether household members / 
relatives are in elected positions  
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.007 -0.004 0.033 0.006 
(0.047) (0.075) (0.049) (0.074) 
Whether household head belong 
to savings and credit 
organisations (SACCO) (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.013 0.020 0.210*** 0.154* 
(0.059) (0.093) (0.061) (0.092) 
Whether household members / 
relatives are VVC members 
(1=yes, 0=no)  
-0.042 0.115 -0.037 -0.015 
(0.075) (0.118) (0.077) (0.117) 
     
Village variables     
Access to all-weather road 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.090 0.067 0.145 -0.033 
(0.090) (0.141) (0.092) (0.139) 
Log of distance to town (km) 0.018 -0.043 0.003 0.125* 
(0.046) (0.072) (0.048) (0.072) 
Whether village has permanent 
input sales point (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.084 0.034 -0.015 -0.197 
(0.118) (0.186) (0.122) (0.184) 
Log of number of maize buyers 
visiting to village  
-0.002 -0.028 0.018 0.054 
(0.032) (0.051) (0.033) (0.051) 
Whether village has mobile 
phone network (1=yes, 0=no)  
0.006 0.045 -0.228* -0.107 
(0.113) (0.177) (0.117) (0.175) 
Log of real labour daily cost for 
land preparation (Thousand 
TZS)  
0.394 0.537 0.183 -0.511 
(0.405) (0.637) (0.418) (0.630) 
Log of real maize prices 
(Thousand TZS)  
0.000 0.049** 0.030** 0.009 
(0.014) (0.022) (0.014) (0.021) 
Constant  -2.533 -1.960 -1.064 2.733 
 (2.394) (3.768) (2.464) (3.726) 
Number 384 384 381 384 
Residuals 0.124 0.086 0.145 0.111 
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Appendix 23. Impact of voucher receipt in any one year on ownership of household assets 2 
 (1) (2) 
 Mobile phone Log of bed 
 dydx/ (se) dydx/(se) 
Time (Round 3=0, Round4=1) 0.617*** 0.984*** 
(0.207) (0.132) 
   
Whether household received voucher in any one year 
(1=received, 0=no) 
0.253** 0.242*** 
(0.111) (0.070) 
   
Intersection of Time and voucher receipt in any one 
year 
0.165 -0.081 
(0.152) (0.097) 
   
Log of household head age -0.162 0.059 
(0.147) (0.094) 
   
Sex of household head (1=male, 0=female) 0.025 0.101 
(0.105) (0.067) 
   
Whether household head completed standard 5 (1=yes, 
0=no) 
0.153** 0.051 
(0.077) (0.049) 
   
Average soil quality of parcels (1=poor, 2=average, 
3=good) 
-0.078 0.006 
(0.088) (0.056) 
   
Log of non-farm_income (Thousand TZS) 0.054*** 0.024*** 
(0.013) (0.008) 
   
Whether household members / relatives are in elected 
positions  (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.016 0.032 
(0.071) (0.045) 
   
Whether household head belong to savings and credit 
organisations (SACCO) (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.183** 0.106* 
(0.088) (0.056) 
   
Whether household members / relatives are VVC 
members (1=yes, 0=no)  
0.081 -0.048 
(0.112) (0.071) 
   
Village variables   
Access to all-weather road (1=yes, 0=no) 0.319** 0.113 
(0.134) (0.085) 
   
Log of distance to town (km) -0.130* -0.044 
 
 
(0.069) (0.044) 
  
Whether village has permanent input sales point 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.069 -0.111 
(0.178) (0.113) 
   
Log of number of maize buyers visiting to village  -0.026 -0.008 
(0.049) (0.031) 
   
Whether village has mobile phone network (1=yes, 
0=no)  
-0.009 0.005 
(0.169) (0.107) 
   
Log of real labour daily cost for land preparation 
(Thousand TZS)  
0.756 0.767** 
(0.607) (0.386) 
   
Log of real maize prices (Thousand TZS)  0.022 0.012 
(0.021) (0.013) 
   
Constant -3.728 -4.547** 
(3.591) (2.283) 
   
Number 384 384 
Residuals 0.247 0.479 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. dfdx=marginal effects; 
se=standard error. Errors are calculated using the delta method. Beds: Number of beds. Mobile phone (not 
own=0, own one=1, own more than two=2). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Appendix 24. Propensity score matching for graduates 
The treatment is graduates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table shows sample distribution of graduates (=1) and non-graduates (=0) 
groups. Estimation of the propensity score 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -128.53839 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -95.556327 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -93.572197 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -93.512375 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -93.512285 
Probit regression 
      Number of obs =222 
     LR chi2(19) = 70.05 
       Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -93.512285                      
Pseudo R2  = 0.2725 
Graduates  Coefficient Standard 
Error 
 z  P>z [95% Conf. Interval} 
           
Log of household head age  -0.42648  0.39872  -1.07  0.285 -1.20796 0.354994 
Sex of household head  0.3519  0.321702  1.09  0.274 -0.27862 0.982424 
Education level of household head  0.211154  0.23061  0.92  0.36 -0.24083 0.66314 
Average soil quality  -0.23433  0.353519  -0.66  0.507 -0.92721 0.458559 
Log of contribution amount to village  0.054563  0.10162  0.54  0.591 -0.14461 0.253734 
Log of number of farmers in the  household  0.037986  0.043164  0.88  0.379 -0.04661 0.122586 
Log of total household consumption per 
adult equivalent 
 0.2849  0.131793  2.16  0.031 0.026591 0.54321 
Average in access to irrigation facilities by 
parcels 
 -1.08874  0.921709  -1.18  0.238 -2.89525 0.71778 
Whether household members or relatives 
are in elected position in the village 
 -0.1846  0.212678  -0.87  0.385 -0.60144 0.232241 
Whether household head belongs to  SACCO  0.216002  0.24254  0.88  0.379 -0.26498 0.696984 
Whether household members or relatives 
are in VVC 
 0.298276  0.259766  1.15  0.251 -0.21086 0.807408 
Whether the village has access to all 
weather road 
 0.145802  0.276335  0.53  0.598 -0.39581 0.687409 
Log of distance to town  -0.03197  0.143674  -0.22  0.824 -0.31356 0.249629 
Whether the village has access to input 
sales points 
 1.464775  0.526235  2.78  0.005 0.433373 2.496177 
Log of maize buyers in the village  0.260995  0.11481  2.27  0.023 0.03597 0.486019 
Whether the village has mobile  phone  0.107632  0.27133  0.4  0.692 -0.42416 0.639429 
Log of real urea price  0.120766  0.04785  2.52  0.012 0.026982 0.21455 
Log of daily labour wage for land preparation  0.062173  0.0465  1.34  0.181 -0.02897 0.153311 
Log of real maize price  0.052891  -0.04601  1.15  0.25 -0.03729 0.143068 
Constant  -2.50383  1.856307  -1.35  0.177 -6.14212 1.134467 
Note: The table provides likelihood of being graduates based on probit model. The model for 
being graduates is estimated. The common support option has been selected. The region of 
common support is [0.09800602, 0.94581225] 
 
 
 
graduates Freq. Percent Cum. 
    
0 243 78.64 78.64 
1 66 21.36 100 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Total 309 100  
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Description of the estimated propensity score in region of common 
support Estimated propensity score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table shows the percentile distribution counting from the bottom of the estimated 
propensity score in region of common support. The least about 10 th percentile of the sample in 
the region has the 1% probabilities on the participation to the programme and about 94 th 
percentile of the sample has 99% probabilities. 
 
*****************************************************
* Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
*****************************************************
* The final number of blocks is 5 
 
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity 
score is not different for treated and controls in each block 
 
*********************************************************
* Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
*********************************************************
* The balancing property is satisfied 
The table shows the number of treated and the number of controls for each block which has certain 
inferior bound in the propensity score. The left column indicates the number of non-graduates and 
the right column shows graduates. 
Inferior    
of block graduates   
of pscore 0 1 Total 
    
0.098006 42 9 51 
0.2 34 16 50 
0.4 9 13 22 
0.6 6 12 18 
0.8 2 9 11 
    
Total 93 59 152 
Note: the common support option has been selected. 
******************************************
* End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.0996612 0.098006   
5% 0.1132367 0.0996612   
10% 0.130801 0.1062666 Obs 152 
25% 0.1713681 0.1074053 Sum of Wgt. 152 
     
50% 0.3021755  Mean 0.364491 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.233997 
75% 0.5093735 0.9082935   
90% 0.7384362 0.9357326 Variance 0.054754 
95% 0.8874968 0.9391758 Skewness 0.941786 
99% 0.9391758 0.9458123 Kurtosis 2.838564 
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Appendix 25. Impact of being graduates on poverty and ownership of household assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Poverty 
headcount ratio 
Radio Tables Modern 
houseroof 
 dydx/(se) dydx/(se) dydx/(se) dydx/(se) 
Time (Round 3=0, Round4=1) 0.047 -0.014 0.309 0.156 
 (0.187) (0.162) (0.240) (0.172) 
Whether household received 
voucher for more than three years 
(1=received, 0=no) 
0.021 0.239*** 0.081 0.185** 
(0.098) (0.084) (0.125) (0.091) 
Intersection of Time and voucher 
receipt for more than three years 
-0.134 -0.069 0.179 -0.136 
(0.141) (0.122) (0.181) (0.131) 
Log of household head age 0.009 -0.009 0.086 -0.025 
 (0.138) (0.121) (0.179) (0.128) 
Sex of household head (1=male, 
0=female) 
-0.165 0.045 0.184 0.114 
(0.103) (0.088) (0.130) (0.094) 
Whether household head completed 
standard 5 (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.198*** 0.035 -0.047 0.028 
(0.076) (0.066) (0.099) (0.071) 
Average soil quality of parcels 
(1=poor, 2=average, 3=good) 
-0.084 0.057 -0.044 0.069 
(0.079) (0.069) (0.102) (0.073) 
Log of non-farm_income (Thousand 
TZS) 
-0.032** 0.024** 0.042*** 0.019 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) 
Whether household members / 
relatives are in elected positions 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.075 0.018 0.016 0.077 
(0.063) (0.055) (0.081) (0.058) 
Whether household head belong to 
savings and credit organisations 
(SACCO) (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.062 -0.017 0.065 0.168** 
(0.076) (0.067) (0.099) (0.071) 
Whether household members / 
relatives are VVC members (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.063 -0.027 0.023 -0.108 
(0.091) (0.080) (0.118) (0.085) 
Village variables     
Access to market (1=more than 1 
hour to reach market, 0=otherwise) 
-0.059 -0.120 -0.084 -0.083 
(0.248) (0.211) (0.312) (0.224) 
Access to all-weather road (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.058 -0.151 0.053 0.184 
(0.140) (0.120) (0.178) (0.128) 
Log of distance to town (km) 0.135* 0.038 0.029 -0.009 
 (0.071) (0.062) (0.092) (0.066) 
Whether village has permanent  
input sales point (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.259 -0.076 0.218 -0.035 
(0.173) (0.152) (0.226) (0.162) 
Log of number of maize buyers 
visiting to village 
0.065 -0.018 0.018 -0.026 
(0.062) (0.054) (0.080) (0.057) 
Whether village has mobile phone 
network (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.051 0.027 0.038 -0.428*** 
(0.172) (0.151) (0.224) (0.162) 
Log of real labour daily cost for land 
preparation (Thousand TZS) 
-0.708 0.417 0.130 0.627 
(0.647) (0.545) (0.808) (0.579) 
Log of real maize prices (Thousand 
TZS) 
0.008 -0.007 0.039* 0.027 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.024) (0.017) 
Constant 4.786 -2.092 -0.332 -3.224 
 (3.993) (3.340) (4.951) (3.535) 
Number 258 265 265 262 
Residuals 0.158 0.129 0.108 0.175 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. 
dfdx=marginal effects; se=standard error. Errors are calculated using the delta method. Tables 
(Do not own=0, Own one table or bicycles, etc.=1, Own more than two=2), Radio (Own radio=1, 
Do not own=0), Modern house roof (Have modern house roof=1, Do not have=0). Real prices 
are calculated by CPI (base year=2009). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Appendix 26. Impact of being graduates on ownership of household assets 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 bicycle Mobile phone Log of bed 
 dydx/ (se) dydx/(se) dydx/(se) 
Time (Round 3=0, Round4=1) -0.061 0.633** 0.893*** 
 (0.253) (0.259) (0.152) 
Whether household received voucher 
for more than three years (1=received, 
0=no) 
0.217* 0.078 0.216*** 
(0.131) (0.134) (0.079) 
Intersection of Time and voucher 
receipt for more than three years 
0.127 0.152 -0.049 
(0.190) (0.194) (0.114) 
Log of household head age 0.010 -0.183 0.009 
 (0.188) (0.193) (0.113) 
Sex of   household head (1=male, 
0=female) 
-0.020 -0.040 0.141* 
(0.137) (0.140) (0.082) 
Whether household head completed 
standard 5 (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.005 0.089 0.076 
(0.104) (0.106) (0.062) 
Average soil quality of parcels (1=poor, 
2=average, 3=good) 
0.066 -0.044 -0.002 
(0.107) (0.110) (0.064) 
Log of non-farm_income (Thousand 
TZS) 
0.063*** 0.048*** 0.026** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.010) 
Whether household members / relatives 
are in elected positions  (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.007 0.043 0.011 
(0.085) (0.087) (0.051) 
Whether household head belong to 
savings and credit organisations 
(SACCO) (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.132 0.250** 0.062 
(0.104) (0.106) (0.062) 
Whether household members / relatives 
are VVC members (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.058 0.046 -0.009 
(0.125) (0.127) (0.075) 
Village variables    
Access to market (1=more than 1 hour 
to reach market, 0=otherwise) 
-0.244 -0.444 0.192 
(0.329) (0.336) (0.198) 
Access to all-weather road (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.088 0.375* 0.058 
(0.188) (0.192) (0.113) 
Log of distance to town (km) 0.170* -0.112 -0.054 
 (0.097) (0.099) (0.058) 
Whether village has permanent input 
sales point (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.121 -0.046 -0.018 
(0.238) (0.243) (0.143) 
Log of number of maize buyers visiting 
to village 
0.114 -0.011 -0.042 
(0.084) (0.086) (0.050) 
Whether village has mobile phone 
network (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.115 0.016 0.060 
(0.236) (0.241) (0.142) 
Log of real labour daily cost for land 
preparation (Thousand TZS) 
-0.899 0.799 0.657 
(0.851) (0.869) (0.511) 
Log of real maize prices (Thousand 
TZS) 
-0.010 0.006 0.009 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.015) 
Constant 5.543 -3.909 -3.815 
 (5.215) (5.329) (3.134) 
Number 265 265 265 
Residuals 0.144 0.220 0.490 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. dfdx=marginal effects; 
se=standard error. Errors are calculated using the delta method. Bicycle (Do not own=0, Own one table 
or bicycles, etc.=1, Own more than two=2), Mobile phone (not own=0, own one=1, own more than two=2). 
Beds=number of beds. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 27. Impact of being graduates on ownership of livestock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log of poultry Log of cow Log of goat Log of pig 
 dydx/(se) dydx/(se) dydx/(se) dydx/(se) 
Time (Round3=0, Round4=1) 0.588 0.191 0.422 0.354 
 (0.645) (0.267) (0.448) (0.300) 
Voucher receipt for more than 
three years(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.005 0.259** 0.406** 0.137 
(0.251) (0.104) (0.174) (0.117) 
Intersection of Time and 
voucher receipt for more than 
three years 
0.416 0.060 0.058 0.048 
(0.405) (0.168) (0.281) (0.188) 
Log of household head age 0.300 0.099 0.228 0.358** 
 (0.370) (0.153) (0.256) (0.172) 
Sex of household head 
(1=male, 0=female) 
-0.186 0.083 -0.200 -0.091 
(0.273) (0.113) (0.189) (0.127) 
Whether household head 
completed standard 5 (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.005 -0.126 -0.019 -0.081 
(0.201) (0.083) (0.139) (0.093) 
Averaged soil quality of 
parcels (1=Poor, 2=Average, 
3=Good) 
0.174 -0.030 0.162 -0.138 
(0.219) (0.091) (0.152) (0.102) 
Log of total non-farm income 
(Thousand TZS) 
0.080** -0.006 0.006 0.022 
(0.033) (0.014) (0.023) (0.015) 
Averaged access to irrigation 
facilities of parcels (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.002 -0.063 0.444** 0.066 
(0.282) (0.117) (0.196) (0.131) 
Whether household members 
or relatives are in elected 
positions in the village (1=yes, 
0=no) 
0.151 -0.095 -0.082 0.131* 
(0.168) (0.070) (0.117) (0.078) 
Whether household head 
belongs to saving and credit 
organisation (SACCO) (1=yes, 
0=no) 
0.179 0.127 0.285** 0.039 
(0.198) (0.082) (0.138) (0.092) 
Whether household members / 
relatives are VVC members 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.227 0.097 -0.335** -0.021 
(0.236) (0.098) (0.163) (0.109) 
Village variables     
Access to market (1=yes, 
0=no) 
0.088 0.097 -0.015 -0.029 
(0.368) (0.153) (0.255) (0.171) 
Access to all-weather road 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.192 -0.196* -0.299* -0.105 
(0.250) (0.104) (0.174) (0.116) 
Log of distance to town (km) -0.928 -0.384 -0.137 -0.238 
 (0.633) (0.262) (0.439) (0.294) 
Whether village has permanent 
input sales points (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-0.089 -0.098 -0.056 0.013 
(0.190) (0.079) (0.132) (0.088) 
Log of number of maize buyers 
in the village 
-0.888* 0.161 -0.342 -0.280 
(0.535) (0.222) (0.371) (0.249) 
Whether village has mobile 
phone network (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.080* 0.024 0.068** 0.019 
(0.047) (0.020) (0.033) (0.022) 
Log   of   real urea  price in 
village (Thousand TZS) 
1.806 0.979 1.242 0.129 
(2.294) (0.950) (1.590) (1.066) 
Log of real labour daily cost 
for land in the village 
(Thousand TZS) 
-0.017 -0.022 0.034 0.010 
(0.047) (0.020) (0.033) (0.022) 
Log of real maize sales prices 
by households (Thousand 
  TZS)  
-10.147 -5.676 -6.841 -1.171 
(14.418) (5.974) (9.997) (6.699) 
Constant 238 238 238 238 
Residuals 0.148 0.147 0.204 0.111 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. 
dfdx=marginal effects; se=standard error. Errors are calculated using the delta method. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 28. Impact of being graduates on children not attending primary school 
 Children not attending 
primary school 
 dydx/(se) 
Time (Round3=0, Round4=1) 0.058 
 (0.091) 
Voucher receipt for more than three years (1=yes, 0=no) 0.046 
 (0.047) 
Intersection of Time and voucher receipt for more than three years -0.057 
 (0.068) 
Log of household head age -0.120* 
 (0.068) 
Sex of household head (1=male, 0=female) -0.001 
 (0.049) 
Whether household head completed standard 5 (1=yes, 0=no) -0.001 
 (0.037) 
Averaged soil quality of parcels (1=Poor, 2=Average, 3=Good) -0.051 
 (0.039) 
Log of total non-farm income (Thousand TZS) 0.003 
 (0.006) 
Whether household members or relatives are in elected positions in the village 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.035 
(0.031) 
Whether household head belongs to saving and credit organisation (SACCO) 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.014 
(0.037) 
Whether household members / relatives are VVC members (1=yes, 0=no) -0.045 
 (0.045) 
Village variables  
Access to market (1=yes, 0=no) 0.004 
 (0.118) 
Access to all-weather road (1=yes, 0=no) -0.008 
 (0.068) 
Log of distance to town (km) -0.044 
 (0.035) 
Whether village has permanent input sales points (1=yes, 0=no) 0.083 
 (0.086) 
Log of number of maize buyers in the village -0.009 
 (0.030) 
Whether village has mobile phone network (1=yes, 0=no) -0.002 
 (0.085) 
Log of real labour daily cost for land in the village (Thousand TZS) -0.159 
 (0.306) 
Log of real maize sales prices by households (Thousand TZS) -0.010 
 (0.009) 
Constant 1.680 
 (1.875) 
Number 265 
Residuals 0.078 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. dfdx=marginal effects; 
se=standard error. Errors are calculated using the delta method. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 29. Impact of voucher receipt in 2011/12 on log of total calorie consumed in last 
7 days per adult eater equivalent 
 (1) (2) 
 Log of total calorie 
consumed per adult 
eater equivalent 
Log of total calorie 
consumed per adult 
eater equivalent 
 dydx/(se) dydx/(se) 
Time (Round3=0, Round4=1) 0.100 -0.300*** 
 (0.193) (0.102) 
Voucher receipt in 2011/12 -0.088 -0.170* 
(1=received, 0=no) (0.093) (0.087) 
Intersection of Time and voucher receipt in 
2011/12 
0.012 0.255** 
(0.143) (0.106) 
Log of household head age 0.486*** 0.520*** 
 (0.143) (0.134) 
Sex of household head (1=male, 0=female) -0.106 -0.049 
 (0.107) (0.090) 
Whether household head completed standard 5 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.148* 0.118* 
(0.075) (0.067) 
Averaged soil quality of parcels (1=Poor, 
2=Average, 3=Good) 
0.122 0.137* 
(0.088) (0.074) 
Log of non-farm income (Thousand TZS) 0.025* 0.034*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
Whether household members or relatives are in 
elected positions in the village (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.023 -0.036 
(0.070) (0.062) 
Whether household head belongs to saving and 
credit organisation (SACCO) (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.042 -0.037 
(0.088) (0.078) 
Whether household members / relatives are VVC 
members (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.063 0.073 
(0.109) (0.094) 
Village variables   
Access to market (1=yes, 0=no) 0.492*  
 (0.257)  
Access to all-weather road (1=yes, 0=no) -0.060  
 (0.144)  
Log of distance to town (km) -0.060  
 (0.070)  
Whether village has permanent input sales points 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.176  
(0.182)  
Log of number of maize buyers in the village -0.032  
 (0.051)  
Whether village has mobile phone network 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.049  
(0.165)  
Log of real labour daily cost for land preparation 
(Thousand TZS) 
1.073*  
(0.620)  
Log of real maize prices (Thousand TZS) 0.002 -0.014 
 (0.021) (0.019) 
Constant -5.173 0.826 
 (3.611) (0.540) 
Number 394 462 
Residuals 0.097 0.091 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. dfdx=marginal effects; 
se=standard error. Errors are calculated using the delta method. Column (1) includes all the variables. 
Column (2) does not use village variables except for real maize prices. *, **, *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 30. Impact of voucher receipt in any year on log of total calorie consumed in 
last 7 days per adult equivalent eater 
 (1) (2) 
 Log of total calorie 
consumed per adult 
equivalent eater 
Log of total calorie 
consumed per adult 
equivalent eater 
 dydx/(se) dydx/(se) 
Time (Round3=0, Round4=1) -0.372*** -0.002 
 (0.119) (0.209) 
Voucher receipt in 2011/12 0.023 0.096 
(1=received, 0=no) (0.092) (0.099) 
Intersection of Time and voucher receipt in 
2011/12 
0.216** 0.024 
(0.109) (0.138) 
Log of household head age 0.476*** 0.494*** 
 (0.135) (0.143) 
Sex of household head (1=male, 0=female) -0.053 -0.106 
 (0.090) (0.104) 
Whether household head completed standard 5 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.140** 0.167** 
(0.068) (0.076) 
Averaged soil quality of parcels (1=Poor, 
2=Average, 3=Good) 
0.148** 0.123 
(0.071) (0.086) 
Log of non-farm income (Thousand TZS) 0.030** 0.025* 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Whether household members or relatives are in 
elected positions in the village (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.058 0.013 
(0.062) (0.069) 
Whether household head belongs to saving and 
credit organisation (SACCO) (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.052 -0.014 
(0.077) (0.087) 
Whether household members / relatives are 
VVC members (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.101 0.088 
(0.096) (0.110) 
Village variables   
Log of real maize prices (Thousand TZS) -0.017 -0.000 
 (0.019) (0.020) 
Access to market (1=yes, 0=no)  0.402 
  (0.256) 
Access to all-weather road (1=yes, 0=no)  -0.067 
  (0.143) 
Log of distance to town (km)  -0.090 
  (0.069) 
Whether village has permanent input sales 
points (1=yes, 0=no) 
 -0.229 
 (0.176) 
Log of number of maize buyers in the village  -0.074 
  (0.050) 
Whether village has mobile phone network 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
 0.286* 
 (0.166) 
Log of real labour daily cost for land 
preparation (Thousand TZS) 
 0.965 
 (0.593) 
Constant 0.884 -4.886 
 (0.552) (3.507) 
Number 462 384 
Residuals 0.084 0.105 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. dfdx=marginal effects; 
se=standard error. Errors are calculated using the delta method. Column (2) includes all the household and 
village variables. Column (1) does not use the village variables except for the real maize prices. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 31. Impact of being graduates on log of total calorie consumed in last 7 days 
per adult equivalent eater 
 (1) (2) 
 Log of total calorie 
consumed per adult 
equivalent eater 
Log of total calorie 
consumed per adult 
equivalent eater 
 dydx/(se) dydx/(se) 
Time (Round3=0, Round4=1) -0.187 -0.300** 
 (0.241) (0.130) 
Voucher receipt for more than three years 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.051 -0.142 
(0.107) (0.105) 
Intersection of Time and voucher receipt for 
more than three years 
0.042 0.107 
(0.165) (0.129) 
Log of household head age 0.712*** 0.763*** 
 (0.181) (0.180) 
Sex of household head (1=male, 0=female) 0.023 0.026 
 (0.131) (0.111) 
Whether household head completed standard 5 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.230** 0.182** 
(0.100) (0.091) 
Averaged soil quality of parcels (1=Poor, 
2=Average, 3=Good) 
0.139 0.185** 
(0.104) (0.085) 
Log of non-farm income (Thousand TZS) 0.009 0.023 
 (0.016) (0.015) 
Whether household members or relatives are in 
elected positions in the village (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.035 -0.032 
(0.082) (0.075) 
Whether household head belongs to saving and 
credit organisation (SACCO) (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.033 -0.008 
(0.099) (0.093) 
Whether household members / relatives are 
VVC members (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.057 0.049 
(0.119) (0.106) 
Village variables   
Access to market (1=yes, 0=no) 0.037  
 (0.315)  
Access to all-weather road (1=yes, 0=no) 0.083  
 (0.180)  
Log of distance to town (km) -0.103  
 (0.093)  
Whether village has permanent input sales 
points (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.061  
(0.229)  
Log of number of maize buyers in the village -0.102  
 (0.081)  
Whether village has mobile phone network 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.195  
(0.226)  
Log of real labour daily cost for land 
preparation (Thousand TZS) 
1.205  
(0.818)  
Constant -7.362 -0.264 
 (5.014) (0.724) 
Number 265 298 
Residuals 0.129 0.113 
Note: Table shows average marginal effects of OLS using village level fixed effects. dfdx=marginal effects; 
se=standard error. Errors are calculated using the delta method. Column (1) includes all the household and 
village variables. Column (2) does not use village variables. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
